Mindful Life or Mindful Lives? Exploring why the Buddhist belief in rebirth should be taken seriously by mindfulness practitioners by Lucas, J
  
Mindful Life or Mindful Lives? 
Exploring why the Buddhist belief in rebirth should be taken 
seriously by mindfulness practitioners 
 
 
 
Submitted by Jacob Andrew Lucas, to the University of Exeter as a thesis for 
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy, June 2018. 
 
This thesis is available for Library use on the understanding that it is copyright 
material and that no quotation from the thesis may be published without 
proper acknowledgement. 
 
I certify that all material in this thesis which is not my own work has been 
identified and that no material has previously been submitted and approved 
for the award of a degree by this or any other University. 
 
 
(Signature)…………………………………………………………………………… 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
Abstract 
This thesis will explore whether those interested in Buddhist practices such as 
mindfulness but who approach such practices from a broadly secular 
perspective can be offered reasons to take rebirth seriously as an afterlife 
possibility. It will begin by exploring some of the history of mindfulness and its 
adoption from Buddhism to show how foundational cosmological elements such 
as rebirth have been side-lined as part of a wider movement to bring Buddhism 
in line with modernist, particularly scientific, discourses. 
The thesis will investigate the philosophical principles behind the Buddhist 
multi-life perspective in order to see whether arguments could be rallied in 
defence of it. This will involve focussing specifically on the argument in defence 
of rebirth offered by Dharmakīrti and show how its premises draw from 
philosophical principles adopted by the earliest Buddhist philosophical systems. 
Dharmakīrti’s argument will be examined within the context of contemporary 
philosophy of consciousness where philosophers such as Evan Thompson and 
Galen Strawson have challenged the view that consciousness could arise from 
entirely unconscious factors. This challenge aligns with a key premise of 
Dharmakīrti’s argument for rebirth as well as Buddhist Abhidharma principles. 
Arguments against the emergence of consciousness from unconscious factors 
strengthen the case for claiming that consciousness cannot simply appear at 
the beginning of life and disappear at death. 
Whilst supporting Strawson’s arguments, the thesis will ultimately reject his 
claim that an individual consciousness could be constructed from, and 
ultimately collapse into, multiple consciousnesses. From here it will be argued 
that conscious experiences arise as part of an unbroken stream that can neither 
arise from nor collapse into rudimentary factors that are devoid of the distinctive 
characteristics of consciousness. The argument will conclude by suggesting 
that the stream of consciousness involves an inseparable capacity for retention 
and recall. This capacity provides the possibility for the sort of psychological 
continuity between lives that, within traditional Buddhist cosmology, allows an 
ordinary being to cultivate the extraordinary personal qualities of a Buddha. 
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Preface and Acknowledgements  
I would like to say something here about the roots of this thesis. I began 
studying both western and Buddhist philosophy at the same time, albeit in 
different ways. Within months of starting a course in A-Level Philosophy I began 
practising and studying Buddhism informally with the Saraswati Buddhist 
Group. These two types of study continued to run in parallel during my 
undergraduate years. Although my undergraduate philosophy programme was 
entirely based in the western tradition, I continually brought Buddhist insights 
and ideas to bear on what I was learning. In particular, when studying 
philosophy of mind and encountering the “hard problem” of how to explain the 
origins of consciousness, I considered it in the light of the traditional Buddhist 
claim that the mind-stream persists through countless lifetimes.  
But despite the constant interplay of Buddhist and western philosophical 
perspectives in my own thinking, little of this cross-cultural dialogue found its 
way into my undergraduate work. Most of it took place in conversations with 
friends, family, fellow students, and fellow Buddhist practitioners. In the end it 
was not studying philosophy but rather working for a mental health charity and 
noticing the increasing use of Buddhist practices in clinical contexts that would 
ignite my desire to research the differences between western and Buddhist 
perspectives on the world. 
However, my main goal in returning to university was to explore the extent to 
which the practice of mindfulness, even in secular contexts, retained something 
of the wisdom found in Buddhist teachings. My Masters dissertation, for 
example, asked whether there was a distinctly mindful way to do politics, which 
might spread with increased uptake of mindfulness practice. This was the 
direction that my PhD project was originally going to take. 
And then I read Owen Flanagan’s The Bodhisattva’s Brain: Buddhism 
Naturalized. 
Reading Flanagan’s attempt to bring Buddhism into line with a naturalistic 
framework I was surprised by the degree of contempt that he showed for the 
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traditional Buddhist worldview. I had spent nearly a decade considering 
traditional Buddhist claims about rebirth in the light of scientific evidence and 
philosophical argument and had come to regard those claims as worth taking 
seriously. But here was someone rejecting those claims as if they were worthy 
of little more than light attention tinged with ridicule.  
In response, I wanted to offer something of a counterweight to Flanagan’s 
dismissal of traditional Buddhists as well-meaning but woolly-minded dabblers 
in ‘wishful hocus pocus’.1 I wished to present something of the Buddhist thinking 
that I had come to respect as a genuine challenge to materialist approaches to 
the mind and world. The following thesis is the result of this attempt to present 
the traditional Buddhist belief in rebirth as worthy of being seriously engaged 
with. 
There are many people who I wish to thank. Firstly, my PhD supervisors (past 
and present), Dr. Joel Krueger, Prof. Rupert Gethin, and Dr. Nigel Pleasants, 
for all of their open-minded support, advice, and feedback. Without their 
balance of genuine interest and critical evaluation of my work, this thesis would 
not have been possible. I also thank the South West and Wales Doctoral 
Training Partnership, funded by the Arts and Humanities Research Council, 
without whose financial support I would not have been able to embark on this 
project. 
I owe a great deal to the teaching and guidance of a number of academics at 
the Universities of Exeter and Cardiff. At Cardiff University I wish to give 
particular thanks to my undergraduate tutor Dr. Peter Sedgwick for introducing 
me to the phenomenological tradition, whose work provides something of a 
bridge between western philosophy and Buddhist thought. At the University of 
Exeter I wish to give a specific thankyou to Dr. Edward Skidelsky for his 
friendliness and for hosting the Good Life reading group, which provided 
inspiration and encouragement to me when I was starting this project.  
                                                 
 
 
 
1 Owen Flanagan, The Bodhisattva’s Brain: Buddhism Naturalized, MIT Press, 2011, p.3. 
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I have also benefited from the friendship and conversation of many others. In 
particular I thank Dr. George Carpenter, Dr. Lewis Coyne, Dr. Jack Griffiths, 
Jaanika Puusalu, Dr. Andrea Raimondi, and my fellow members of the 
Embodiment Research Cluster, without whose supportive and scintillating 
conversation this whole project would have not been even half as fun. 
I also wish to thank those key teachers who set me off on this course. In 
particular I thank Andy Wistreich who, thirteen years ago, led a two-day retreat 
that gave me a deep, experiential introduction to Buddhist cosmology. That 
was, in many ways, the beginning of the journey that led to this project. But I 
would never have been at that retreat were it not for one of my greatest 
teachers: my dad, Andrew Lucas. I thank him for taking me along to this and 
many other retreats and meetings of the Saraswati Buddhist Group, and for all 
the great conversations we have had about the Buddhist worldview and practice 
that have enriched this thesis. Likewise I thank my mother, sister, and brother 
for all the support and conversations that got me to this point. I also offer special 
thanks to poet, peace activist, and Zen Master Thich Nhat Hanh, for the 
inspiration that he provides for practitioners around the world and for helping 
me to recognise that the existence of this thesis is dependent upon the 
existence of the entire cosmos. 
Lastly, and in so many ways most importantly, I thank my wife Laura, whose 
love and the ability to provide either unfailing encouragement or much needed 
distraction at precisely the right times have held me steady throughout this 
journey. 
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1. Introduction 
The last thirty years have seen enormous growth in mindfulness 
based therapies derived from Buddhist meditation techniques. In 
January 2015 the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Mindfulness in 
the UK published an interim report, Mindful Nation UK, with 
recommendations on mindfulness in the areas of health, the 
workplace, education and the criminal justice system. The 
techniques of mindfulness, in both their traditional Buddhist forms 
and in their modern secular forms, aim to give us access to a 
perspective on our emotions and thoughts that is universally 
therapeutic, yet do modern secular techniques of mindfulness free 
mindfulness from the burden of its outmoded Buddhist cultural 
baggage or deprive it of the essential humanising vision that should 
be at its core?1 
 
This abstract was for a panel discussion titled ‘Buddhism, Mindfulness and 
Being Human’, organised by the University of Bristol as part of the InsideArts 
Festival of Arts and Humanities, held on the 18th of November 2015. The panel 
was composed of David Leech, a philosopher of religion; Michael Houser, a 
psychiatric nurse; and Venerable Amaro Bhikkhu, a Buddhist monk. David 
Leech began the discussion by highlighting some of the issues facing 
mindfulness as a practice that originates within Buddhist meditation techniques 
but has been adopted and adapted for clinical use in psychological therapies 
and has become increasingly popular within the wider context of secular self-
help techniques. For some, the sort of mindfulness practised in clinical and self-
help contexts is becoming too heavily secularised; it is not “Buddhist enough”, 
having lost its ethical emphasis. For others, mindfulness is still “too Buddhist”, 
with its adoption being tantamount to an attempt to covertly convert vulnerable 
people to Buddhism.  
As the discussion progressed it became clear that the secularisation of 
mindfulness does not render it ethically empty. We can reasonably assume that 
                                                 
 
 
 
1 This quote is taken from the web page advertising the panel discussion ‘Buddhism, 
mindfulness, and being human’ available at 
http://www.bristol.ac.uk/arts/festival/events/2015/panel-discussion-buddhism-
mindfulness-and-being-human.html (accessed 14th June 2018). 
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secular teachers and practitioners of mindfulness are not operating within a 
valueless vacuum that only Buddhist ethics can fill. Any practitioner, Buddhist 
or not, will be embedded within a culture or way of life that has a rich and 
complex ethical framework. Nor can we claim that secular ethics are 
incompatible with the Buddhist origins of mindfulness. It would be uncharitable 
to flatly deny that Buddhist and secular teachers and practitioners of 
mindfulness are alike in their intention to increase happiness and reduce 
suffering. And yet, while the sides of this debate were not defined by the outright 
presence or absence of an ethical approach, one could argue that the specific 
emphases and details of their respective approaches determined how they 
viewed mindfulness practice. In this way, a key issue was the fact that 
mindfulness is a technique with its origins in a distinctly Buddhist way of life. 
This way of life is not homogeneous; a quick glance at any book on the varieties 
of Buddhist culture and life will attest to that. 
Nevertheless, there are some foundational features, some roots from which the 
variety of Buddhist cultures, practices and ways of life have grown. 
Foundational features include the four noble truths, the basic analysis of 
suffering, its causes, and its cessation, which structures the path of Buddhist 
practice. The fourth of these noble truths is the disclosure of eight intertwined 
practices that lead to liberation from suffering, of which the correct application 
of mindfulness (Pali: sammā-sati, Sanskrit: samyak smṛti)  is one.2 The Buddhist 
approach to mindfulness is rooted in its own analysis of suffering and its 
distinctive understanding of the path to lasting happiness. 
Listening to the panellists, I realised that in discussing the question of how 
“Buddhist” mindfulness should be, when adapted for a secular context, they 
were fundamentally discussing how much it should remain structured and 
directed by those approaches to overcoming suffering and achieving happiness 
that are foundational to Buddhism. And yet, while they discussed this issue, 
                                                 
 
 
 
2 Thich Nhat Hanh, Transformation and Healing: Sutra on the Four Establishments of 
Mindfulness, Berkeley, Parallax Press, 2006, p.8. 
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there was one distinct feature of the foundational Buddhist approach, not only 
to mindfulness but to life in general, which was never mentioned let alone 
discussed. Where the discussion highlighted some of the differences between 
mindfulness as understood within Buddhist traditions and outside of them there 
was no mention of the fact that mindfulness and other techniques were 
originally practised within a temporal framework of multiple lifetimes.  
The Buddhist vision of reality includes as one of its foundational features the 
cosmological assumption that every being is caught in a cycle of perpetuating 
rebirths. Insofar as a secular approach to mindfulness removes any reference 
to rebirth, it cannot approach suffering and liberation from suffering in the same 
way that Buddhists traditionally have. Foundational to the Buddhist analysis of 
suffering and its causes is the cycle of dependent origination (Sanskrit: 
pratītyasamutpāda Pali: paṭiccasamuppāda), a cycle of birth, death and, most 
importantly, rebirth. 
But what does it mean to talk of foundational features of Buddhism? Given the 
diversity of Buddhist cultures throughout history we must be careful not to 
assume that Buddhism is a monolithic and historically static phenomenon. 
Buddhist ideas and practices have changed and developed throughout history 
and so do not give us an unmediated sense of what Buddhism is and what the 
Buddha taught. Particularly when it comes to the recent reception of Buddhist 
ideas and practices in the West, there has been a great deal of interpretation 
that has led to the manner in which they are presented and understood. 
That said, I do wish to claim that one can meaningfully refer to traditional 
Buddhist beliefs, beliefs that are part of a shared Buddhist heritage. To do so I 
wish to draw on the work of Buddhist scholar Rupert Gethin.  
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1.1 The Foundations of Buddhism 
In The Foundations of Buddhism Gethin points out that it is both fashionable 
and accurate to say that ‘there is not one Buddhism but many Buddhisms’.3 
With this in mind he nonetheless confirms that there are ‘fundamental ideas 
and practices that constitute something of a common heritage shared by the 
different traditions of Buddhism’.4 These include the story of the Buddha 
Siddhārtha Gautama; a textual and scriptural tradition; the framework of the 
four noble truths; the monastic and lay ways of life; and, most importantly for 
our concerns, a cosmology based around karma and rebirth. The common 
heritage also includes the teachings on no self and interdependence; an ethical 
way of life leading from good conduct to meditation and understanding of the 
nature of reality; theoretical systems on this nature of reality; and the altruistic 
ideal to which this all leads. 
To take this common heritage as providing the basic features of the traditional 
Buddhist perspective is not to claim that these constitute the essence of 
Buddhism. As Gethin points out, different Buddhists might talk about these 
features in different ways depending on their location and context. Nonetheless: 
[W]hatever the nature of the Buddhist terrain, one cannot dig much 
below the surface without coming across some trace of the patterns 
of thought and practice outlined here, even if at different times and 
in different places the constructions built on their foundations present 
their own distinctive and peculiar aspects.5 
These patterns of thought and practice are, in Gethin’s words, ‘the foundations 
on which Buddhism rests.’6 
In using the term ‘traditional Buddhism’, I am referring to the attitudes, values 
and practices that have historically framed the lives of Buddhists in countries 
such as Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Thailand, Tibet, Bhutan and Vietnam and 
                                                 
 
 
 
3 Rupert Gethin, The Foundations of Buddhism, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998, p.2. 
4 Ibid., p.3. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid. 
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continue to do so in increasingly diverse locations. According to this framework, 
the Buddha, Siddhārtha Gautama, was an awakened being who taught that 
suffering arises due to a fundamental ignorance about the nature of reality. This 
ignorance takes the form of an assumption that there is an enduring, 
independently existing self. This assumption gives rise to attachment towards 
that which belongs to the self and aversion towards everything that threatens 
it. Motivated by ignorance, attachment and aversion we engage in activities 
(Sanskrit: karma Pali: kamma) that lead to being reborn again and again in lives 
of varying quality. In these future lives we could be a human, or a non-human 
animal, or we could be reborn in any one of a variety of heavenly or hellish 
realms. Only the realisation that all things are interdependent and impermanent 
can bring an end to the cycle of birth, sickness, decay, death and rebirth. 
This foundational framework is the shared heritage common to all Buddhist 
traditions and by not touching on the key cosmological features that define this 
framework, the panel discussion could not get to the heart of what is at issue 
here. The core issue is whether one thinks that ‘modern secular techniques of 
mindfulness free mindfulness from the burden of its outmoded Buddhist cultural 
baggage’ or one thinks that they ‘deprive it of the essential humanising vision 
that should be at its core’. Surely, I thought, a discussion of the essential 
humanising vision at the heart of Buddhist mindfulness practice must at least 
mention rebirth.  
Without addressing the multi-life context in which mindfulness has traditionally 
been practised, one of the key distinctions between the secular modernist and 
traditional Buddhist practitioners of mindfulness remains untouched. This key 
distinction is whether they consider traditional Buddhist cosmology, which 
includes rebirth, to be outmoded baggage or an essential feature of the 
Buddhist understanding of suffering and the path to happiness. Insofar as we 
overlook this key distinction we risk presenting Buddhist cosmology as 
irrelevant to practices associated with the Buddhist path. This is a risk whether 
we are engaging in a panel discussion or any of the other aspects of the general 
conversation around Buddhism’s relationship to modernity. If such discussions 
consistently overlook the multi-life perspective, the impression is given that 
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rebirth is ultimately irrelevant to the humanising vision at the heart of 
mindfulness practice.  
Such an approach to the relationship between Buddhist cosmology and practice 
might become tempting given the fact that, over thirty years, a Buddhist 
meditation technique has been successfully adopted for use in clinical therapy. 
After all, Jon Kabat Zinn and others writing about mindfulness during the 1980s 
and 1990s were highly successful in adapting Buddhist practices to fit within 
the Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT) model introduced by Aaron T. Beck.7 
One might assume, given the success with which traditional Buddhist 
meditation techniques were adopted into psychotherapeutic practice, that the 
distinctive Buddhist cosmological framework is not particularly important when 
it comes to the successful practice of core techniques. This may well be at least 
partially true. The evidence strongly suggests that one can gain benefit from 
the practice of mindfulness without any familiarity with the traditional Buddhist 
framework.8 This is not surprising given that both Buddhist tradition and modern 
psychology seem to be using mindfulness techniques in order to overcome the 
same phenomenon: suffering, conceived of as the various forms of mental and 
physical misery that we might experience. What is important to the successful 
adoption of mindfulness for clinical benefit is the compatibility between the 
overall interests and orientation of Buddhist and modern psychological 
traditions. 
                                                 
 
 
 
7 Jon Kabat-Zinn is strongly associated with the emergence of mindfulness-based therapies in 
the 1980s and 90s, having founded the Mindfulness Based Stress Reduction 
Programme in 1979. See Jon Kabat-Zinn, Full Catastrophe Living, New York, 
Random House, 2005, p.xxix. See also Rupert Gethin, 'On some definitions of 
mindfulness', pp.263-279, in Contemporary Buddhism: An Interdisciplinary Journal, 
Vol. 12, No. 1, May 2011, p.268. And see also Melanie Fennell and Zindel Segal, 
‘Mindfulness-based cognitive therapy: culture clash or creative fusion?’, 
Contemporary Buddhism: An Interdisciplinary Journal, pp.125–142, Vol.12, No.1, 
2011, pp.125-128. 
8 See, for example, J. Mark G. Williams and Jon Kabat-Zinn, ‘Mindfulness: Diverse 
perspectives on its meaning, origins and applications at the intersection of science 
and dharma’, Contemporary Buddhism: An Interdisciplinary Journal, pp.1-18, Vol.12, 
No.1, 2011, pp.1-4. 
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Nevertheless, this essential compatibility need not go any deeper than the 
shared interest in suffering, its causes and its cessation. Such compatibility 
need not even mean that these different traditions share similar accounts of 
what suffering is at its deepest level and how best to overcome it. As one 
explores the analysis of suffering, its causes and its cessation found in most 
Buddhist traditions, one will eventually come across cosmological ideas that 
are simply not found in modern psychological approaches. These cosmological 
ideas are found because Buddhist practitioners have not traditionally 
considered suffering to be the problem of a single life. Within the foundational 
Buddhist framework suffering is understood to be a condition of existing in 
saṃsāra, the cycle of involuntary birth and death. To suffer, according to this 
understanding, is to be trapped by psychological tendencies that will pull one 
from life to life without end. Liberation from suffering comes once these 
tendencies are extinguished. 
The differences between this approach to suffering and happiness when 
compared to modern psychological approaches are too numerous to list here. 
Needless to say the multi-life perspective gives Buddhism a distinct approach 
to what mindfulness practice amounts to.9 Its distinct analysis of suffering 
includes very subtle analysis combined with a vast cosmic and temporal scale. 
For each practitioner, their path to happiness and their history of suffering takes 
place over multiple lifetimes in a variety of different types of body and world.  
Therefore, when we discuss the ‘essential humanising vision’ of Buddhism we 
are discussing a vision with a high degree of breadth and complexity. The 
successful adoption of mindfulness does not rule out the possibility that 
something valuable and beneficial is lost when mindfulness practice is 
disconnected from a Buddhist cosmological framework. 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
9 Ibid., p.33. 
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1.2 Bringing Rebirth into the Discussion 
My aim in challenging the terms of the panel discussion on mindfulness is to 
highlight the undue absence of the traditional Buddhist cosmology from the 
wider discussion regarding Buddhism’s relationship with modern secular 
culture. This absence unduly limits discussion regarding the relationship 
between the respective philosophical frameworks that ground Buddhist and 
modern secular culture. Discussions regarding secularism and Buddhism rarely 
entertain the possibility that the Buddhist cosmological framework, specifically 
its account of the afterlife, might be a serious alternative to the widespread 
assumption within secular culture that death results in annihilation. There are a 
great many avenues that we might explore and questions that we might ask 
about the possible influence that such a cosmological framework might have 
on ethical and political attitudes, self-understanding and self-help practices, as 
well as educational and clinical interventions. But these avenues will only be 
explored and questions asked if the Buddhist cosmological framework is taken 
seriously.  
I aim to explore this framework in order to discover what arguments might be 
put forward to suggest that it be taken seriously by non-Buddhists. I am using 
non-Buddhist practitioners of mindfulness as my chief example because they 
represent a subset of non-Buddhists who may wish to engage with Buddhist 
tradition but who may find its cosmological ideas inaccessible. Ernest 
mindfulness practitioners steeped in a secular worldview are likely to have 
some basic respect for the tradition from which the technique originates whilst 
also requiring good reasons to take traditional ideas such as rebirth seriously. 
This allows me to imagine that they might be willing to engage with the 
philosophical ideas that ground Buddhist cosmology. 
I will begin by exploring the marginalisation of the Buddhist cosmological 
framework within modern approaches to Buddhist practice in order to show how 
it is rooted in a rejection of the multi-life perspective traditionally adopted by 
Buddhist practitioners. I will suggest that, if we are to reject this cosmology, it 
should be because of weaknesses in the philosophical support for rebirth as an 
afterlife possibility not the result of disengaged scepticism or uncritical 
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adherence to modern western philosophical assumptions. Genuine 
engagement with Buddhist philosophy as it relates to Buddhist cosmology is 
required in order to determine whether cosmological features such as rebirth 
should be taken seriously. 
 
1.3 Buddhist Modernism and Buddhist Cosmology 
The process of peeling mindfulness away from other aspects of Buddhism did 
not begin with modern clinicians. The successful adaptation of mindfulness into 
a psychological therapy is due in part to a wider historical trend in which the 
Buddhist culture surrounding and permeating meditation techniques like 
mindfulness is stripped away. In The Making of Buddhist Modernism, David L. 
McMahan investigates how a distinctly modern form of Buddhism developed as 
traditional ideas and practices entered into dialogue with the narratives of 
scientific rationalism, romanticism and protestant Christianity. For the past one-
hundred-and-fifty years, this dialogue has resulted in various forms of what 
McMahan calls Buddhist Modernism, interpretations of Buddhism that are to 
various degrees de-traditionalised, demythologised and psychologized.10 
McMahan describes the detraditionalization of religion as ‘the shift of orientation 
from external to internal authority and the associated reorientation from 
institutional to privatized religion’.11 He uses the term demythologization to 
describe ‘the process of attempting to extract – or more accurately, to 
reconstruct – meaning that will be viable within the context of modern 
worldviews from teachings embedded in ancient worldviews.’ A key aspect of 
this process is that ‘elements that are incompatible with modernity are relegated 
to “myth” and shorn of literal truth-value.’12 Such “mythical” elements are then 
psychologized, that is, reinterpreted as being purely psychological in nature. 
                                                 
 
 
 
10 David L. McMahan, The Making of Buddhist Modernism, New York, Oxford University 
Press, 2008, pp.36-87. 
11 Ibid., p.42. 
12 Ibid., p.46. 
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We can find another excellent investigation into the development of the division 
between ‘mythical’ and ‘essential’ Buddhism in Donald Lopez Jr’s Buddhism 
and Science. Lopez shows how, at different times in the past one-hundred-and-
fifty years, different Buddhist traditions have entered into dialogue with different 
aspects of the natural sciences and, in each case, the process of making a 
particular form of Buddhism compatible with the science of the day has required 
the elimination of features deemed essential by previous lay and monastic 
practitioners.13 
Prior to McMahan’s comprehensive investigation, Philip A. Mellor also 
recognised some of the same processes in his article ‘Protestant Buddhism? 
The Cultural Translation of Buddhism in England’. For example, Mellor points 
out that the England-based organisation known at the time as the Friends of 
the Western Buddhist Order held the view that ‘a Buddhist ‘essence’ can be 
distilled from the eastern cultures and traditions in which it has been located 
until the recent past’. Mellor notes that this view ‘demonstrates certain 
continuities with Protestant perspectives’ which, having ‘combined with a post-
Enlightenment scientific tradition’, ‘present religion as essentially a personal, 
private matter rather than an issue of culture.’14 Here, what Mellor calls 
Protestant Buddhism involves the same process of detraditionalization as 
Buddhist Modernism. 
It is as a result of this modernising trend that Buddhist ideas and practices have 
been evaluated to see if they can be rendered meaningful and useful within the 
context of modern worldviews. Both monastics and laypeople from historically 
Buddhist countries have been involved in attempts to modernise Buddhism, 
identifying the “core” teachings of the Buddha amongst so much cultural 
baggage and making them available to a modern audience.15 Whilst some 
Buddhist ideas and practices retain pride of place in modernist interpretations, 
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considered relevant and useful, others are quietly ignored, regarded as 
antiquated or irrelevant in today’s modern, increasingly secular, culture.16  
This modernising trend is one of the reasons why the adoption of Buddhist 
meditation techniques for use in western psychotherapeutic contexts has been 
so successful. There were enough modernist interpretations of Buddhism 
around when Kabat-Zinn and others began adapting mindfulness for use in a 
clinical setting that little more needed to be stripped out. By Kabat-Zinn’s time 
both mindfulness and the Buddhist path in general had already been prepared 
for a modernist audience, an audience who did not share the philosophical 
assumptions traditionally held by Buddhists. The modernist outlook is steeped 
in its emergence from, and conflict with, pre-modern religious outlooks. As a 
result, certain religious motifs such as divine beings, miracles and the afterlife 
present a prima facie problem for modern audiences. This secular disposition, 
along with the material advances brought about by the empirical sciences, has 
shaped modernist interpretations of Buddhism and, through them, secular 
approaches to mindfulness.  
Whereas the traditional Buddhist framework is rooted in philosophical 
arguments combined with meditative insights, modern approaches are rooted 
in philosophical arguments combined with empirical observations. This allows 
for a successful narrative to take hold according to which the modernist has a 
poorer knowledge base when it comes to the ‘inner world’ and the Buddhist has 
a poorer knowledge base when it comes to the ‘outer’ material world.17 The 
space that has been carved out for Buddhism within the modern worldview is 
as an “inner science” that can augment the “objective” sciences whilst also 
meeting some of the secularist’s unmet spiritual needs. This would explain why 
Buddhism is so often identified with meditation: techniques of inner observation 
epitomize the way in which Buddhist practices can augment the modern 
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approach. This is likely to have helped to develop the profile of mindfulness, 
which was described by Nyanaponika Thera as ‘The Heart of Buddhist 
Meditation’ in his book of the same name.18 
While modernising movements tend to identify mindfulness as epitomizing the 
Buddhist path, practices for cultivating compassion and doctrines such as no-
self and impermanence also find a place within modernist views of what is 
central to Buddhism.19 The successful retention of these additional practices 
and doctrines is not surprising when we consider their compatibility with other 
modernist motifs. Teachings on no-self, often glossed as the no-soul doctrine, 
fit comfortably with a secular, even anti-religious, culture. Equally, practices for 
cultivating universal compassion are highly compatible with the universalising 
values of enlightenment morality. Meanwhile, the doctrine of impermanence 
chimes well with scientific discoveries in physics, the recognition that we are all 
part of a ceaseless flux of forces. 
Rebirth, on the other hand, represents a paradigm case of an aspect of 
traditional Buddhism that does not fit with the secular scientific aspirations of 
modernist approaches.20 The traditional Buddhist cosmology, including the 
belief that sentient beings are reborn after death, is taken by many modernisers 
to be an example of Buddhism’s religious baggage.21 While aspects of Buddhist 
psychology and the term “karma” might be utilised in some modernist 
approaches, the core assumption is that the cosmology around rebirth is not 
particularly relevant when it comes to core Buddhist practices. This attitude to 
rebirth comes in a range of strengths. At one end of the spectrum we have 
those who adopt particular Buddhist ideas and practices but remain genuinely 
agnostic regarding rebirth. Jon Kabat-Zinn is a good example of someone in 
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this category. Although Kabat-Zinn does not identify as a Buddhist, he 
describes what he does in terms of practising the ‘Buddhadharma’.22 But Kabat-
Zinn never mentions rebirth, and this omission carries the implicit assumption 
that rebirth is not particularly relevant to practising the Buddhadharma, even if 
it is not completely implausible. 
At the other end of the spectrum we have full-on revisionists who adopt 
Buddhist ideas and practices whilst trying to fit all of this into an explicitly secular 
or naturalistic framework. In such a framework, traditional Buddhist cosmology 
and belief in rebirth are considered far-fetched and implausible as well as 
irrelevant. Those at the revisionist end of the spectrum sometimes take the 
cosmology to be a contingent aspect of ancient Indian culture that became 
mixed in with the Buddha’s core teachings after he died. Such core teachings 
are taken to be aimed simply at reducing suffering and so are perceived to have 
no necessary connection to belief in the afterlife.23 Owen Flanagan, philosopher 
and author of The Bodhisattva’s Brain: Buddhism Naturalized, is an excellent 
example of someone who does not self-identify as a Buddhist but nonetheless 
wishes to transform Buddhism into a secular ethics. Other revisionists, like 
Stephen Batchelor, identify as Buddhist whilst having a similar goal. 
Batchelor’s interpretation of Buddhism offers a good example of the kind of 
modernist revision that McMahan describes. Batchelor is highly critical of the 
traditional approach to Buddhist practice insofar as it presents rebirth as being 
an important feature of reality. In works such as Confessions of a Buddhist 
Atheist, Buddhism without beliefs and After Buddhism he is keen to reinterpret 
Buddhism for a secular age, presenting Siddhārtha Gautama as a thoroughly 
                                                 
 
 
 
22 See Jon Kabat-Zinn, ‘Some Reflections on the Origins of MBSR, Skillful Means, and the 
Trouble with Maps’, Contemporary Buddhism: An Interdisciplinary Journal, Vol. 12, 
No. 1, 2011, p.290. 
23 See Andrew Olendzki, ‘The Construction of Mindfulness’, Contemporary Buddhism: An 
Interdisciplinary Journal, pp.55–70, Vol.12 No.1, 2011, p.56. See also Stephen 
Batchelor, Confessions of a Buddhist Atheist, New York, Spiegel, 2011, pp.97-110. 
21 
 
anti-metaphysical man and his teachings regarding rebirth as being for the sake 
of those trapped in the belief-system of their time.24  
Batchelor’s approach is aimed at those who engage with Buddhist teachings 
and practices outside of the traditional framework and for whom its cosmology 
appears strange and irrelevant to their concerns. For these practitioners the 
suggestion that they might be reborn after dying does not ring true, enrich their 
lives, nor act as a motivating factor for their engagement with Buddhist 
practices.25 Such practitioners might consider the dearth of empirical evidence 
for future lives as a serious obstacle to taking it seriously. They might also find 
the very idea that the mind could continue to exist without a brain hard to believe 
given scientific evidence suggesting that mental processes depend on brain 
function.26 For some, belief in rebirth may be viewed as an excuse to disengage 
from life and its suffering by seeking solace in a pleasant afterlife.27  
By jettisoning Buddhist cosmology, the whole framework of Buddhist practice 
fits more comfortably into the worldview of a new audience. The easiest way to 
do this is to psychologise the cosmology, to interpret teachings about rebirth or 
about heaven and hell realms as making reference to extreme mental states 
and the way in which they condition one’s experience of the environment.28 The 
extent to which such an interpretation does actually psychologise the Buddhist 
cosmology is debatable. Whether we are discussing heaven, hell, hungry ghost, 
animal or human realms, within the Buddhist cosmology all such realms are 
taken to be the results of particular mental states.29 As Rupert Gethin points 
out: 
The key to understanding the Buddhist cosmological scheme lies in 
the principle of the equivalence of cosmology and psychology. I 
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mean by this that in the traditional understanding the various realms 
of existence relate rather closely to certain commonly (and not so 
commonly) experienced states of mind. In fact Buddhist cosmology 
is at once a map of different realms of existence and a description of 
all possible experiences.30 
 
If this is the case, what does it mean to give the traditional Buddhist cosmology 
a psychologised interpretation? The key to such an interpretation seems to be 
the claim that the Buddhist cosmology is purely psychological, that it describes 
all possible experiences but not actual realms of existence. The easiest way to 
make this claim is to offer a psychologised interpretation, not of the whole 
cosmology but simply of rebirth. If rebirth is simply the name given to the 
moment-by-moment transformation of one’s experiences throughout a lifetime, 
rebirth in a heavenly or hellish realm refers to the transformation of experience 
into an extremely pleasant or an extremely unpleasant form and nothing more. 
According to such an interpretation, rebirth in the human realm comes to 
describe a particularly reflective and balanced mental state in which there is 
awareness of both happiness and suffering.31 The central claim required for 
such an interpretation is that all these “rebirths” are psychological states that 
occur within a single lifetime. Once rebirth is psychologised in this way, the 
whole Buddhist cosmology becomes purely psychological.  
Here we find the dividing line between a psychologised and a traditional 
interpretation of Buddhist cosmology. 
While a traditional understanding of rebirth includes the idea that a being is 
reborn moment-by-moment it also, most importantly, involves the claim that this 
stream of momentary experiences does not cease at death.32 According to the 
traditional view, a being can be reborn within any of the realms of possible 
experience after death. A psychologised view of Buddhist cosmology simply 
side-steps this claim and focusses on a single lifetime. In this way, the key to a 
psychologised account of Buddhist cosmology is the rejection of the multi-life 
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perspective as either accurate to reality or relevant to Buddhist practice. Once 
an interpretation of Buddhism has marginalised or ignored the multi-life 
perspective, the traditional cosmology disappears.  
Conversely, once rebirth is established, we can recognise a range of possible 
afterlife experiences and sketch a rough cosmology. Our cosmological map 
would consist of all possible rebirths and would include realms ranging from the 
heavenly to the hellish. It would also include human and animal life along with 
other possible embodiments. This cosmological map would rapidly come to 
resemble something like the traditional Buddhist cosmology. 
This is why rebirth is foundational to Buddhist cosmology. Buddhist cosmology 
can be rejected automatically if the multi-life perspective is incoherent or 
implausible. If one cannot continue to experience anything after death, there is 
little weight to cosmological claims that one will go on to experience heavenly, 
hellish or human realms. Batchelor’s rejection of traditional Buddhist cosmology 
seems to be precisely on these grounds. He rejects rebirth as a core feature of 
Buddhism on the grounds that it does not have the demonstrability that other 
features of Buddhism do. And once rebirth is side-lined, the cosmology that 
depends upon it is side-lined as well.  
According to Batchelor, the claim that a being continues to undergo the full 
range of experiences after death is not demonstrable in the experiential way 
that other foundational Buddhist claims are. Claims to the effect that life 
involves suffering, that one can achieve peace through certain practices, or that 
mindfulness cultivates concentration, would count as core Buddhist ideas for 
Batchelor insofar as their accuracy can be experienced after a certain amount 
of practice. What Batchelor attests to in Confessions of a Buddhist Atheist is 
that despite years as a Buddhist monk, he never found the kind of evidence for 
the Buddhist afterlife that he found for the value of a Buddhist way of life.33 
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The need to experience the truth of traditional Buddhist claims constitutes a key 
aspect of what makes Batchelor’s approach to Buddhism distinctly modernist. 
David McMahan highlights an emphasis on individual experience as one of the 
key features of Buddhist Modernism. Modernist Buddhist practice involves 
open inquiry into the nature of oneself and reality that need not take account of 
traditional Buddhist doctrines, scriptures or monastic authorities. Such de-
traditionalised approaches to Buddhism rate the reliability of individual 
experience above claims made by traditional Buddhist authorities.34 The value 
of traditional Buddhist sources comes to be determined by their relevance to 
the individual practitioner rather than the merits of the source itself.  
McMahan argues that this is a notable departure from the way in which 
Buddhism has been traditionally manifested. In countries such as Thailand, 
Myanmar, Tibet and Sri Lanka, Buddhism involves rituals and beliefs about 
karma and rebirth that are not presented as open to question.35 He claims that 
the conception of Buddhism as a matter of individual inquiry free from 
institutional and authoritarian constraints has been heavily influenced by 
attitudes originating in the reformation and the enlightenment, in which the 
status of the individual was elevated and appeals to traditional beliefs and 
authority were challenged.36  
However, in discussing the contrasts between traditional and de-traditionalised 
modes of Buddhist practice, we would not want to fall into the trap of assuming 
that the Buddhist Modernist is supremely rational and the traditionalist is a 
superstitious dogmatist. It is important to remember that there are reasons why 
the doctrinal, scriptural and monastic authorities to whom one might appeal if 
living in a traditional Buddhist country are perceived to possess this authority. 
Both the Buddhist scriptures and the monastic community are able to offer 
doctrinal insights as well as practical instructions to the Buddhist practitioner.37 
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The monastic life is also considered by Buddhist standards to be the most 
conducive to the development of the ethical conduct and mental stability 
needed to generate the insights towards which the Buddhist path leads.38 
When appraising the traditional approach to Buddhist practice, it is important to 
bear in mind that it presents the Buddhadharma as a path. It follows from this 
that one person can be further along the path than another and therefore more 
reliable as a guide. The foundational doctrines of Buddhism such as no self, 
dependent-origination, karma and rebirth are taken to be the result of profound 
insight. They are not generally taken to be self-evident truths equally 
comprehensible to all.39 It is assumed that the full meaning of Buddhist doctrine 
requires extensive study and reflection to be clearly understood. The vast 
majority of traditional Buddhists, who lack the time to engage in such extensive 
study, place their trust in those who are presumed to have developed a greater 
amount of insight. This generally leads them to accept the doctrinal convictions 
of monastics, advanced practitioners, or the wider Buddhist community. 
Nevertheless, we must accept that there are dangers involved in placing too 
much faith in authority derived from what we could call spiritual achievements. 
It is to be expected that achievements such as psychological wellbeing, 
meditative prowess or doctrinal expertise would draw a certain amount of 
respect. But an individual or group may have mastered a range of psychological 
or intellectual abilities without this increasing their ability to verify the truth of 
metaphysical claims. The risk is that we assume that the accumulation of 
scriptural knowledge and the development of meditative skill automatically 
leads to the capacity to directly verify the truth of Buddhist cosmological claims.  
In his account of living as a Gelug Tibetan Buddhist monk, Batchelor provides 
an example in which the connection between spiritual development and 
prestige can actually decrease overall interest in pursuing or supporting honest 
inquiry into the truth of claims. He describes how the educational paradigm that 
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was in place during his monastic training did not encourage open inquiry in 
which every possibility is equally considered. Rather, there was a correct 
doctrinal answer and other viewpoints were presented simply to be ruled out. 
This meant that failure to completely accept the truth of certain claims was 
viewed as an educational failure. Batchelor claims that insofar as he genuinely 
questioned the doctrine of rebirth, he was seen as an embarrassment to his 
teacher. His teacher, Geshe Rab-ten, feared that he would develop a bad 
reputation through being responsible for such a poorly educated monk. As a 
result, Batchelor claims, he was pressured into keeping his doubts to himself.40 
Interestingly, the particular approach of Geshe Rab-ten is explored by Georges 
Dreyfus in The Sound of Two Hands Clapping: the Education of a Tibetan 
Buddhist Monk. According to Dreyfus, Geshe Rab-ten took the view that debate 
was merely a method by which students could internalize the teachings of the 
tradition. He explains how Geshe Rab-ten saw the student-teacher relationship 
as ‘a context for the transmission of the truth, all of whose details were decided 
by the tradition.’41 But Dreyfus is clear that this pedagogical perspective was 
not adopted by every teacher in the tradition and only gained popularity due to 
a sectarian revival in the early twentieth century.  
Whether we consider Batchelor’s experience to be the result of a particularly 
dogmatic teacher or the tradition itself, it doesn’t take a great deal of 
investigation to discover that, where a belief is considered by a group or 
institution to be a fundamental doctrine, pressure is often exerted on individuals 
to share that belief, regardless of the strength of arguments in its favour. As a 
result, a belief can receive widespread support and inform people’s practices 
without being particularly plausible. It makes sense, then, to be sceptical when 
it comes to religious or institutional doctrines regardless of the character and 
qualities of those who advocate them. If we find that a particular Buddhist 
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tradition has quashed genuine debate by discouraging practitioners from 
questioning the truth of rebirth, this provides a reason not to take its claims 
about the afterlife seriously.  
However, although we should maintain vigilance regarding the cultural and 
institutional context in which different claims have been espoused, we cannot 
justify the assumption that the quashing of genuine inquiry has been the norm 
within every intellectual tradition throughout history, Buddhist or otherwise. 
Even in the Tibetan Tradition we find a spectrum of teachers who range from 
the dogmatic to the inquiring. Dreyfus dedicates an entire chapter of The Sound 
of Two Hands Clapping to exploring the differences between Geshe Rab-ten, 
for whom debate was simply a means to learn the key texts, and Gen Nyi-ma, 
for whom debate was a way to scrutinise those texts. Buddhism, in general, has 
a rich history of philosophical inquiry that, thanks to recent translation and 
scholarship, is increasingly accessible. This history stretches back to the lively 
debates between Buddhist and non-Buddhist schools of thought in ancient 
India. Buddhist philosophy developed in a milieu of debate that included 
different Buddhist, Hindu and also anti-religious materialist schools. 
Although there might be times and places where Buddhist practitioners become 
somewhat insular, failing to debate with those who disagree fundamentally with 
their views, Buddhism could not have thrived in India if this approach was the 
norm. It is for this reason that we can use the work of Indian Buddhist 
philosophers in order to defend key Buddhist claims. There are no automatic 
reasons why the principles and premises used in Buddhist arguments for key 
metaphysical and cosmological claims should not be persuasive today. We 
should not ignore these arguments even if we can find evidence that they are 
not always being tested as forcefully as we might wish. Nor should we assume 
that every one of the assumptions and arguments that grounds modernist 
discourses is beyond question. 
A respectable modernist interpretation of Buddhism should critically assess 
modernist discourses, particularly scientific ones, whilst also critically engaging 
with the Buddhist philosophical framework aimed at justifying and making sense 
of traditional cosmological ideas such as rebirth. Such interpretations should 
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neither assume a triumphalist position, according to which modern intellectual 
culture has superseded all possible alternative philosophies, nor sink into a 
disengaged scepticism regarding the kind of metaphysical questions that 
Buddhist philosophy has attempted to answer. 
Interpreters of Buddhism should certainly resist the tendency, evident in the 
work of Batchelor and others, simply to tell a story about the Buddha or 
Buddhism, which reinforces certain philosophical assumptions without actually 
engaging critically with them. By conceiving of the Buddha as a modernist with 
no interest in anything metaphysical or cosmological, Batchelor and secular 
modernist interpreters who take a similar approach are able to avoid engaging 
with the metaphysical arguments that exist for and against rebirth. This involves 
appealing to the authority of the Buddha, a weak argumentative approach given 
that our only knowledge of what the Buddha taught comes from sources that 
suggest he taught extensively about rebirth.  
Insofar as revisionist interpreters present the Buddha as an anti-metaphysical 
sceptic who completely rejected the cosmology of his time, they must likewise 
advocate a sharp dividing line between the Buddha and those who compiled 
and transmitted the earliest scriptures. But it is only through the earliest 
followers of the Buddha that we have any impression of what he taught. 
Buddhist scholarship suggests that even the earliest Buddhist scriptures were 
very unlikely to have been transmitted verbatim as fixed texts from the Buddha’s 
own mouth. This is why, as Rupert Gethin points out, ‘the task of identifying 
sharp fault lines between what the Buddha taught and what his early followers 
tell us he taught is far from straightforward.’42 The scriptures suggesting that 
the Buddha’s teachings offered a cosmological framework that included rebirth 
are from more or less the same sources as those scriptures that suggest that 
the Buddha taught anything. 
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We have little reason to take the claim that the Buddha taught about rebirth and 
a cosmology influenced by karmic actions any less seriously than claims that 
he offered teachings on the path to liberation from suffering. This is why relying 
on the Buddha’s support to establish a fault line within Buddhist teachings 
between “serious practice” and “metaphysical nonsense” is such a flawed 
approach. As Gethin warns, ‘The danger is that we begin to see the fault lines 
where we want to see them.’43 Here it is interesting to consider the words of 
E.P. Sanders, who wrote about the many attempts to discover the historical 
Jesus: ‘People want to agree with Jesus, and this often means that they see 
him as agreeing with themselves.’44 As Gethin points out, the same could be 
said of the historical Buddha.  
Rather than invoking their own vision of the historical Buddha, those who wish 
to partition Buddhist teachings in this way should come up with independent 
reasons for rejecting its cosmological aspects. Some Buddhist modernisers 
might, for example, be justified in making such a partition in virtue of their 
audience. If the audience of Buddhist teachings doesn’t want to hear about 
karma or rebirth, if they cannot connect with such teachings, this may be a 
reason to leave out certain cosmological aspects. This is one of the reasons 
why those attempting to introduce Buddhist practices to non-Buddhist 
audiences tend to de-emphasise and perhaps even re-interpret traditional 
Buddhist beliefs that may get in the way of people benefitting from Buddhist 
practices. Practices such as mindfulness are often presented in this “agnostic” 
manner, being aimed chiefly at wellbeing in this life without reference to 
traditional Buddhist doctrines which make reference to an afterlife.45 
While this is clearly a noble motivation, some believe that this should be 
recognised simply as a pragmatic way of helping others and not a rejection of 
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foundational Buddhist ideas.46 That there are good reasons for taking a 
pragmatic approach to teaching newcomers about Buddhist practices does not 
automatically justify taking the same approach to Buddhist teaching and 
practice as a whole. When teaching a student how to practice, it makes good 
sense to distil over two-thousand years of Buddhist theory into just those 
aspects that are relevant to the student’s situation. But this does not make 
sense when presenting the Buddha’s teachings, as we understand them, to an 
audience who wish to know what Siddhārtha Gautama taught. If the audience 
wants to understand such teachings, on what basis can we justify leaving out 
foundational features that have been central to over two-thousand year of 
Buddhist theory? It would be a disservice to the audience to present them with 
only those features of Buddhism that fit with contemporary intellectual attitudes. 
It would be downright dishonest to present them with only those features that 
fit with our own attitudes or to misrepresent certain features as less significant 
because we do not take them seriously. 
Those interpreters of Buddhism who have philosophical reasons for not taking 
Buddhist cosmology seriously should be up front about those reasons, 
presenting and defending them. They should not merely tell a story that fails to 
engage with the philosophical questions that philosophers, Buddhist and 
western alike, have long been interested in. Such questions regard the ultimate 
nature of consciousness and its place in reality, as well as the meaning of life 
amidst the problems of suffering and death. The same philosophical 
approaches that touch on these subjects are applicable to the question of 
whether rebirth is a plausible afterlife possibility. In order to appropriately 
assess whether the rebirth aspect of Buddhism is mere cultural baggage, one 
must first engage with these philosophical issues. 
Overall, in giving traditional Buddhist beliefs a fair hearing, we should navigate 
between what might be seen by modernists as an overly credulous faith in 
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Buddhist institutions and what might be seen by traditional Buddhists as an 
ignorance of modern philosophical weaknesses and of Buddhism’s intellectual 
resources. These resources include arguments that can be engaged with in 
their own right.  
Nevertheless, in engaging with these arguments, we must accept that we will 
be to some extent de-traditionalising them. It makes sense to approach 
arguments for foundational Buddhist beliefs such as rebirth from a position of 
scepticism even though adopting this position means we will miss out on some 
of the factors that have traditionally supported such beliefs. Neither the 
compassion nor wisdom of those advocating such beliefs nor any psychological 
benefits of adopting them can be considered. The plausibility of Buddhist 
cosmology and rebirth in particular will stand or fall on the strength of arguments 
for them rather than on appeals to traditional sources such as doctrine, scripture 
or institutional authority. 
However, it remains the case that the traditional Buddhist belief in rebirth has 
been the subject of discussion and debate since Siddhārtha Gautama was 
teaching. Although we can find various Buddhist schools of thought there is a 
common heritage regarded as foundational to all Buddhist schools. This 
common heritage includes a basic philosophical approach to reality and to 
consciousness that has defined how Buddhists justify the ‘working hypothesis’ 
that death is followed by rebirth.47 I wish to bring attention to this basic 
philosophical approach as a means to bring it into the discussion regarding the 
modernisation and secularisation of Buddhist practice. 
 
1.4 Mindful Life or Mindful Lives? An Overview 
As we have seen, the adoption of mindfulness into clinical and secular self-help 
contexts has been aided by attempts to modernise Buddhism, which have 
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marginalised and in places psychologised the role of traditional Buddhist 
cosmology. This marginalisation of Buddhist cosmology is rationalised as an 
attempt to align with the attitudes of a modern, broadly secular, audience. But 
such rationalisation only amounts to justification if a modern audience has no 
reason to take Buddhist cosmology seriously. If a case can be made for the 
plausibility of rebirth as an afterlife possibility, modern audiences have a reason 
to take it seriously as well as the de-psychologised cosmology that springs from 
it. 
This is why the debate as to whether ‘secular modern techniques of 
mindfulness free mindfulness from the burden of its outmoded Buddhist cultural 
baggage or deprive it of the essential humanising vision that should be at its 
core’ turns on the question of whether a secular mindfulness practitioner can 
be given good reasons to take the Buddhist belief in rebirth seriously. The 
debate would, therefore, benefit from an investigation into the traditional 
Buddhist philosophical system to see if it can be used to offer reasons for a 
non-Buddhist to believe in rebirth, specifically when this system is approached 
using relevant concepts used in modern western philosophy. The aim of this 
project is to attempt such an investigation. 
This investigation will involve engagement with traditional Buddhist 
philosophical systems but will also attempt to ensure that the key principles and 
ideas of these systems are accessible to non-Buddhists. Where it helps, I will 
relate Buddhist philosophical ideas to relevant ideas within contemporary 
Anglophone philosophy, often referred to as western philosophy, which 
includes analytic and continental philosophical traditions. Overall, I will attempt 
to be sympathetic to the traditional Buddhist multi-life perspective, seeking 
reasons for its plausibility. Where existing arguments struggle or fail I will 
highlight this and attempt alternatives that might be compatible with Buddhist 
philosophical principles. In this respect I will be acting as something of the 
consultant for traditional Buddhists who wish to present their cosmology as 
plausible. 
In the next chapter I will explore the historical Buddhist arguments for rebirth 
and identify the key philosophical principles that support them. I will argue that, 
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despite the historical debates that took place between the adherents of different 
early Buddhist philosophical Abhidharma systems, three basic principles can 
be found that seem to be used within the earliest known argument for rebirth 
made by Buddhist philosopher Dharmakīrti. 
In the third chapter I will survey some of the works of scholarship that have 
evaluated Buddhist ideas and the arguments and assumption behind them. 
What should emerge is something of an overview of how the Buddhist multi-life 
hypothesis has been approached in philosophical works that have sought 
justification for key Buddhist ideas. While an increased interest in Buddhist 
philosophy has not been accompanied by a deeper engagement with Buddhist 
claims about the afterlife, this is despite the fact that views regarding the 
potential for phenomenal consciousness to persist beyond death rest upon 
increasingly contested assumptions about the nature of consciousness. 
Chapter Four will explore how consciousness is understood within both western 
and Buddhist philosophy. These approaches to consciousness will be explored 
with particular regard to Dharmakīrti’s argument for rebirth. This argument relies 
on two key premises: (1) Consciousness is distinct from other non-conscious 
phenomena, particularly physical phenomena. (2) An instance of 
consciousness must be preceded by a cause with the same intrinsic nature. I 
will then examine Evan Thompson’s treatment of Dharmakīrti’s argument for 
rebirth in Waking, Dreaming, Being in order to show what needs to be 
established in order for it to be successful. This will involve showing why 
empirical methods requiring objective evidence fail to support claims about the 
nature of consciousness and its capacity to survive death. What are required 
are metaphysical arguments about the nature of consciousness and what can 
or cannot bring it into existence. 
Chapter Five will then show how, within contemporary philosophy of mind, the 
kind of metaphysical argumentation used by Dharmakīrti can be found in 
arguments to support panpsychism. In his argument for panpsychism, Galen 
Strawson denies that the physical processes of the body and brain are devoid 
of consciousness by defending what is essentially the second premise of 
Dharmakīrti’s argument for rebirth. According to panpsychism, consciousness 
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cannot emerge from intrinsically unconscious phenomena but it can arise from 
purely physical factors as long as these factors are intrinsically conscious. I will 
argue that Strawson’s argument is persuasive and provides support for the 
second premise of Dharmakīrti’s argument for rebirth. 
In Chapter Six, I will address Evan Thompson’s alternative to panpsychism in 
which phenomenal consciousness emerges from mere potential for 
consciousness. The chapter will present reasons for rejecting Thompsons view. 
It will then go on to address the fact that Galen Strawson’s constitutive version 
of panpsychism presents a threat to Dharmakīrti’s argument for rebirth. In 
particular, the view that a single stream of conscious experience survives death 
and continues into future lives is not compatible with constitutive panpsychism. 
Arguments against constitutive panpsychism will be presented in order to show 
that the singular conscious subject of our current experience cannot be 
produced from multiple conscious subjects. 
Chapter Seven will then explore reasons for believing that the core conditions 
for conscious experience can only ever arise as a single “cluster”. These core 
conditions will be shown to consist of an individual instance of phenomenally 
conscious apprehension, anticipation, retention, and immediate recollection of 
objects embedded within a temporal structure. It will be argued that every 
instance of phenomenally conscious experience requires these factors and that 
the separation of any one of them from the others not only makes phenomenal 
consciousness impossible but also makes every remaining factor incapable of 
accounting for the particular characteristics found in conscious experience. In 
this case, the division of a consciousness cluster would preclude any possibility 
of that phenomenal consciousness ever existing. This is why we must assume 
that, for every instance of phenomenal consciousness, there is a cluster of 
factors that have never, in the history of reality, arisen in isolation from one 
another. This justifies believing that any instance of conscious experience 
involves an indivisible consciousness cluster and that this instance is part of an 
unbroken stream of such instances. Such a stream would continue even 
through physical death. 
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Chapter Eight will address some of the questions that remain once we have 
reasons to believe that our stream of phenomenal consciousness can continue 
after bodily death. The first part of the chapter will address the neuroscientific 
evidence suggesting that our psychological traits are dependent upon particular 
brain functions. This evidence poses a problem for traditional Buddhist claims 
that wholesome mind states can be developed across multiple lives. To address 
this problem, I will argue that the capacity for retaining passing experience, 
which is inseparable from consciousness, results in the experiential history of 
a stream of consciousness becoming embedded within its structure. This 
embedded experiential history influences the precise quality of presently 
occurring conscious experiences. Examples will then be offered to suggest 
ways in which the impact of mind training practices in one life could influence 
the character of psychological factors occurring in later lives. 
The second part of the chapter will address the question of how a conscious 
event, with its embedded history, interacts with physical events. In particular it 
will suggest ways in which we might try to understand the relationship between 
the physical processes and the illuminating, retaining, and temporal structuring 
processes of consciousness. At this point the question of mental causation will 
be addressed and it will be argued that physical events must be, by their very 
nature, responsive to conscious events. From here the chapter will touch upon 
the question of what might happen within the stream of conscious events after 
bodily death and why this suggests that streams of consciousness can be 
reborn in newly developing bodies. 
This investigation will conclude that we have good reasons to take seriously the 
view that an instance of conscious experience is preceded by a prior instance 
of conscious experience and that this stream of instances is unbroken. Taking 
such a view, physical birth cannot be considered the point at which conscious 
experience emerges from non-conscious factors nor can bodily death be the 
point at which the stream of consciousness transforms into completely different 
non-conscious factors. Some concluding thoughts will then be offered 
regarding post-mortem consciousness, further possibilities for exploration, and 
the significance of this argument for non-Buddhist practitioners of mindfulness. 
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2. Buddhist Philosophy and Rebirth 
2.1 Introduction: How to approach a Buddhist defence of Rebirth? 
Debates regarding the secularisation of Buddhist practices, particularly 
mindfulness, would benefit from an investigation into whether good reasons can 
be offered for non-Buddhists, as well as Buddhists, to take the traditional 
Buddhist multi-life perspective seriously. In attempting such an investigation, I 
will stick to Buddhist form in following a middle-way between two undesirable 
extremes. The first extreme would be to ignore Buddhist philosophy as a whole 
and simply offer an argument for the possibility that death is followed by rebirth. 
The risk is that such an approach might develop arguments that do not take 
into account any Buddhist philosophical commitments. There are, for example, 
a number of arguments for substance dualism, which allow for the possibility of 
personal existence after death.1 The problem with these arguments is that they 
amount to an argument for a substantial, enduring self. Such an argument 
would be difficult to reconcile with the earliest Buddhist teachings on no-self 
and impermanence. Without trying to accommodate Buddhist philosophical 
principles there is a risk that the key premises of an argument for rebirth will 
end up being incompatible with key Buddhist ideas.  
However, the second extreme would be to get stuck in a particular Buddhist 
school’s vision of what an argument for rebirth must look like. One might adopt 
a set of principles that are only relevant to a small sub-set of Buddhist traditions. 
Such a narrow approach would potentially develop into a defence of rebirth that 
is only accessible to those who adhere to a particular Buddhist school. On a 
more practical note, a defence of such a position would require either ignoring 
or otherwise fully unpacking a number of historical debates between particular 
Buddhist schools. Adopting a very specific and potentially controversial position 
                                                 
 
 
 
1 A classic argument for this kind would be that of Descartes; see René Descartes, 
Meditations, trans. Desmond M. Clarke, London, Penguin Books, 2000. For a similar, 
updated argument see Richard Swinburne, Mind, Brain, and Free Will, Oxford 
University Press, 2013. 
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without defending it would be philosophically lazy but addressing all of these 
issues would take far too much time. 
The middle-path that I will take involves establishing some key premises that 
are compatible with the widest number of Buddhist schools. The aim is to find 
some foundational philosophical principles that are as common as the belief in 
rebirth itself. In this respect I will not be looking for a canonical Buddhist 
argument for rebirth. Such a search would prove fruitless insofar as it would 
amount to a search for a defence of rebirth offered by the Buddha himself. 
Although there are recorded discourses in which the Buddha, Siddhārtha 
Gautama argues in favour of taking rebirth and karma as working hypotheses, 
his argument does not aim to defend the plausibility of these ideas. In the 
Apaṇṇaka Sutta, for example, Gautama offers a brief pragmatic argument that 
entertaining the possibility of rebirth can help to motivate renunciant life rather 
than a philosophical treatise on why the multi-life perspective should be 
adopted by those who do not already hold it.2 
In the Apaṇṇaka Sutta, Gautama presents something of a Buddhist wager, 
prefiguring Blaise Pascal by millennia. Like Pascal’s wager, the claim is that 
there is much to gain and nothing to lose by assuming that positive actions in 
this life provide benefits in future lives while negative actions in this life provide 
misery in future lives. Conversely, there is nothing to gain and much to lose if 
we assume that this is not the case. Gautama assumes that adopting a multi-
life perspective combined with a belief in a form of moral causation linking moral 
action with pleasant results and immoral action with unpleasant results will 
motivate moral conduct. This conduct will be praised in this life and possibly 
bring benefits in the next. Without the multi-life perspective combined with a 
belief in moral causation this added motivation will be absent. One might still 
find other reasons to act morally but nothing extra is gained. The risk is that no 
                                                 
 
 
 
2 See ‘Apaṇṇaka Sutta’, in The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha: A Translation of the 
Majjhima Nikāya, trans. Bhikkhu Nāṇamoli and Bhikkhu Bodhi, London, Wisdom 
Publication, 1995, pp.506-520. 
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alternative motivation is found and immoral conduct becomes tempting. This 
results in disapproval in this life and possible misery in the next.3 
But Gautama’s wager is not an argument for the plausibility of the multi-life 
perspective. It is an argument for the pragmatic benefits of such a perspective 
combined with a belief in moral causation. It is equivalent to a holiday brochure 
showing the benefits of a destination rather than a map on how one gets there. 
Gautama is suggesting that, if we can find reasons to take this cosmology 
seriously, it will serve us well in our moral and spiritual development. His 
argument does not provide those reasons. 
Nor do we find dedicated arguments for rebirth in the attempts to systematise 
Gautama’s teachings in the generations after his death. The commentaries and 
philosophical systems that developed in the first millennium after the time of the 
Buddha did not focus on defending the multi-life perspective. This makes sense 
when we consider how widespread such a perspective was in ancient India. 
The dominant Brahmanical teachings of the Vedas and Upanishads as well as 
Jain teachings all presupposed the cycle of birth, death and rebirth.4 The 
Buddha’s teachings are comparable to Jain and Brahmanical teachings insofar 
as he was part of a shared renunciant tradition. Renunciant traditions sought 
liberation from the endless cycle of rebirth through contemplative and 
devotional practices.5  
The only well-known school that rejected an afterlife as well as the search for 
liberation was the Cārvāka School. The Cārvākas were a materialist school who 
identified the person with the body. As such they considered death to be the 
end of the body and the end of the person.6 Like followers of the Buddha, the 
Cārvākas were considered unorthodox compared to followers of the Vedic and 
                                                 
 
 
 
3 See Nigel Tetley, The Doctrine of Rebirth In Theravāda Buddhism: Arguments for and 
against, Doctoral Thesis, University of Bristol, 1990, pp.54, 55.  
4 Roy W. Perrett, An Introduction to Indian Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, 2016, 
pp.8-10. 
5 Rupert Gethin, The Foundations of Buddhism, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998, pp.9-
11. 
6 See Perrett, An Introduction to Indian Philosophy, pp.169,170. 
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Upanishadic teachings. The Cārvākas did not hold the sort of sway that would 
have required Gautama to provide arguments against their position. This 
remained true for the early period after Gautama’s death. There was little 
benefit in spending time defending the doctrine of rebirth in a time when, as 
Richard Hayes points out, ‘most other philosophical systems in India were, like 
Buddhism, based on the notion that the foremost predicament for all living 
beings is that they are bound to experience the consequences of actions 
performed in previous lives’.7 It was the doctrine of no-self rather than the 
doctrine of rebirth than set Buddhism apart from its philosophical 
contemporaries. 
The Buddhist position regarding the existence of the self was a strong contrast 
to the orthodox Hindu schools.8 These schools, along with the Jain school, 
considered the self to be a substantial entity, often referred to as the Atman. 
While the orthodox schools differed as to the true nature of the self, they did not 
disagree about its substantial reality. Gautama’s teachings were developed into 
a systematic philosophy in response to ongoing debate with these so-called 
Atmanic schools. Arguments were required in order to clarify how phenomena 
like memory and moral responsibility can function without a self. The question 
of precisely what is reborn if there is no self was also addressed in response to 
challenge from Atmanic schools that considered the self to survive death. Such 
schools wanted Buddhists to account for how their philosophy makes sense of 
rebirth.9 These arguments were therefore based on a common agreement that 
the multi-life perspective was accurate. It was only once debate got going 
between Buddhists and materialists like the Cārvākas that an argument aimed 
specifically at justifying rebirth was required. As Hayes remarks, once 
                                                 
 
 
 
7 Richard P. Hayes, ‘Dharmakīrti on Punarbhava’, Studies in Original Buddhism and 
Mahāyāna Buddhism, Vol. 1, 1993, p.111. 
8 The orthodox schools of classical Indian philosophy are often listed as six paired schools: 
Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkya-Yoga, and Mīmāṃsā-Vedānta. See Perrett, An 
Introduction to Indian Philosophy, pp.10-12. 
9 Gethin, The Foundations of Buddhism, p.140. 
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philosophers began to challenge the multi-life perspective ‘it was no longer 
possible for Buddhist apologists to take the doctrine of rebirth for granted.’10 
Amongst those Buddhist philosophers who rose to the challenge of providing ‘a 
reasoned defence of the doctrine of rebirth’ Dharmakīrti (circa 600-660 CE) is 
perhaps the most commonly cited.11 His argument, found in his 
Pramānavārttika, is one of the earliest that we know of and directly influenced 
those of later Buddhist philosophers. At the heart of Dharmakīrti’s argument is 
the claim that ‘among the causes of any cognition is an immediately preceding 
moment of awareness’.12 It follows from this central claim that even the very 
first mental event of a sentient being’s life must have amongst its causes a 
preceding moment of awareness. If bodily processes are purely physical, 
lacking in any degree of awareness, they cannot be the sole causes of mental 
events. The cognitive, conscious character of mental events can only come 
about due to a prior event of the same kind. Therefore our current cognition 
must be the latest in a chain of mental events, each contributing to the arising 
of the next. Because we cannot posit a beginning to this causal chain, the 
beginning of this present life cannot be the beginning of our conscious 
existence. Dharmakīrti concludes that previous lives must be posited, following 
a pattern of birth, death and rebirth, in order to explain the origins of 
consciousness in this life. 
 
2.2 Buddhist Philosophical Principles for Defending Rebirth 
The central principles employed by Dharmakīrti in his argument in defence of 
rebirth can be found at work in the arguments of Śāntarakṣita (circa 725-783 
CE), who was one of the central figures in the establishment of Buddhism in 
                                                 
 
 
 
10 Hayes, ‘Dharmakīrti on Punarbhava’, p.111. 
11 Ibid., p.112. See also Dan Arnold, Brains, Buddhas, and Believing, New York, Columbia 
University Press, 2012, p.2. 
12 Arnold, Brains, Buddhas, and Believing, p.33. 
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Tibet.13 This connection with Tibet might explain why we find the same sort of 
argumentation showing up in defences of the multi-life perspective by Tibetan 
Buddhist teachers.14 Tibetan Buddhism is both popular in western countries 
and also boasts a number of western scholars who are quite vocal in advocating 
the multi-life perspective to secular audiences.15 This is one of the reasons why 
Dharmakīrti’s argument provides an important reference point for this project. 
As a respected argument for rebirth, Dharmakīrti’s will hopefully provide some 
of the basic premises necessary for a successful argument that is also 
accessible to non-Buddhist audiences. 
However, these premises are not exclusive to Dharmakīrti’s argument. The 
core principles of his argument for rebirth can be found in the earliest Buddhist 
philosophical approaches. These early philosophies were attempts to formulate 
a comprehensive approach from the orally transmitted (and eventually 
transcribed) teachings of the Buddha known as the Suttas (Pali) or Sutras 
(Sanskrit). Because the Buddha’s teachings were given in specific contexts to 
specific audiences, commentaries were composed in order to develop these 
specific teachings into a system of thought that could be applied generally. 
These attempts at systematisation took the form of commentaries on the 
Buddha’s teachings and are known as Abhidhamma in the Pali language and 
Abhidharma in Sanskrit, both of which have the approximate meaning of 
‘Higher’ or ‘Further’ teachings.16 
There is evidence that the earliest attempts to provide an overall commentary 
on the Buddha’s philosophical approach took place during his lifetime. One 
example is found in the Mahāvedalla Sutta, which recounts how a nun was 
                                                 
 
 
 
13 Matthew T. Kapstein, The Tibetan Assimilation of Buddhism: Conversion, Contestation, and 
Memory: Conversion, Contestation, and Memory, Oxford University Press USA, 
2000, pp.24, 25. For an exploration of Śāntarakṣita’s argument, see Roy Perrett, 
‘Rebirth’, in Religious Studies, Vol. 23, March, 1987, pp.41-57. 
14 See, among others, Robert Thurman, Infinite Life, New York, Riverhead Books, 2004, pp.4-
8 
15 As well as Thurman (Ibid.), see B. Alan Wallace, Choosing Reality: A Buddhist View of 
Physics and the Mind, New York, Snow Lion, 2003, pp.184-5. 
16 Gethin, The Foundations of Buddhism, p.47. 
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asked about aspects of the technical vocabulary used in the Buddha’s 
teachings.17 No doubt there will have been plenty of circumstances in which the 
Buddha’s followers were asked, in his absence, about the key points of his 
teachings. There is also evidence that the earliest attempts at giving a ‘full and 
systematic statement of the Buddha’s teaching on the basis of what is found in 
his discourses’ were also most likely to have occurred during Siddhārtha 
Gautama’s lifetime.18 This is why Gethin considers it legitimate ‘to see the 
exposition of the basic principles and methods of Abhidharma as the product of 
the first generation of the Buddha’s disciples.’19 
Nevertheless, after Gautama’s lifetime a variety of interpretations and 
applications of the basic principles and methods found in the discourses led to 
the development of a range of systematic Buddhist approaches to the nature of 
reality.20 Different schools emerged with their own commentarial literature, their 
approach to systematising the Buddha’s teachings. Here the term school is 
used to mean “school of thought” rather than something stronger like “sect” or 
“denomination”. The early Buddhist schools followed the same root teacher, 
Siddhārtha Gautama, and adopted the philosophical principles and methods 
taught by him. They differed in terms of the positions that they took on key 
philosophical questions that arose as a result of applying these principles and 
methods to reality. 
Our knowledge about the existence of this variety of early Buddhist schools 
comes from the details provided in the range of Abhidharma texts that have 
survived the millennia since their composition. Of these Abhidhamma texts, 
those that have come down to us in a complete form are the canonical texts of 
the Theravāda Abhidhamma (preserved in the Pali language) and the 
Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma (preserved in the Chinese and Tibetan, having been 
translated from Sanskrit) as well as a series of later treatises (in Pali and 
                                                 
 
 
 
17 Ibid., p.47. 
18 Ibid., p.48. 
19 Ibid., p.54. 
20 Ibid., pp.203-208 
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Sanskrit, and in Chinese and Tibetan translation) belonging to both schools. 
The canonical texts of the Yogācāra Abhidharma also survive thanks to Chinese 
translations, but only in part, although a number of treatises of Yogācāra 
Abhidharma also survive in Sanskrit and in Tibetan translation. There were 
many more Abhidharma commentaries in ancient India that have influenced 
today’s Buddhist traditions but that have since disappeared along with the 
schools that followed them. All that remains of these systems and their 
respective schools of thought are the arguments against them preserved in the 
surviving works of their opponents.21 
Overall, despite the diversity of Buddhist traditions in terms of both cultural 
practices and geographical locations, most Buddhist traditions draw on the 
philosophical principles found in Abhidharma commentaries.22 Furthermore, 
these commentaries adopt common philosophical principles and methods, 
having their roots in the earliest commentaries of the first generation of the 
Buddha’s disciples.23 This is why Gethin suggests that something of the 
Abhidharma method must go back to the lifetime of the Buddha himself: 
‘Certainly much of its outlook and many of its principles must be regarded as 
still forming part of the common heritage of Buddhism’.24 
We can make a clear distinction between, on the one hand, the Abhidharma 
principles and methods, which were derived from the discourses of the Buddha 
very early on, and on the other hand, the variety of Abhidharma schools that 
developed once these principles and methods were worked into 
comprehensive philosophical systems. The Theravāda Abhidhamma, as well 
as the Sarvāstivāda and Yogācāra Abhidharmas, represent attempts at 
providing a comprehensive Buddhist analysis of reality. They also represent the 
                                                 
 
 
 
21 Ibid., p.49. 
22 The Theravāda Buddhism of Sri Lanka and South-East Asia is directly informed by the 
Theravāda Abhidhamma while philosophical developments in the Buddhisms of Tibet 
and China drew heavily on the Sarvāstivāda and Yogācāra Abhidharmas. Gethin, 
The Foundations of Buddhism, pp.244-273. 
23 Gethin, The Foundations of Buddhism, p.54. 
24 Ibid. p.48. 
44 
 
application of fundamental philosophical principles and methods of analysis 
used by Siddhārtha Gautama.  
The principles and methods of analysis that are shared by the different 
Abhidharma schools, having been derived from the Buddha’s teachings, are 
those employed by Dharmakīrti (and later Śāntarakṣita) in arguments 
defending the multi-life perspective. These principles form a philosophical 
foundation for most of the Buddhist traditions that exist to this day. It is for this 
reason that the core principles of Abhidharma should be both compatible with 
the commitments of most Buddhist schools and capable of providing some 
support to an argument defending the plausibility of rebirth. I wish to present 
the three core Abhidharma principles that will be crucial in an argument for 
taking the traditional Buddhist multi-life perspective seriously. I will refer to 
these as: 
1) The Chariot Principle 
2) The Cluster Principle 
3) The Continuity Principle 
These three principles are logically connected insofar as adopting the first 
opens the way to adopting the following two. In order to show how this is the 
case I will demonstrate how and why these Abhidharma principles have been 
supported and applied. 
 
2.3 Abhidharma Principle I – The Chariot Principle 
One of the clearest demonstrations of the application of Abhidharma principles 
is found in Milinda’s Questions. This text recounts a (most likely imagined) 
conversation between the Bactrian King Milinda (150-110 BCE) and a monk 
who introduces himself as Nāgasena. The monk claims that “Nāgasena” is 
simply a convenient label because ultimately there is no individual who can be 
found. The king initially dismisses this claim as nonsense and so, in response, 
Nāgasena provides an analysis of King Milinda’s chariot in order to show that it 
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cannot be found.25 Analysing the chariot, we find the pole, axle, wheels, 
framework and reins but we find nothing that is the chariot. All that can be found 
when we analyse the object is multiple parts or features and the convention to 
unify and label this multiplicity as if it were a single entity. Nothing can be found 
aside from the parts and their designation as “chariot”. Such designations are 
a convenience but ultimately there is no chariot beyond the label.26  
Echoing Gautama’s teachings, Nāgasena goes on to explain to the king how 
this analysis can be applied to individuals such as himself. When we analyse 
ourselves we find five types of feature: the physical features of the body as well 
as feelings, cognitions, volitions and consciousness.27 Aside from these five 
psychophysical factors (frequently referred to as aggregates) there is no self. 
Like the chariot, the self is neither among nor separate from the parts; “self” is 
merely a convenient label. The wisdom that recognises this inability to find an 
ultimate self among or separate from the aggregates is referred to in various 
places as the wisdom of no-self, the wisdom of selflessness or the wisdom of 
emptiness (meaning emptiness of self). Regardless of the precise terminology, 
this is the kind of wisdom that Buddhist practitioners have traditionally sought 
to cultivate in order to be liberated from the cycle of rebirth.  
The precise philosophical moves being made by Nāgasena are explored 
thoroughly in Mark Siderits’ Buddhism as Philosophy and also in Amber 
Carpenter’s Indian Buddhist Philosophy but the primary principle at work is that 
to exist in the ultimate sense is to be something in particular. The earliest 
Buddhist thinkers took the view that it was only sensible to consider things to 
exist if they were a particular characteristic or feature of reality that could be 
distinguished from other particular characteristics.28 According to this 
                                                 
 
 
 
25 Milinda’s Questions, trans. Isaline B. Horner, London, Luzac, 1963-64, pp.25-28. 
26 Gethin, The Foundations of Buddhism, p.139. 
27 Ibid., p.136. See also Dan Lusthaus, Buddhist Phenomenology, RoutledgeCurzon, 2002, 
p.50. 
28 See Y. Karunadasa, The Theravāda Abhidhamma: Its Inquiry Into the Nature of 
Conditioned Reality. Centre for Buddhist Studies, University of Hong Kong, 2010, 
pp.14,15. See also K. L. Dhammajoti, Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, Centre of Buddhist 
Studies, The University of Hong Kong, 2007, p.23. 
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perspective, the only things that can be said to have any kind of existence must 
have a defining characteristic in virtue of which their existence can be 
registered. This can be anything from a distinct phenomenal character to the 
minutest yet characteristic effect on other phenomena. What cannot exist is 
something characterless.  
We commonly describe entities such as persons and chariots as having parts 
and characteristics. This implies that the entity is something distinct from its 
parts and characteristics whilst at the same time having no distinct character 
apart from them. Under analysis, complex entities dissolve into the basic 
characteristics by which they are recognised and labelled. No chariot or person 
is ultimately found. In this way, without a particular characteristic to define them, 
complex entities like persons and chariots cannot be said to ultimately exist. 
They are simply labels attached to configurations of parts and characteristics, 
which do ultimately exist. These merely labelled configurations are referred to 
as conventionally real because it is part of everyday convention to speak of 
chariots and people instead of trying to mention every relevant characteristic or 
part. 
According to this primary principle of Abhidharma analysis, if an object, such as 
the self or a chariot, can be analysed into multiple elements it does not 
ultimately exist as one thing. This is the principle used by Nāgasena in order to 
analyse King Milinda’s chariot. Amber Carpenter refers to this as the Chariot 
Principle and formulates it as follows:  
Whatever has constituents depends upon those constituents for its 
existence, and depends upon our conceiving this ‘many’ as a ‘one’ 
for its unity, and so does not exist ultimately, but only (at best) 
conventionally.29 
 
She also offers the longer formulation:  
Wherever there are ‘multiple distinguishable and distinct’ properties 
or parts jointly referred to by a single word, we must identify one or 
the other constituent as the thing named, or discover some separate 
                                                 
 
 
 
29 Amber D. Carpenter, Indian Buddhist Philosophy, Durham, Acumen, 2014, p.43. 
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entity as the thing named, or accept that the name picks out several 
distinct individuals together, without there being some one thing thus 
picked out. In every case, the last option will turn out to be the only 
viable one.30 
 
Once the Chariot Principle is applied to everything, the result is a perspective 
in which the only ultimately real entities would be those basic characteristics or 
processes that cannot be coherently analysed any further.31 For example, if 
water is fluid and cold it is not ultimately real. As Carpenter points out, ultimately 
‘there is an instance of coldness and an instance of fluidity, co-located.’ Even 
coldness and fluidity would turn out to lack ultimate reality if they could be 
analysed into further distinct aspects.32 As Mark Siderits explains, ‘concepts 
like that of the chariot and water are aggregative: they involve the mind putting 
together separate things and then constructing some one thing to hold them all 
together.’33 It is for this reason that these entities disappear under analysis, they 
do not have a distinct nature of their own; they borrow their nature from their 
constituent features. 
The Abhidharma schools produced their own taxonomies of ultimately real, 
fundamental particulars called dhammas (in Pali) or dharmas (in Sanskrit). 
Examples of these include the most basic aggregates such as consciousness 
and feeling but also such characteristics as ‘lightness’, ‘malleability’, and 
‘agitation’.34 We do not need to accept the specific taxonomy of any of the 
Abhidharma schools in order to appreciate the principle involved, which is that 
to be real is to be a specific, particular something. An unspecific, vague or 
purely general phenomenon cannot be found anywhere in actual reality. Those 
phenomena that can be found in reality are particular phenomena. Any such 
particular will either be analysable into further particulars or it will not. In the 
case of an analysable phenomenon, its particular nature has been “borrowed” 
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from the further particulars into which it can be analysed. Such a phenomenon 
is, on analysis, ultimately found to be multiple particulars, which have been 
taken as one. This is why all analysable phenomena ultimately resolve, under 
analysis, into further particulars. Thus, according to the principles of 
Abhidharma methodology, any fundamental constituents of reality must be 
particulars that are not themselves combinations of further particulars. 
According to this methodology, these unanalysable particulars, whatever they 
turn out to be, are dharmas. 
If we were to apply the Chariot Principle universally we would find that the 
fundamental features of reality would have to be absolutely simple 
characteristics that cannot be analysed into anything further. Insofar as they 
are understood to be radically simple, a single dharma cannot be said to 
possess features, properties, aspects or abilities. Such a relationship of 
possession would mean that a dharma could be analysed into, on the one hand, 
the dharma entity itself, and on the other hand, the features or properties of the 
dharma entity. Such an entity could not be a dharma because it would be 
analysable into at least two particulars, the entity and its properties. This is why 
dharmas should not be confused with substances, which are the bearers of 
properties. As Carpenter points out, ‘they are their (respective) properties.’35 A 
dharma is precisely whatever property or characteristic defines it. For example, 
if we take lightness to be a dharma, we must consider such a dharma to be a 
particular instance of lightness. Such an instance both is and does a particular 
thing and nothing more. That is to say, a dharma cannot be analysed into, on 
the one hand, its nature, and on the other hand, its capacity to influence and be 
influenced by other dharmas. This would make a dharma into two distinct 
phenomena. Rather, a dharma is an instance, a specific occurrence, a simple 
event of a particular kind.36 
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Therefore, any given dharma is neither substantial nor enduring. As Siderits 
explains, ‘In the Abhidharma ontology there is no category of substance.’37 
Once we have applied the Chariot Principle, we find that anything with ultimate 
reality cannot have properties nor can such an ultimate belong to a 
characterless substance. Insofar as a substance lacks its own distinct 
characteristic, it cannot be discovered by analysis. All that can be discovered 
are the properties or characteristics that the substance supposedly bears. This 
is why dharmas are atoms ‘in the strictest sense’.38 Even the most basic 
constituents of matter are not, according to Abhidharma principles, miniscule 
particles. Even what some Abhidharma systems describe as an ‘earth atom 
dharma’ is, as Siderits explains, ‘just a particular occurrence of solidity.’39 A 
dharma is, as Carpenter points out, ‘atomos (indivisible) far more literally than 
in any ancient Greek atomism, for there are no single bits of reality that have 
both shape and size, for instance.’40  
 
2.4 Abhidharma Principle II – The Cluster Principle 
Both substances and ancient Greek atoms have often been considered to have 
independent existence, being capable of existing in isolation. In contrast, the 
complete simplicity of a dharma renders it intrinsically dependent on other 
dharmas.41 Even before we reach the level of fundamental dharmas we can 
recognise the way in which distinct features of reality depend upon others. Were 
it to be completely isolated, a characteristic such as consciousness or solidity, 
for example, would lack the required conditions to exist. Consciousness arising 
in the absence of either an object or reflexivity would not be consciousness of 
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anything, not even itself.42 An instance of solidity without shape would lack any 
spatial dimensions and so could not be said to occur at all. Our tendency to 
claim that there must be something that is solid rather than mere solidity comes 
from a recognition that solidity must co-arise with a range of other 
characteristics such as spatial extension.  
Despite their distinct natures, both consciousness and solidity require the 
presence of other characteristics before they can arise. And if consciousness 
and solidity can be analysed into further characteristics, these more basic 
constituents would be no less dependent on the presence of additional 
characteristics. At a certain depth of analysis, the distinct features of reality 
become so rudimentary that they can only exist in dependence on one another. 
Given how simple and basic dharmas are supposed to be, we should be able 
to understand why these would be no less dependent upon one another than 
distinctive characteristics such as consciousness and solidity. This was 
recognised within Abhidharma systems in what we can call the Cluster 
Principle, the recognition that any given dharma must always arise as part of a 
cluster of mutually dependent factors.43  
Both the Theravāda and Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma systems consider there to 
be basic mental and physical clusters. The most basic physical clusters include 
the minimal characteristics required for something physical to exist.44 The most 
basic mental clusters include the minimal characteristics required for 
subjectivity to exist. These factors include consciousness, volition, feeling, and 
recognition, four of the five aggregates.45 These four mental aggregates can 
only arise together because each factor has a particular characteristic that 
depends on the presence of others.46 While each of these aggregates can be 
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found listed as dharmas in some Abhidharma taxonomies, the fact that they 
always arise together in a cluster does not require that they be simple, 
unanalysable dharmas.  
As we shall see in later chapters, the justification for claiming that the mental 
aggregates form a cluster of mutually dependent factors relies on their 
irreducibly subjective character rather than their simplicity. Without the 
subjective character of consciousness, the particular qualities of an object could 
not be recognised, nor could there be any feeling or volition in response to that 
object. Conversely, any specific occurrence of consciousness must always 
arise with sufficient factors to determine the mode of its engagement with an 
object. In other words, there must be additional factors that determine the way 
in which consciousness engages with its object.  
According to Abhidharma thinking, an instance of object-directed awareness is 
neither a simple nor a passive phenomenon. A consciousness engages actively 
with its object, reaching out to make contact with it, investigating its nature, 
recognising its particular phenomenal quality, and then seeking to gain 
satisfaction from it. The image used in the early Buddhist text Atthasālinī, 
believed to have been written by 5th century commentator Buddhaghosa, is that 
of a spider responding to a tremor in its web. The spider moves along a thread 
to where the fly is caught and then feasts on what it finds. Likewise, any 
occurrence of consciousness involves different phases, which together 
constitute the engagement of consciousness with an object.47 Notably, these 
essential phases of conscious engagement with an object include recognition, 
the factor in virtue of which consciousness engages with the distinctive 
characteristics of the object. 
Furthermore, these phases amount to a drive to reach out, fully apprehend, and 
“indulge” in the object. In this respect, in its engagement with an object, any 
occurrence of consciousness involves the will to fully and satisfactorily 
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apprehend its object. Such a claim regarding the wilfulness of consciousness 
is not limited to early Buddhist philosophy. We can find a similar description of 
consciousness in the work of Edmund Husserl, the founder of phenomenology: 
the study of experiences themselves. Husserl explored the concept of 
intentionality, a term that he appropriated from his teacher Franz Brentano. 
Intentionality refers to the distinctive way in which consciousness reaches 
beyond itself and towards its object.48 For example, to see a cup is not simply 
to see the side of it that is facing us, rather we take the cup to have unseen 
sides in the act of apprehending the cup. Husserl describes this as ‘a striving, 
from the very beginning a “driving at” a satisfaction’.49 This striving character of 
consciousness, its reaching to achieve satisfaction in a complete apprehension 
of the object, must involve at least some degree of purpose. 
Like the Abhidharma philosophers, Husserl recognised that consciousness 
arises with a purposive, volitional component. And this purposive engagement 
of consciousness with an object always involves an affective character: the 
engagement of consciousness with an object involves pleasant, unpleasant, 
and neutral feelings.50 The drive to reach towards and gain some kind of 
satisfaction from an object renders the engagement in affective terms 
depending on how successful it is. And, according to basic Buddhist 
psychological assumptions, if engagement with an object is unsatisfying or 
unpleasant, the volitional factors that initially supported this engagement might 
cease to continue doing so. While any given occurrence of consciousness is 
purposive in being directed towards a particular object, such an instance will 
always come to an end. Like the spider moving to feast on a fly caught in a 
different part of its web, conscious engagement with one object might flow into 
engagement with a new object. But whether awareness of an object involves 
sustained engagement or is abandoned in favour of another object, both the 
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maintenance and transfer of attention on an object involve the same basic 
striving to achieve a satisfactory, pleasing state of object-apprehension. 
From this brief sketch, it has hopefully become somewhat clearer why the 
Abhidharma systems considered the mental factors of consciousness, 
recognition, volition, and feeling to form an indivisible cluster of characteristics 
that always arise together. Each factor in the cluster exists and operates with 
the others and cannot arise without the others. This state of affairs was taken 
to be indicative of the way in which the fundamental constituents of reality, 
dharmas, related to one another. Insofar as consciousness, recognition, 
feeling, and volition cannot operate without one another, so too must any further 
factors into which they can be analysed be likewise incapable of arising 
separately. And just as this would be true of the dharmas that constitute mental 
factors, so too would all dharmas be incapable of operating or existing without 
support. 
Insofar as a dharma is a completely simple, unanalysable characteristic, it 
cannot exist on its own. Even in the case of characteristics such as 
consciousness and solidity, which may in fact be analysable, we can see that it 
is in their nature to be unable to arise on their own. Consciousness arises as 
instances of object-awareness.51 Without the characteristics of which it is 
conscious, the character of consciousness cannot arise. Similarly, in the case 
of solidity, a lack of spatial dimensions renders the material characteristic 
impossible. For there to be an occurrence of solidity or resistance, it must co-
arise with another characteristic: spatial extension. In these cases, it is only 
when they co-arise with other characteristics that consciousness and solidity 
are able to exist as the particular characteristics that they are. The object of 
consciousness makes the occurrence of consciousness possible while spatial 
dimensions make the occurrence of solidity possible. 
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Furthermore, such dependent characteristics are also conditioned by the others 
with which they co-arise. Insofar as a given characteristic cannot arise without 
others, its very existence as the characteristic that it is requires other 
characteristics to condition the way that it arises. For example, consciousness 
of a sunset is not identical to consciousness of birdsong. Although this lack of 
identity is due to the difference between the objects of consciousness, there is 
no consciousness that arises separately from an object.52 There can either be 
consciousness of one object or consciousness of another. Both occurrences of 
consciousness are qualitatively distinct in virtue of the difference in the object 
with which each consciousness arises.  
Similarly, using the example of solidity we can recognise that there is no pure 
solidity, only solidity here or solidity there. The character of solidity is 
conditioned by its shape just as consciousness is conditioned by its object. 
Solidity and consciousness are just two examples of the way in which the 
distinctive characteristics that constitute reality depend upon and condition one 
another. Solidity is not spatial extension; consciousness is not its object. But 
solidity must be spatially extended, and consciousness must be conscious of 
something. According to Abhidharma systems, this pattern of distinction and 
dependence is found throughout reality. Every phenomenon that appears as if 
it can exist on its own can be analysed into a plurality of distinct characteristics. 
These characteristics constitute the nature of the apparently self-standing 
phenomenon, making it what it is. But even at the most fundamental level of 
reality these distinct characteristics will turn out to be like consciousness and 
solidity in that no instance of their kind could arise on its own, they can only 
arise in clusters.  
Hopefully it is becoming clear how the Cluster Principle follows from the Chariot 
Principle. Were we to analyse reality into completely simple characteristics, the 
very simplicity of these characteristics would be such that the very possibility of 
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their arising in first place would require other characteristics. Any fundamental 
characteristic must co-arise with others, forming a cluster of multiple 
characteristics. Like consciousness and an object, or solidity and spatial 
extension, characteristics that arise together support one another’s existence. 
Likewise dharmas, being the fundamental characteristics that constitute all 
phenomena, are understood within Abhidharma systems to arise in clusters. 
This is also why, according to Abhidharma philosophy, no phenomenon can 
arise from a single cause nor give rise to a single effect. An event or entity is a 
short-lived cluster of multiple factors with at least as many proximate causes as 
factors in its composition. 
For example, any occurrence of consciousness cannot be caused merely by a 
single immediately prior occurrence of consciousness. Insofar as 
consciousness always has an object, the object of consciousness must also 
have a cause. But because consciousness is distinct from its object, these two 
factors must have different preceding causes. Between them, the 
consciousness factor and the object factor must have at least two causes that 
worked together to produce consciousness of an object. According to 
Abhidharma principles, causation operates in such a way that ‘there is no single 
or multiple fruit of any kind from a single cause, nor a single fruit from multiple 
causes, but only multiple fruit from multiple causes.’53 This is how Buddhaghosa 
describes the operation of causation in the Visuddhimagga or ‘Path of 
Purification’, a text summarising Theravāda Buddhist teaching.54 Not only do 
dharmas always arise in clusters of multiple mutually dependent factors, they 
also arise from clusters of multiple causes. 
Equally, any event or entity, being a cluster of characteristics, can be expected 
always to give rise to multiple effects. An instance of consciousness cannot 
produce only a single succeeding instance of consciousness because both 
instances of consciousness require further factors, such as an object of 
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consciousness. Any occurrence of consciousness can only give rise to a future 
occurrence of consciousness if it does so in concert with another factor that is 
capable of giving rise to the object of that future consciousness. Neither 
consciousness nor any other phenomenon, dharma or otherwise, is capable of 
producing only a single effect. This is why there are no circumstances in which 
a dharma could arise alone; it will always be caused by, arise with, and give 
rise to, multiple other factors. In this way the very nature of a dharma depends 
on its arising with others.  
This is also why any particular dharma is understood to be very short lived.55 
Insofar as a particular dharma exists in dependence upon the other dharmas in 
a cluster, that particular dharma exists for no longer than the cluster of which it 
is a member. Once the phenomenon of change has been interpreted through 
the lens of Abhidharma principles we are left with a reality that unfolds and 
changes due to the arising of dharmas in different clusters at different times. 
Change would not be possible if all dharmas only ever arose as part of the 
same cluster. While some dharmas might depend exclusively on a fixed cluster, 
there must be dharmas that are compatible with a variety of others in order to 
be able to arise with different clusters at different times. Every example of 
change can then be understood in terms of characteristics arising and ceasing 
in different clusters.  
For example, a ball that has been thrown across a field can be understood in 
terms of physical characteristics arising at different locations at different times. 
Whilst the properties of the ball might remain stable as it moves, from an 
Abhidharma perspective what is happening is that the types of dharma 
constituting this object are arising in configuration with different portions of 
space in different moments.56 The reason why dharmas are so short-lived is 
that dharmas are conditioned by the others in their cluster. This means that 
even an unanalysable characteristic is different depending upon whether it is 
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arising in one cluster or another. For example, an instance of solidity in its 
simplest form in one part of space is characteristically the same as an instance 
in another part of space. But the different positions of these two instances of 
solidity makes them distinct from one another. As a solid ball moves through 
the air, solidity arises in different spatial positions and because each of these 
positions is different, there is a new instance of solidity for each new position. 
This is also the case with phenomena such as consciousness. Insofar as a 
particular occurrence of consciousness is conditioned by its object, an 
occurrence of consciousness cannot remain the same if the object has 
changed. Just as consciousness of a red sunset is different from consciousness 
of birdsong, so too is consciousness of one “tweet” of birdsong distinct from 
consciousness of a different “tweet”. Any occurrence of consciousness is 
defined by the particular characteristics that make consciousness what it is, but 
these particular characteristics exhibit intentionality, meaning that 
consciousness involves a specific object. Consciousness can only be 
consciousness if it is consciousness of a particular object, and the nature of 
that object defines what a particular occurrence of consciousness is. This is 
why a particular occurrence of consciousness lasts only as long as its object 
remains unchanged. If the object changes, so too does the consciousness. 
Furthermore, because every characteristic is conditioned by the others in its 
cluster, every characteristic is also altered by changes to that cluster’s 
configuration. In the case of the ball, both the characteristics of the ball itself 
and those of the space through which it moves are conditioned by its 
movement. Space occupied by a ball is distinct from space occupied by 
something else just as a ball in one place is distinct from a ball in another. 
Throwing a ball conditions the thrower, the ball, and the space through which 
the ball moves. Any other factors that are dependent upon and responsive to 
any of the fundamental constituents of the ball, thrower or space will also be 
conditioned by the throwing.  
The ripple of conditioning that emanates from the simple act of throwing a ball 
would alter every dharma connected to it via the conditioning relationship that 
exists between these mutually dependent factors. If every instance of change 
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has the same ripple-effect, the only characteristics that could remain 
unchanged for more than a moment would be those that are part of clusters 
that are not dependent upon any outside factors. From an Abhidharma 
perspective, such self-sufficient clusters would be incapable of change or 
interaction, making them completely unknowable.57 What are left are those 
knowable clusters that change because they are dependent and responsive to 
external factors. These clusters will be linked to every other via mutually 
dependent characteristics. As a result, a change anywhere becomes a change 
everywhere else.  
The continual conditioning of dharmas is another reason why they are unlike 
substances or ancient Greek atoms. Both substances and ancient Greek atoms 
have often been considered to be the eternal, unchanging reality underlying all 
change and transformation.58 In contrast, dharmas, despite their ultimate 
status, are ephemeral in the extreme. Because a single dharma cannot have 
multiple characteristics, we cannot say that a single dharma arises in multiple 
forms or at multiple locations. For example, each arising of solidity in a different 
location counts as a different dharma with each instance of solidity being 
conditioned by a different location. Similarly, each arising of consciousness with 
a different object counts as a different occurrence with each occurrence being 
conditioned by a different object. If consciousness can be analysed into more 
basic dharmas, these will be just as ephemeral as the changing phenomenon 
into which they are configured. In this way, the conditioning of any distinct 
characteristic over time provides the basis for claiming that there is not a single 
enduring characteristic but rather a series of subtly different ones. 
We can understand how the ephemeral nature of dharmas follows from the 
Chariot Principle when we apply it to time. Any entity can be analysed in terms 
of time just as it can be analysed in terms of space. A chariot can be analysed 
spatially into its wheels, which are beneath its framework, which is behind its 
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reins, and so on. It can also be analysed temporally into, for example, its 
construction phase, its first journey, second journey, and so on. The chariot has 
no existence aside from its occurrence at these times. And because the chariot 
cannot be found under analysis, its dependence on temporal parts ultimately 
applies to its fundamental constituents, the dharmas of which it is a 
configuration. The chariot is ultimately dependent upon and analysable into 
every instance of every particular characteristic that constitutes its occurrence 
as the thing that it is. This means that the occurrence of a particular 
characteristic over time can be analysed into distinct instances of a particular 
type of characteristic arising.  
Therefore, a single dharma, being completely simple, is an instance of a 
particular unanalysable characteristic. Where there are two instances of a 
single type of characteristic, our ability to recognise them as different instances 
lets on that they cannot be a single dharma. If the continual arising of dharmas 
in different clusters has a rippling conditioning effect on every other dharma, it 
follows that each dharma lasts no longer than the time it takes to be conditioned 
in a particular way. Once the specific conditioning factors change, the dharma 
in question can no longer be said to exist. What arises in its place is a dharma 
of the same type that is conditioned differently. The consequence of applying 
both the Chariot and Cluster Principles to everything, including time, is that no 
dharma can last for longer than a moment.59 This is why, from the perspective 
of Abhidhamma principles, every new moment brings a whole new world 
constituted by new dharmas. 
However, if the fresh arising of new dharmas in every moment amounted to the 
appearance of novel or unprecedented dharmas, the world could not possibly 
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make sense. If it were possible for a completely unprecedented characteristic 
to arise, the chances of continuity between even two consecutive moments 
would be implausibly remote. This is why dharmas are not just momentary, they 
are also serial. There is no type of dharma that arises only once. Any dharma 
is always preceded by a dharma of the same type just as it is also succeeded 
by a dharma of the same type.60 This is true not just of dharmas but also of any 
indivisible clusters in which they continually arise. To use our previous 
examples, if solidity or consciousness are configurations of fundamental 
characteristics that cannot arise separately, any occurrence of solidity or 
consciousness will be preceded and followed by further occurrences of these 
same types of characteristic. In this case neither solidity nor consciousness can 
be said to arise just a few times and then never again. For such an 
unprecedented arising of characteristics to be possible would mean that in any 
moment an infinite number of unprecedented characteristics could appear. The 
repeated arising of a comprehensible world in every moment makes such a 
hypothesis incredible in the extreme. 
 
2.5 Abhidharma Principle III – The Continuity Principle 
It is due to the absurdity that results from allowing for the possibility of 
unprecedented characteristics that one of the core principles of the Abhidharma 
approach is the Continuity Principle.61 Once we have used the Chariot Principle 
to undermine the idea that the world is full of substances or entities, the full 
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absurdity of assuming that fundamental characteristics can completely appear 
or disappear is revealed. Objects such as persons and chariots change over 
time, picking up and dropping certain characteristics depending on their 
context. If we think that entities like chariots are ultimately real and that their 
properties are merely their aspects, the fact that a chariot gains and loses 
properties such as speed, efficiency or colour does not seem problematic. If 
properties are simply ways for an object to exist, they can appear and disappear 
without really changing the stuff that exists. The problem is when the chariot 
falls apart. This is when we begin to wonder what happened to its essence. 
Nevertheless, it seems obvious that the chariot is no more, it has ceased to be. 
Suddenly annihilation seems very real. Equally, the production of artefacts and 
the birth of people makes the creation of completely new and unique entities 
seem commonplace. The ease with which we can observe the creation and 
destruction of objects combined with our inability to recognise the continuity of 
the most fundamental characteristics that constitute them makes change 
appear to be an interplay of creation and destruction rather than the constant 
reconfiguration of fundamental constituents. Once we apply the Chariot 
Principle, the demotion of objects to conventional status and the elevation of 
mere properties to ultimate status makes creation and annihilation much less 
plausible. The disintegration of constructed phenomena becomes inevitable 
while the creation and annihilation of the fundamental features of reality 
becomes not only deeply absurd but completely unjustified. 
For example, let us consider features of reality such as solidity or the subjective 
characteristics of consciousness. Insofar as these characteristics are 
distinctive, there must be fundamental features of reality that make them the 
way that they are. Instances of solidity or consciousness could not be said to 
simply appear or disappear without remainder because the fundamental 
features that constitute them must be preceded and succeeded by features of 
the same type. This condition must be accepted unless we are able to make 
sense of a world in which unprecedented, completely unpredictable 
fundamental features of reality can appear at any time. This is why, according 
to Abhidharma principles, any fundamental feature of reality must be preceded 
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and followed by another of the same type. This is one way in which the 
Continuity Principle follows from the Chariot Principle. 
Another way in which the Continuity Principle follows from the Chariot Principle 
is that, at the most fundamental level of reality, the creation and annihilation of 
phenomena must be impossible. Complex objects such as persons and 
chariots can be created and destroyed through gradual stages of development 
and dissolution. But, being complex, these are not fundamental phenomena. In 
contrast, the fundamental constituents of reality cannot develop or dissolve. 
Whether they are absolutely simple unanalysable dharmas or indivisible 
clusters of dharmas, the fundamental features of reality cannot appear part by 
part. This is because dharmas have no parts and indivisible clusters consist of 
factors that cannot arise on their own.  
If we were to believe that the creation and destruction of dharmas or indivisible 
clusters was possible, we would have to believe that such creation or 
destruction occurred instantaneously. Dharmas and indivisible clusters cannot 
emerge gradually because they either exist as the characteristics that they are 
or otherwise they cannot exist at all. For example, if there is a dharma of solidity 
or if the most fundamental form of solidity is a cluster of inseparable 
characteristics then either there is an instance of such solidity or there is not. 
Even if we accept that solidity comes in degrees, the weakest form of solidity is 
still characteristically solid in some sense. In order for even the weakest form 
of solidity to appear it would have to do so all at once. There would have to be 
a single instant in which solidity in such a fundamental form was created or 
annihilated.  
However, the instantaneous arising of any phenomenon requires there to be 
such a thing as a single temporal instant. If we were to believe that the creation 
and destruction of dharmas or indivisible clusters was possible, we would have 
to believe that such creation or destruction occurred within such a temporal 
instant. But if such an instant had a duration, its duration would render it 
analysable into temporal parts or phases. If the type of creation or annihilation 
that we are considering is not gradual, it can only take place in one of these 
phases, it cannot occur gradually over the course of more than one phase. In 
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this case, the phases of an instant would have to be durationless, otherwise 
they too could be analysed into further phases. Eventually we would require an 
unanalysable temporal instant in which the creation or annihilation takes place. 
Such an instant would by necessity lack duration and so would amount to an 
interstice or break in the occurrence of events. And yet, without having any 
duration whatsoever, such interstices cannot be said to occur within time at all. 
The conclusion drawn within most Abhidharma systems was that there cannot 
be breaks or interstices between the end of one event and the beginning of 
another. This conclusion follows from the foundational Buddhist approach to 
time, found in the earliest scriptures, in which there is ‘no moment, no instant, 
no particle of time when the river [of time] stops flowing.’62 Because each 
fundamental unit of time is always already flowing into the next, we cannot find 
a break in the continuous flow of time. In the Visuddhimagga, Buddhaghosa 
attempts to illustrate this situation by likening each moment in time to a single 
point on the rim of a constantly rolling wheel.63 In order for the wheel to keep 
rolling, no point on its rim can remain touching the same point on the ground. 
In fact, each point must already be leaving the ground as soon as it touches it 
in order for the wheel to be constantly turning. In this way, unless we think that 
time occasionally stops, we must approach the flow of events as completely 
uninterrupted.  
Therefore, if we were to believe that the creation and destruction of dharmas or 
indivisible clusters was possible, we would have to also believe that there are 
durationless temporal instants. These unanalysable durationless instants would 
be particles of time in which the flow of events was interrupted. But such a belief 
would be incompatible with Abhidharma principles as well as being highly 
problematic on its own terms. If time were to stop flowing, how could an event 
ever occur that would start it again? We should reject such a belief and accept 
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that even if we analysed every phenomenon into the briefest occurrences of the 
most fundamental characteristics, we would find no interruption in the flow of 
conditioning that brings one occurrence to an end and commences the next. 
Moreover, this uninterruptedness in the flow of events holds at every level of 
reality. Between the arising of the ball in one spatial position and its arising in a 
different spatial position there is no break in which the ball did not occupy any 
position at all. Likewise, between the arising of consciousness of a particular 
object and the arising of the following instance of consciousness, there is no 
point in time at which there is no consciousness at all. The fundamental 
characteristics that constitute consciousness cannot cease altogether. 
According to the Continuity Principle, wherever we find a conscious being, we 
can expect each instance of the subjective characteristics that constitute their 
consciousness to be followed without interruption by succeeding instances of 
those same types of subjective characteristic. In this way, one configuration of 
factors flows uninterruptedly into the next, forming an unbroken continuity 
between any given dharma and those that precede and succeed it. There is no 
gap in the stream of a particular type of dharma’s arising; one instance is 
immediately followed by another of the same type. There is no point in time at 
which a completely new type of dharma could arise. Nor is there a point at which 
the arising of dharmas stops. In this way, adopting the Continuity Principle 
commits one to the view that any fundamental characteristic is always 
immediately preceded and succeeded by another of the same type. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
In enumerating the key principles of Abhidharma analysis, my aim is to provide 
a few core premises that would be recognised and supported by the earliest 
Buddhist philosophers. Despite the historical debates that took place between 
the adherents of different Abhidharma systems, I believe that what I have 
referred to as the Chariot, Cluster, and Continuity Principles were adhered to 
by most interlocutors in these debates.  
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Furthermore, it is through the force of these principles that Dharmakīrti is able 
to reach his conclusion. If we accept Dharmakīrti’s premise that there is 
something distinctive about conscious events, it follows from Abhidharma 
principles that either there must be a number of fundamental characteristics 
that constitute this distinctiveness or else consciousness must be an 
unanalysable dharma. Even if consciousness is analysable into distinct 
features or aspects, a case can be made, based on the cluster principle, for the 
inseparability of the core characteristics of consciousness. From here an 
argument against the unprecedented appearance of these core characteristics 
as well as an argument against the possibility of their dispersal and annihilation 
would allow us to conclude that there must always be a previous occurrence of 
consciousness just as it must also continue occurring in future. If reasons can 
be given for believing that consciousness is either unanalysable or constituted 
by inseparable factors and also that the distinct characteristics of each event 
are reproduced in future events, reasons can be given to support the idea that 
consciousness, being one of these events, arises in a continual unbroken 
stream.64 
Therefore, if a case can be made for these key Abhidharma principles, this will 
strengthen the case for the Buddhist multi-life perspective according to which a 
cohesive, if minimal, form of subjectivity continues indefinitely into the future 
regardless of the presence or absence of the physical characteristics of the 
body. Throughout one’s life, the mental factors recurrently combine with bodily 
processes, the physical factor. When the body dies this psycho-physical 
combination stops arising but this does not stop the uninterrupted series of 
mental events. If we can offer strong reasons, accessible to Buddhists and non-
Buddhist alike, to consider these principles to be sound, secular mindfulness 
practitioners would have reasons to take arguments for rebirth seriously. 
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3. Reviewing the Situation: Rebirth in Contemporary 
Philosophy 
3.1 Introduction 
The overall aim of this project is to investigate whether a philosophical 
argument can be provided for the multi-life perspective that would be 
compatible with the core commitments found in the earliest Buddhist 
philosophical systems whilst also being accessible and persuasive to modern 
audiences. It is the purpose of this chapter to survey some of the works of 
scholarship that have evaluated Buddhist ideas and the arguments and 
assumptions behind them. What should emerge is something of an overview of 
how the Buddhist multi-life hypothesis has been approached in philosophical 
works that have sought justification for key Buddhist ideas.  
As has already been shown, there is a tendency for modern engagements with 
Buddhism to overlook, dismiss or otherwise side-line its traditional multi-life 
perspective according to which consciousness continues across multiple lives 
of birth, death, and rebirth. A ready example would be the work of Stephen 
Batchelor, who has developed an interpretation of Buddhism that is increasingly 
dismissive of its traditional multi-life perspective. Between his earlier Buddhism 
without Beliefs and the later After Buddhism, Batchelor’s views have shifted 
from a sceptical agnosticism regarding claims about rebirth to outright dismissal 
of them. Even in Buddhism without Beliefs, Batchelor describes the historical 
debates between different schools regarding the nature of rebirth as examples 
of the kind of unprovable metaphysical speculation that the Buddha rejected.1 
He does not entertain the possibility that these debates took place from a 
common basis of genuine insight and that the interlocutors in such debates had 
strong reasons to believe that rebirth takes place but sought further clarity 
regarding its details. Even in this earlier agnostic phase, Batchelor is decisive 
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in his dismissal of rebirth and does not wish to spend too much time on it in his 
presentation of Buddhism.  
However, it is important to clarify that a good deal of the debate regarding the 
plausibility of the Buddhist multi-life perspective takes place within different 
kinds of literature, not all of it scholarship in the usual sense of the word. 
Batchelor’s work, for example, does not represent the work of a Buddhist 
scholar in the conventional sense. Given his long training in the Tibetan 
tradition, Batchelor has not followed the usual academic route of obtaining 
educational degrees and academic research posts. This does not, of course, 
reduce the value of Batchelor’s work but rather helps to demonstrate the way 
in which his attempts at founding a secular school of Buddhism are distinct from 
most works of mainstream academic Buddhist scholarship. Batchelor’s 
engagement with Buddhism differs from the great deal of modern exegetical 
scholarship that does not seek to impose a modernist interpretation on the 
central aspects of Buddhism. 
Examples of this kind of conventional Buddhist scholarship include but are not 
limited to Bhikkhu Bodhi’s Comprehensive Manual of Abhidhamma; Rupert 
Gethin’s The Foundations of Buddhism or his article ‘Bhavaṅga and Rebirth 
According to the Abhidhamma’; Y. Karunadasa’s The Theravāda Abhidhamma: 
Its Inquiry Into the Nature of Conditioned Reality; K. L. Dharmajoti’s exploration 
of the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma; Robert Thurman’s Essential Tibetan 
Buddhism; and Walpola Rahula’s What The Buddha Taught. Such brilliant 
research aims to accurately represent the way in which Buddhism has been 
understood and practised in various traditions. Such research makes clear 
reference to the traditional cosmology in which rebirth is a key factor. 
Nevertheless, being exegetical in nature, these works of Buddhist scholarship 
do not attempt to explore the philosophical justification for the multi-life 
perspective. Although Robert Thurman’s Infinite Life constitutes an example of 
a Buddhist scholar advocating the multi-life perspective, only a few pages are 
spent briefly defending the belief. On the whole, scholars whose primary role is 
to provide exegesis and interpretation of Buddhist ideas tend not to engage in 
philosophical arguments about the truth of these ideas. Here there is an 
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interesting contrast with Christian scholarship, in which there is a long tradition 
of Christian theologians attempting to provide philosophical defences of 
Christian doctrine. Contemporary Buddhist scholarship lacks this sort of 
tradition. Almost twenty years ago, an attempt at remedying this absence was 
made in the edited volume Buddhist Theology: Critical Reflections By 
Contemporary Buddhist Scholars but this did not lead to a burgeoning tradition 
of Buddhist scholars expounding and defending Buddhist doctrines.2 One of the 
key concerns raised regarding the very idea of a “Buddhist” Theology was the 
fundamentally Christian structure of theology as a discipline. Richard Payne 
provided an argument to this end in a keynote address in August of 2011. His 
ultimate concern was that theology developed in response to Christian 
Europeans’ growing awareness of the plurality of religious belief across the 
world. Theology was developed as the discipline aimed at demonstrating the 
superiority of Christianity and staving off doubt in the face of multiple faiths. 
Buddhism, as Payne points out, developed amongst diverse religions from the 
beginning and also developed into diverse traditions. The desire to subsume all 
religious belief into a single unified church was never a major aspect of the 
development of Buddhism as it was in Christianity. This is why Payne considers 
it inappropriate to develop a tradition of Buddhist Theology.3 
However, insofar as it developed amongst other beliefs and practices, Buddhist 
thought and practice could not avoid developing a critical, philosophically 
argumentative dimension. It might, as Payne suggests, be a mistake to refer to 
this aspect of Buddhism as a kind of “theology” but this does not reduce the 
need for some degree of critical engagement with those countervailing 
viewpoints that contradict Buddhism’s foundational ideas and practices. If there 
is nothing that even approximates a theological tradition within contemporary 
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Buddhist scholarship, the job of engaging in arguments about the plausibility of 
traditional Buddhist ideas is left to contemporary philosophers. Such a situation 
does not bode well for the traditional Buddhist cosmological framework insofar 
as contemporary western philosophers engaging with Buddhism have not been 
particularly open to the claim that consciousness continues and is reborn after 
death. This is largely due to a strong underlying assumption shared by a great 
many contemporary philosophers of mind. Despite ongoing philosophical 
debate regarding the exact relationship between minds, brains and the world, 
the view that whatever consciousness turns out to be it ceases when the body 
dies seems to be a fixed assumption. That most philosophers are committed to 
this assumption becomes apparent when a particular number of them show 
interest in an area of argument in which this assumption should at least be 
questioned. 
In Real Materialism, for example, Galen Strawson argues that it is most 
reasonable to assume that conscious experience exists throughout the physical 
world. Adopting this position, Strawson suggests that there are subjective 
experiences that exist outside of living organisms but does not explore what 
happens to our own subjective experiences once they are no longer part of our 
living body.4 And Strawson is not alone. There is also an increasing amount of 
work that explores some of the serious philosophical problems facing the 
mainstream physicalist approach to consciousness in which it is a by-product 
of physical processes. Recent examples of this work include Philip Goff’s 
Consciousness and Fundamental Reality and Howard Robinson’s From the 
Knowledge Argument to Mental Substance.5 
Nevertheless, within contemporary philosophical debate as a whole, the view 
that whatever consciousness turns out to be it is a process that ceases when 
the physical body dies remains the dominant assumption. This assumption 
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rarely faces a direct challenge by those philosophers who are either challenging 
the plausibility of physicalism or otherwise redefining the physical away from 
the Cartesian assumption that it lacks any subjective or experiential qualities. 
When it comes to the possibility of individual consciousness existing after 
death, it seems that most contemporary western philosophers have made up 
their minds regarding the plausibility and importance of this issue. It is notable 
that when David Bourget and David Chalmers surveyed philosophers on their 
beliefs there were questions on whether they believed in God, whether they 
were physicalist or non-physicalist about the mind, and also on what constitutes 
personal identity, but nowhere was there a question on the possibility of life 
after death.6 The question on whether they believe they would survive 
teleportation has certain similarities but it is nonetheless clear that the question 
of whether there is something personal or subjective that survives death is 
being neglected within philosophy. One gets the impression that most 
contemporary western philosophers either have no interest in addressing this 
question or otherwise have made up their minds that subjective experiences 
simply do not continue after death. 
 
3.2 Buddhism in Contemporary Philosophical Discussion 
There is also an increasing number of works rooted in the western philosophical 
tradition that seek to explore Buddhist philosophy or make use of Buddhist 
ideas in order to explore the nature of mind and world.7 But what is 
conspicuously missing from many of these explorations of Buddhist accounts 
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of consciousness is the traditional Buddhist claim that consciousness is 
continuously reproduced even beyond death.8 
An increasing number of philosophers trained in the western tradition have 
engaged with Buddhist philosophical arguments and approaches in a way that 
demonstrates their relevance. Much of this work focusses on elucidating the 
key Buddhist arguments for distinct views regarding the self and reality. These 
works include, among many others, Paul Williams’ Mahāyāna Buddhism: The 
Doctrinal Foundations, Altruism and Reality: Studies in the Bodhicaryāvatāra or 
his paper ‘Abhidharma Ontology’; Amber Carpenter’s Indian Buddhist 
Philosophy; Mark Siderits’ Buddhism as Philosophy; Jay Garfield’s Empty 
Words; Dan Lusthaus’ Buddhist Phenomenology; and Miri Albahari’s Analytical 
Buddhism: The Two-Tiered Illusion of Self.  
There are also those philosophical works that make use of Buddhist 
philosophical ideas in order to address contemporary philosophical discussions 
around the nature and reality of the self. Examples include John Pickering’s 
article ‘The Self as a semiotic process’ and the volume Self, No Self? edited 
and contributed to by Mark Siderits, Evan Thompson and Dan Zahavi. These 
are examples of excellent work in which Buddhist analyses of the self, 
approaches to change and also psychological categories have been borrowed 
and explored as ways to approach and perhaps answer questions within the 
philosophy of mind and self.9 These excellent philosophical engagements with 
Buddhism do not, however, explore in any detail the arguments that have been 
presented in defence of rebirth. Any mention of the traditional Buddhist claim 
that consciousness is continuously reproduced even beyond death is often 
minimal or even absent from philosophical engagement with Buddhism. 
That said, we do find an extended discussion between Paul Williams and Mark 
Siderits in the third issue of Philosophy East and West, Volume 50. This 
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discussion begins with Siderits’ review of Williams’ Altruism and Reality and 
develops into a dialogue that centres primarily on self-interest in Buddhist 
philosophy with reference to rebirth. What becomes clear in this argument is 
that neither Williams nor Siderits considered rebirth to be particularly important 
to the Buddhist practitioner. Siderits considers the relevance of rebirth primarily 
in terms of its potential to reduce conventionally immoral behaviour in a culture 
‘that supports belief in karma and rebirth’.10 Williams states that the tendency 
for Buddhists, in practice, to consider themselves to be reborn is ‘a confusion’.11 
Therefore, despite tackling aspects of rebirth in their discussion, both Williams 
and Siderits show some ambivalence regarding its importance or validity. 
On the whole, contemporary philosophical works on Buddhism tend to avoid 
addressing cosmological aspects of Buddhism, instead maintaining a focus on 
arguments regarding the nature of consciousness, the self, and objects in the 
world. These sorts of arguments are those that have clear parallels in 
contemporary metaphysics and the philosophy of mind. In contrast, Buddhist 
claims about the continuity of consciousness after death do not find a clear 
parallel in contemporary philosophical debates. The dearth of interest in 
questions about the potential survival of consciousness after death within 
contemporary metaphysics and philosophy of mind precludes the cosmological 
aspect of Buddhism from being discussed in detail by the philosophers who are 
interested in Buddhism. Claims about the afterlife are generally dealt with by 
philosophers or scholars of religion and theology. For this reason, rebirth is 
generally subtracted from the category of Buddhist philosophy and placed in 
the “Buddhism-as-a-religion” bin.12 
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A clear example of this is found in Antoine Panaïoti’s Nietzsche and Buddhist 
Philosophy, an otherwise brilliant exploration of the relationship between the 
ethical systems presented within the work of Friedrich Nietzsche and the 
teachings of the Buddha. Panaïoti makes it abundantly clear from the outset 
that he will not be addressing the beliefs of traditional Buddhists but only the 
therapeutic practices that the Buddha taught for living well in this life.13 In this 
way he adopts the view that the Buddha’s claims about the afterlife are not 
relevant to the therapeutic practices that he also taught. This approach leaves 
unquestioned the assumption that Buddhism consists of a legitimately 
philosophical and practical side on the one hand and a culturally embedded, 
superstitious and faith-based dimension on the other. This is an imposed 
partition that is not found in Buddhist traditions. The partitioning of Buddhist 
philosophical ideas and Buddhist religious doctrines encourages the view that 
while traditional Buddhist thought can make important contributions to 
philosophical discussions around the self and consciousness, it is blinkered by 
religious convictions when it comes to approaching death. 
 
3.3 Rebirth in Contemporary Philosophical Discussion 
It would, however, be untrue to say that there is no work being done that 
explores Buddhist philosophical arguments for rebirth. We can indeed find 
examples of philosophical engagements with the Buddhist arguments that have 
been made in defence of the multi-life perspective.  
For in-depth analyses of these arguments we can look to work such as Richard 
Hayes’ article ‘Dharmakīrti on Punarbhava’; Roy Perrett’s Death and 
Immortality or his article ‘Rebirth’; Paul Griffiths’ On Being Mindless; Dan 
Arnold’s Brains, Buddhas, and Believing; or Mikel Burley’s Rebirth and the 
Stream of Life and his article ‘Reincarnation and the Lack of Imagination in 
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Philosophy’. But what none of these works does is engage with the key 
principles behind the arguments for rebirth and see how they might offer 
support where the traditional arguments are weak. There is no attempt to set 
up a discussion in which the traditional Buddhist is offered the contemporary 
philosophical tools to persuade an unconvinced audience to take the multi-life 
perspective seriously.  
For example, of the works mentioned, Hayes, Perrett and Griffiths present the 
arguments that are to be found in the history of Buddhist philosophy and provide 
some comments on how persuasive a contemporary audience might find these 
arguments. The aim of these works is simply to present the historical arguments 
rather than to develop those arguments in the light of contemporary challenges. 
In this way they do not set out to develop a dialogue between contemporary 
and traditional Buddhist thought. Arnold’s Brains, Buddhas, and Believing is 
slightly different. Arnold examines Dharmakīrti’s argument for rebirth and brings 
it into dialogue with contemporary arguments in philosophy of mind.  
However, Arnold’s primary goal is to demonstrate how certain features of 
Dharmakīrti’s argument are common to Jerry Fodor’s contemporary argument 
for a physicalist approach to mental states. Both Dharmakīrti and Fodor attempt 
to explain mental states, particularly beliefs, in causal terms that are incapable 
of making sense of how beliefs can be about anything. Arnold’s key aim is to 
criticise Dharmakīrti’s approach to the mental on the grounds that our ability to 
understand the meaningfulness of statements as well as our responsiveness to 
reasons (as opposed to mere stimuli) cannot be accounted for in purely causal 
terms. Arnold’s work does much to elucidate the intricacies of ancient Indian 
argument and their relevance to recent developments in philosophy of mind 
and language. It is not, however, clear where his discussion leaves us with 
regard to the central argument for rebirth that Arnold is examining. Rather than 
weighing in on the overall plausibility of rebirth, Arnold is simply critiquing 
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Dharmakīrti’s attempt to understand the mental in purely causal terms on the 
grounds that this is something which physicalists generally try to do.14 
Mikel Burley’s work is similar to Arnold’s in that his key focus is not on 
arguments for rebirth themselves but rather on related issues. In Burley’s case 
it is the relationship between rebirth beliefs and the ways of life in which these 
beliefs are embedded. He expertly brings Wittgenstein’s thought to bear on the 
issue of rebirth and in doing so presents belief in rebirth as inextricably linked 
to ethics and to a certain ‘form of life’.15 Burley argues that metaphysical 
questions about whether or not rebirth takes place cannot be separated from 
the moral vision that is enabled by talk of rebirth. Burley offers a fascinating 
exploration of the variety of rebirth beliefs in cultures that span the entire globe, 
from Asia to Africa to the Americas. In doing so he offers a powerful challenge 
to those western philosophers who have dismissed rebirth, somewhat lazily, 
without examining the particular views of those for whom rebirth is a feature of 
their world. Burley’s work does not aim to make a case for the plausibility of 
rebirth for a contemporary non-Buddhist audience. Rather, he argues for the 
inseparability of belief in rebirth and the way of life in which this belief lives and 
breathes. 
The works mentioned here take arguments for rebirth as primarily interesting 
for cultural, ethical, or scholarly reasons rather than as potentially persuasive 
to contemporary audiences. There is a risk here that this lack of dialogue 
between contemporary thought and Buddhist arguments for rebirth presents 
the multi-life perspective as something that cannot actually stand-up to the kind 
of scrutiny that contemporary secular audiences would subject it to. For some 
contemporary philosophers engaging with Buddhism, this is entirely the case, 
belief in rebirth simply does not survive critical appraisal. The most striking 
example of a philosophical engagement with Buddhism that vehemently rejects 
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rebirth in this way is Owen Flanagan’s The Bodhisattva’s Brain: Buddhism 
Naturalized. 
 
3.4 Owen Flanagan’s The Bodhisattva’s Brain 
Flanagan’s work attempts to offer an interpretation of Buddhism that is 
compatible with naturalism, a worldview that he admits is vague but can be 
taken to be the rejection of belief in anything that could be described as 
supernatural: rebirths, heavens, hells, creator gods, miracles and so on.16 For 
naturalists, the things that happen in the world are best understood in terms of 
‘causes that have revealed themselves both to exist and to possess actual 
causal powers that could explain the phenomena’.17 Flanagan seems to be 
referring predominantly to the kinds of causes for which there is scientific, and 
perhaps philosophical, evidence. He asserts: ‘World historical evidence 
suggests that naturalism, vague as it is, keeps being vindicated’.18 This process 
of vindication seems to consist in the capacity for scientific theories to explain 
more and more features of the world to such an extent that positing causes like 
miracles, afterlives and gods becomes an unnecessary extravagance. 
Flanagan claims that, in light of this evidence, it is most reasonable to assume 
that when all the scientific evidence has come in, no supernatural term will be 
needed to explain anything. In his words naturalism is ‘a good bet’.19 
The weakness of Flanagan’s approach is the way in which the term naturalism 
is stretched to include a rejection of belief in anything non-physical. For 
example, he places the possibility of a non-physical consciousness on the same 
scale of radical supernaturalism as ‘miracles’ and ‘evil spirits’. Being a 
naturalist, for Flanagan, seems to require being a physicalist. This precludes 
the possibility that a Buddhist might believe that consciousness is non-physical 
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whilst at the same time being considered a naturalist. Many Buddhists seem to 
be quite comfortable believing that their claims about the rebirth of a non-
physical consciousness in line with karmic laws are true and that scientific 
evidence will eventually validate such teachings. Nothing about this idea seems 
obviously problematic. What Flanagan fails to deal with is the possibility that, 
while the natural sciences might come to explain everything in the world, 
scientific theories will nevertheless have to undergo revisions in order to 
accomplish this feat. Scientific revolutions of this kind have occurred throughout 
the history of science and it requires a leap of faith to assume that there will be 
no more such revisions to scientific orthodoxy. The Buddhist view is simply that 
twenty-five centuries of investigation by Buddhist practitioners of 
consciousness and its nature has given them the “inside scoop” so to speak.20 
However, the strength of Flanagan’s approach is that he does engage with 
Buddhist beliefs, particularly about consciousness, and clarifies the key 
problems they encounter when subjected to the standards to which scientific 
theories are held. Such theories require support from robust evidence gathered 
using a scientific methodology that renders the evidence admissible. Insofar as 
they have not been supported by anything that Flanagan would recognise as 
admissible evidence, the Buddha’s teachings on karma, rebirth, heaven and 
hells realms are written off as ‘mind-numbing and wishful hocus-pocus’.21 The 
following passage is a clear illustration of how Flanagan sees such teachings 
in the light of his naturalising project: 
I am trying to provide a picture of Buddhism that could appeal to 
scientific naturalists, and both concepts [nirvana and rebirth] are 
notoriously unscientific, non-naturalistic. It is well known in 
anthropology and psychology that humans relish positive illusions 
and death-defying myths, especially ones that involve afterlives 
where karmic justice is doled out – and this despite the utter 
                                                 
 
 
 
20 See B. Alan Wallace, Hidden Dimensions: The Unification of Physics and Consciousness, 
Columbia University Press, 2013, 58-69. 
21 Flanagan, The Bodhisattva’s Brain, 2011, p.3. 
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incredibility, the complete epistemic unrespectability of such 
beliefs.22 
For Flanagan, a ‘tamed’ version of Buddhism must conform to the naturalistic 
view of the world and must therefore dispense with belief in a non-physical 
mental continuum that spans multiple lives. It is this belief that Flanagan 
perceives as particularly untamed due to the fact that it requires that 
consciousness can exist independently of a living brain and so is presumably 
non-physical despite being able to produce physical effects. For Flanagan, this 
is unreasonable because our entire scientific understanding of the world is 
predicated on the laws of thermodynamics, most notably that energy can 
neither be created nor destroyed. 
As a result, our conscious experiences must either be part of the physical make-
up of the nervous system or otherwise must remain epiphenomenal, unable to 
produce any kinds of physical effects. In this case the mental continuum would 
remain impotent with regard to the physical world. Our being conscious would 
have no effect on our actions. Emotions and sensations, which seem to require 
at least some degree of consciousness, would play no part in motivating our 
actions, rather they would simply be ‘akin to a press release about what the 
body is going to do’.23 Maintaining that there is a non-physical mental continuum 
but that it cannot produce effects in the physical world would create severe 
problems for any belief that our mind plays a causal role in our actions. 
Flanagan’s claim is that, in order for consciousness to produce physical effects, 
it is most plausible to assume that it exists in virtue of the physical processes 
realised in our brains. Therefore, we have no respectable reason to believe 
that, once our brain processes cease, there will be any more mental events for 
us. 
Flanagan’s work is perhaps the foremost example of an attempt to directly 
address the multi-life perspective in order to eliminate it from the Buddhist 
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worldview. The approach Flanagan takes in The Bodhisattva’s Brain has also 
been largely accepted by many of his critics. For example, in Charles 
Goodman’s article ‘Buddhism, Naturalism, and the Pursuit of Happiness’, he 
offers a response to Flanagan’s rejection of rebirth. While this response denies 
that the Buddhist doctrine of no-self is incompatible with rebirth, he does agree 
that rebirth is implausible. On the whole, Goodman accepts from the outset the 
separation of Buddhism into ‘mythic’ and ‘naturalised’ aspects, with rebirth 
being well and truly on the mythic side of this divide. 
However, strong resistance to the physicalist approach to Buddhism and 
consciousness exemplified in The Bodhisattva’s Brain can be found in the work 
of B. Alan Wallace. In Choosing Reality: A Buddhist View of Physics and the 
Mind, The Taboo of Subjectivity : Towards a New Science of Consciousness, 
and Hidden Dimensions: The Unification of Physics and Consciousness, 
Wallace argues that consciousness is fundamental to reality in a way that 
mainstream naturalism denies. The Taboo of Subjectivity offers a brilliant 
exploration of the ways in which a commitment to approaching phenomena 
from a third-person perspective within scientific methodology has resulted in 
many western philosophers and scientists failing to deal effectively with the first-
personal nature of consciousness. In both Choosing Reality and Hidden 
Dimensions, Wallace explores developments in quantum physics in order to 
demonstrate that consciousness is central to the development of physical 
reality. With reference to the work of physicists such as John Wheeler, Roger 
Penrose, George Ellis, David Bohm, Anton Zeilinger and Michael Mensky, 
Wallace presents an interpretation of natural science in which the observable 
physical universe arises in dependence upon conscious observation. 
Throughout these works, Wallace advocates for the relevance of Buddhist 
philosophical and meditative insights to the ongoing development of the 
sciences and even suggests how the kinds of miraculous powers believed by 
Buddhists to be possessed by accomplished meditators might be possible.  
However, like Stephen Batchelor, Wallace is another interesting interlocutor in 
this debate in that he is also a somewhat unconventional Buddhist scholar. In 
fact, Wallace and Batchelor trained together as Tibetan Buddhist monks, giving 
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them a very similar background.24 While Wallace, unlike Batchelor, is a doctor 
of religions studies, he also has degrees in physics and the philosophy of 
science, meaning that his engagement with this debate is not defined by one 
clear and simple academic discipline. This crossing of disciplinary boundaries 
is also found in Flanagan’s work insofar as it blends philosophy of mind and 
science with some light Buddhist scholarship. 
Furthermore, while there are brief mentions of the traditional multi-life 
perspective in Wallace’s work, he has yet to explicitly present an argument for 
the rebirth hypothesis. This is somewhat disappointing given that Wallace has 
written a polemical response to Stephen Batchelor’s interpretation of the 
Buddha’s teachings found in Confessions of a Buddhist Atheist and Buddhism 
without Beliefs.25 Wallace is particularly scathing about Batchelor’s attempts to 
side-line the importance of karma and rebirth so it is a shame that, with his deep 
knowledge of both physics and Buddhist philosophy, Wallace has not, to my 
knowledge, produced a popular defence of rebirth that answers the most 
common physicalist and secularist qualms. It is these qualms that motivate 
Batchelor’s deep scepticism about rebirth and Flanagan’s denouncement of the 
multi-life perspective as epistemically unrespectable. 
 
3.5 Nigel Tetley’s The Doctrine of Rebirth in Theravada Buddhism 
In order to find the kind of investigation that aims to evaluate traditional 
arguments for rebirth in an even-handed manner we can look to two works of 
excellent scholarship: Nigel Tetley’s PhD thesis The Doctrine of Rebirth in 
Theravāda Buddhism: Arguments for and against and Evan Thompson’s 
Waking Dreaming Being: Self and Consciousness in Neuroscience, Meditation, 
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and Philosophy. Tetley’s aim was to ‘ascertain whether there is any valid set of 
epistemological reasons for a non-Buddhist, twentieth century Westerner to 
regard the Theravādin concept of rebirth as true.’26 Apart from the exclusive 
focus on Theravāda Buddhism, the aims of Tetley’s project bear remarkable 
similarity to those of my own. The differences lie in the kinds of arguments that 
are explored. Tetley examines two broad groupings of argument for rebirth.  
Firstly he investigates the arguments for rebirth that are supported by belief in 
kamma or karma. These arguments primarily seek to justify rebirth on the basis 
that if disparities of fortune in this life are to be explained, former lives must be 
posited. The underlying assumption is that suffering and misfortune is caused 
by morally reprehensible acts just as happiness and fortune are caused by 
morally praiseworthy ones. Such arguments trade on the assumption, common 
in theological arguments, that the universe must ultimately be a just place. Such 
an assumption of universal justice is unlikely to be shared by the secular 
audience at whom the present project is aimed. In contrast, Tetley, writing in 
1988, was seeking an argument for rebirth that would satisfy twentieth century 
Westerners, many of whom will have had strong Christian sympathies. 
Nevertheless, it is the second type of argument on which Tetley spends the 
most time. These arguments are empirical arguments that seek to present 
Buddhist claims about rebirth as being based on observation and appeal to 
memory, particularly past life memories. Tetley shows how such arguments 
from memory get bogged down in questions regarding the reliability of such 
memories. The initial problem concerns the phenomenon of ‘cryptomnesia’ in 
which the origins of a memory are forgotten though the memory itself remains. 
A researcher cannot rule out the simple possibility that a subject claiming to 
recall a past life acquired information about that past life in their present life but 
forgot about this act of acquisition. Any information that is available about a past 
life that is available to the researcher will also have been available to the 
                                                 
 
 
 
26 Nigel Tetley, The Doctrine of Rebirth In Theravāda Buddhism: Arguments for and against, 
Doctoral Thesis, University of Bristol, 1990, p.2. 
82 
 
subject. This is why the ever-present possibility of cryptomnesia presents a 
problem for a researcher seeking to verify the accuracy of a subject’s alleged 
past life memories. 
The deeper problem is whether memories about a past life are even admissible 
as evidence for rebirth. Tetley explores the question of whether the transfer of 
memories, were it proven to occur, tells us anything about the continuity of a 
person from one life to the next. The point in contention is that a memory could 
conceivably survive death and travel to a new host without this meaning that a 
person has been reborn. Here Tetley concludes that the Buddhist conception 
of rebirth, based as it is on causal continuity, does not take memories to be the 
basis of personal identity. As a result, even genuine and accurate memories 
from a past life would not demonstrate that the person inheriting those 
memories had previously been the person that those memories were initially 
produced in. These problems are also addressed in John Hick’s vast work 
Death and Eternal Life, as well as in Roy Perrett’s Death and Immortality.27 
Questions regarding the reliability of memory in past-life claims are also dealt 
with by Evan Thompson in Waking Dreaming Being. The difference between 
Tetley and Thompson’s approaches is that, when it comes to evaluating the 
plausibility of rebirth, Thompson places more emphasis on the question of 
whether an individual consciousness could continue to exist after bodily death. 
In contrast, Tetley’s focus is on the reliability of past life memories and personal 
identity. It is the emphasis that Thompson places on consciousness that allows 
his somewhat sympathetic approach to rebirth to be compared more readily 
with Owen Flanagan’s unsympathetic appraisal. 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
27 See John Hick, Death and Eternal Life, Collins, 1976. See also Roy W. Perrett, Death and 
Immortality, Springer, 1987. 
83 
 
3.6 Evan Thompson’s Waking, Dreaming, Being 
In Waking, Dreaming, Being, Thompson investigates the full range of ways in 
which we can be conscious: wakefulness, pure awareness, dreaming, lucid 
dreaming, imagination, out of body experiences, sleeping, dying and self-
awareness. In doing so he utilises his considerable knowledge of Buddhist and 
ancient Indian philosophy, western philosophy of mind (including 
phenomenological approaches) as well as discoveries in neuroscience. The 
purpose of his book is to defend the enactivist view that the conscious self is a 
process of self-making rather than an illusion or a substantial entity.28 Yet it is 
his exploration of consciousness itself that fills most of the pages of his book 
and provides a great deal to think about. This exploration extends to the 
question of whether subjectivity might continue to persist beyond death.  
For example, in the opening prologue Thompson recounts the events at a two-
day conference at MIT in which both he and the fourteenth Dalai Lama spoke 
about the relationship between consciousness and the brain during a panel 
discussion: 
Midway into this discussion, the Dalai Lama says something that 
takes me by surprise. It connects to a question about consciousness 
and the brain I’ve thought about for a long time…Is consciousness 
wholly dependent on the brain or does consciousness transcend the 
brain?29 
While Flanagan’s answer to the Dalai Lama’s question is a vehement “no!” 
Thompson returns to it repeatedly throughout Waking Dreaming Being and 
does so in relation to the consequences the answer might have for the potential 
for consciousness to continue to exist after death. Thompson’s genuine interest 
in claims about the afterlife should be welcomed given the relative dearth of 
research into the consequences that our approach to consciousness has for 
claims about what happens to it after death. This genuine interest makes 
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Waking Dreaming Being a very useful piece of research for the purposes of this 
current project. Evan Thompson provides a brilliant guide as almost the 
quintessential (highly) educated westerner attempting to understand the 
questions raised by ancient traditions such as Buddhism. He engages with a 
broad range of arguments, including those based on reported out-of-body and 
near-death experiences, even hinting that he himself has experienced the 
former.30 He is nevertheless committed to examining such reports critically and 
making use of neuroscientific evidence where relevant. Where the evidence is 
lacking for the validity of such reports, Thompson accepts these findings but 
clearly with a heavy heart. In doing this, Thompson provides much of the 
groundwork needed to present a case for the continuity of consciousness after 
death. 
In particular, Thompson’s clear analysis of different types of consciousness 
allows us to begin setting out what the phenomenon actually is and why we 
might consider its continuity after death to be a possibility. Thompson makes 
use of the fact that, in western philosophy of mind, consciousness can be 
categorised in two ways. It can mean either ‘awareness in the sense of 
subjective experience or awareness in the sense of cognitive access.’ Firstly, 
when we take it to mean subjective experience, ‘we can say you’re conscious 
of something when it appears to you some way in your experience’. 
Furthermore, ‘a mental or bodily state is conscious when there is something it’s 
like for the subject to be in that state.’ Such subjective experience is also called 
phenomenal consciousness. Phenomenal consciousness is the precondition 
for subjective experiences, the condition without which there would be no 
reason for claiming that anything had a subjective character. But consciousness 
can also be understood to mean “access consciousness”. In this case, 
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Thompson explains, ‘you are conscious of something when you can report or 
describe it, or reason about it, or use it to guide how you act or behave.’31 
To clarify the distinction between subjective experience and cognitive access, 
Thompson provides the example of an image flashing by on a screen. This 
image appears and disappears so rapidly that we are not able to form the sort 
of memory that would allow us to clearly describe or think about what it was. 
This image-experience was too rapid to be access conscious but was 
nonetheless phenomenally conscious.32 Examples of the opposite situation 
would be cases where systems with artificial intelligence are able to report, 
describe and respond to a stimulus without necessarily having any phenomenal 
consciousness associated with that stimulus. Such systems could be said to be 
access conscious without being phenomenally conscious. 
Thompson points out that within Indian and Tibetan philosophical traditions we 
often find consciousness defined as ‘luminous’, ‘having the power to reveal, like 
a light.’ ‘Consciousness’, Thompson explains, ‘is fundamentally that which 
reveals or makes manifest because it is the crucial precondition for 
appearance.’33 From this description we can determine that it is phenomenal 
consciousness rather than access consciousness which has this luminous 
character. Appearance is a core feature of phenomenal consciousness 
because where something appears, where there are experiences, there is 
phenomenal consciousness. 
Furthermore, Thompson provides important insights into the nature of 
phenomenal consciousness and its ‘illuminating’ character. Specifically he 
argues convincingly against what he refers to as the ‘other-illumination’ theory 
of consciousness. He introduces this argument with reference to the parallel 
debates that have taken place within both Indian and western philosophy 
regarding the question of whether consciousness is self-illuminating or whether 
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it needs to be illuminated by something else first. According to other-illumination 
theories, in order to have a phenomenally conscious episode of seeing a sunset 
‘you need to have some kind of higher-level, inner cognition of your seeing.’34 
This higher-level cognition brings illumination and phenomenal character to the 
experience of seeing a sunset. 
However, insofar as it brings the phenomenal quality that is essential for true 
consciousness, the higher-level cognition must itself be phenomenally 
conscious. But in order to be conscious in this way, the higher-level cognition 
must be illuminated by an even higher level cognition. This requirement leads 
to a vicious infinite regress because every episode of phenomenal 
consciousness requires a higher-level cognition that can only be phenomenally 
conscious if there is yet another cognition. On the other hand, if we deny that 
the higher-level cognition needs to be phenomenally conscious, we are left with 
two unconscious factors, neither of which has any phenomenal character. We 
are then expected to believe that together these amount to a phenomenally 
conscious experience. Thompson does not find this theory convincing and, as 
we shall see later on, it amounts to a form of emergence that we have good 
reasons to reject. The alternative to other-illumination theories is the view that 
‘prereflective self-awareness’ is simply what phenomenal consciousness is: 
‘consciousness is self-luminous or self-revealing’.35 Thompson mentions the 
traditional analogy of the lamp, which illuminates itself whilst at the same time 
illuminating others.  
In this way, Thompson argues that it is part of the reflexive character of 
phenomenal consciousness to reveal and witness itself whilst also revealing 
events such as a sunset. This reflexive character is another key distinction 
between consciousness as cognitive access and consciousness as 
phenomenal awareness. In exploring the potential continuity of consciousness 
beyond death, Thompson is primarily concerned with the continuity of 
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phenomenal consciousness. The possibility being explored is whether 
subjective experiences of some kind or another might continue after bodily and 
brain functions have ceased, even if this is not necessarily accompanied by 
cognitive access to such experiences. 
The distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness allows 
Thompson to engage meaningfully with arguments from Tibetan and ancient 
Indian sources, which claim that consciousness persists while we are deeply 
asleep. Given these distinct types of consciousness it is plausible for ancient 
Indian and Tibetan philosophers to suggest that there might be phenomenally 
conscious experiences to which there is little or no cognitive access. Thompson 
suggests there could be levels of very subtle phenomenal consciousness for 
which there is ‘something it’s like for the subject to be in that state’ even if the 
experiences involved cannot be clearly recalled or reported. 
For example, there might be such subtle experiences during deep sleep that 
we cannot draw upon them in waking life. Within both Indian and Tibetan 
philosophy, we find claims that these subtle experiences can eventually be 
accessed through mental training or meditation.36 This can be understood as a 
more exotic version of the commonplace practice of recalling dreams after a 
little effort. Often we barely recall what we dreamt about the night before but 
with certain techniques this vague sense of having dreamt something resolves 
into a clear memory of the dream. Another example occurs during the practice 
of deep concentration on the sensations of the body. Often a practitioner 
becomes acutely aware of painful sensations that were not noticed previously 
but were in fact subtly impacting on their posture or movement. Within Indian 
and Tibetan philosophy we also find claims that these subtle levels of 
consciousness persist not only in deep sleep but also in death.37 Thompson is 
interested in arguments from Indian and Tibetan philosophy because of the way 
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in which they take consciousness to be continuous across a lifetime and not 
something punctuated by frequent gaps during deep sleep. 
Thompson’s interest in the possibility that consciousness is continuous 
throughout periods of waking and sleeping leads him to explore the 
development of this idea in Buddhist thought. In particular he looks at the 
Yogācāra School and its concept of store-consciousness, so called because of 
its ability to “store” tendencies towards thought, feeling and action across 
distinct moments.38 One of the key elements of the Yogācāra view is the idea 
that consciousness consists of a continuously changing background awareness 
that gives rise to particular moments of awareness that are of specific objects. 
For Thompson, the Yogācāra view is important in that it recognises the need to 
distinguish between background changes in consciousness and ‘rapidly 
changing episodes of sensory and cognitive awareness’.39 He draws parallels 
between this idea and the distinction in contemporary philosophy of mind 
between the perceptual or cognitive awareness of an object, sometimes called 
state consciousness, which is transitive in that it takes an object, and the life-
consciousness, sentience or creature consciousness, which refers to the whole 
subject of experience. According to the Yogācāra School, an episode of state 
consciousness of an object arises in part due to the pre-existing presence of a 
background creature consciousness.  
Thompson also draws connections between the Yogācāra view of 
consciousness and approaches to consciousness within western philosophy 
and neuroscience. In particular he uses it to explain why it makes sense for 
experiments in neuroscience to move away from a ‘building block model’ of 
consciousness. This model assumes that the neural activity corresponding to 
each content of consciousness could be used to build up an overall picture of 
the correlates of consciousness. Instead, researchers are beginning to explore 
the correlates of consciousness as a whole. 
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For example, experiments in binocular rivalry have been used as a means to 
dissociate the neural activity corresponding to conscious vision from that which 
corresponds to unconscious vision. The idea behind such experiments is that 
when there are two different visual stimuli, one for each eye, only one can be 
dominantly perceived at a time. As the visual stimuli compete for perceptual 
dominance, they alternate in being dominantly perceived. Corresponding 
neural activity can then be studied in order to discover whether there is specific 
neural activity that corresponds to the movement of stimuli between 
consciousness and unconsciousness. This approach adopts the ‘unified field’ 
model of consciousness, which has been advocated by philosopher John 
Searle.40 According to this model it is not enough to simply find the neural 
correlates for every object of consciousness as each object already 
presupposes a background consciousness that is modified by its content. The 
new approach, exemplified by binocular rivalry experiments, is to search for the 
neural correlates of the continuous background field of consciousness.41 Of 
course, Thompson’s view that there is a continuous unified field of 
consciousness throughout a lifetime of waking and sleeping is based on the 
assumption that it is a unified field of phenomenal rather than access 
consciousness. 
If there is indeed phenomenal consciousness without cognitive access during 
periods of deep sleep and coma, the lack of access would account for the belief 
that consciousness disappears during these periods. The state of 
consciousness at death is often considered to be akin to deep sleep or coma, 
but if these are not in fact examples of full unconsciousness, this analogy does 
not hold. Death would be the sole case in which the continuity of phenomenal 
consciousness completely ceases and would not be analogous to anything that 
occurs in life. This would not make the complete cessation of consciousness at 
death less plausible but it would allow for an analogy in the opposite direction. 
If periods of reduced brain activity result in a loss of access rather than 
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phenomenal consciousness, complete loss of brain activity could be treated in 
a similar way. Regardless of whether such a reverse analogy would be 
convincing, it is ultimately the distinction itself between phenomenal and access 
consciousness that motivates Thompson to take claims about the possibility of 
consciousness existing after body and brain functions have ceased seriously.  
Cognitive access involves reporting and responding to stimuli, something which 
can be done by physical machines without reference to any unusual or exotic 
characteristics. But phenomenal consciousness, being fundamentally 
subjective in character, presents a challenge to those who wish to reduce or 
explain it in purely objective terms. This challenge has come to be known as 
the ‘Hard Problem’ of Consciousness since David Chalmers first used the 
phrase.42 Following the work of Chalmers and also Thomas Nagel, it has been 
widely acknowledged that phenomenal consciousness presents a significant 
challenge to the usual attempts at reductive physicalist explanation. 
 
3.7 Conclusion: Rebirth and the ‘Hard Problem’ of Consciousness 
In both What is it like to be a bat? and Subjective and objective, Nagel argues 
that our knowledge regarding the physical facts about an organism, such as a 
bat, tells us nothing about “what it is like” to be that organism. This “what it is 
like”-ness is the subjective, phenomenal quality of an organism’s experiences, 
which cannot be inferred from the objective, physical facts about the 
organism.43 The objective perspective of the natural sciences provides us with 
what Nagel calls a ‘view from nowhere’ in contrast to the subjective first-
personal viewpoint or ‘view from somewhere’ that organisms such as bats and 
ourselves enjoy.44 As Nagel makes clear, the successful reduction of 
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phenomena such as water to H2O molecules or lightning to electrical discharge 
is successful insofar as we can strip away the subjective aspects of the 
phenomenon in question until we are left with what it is when viewed from no 
particular perspective. The reductionist explanation for the special properties 
found in water and lightning involves removing the subjective qualities such as 
what water feels like to our touch or what lightning looks like to us on a stormy 
night. Once these have been removed, we are left with the objective properties 
of water and lightning, properties that do not depend upon a conscious 
observer. These properties can be reduced to the properties of H2O molecules 
or electrical discharge with relative ease.45 
This success cannot, however, be replicated in the case of conscious observers 
themselves. To strip away the subjective properties from consciousness is to 
be left with something that completely lacks one of the essential features that 
makes consciousness the sort of thing that it is. Insofar as there is ‘something 
it is like’ to be phenomenally conscious there is a subjective, first-person 
perspective according to which there is something that it is like to, for example, 
listen to birdsong, be awestruck by lightning, bathe in water, or watch a sunset. 
To strip consciousness of this subjectivity is not to reductively explain 
consciousness but rather to lose sight of consciousness entirely.46  
And yet, the subjective character of consciousness renders it thoroughly distinct 
from the objective phenomena that populate the world according to the natural 
sciences. This is illustrated by Nagel’s use of the example of a bat. The physical 
facts about a bat, the organisation of its organs and nervous system, the way 
in which it uses a form of sonar in order to navigate in the dark, can all be 
explained and described in objective, third-personal terms that do not depend 
upon any particular perspective. But the phenomenal quality of the bat’s 
consciousness, for example what it is like to navigate via sonar, is not 
something that we can learn from an objective, third-personal description of the 
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bat. There are facts about the bat, subjective facts, which do not seem to be 
reducible to, nor explicable in terms of, objective facts.47  
While Nagel problematized attempts to reductively explain consciousness in 
the purely objective terms of the natural sciences, Chalmers presents an 
argument that goes even further in suggesting that physical properties are 
fundamentally distinct from the phenomenal properties found in consciousness. 
Chalmers asks us to imagine a world that is physically identical to ours and that 
is populated with identical duplicates of the physical organisms that populate 
our world. Such a world will include organisms that are physically identical to 
ourselves, which means that every physical fact that is true of us will be true of 
them also. We are then asked to imagine that these physical duplicates are 
devoid of any and all phenomenal consciousness. These duplicates might be 
“access conscious” insofar as they can report and describe their sensory and 
internal physiological states, they can reason about these states and use them 
to guide how they act or behave, but there is nothing ‘that it is like’ to be these 
organisms. There is no subjective, first-person perspective associated with the 
physical, biological, and physiological events that constitute these duplicates. 
Chalmers takes the view that such “zombies” are conceivable and that such a 
world is a possible one.48 The conclusion of this Zombie Argument is that there 
is nothing about the physical properties of an organism that necessarily entails 
the existence of phenomenal properties. It is possible to have physical 
properties without phenomenal properties.49 This leaves us with a situation in 
which a complete understanding of the physical facts about the human 
organism might tell us nothing about the subjective, phenomenal facts. 
Both Chalmers and Nagel’s arguments demonstrate that mainstream accounts 
of the physical world, including the body, do not include the kinds of subjective 
characteristics that would account for the existence of phenomenal 
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consciousness. If we cannot provide a clear explanation for how phenomenal 
consciousness arises from physical processes, our assumption that they 
nonetheless do so is more akin to an article of faith than a reasoned position. 
The difficulties involved in trying to explain the origins of consciousness should 
lead us to question whether phenomenally conscious states are entirely 
dependent upon physical processes. If the dependence of conscious states on 
physical processes is brought into question, the suggestion that conscious 
states might persist beyond bodily death acquires some plausibility. Evaluating 
the plausibility of such a suggestion on the basis of empirical evidence is not a 
straightforward task because this would ideally involve objective observation of 
conscious states. As Nagel has made clear, observing first-person states 
objectively, that is, from a third-person perspective seems, in principle, 
impossible. The discovery of correlations between the reports of test subjects 
regarding their conscious states and other objectively observable phenomena 
does not constitute direct observation of the actual nature of consciousness. 
Furthermore, correlations and repeated coincidences can occur for many 
reasons that do not involve one phenomenon’s existence depending upon 
another’s. Claims about the nature of subjectivity and its potential to continue 
beyond bodily death must be supported by arguments about the fundamental 
nature of reality and what kind of properties exist within it. These would be 
metaphysical arguments rather than empirical investigations. For those, like 
Owen Flanagan, who take the natural sciences to offer the best paradigm of 
knowledge, this might seem like a backward step. But such arguments are 
needed in order to determine whether consciousness has its origins in 
biological or even physical processes. It is therefore worth exploring some of 
the arguments that have been made by those defending the view that 
consciousness is not dependent upon the body and persists beyond death.  
However, those who wish to defend rebirth as an afterlife possibility must 
overcome some key hurdles. These hurdles have been most clearly recognised 
in the work of Flanagan, Arnold and, as we shall see, Thompson. Flanagan’s 
work is particularly effective in highlighting the problem that mental causation 
poses for those who wish to claim that consciousness is not dependent on the 
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physiology of the brain. Any effects that such a consciousness could have on 
the physical world would, presumably, have been noticed as strange 
occurrences unaccounted for by the physiological facts. In Brains Buddhas and 
Believing, Dan Arnold highlights another key hurdle: Making any metaphysical 
claim about the nature of consciousness is problematic given that this must 
involve claims about the conditions for consciousness. As Arnold points out, 
according to the arguments first made by Kant, knowledge is only made 
possible by transcendental conditions, and knowledge of their true nature may 
not be possible from within consciousness itself. One cannot say whether 
consciousness continues to exist after death if the ultimate nature of the 
conditions of consciousness and what governs them cannot be known by us. 
Colin McGinn has defended this view, arguing that our minds are cognitively 
closed with respect to the theories or properties that would enable us to 
understand the place of consciousness in the world.50 
Nevertheless, as an exploration of the relationship between consciousness and 
death, Waking Dreaming Being highlights the major issues facing any claims 
made about the ultimate nature of consciousness and potential continuity of 
subjectivity beyond death. In the next chapter I will use Waking Dreaming Being 
as a starting point in order to argue that, insofar as we accept that 
consciousness presents a challenge to the standard physicalist model of reality, 
we should begin to consider the possibility that consciousness has some kind 
of afterlife. To claim that it is unlikely, implausible, or impossible for 
consciousness to continue beyond death involves making strong and 
increasingly contestable assumptions about the nature and origins of 
subjectivity. It is for this reason that the current dearth of interest in considering 
rebirth as a respectable possibility has more to do with the naturalistic turn 
within contemporary philosophy of mind than with any lack of good reasons to 
consider consciousness to be capable of surviving physical death. 
                                                 
 
 
 
50 Colin McGinn, ‘Can We Solve the Mind--Body Problem?’ Mind, Vol. 98, No.391, July, 1989, 
p.350. 
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4. The Characteristics of Consciousness and Matter 
4.1 Introduction 
In Waking Dreaming Being, Evan Thompson examines one of the earliest 
known and most commonly cited arguments for the Buddhist view that sentient 
beings are reborn after death. This is the argument made by Indian philosopher 
Dharmakīrti (circa 600-660 CE) found in the Pramānavārttika. This argument 
has already been touched upon in the second chapter as has the fact that one 
of its key premises is the claim that consciousness cannot arise from that which 
is purely physical. Thompson’s examination of Dharmakīrti’s argument is one 
of the few examples of a contemporary philosopher exploring and evaluating 
the strengths and weaknesses of the argument in the light of contemporary 
discussions in the philosophy of mind and consciousness. Insofar as we are 
aiming to determine how rebirth might be defended in a contemporary context, 
Thompson’s approach to Dharmakīrti’s argument provides us with a good point 
of departure:  
Dharmakīrti reasoned as follows: matter and consciousness have 
totally different natures; an effect must be of the same nature as its 
cause; hence consciousness cannot arise from or be produced by 
matter (though material things can condition or influence 
consciousness).1 
Dharmakīrti’s argument predates one that René Descartes would make to a 
similar end a millennium later. The key premise, as presented by Thompson, is 
that matter is fundamentally obstructive, it resists other instances of matter, 
while the luminous nature of consciousness is unobstructed and non-
obstructing, like open space it is capable of including diverse objects. 
Consciousness can also cognise an object as well as itself, matter does neither. 
                                                 
 
 
 
1 Evan Thompson, Waking, Dreaming, Being: Self and Consciousness in Neuroscience, 
Meditation, and Philosophy, Columbia University Press, 2015, p.82. 
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Dharmakīrti’s description of the characteristics of consciousness is accepted by 
Thompson, and rightly so. Consciousness, specifically phenomenal 
consciousness, is ‘luminous’ insofar as it involves reflexive self-awareness as 
well as intentional or object-directed awareness. The metaphorical ‘luminosity’ 
of consciousness can be primarily understood as the fact that it is always an 
awareness of an object. In western philosophy, one of the most influential 
philosophers to recognise this aspect of consciousness was Edmund Husserl 
(1859-1938). As mentioned in the second chapter (section 2.4) Husserl, 
following Brentano, recognised that consciousness is intentional: it intends or 
is directed towards objects.2 As consciousness is approached with increasing 
seriousness within the philosophy of mind, phenomenological work such as 
Husserl’s is being explored with increasing interest and more contemporary 
philosophers are appreciating the intrinsically intentional character of 
consciousness.3 
 
4.2 The Core Characteristics of Consciousness 
Consciousness is the awareness that discloses the fact that anything exists. 
With phenomenal consciousness there is “something that it is like” to exist and 
it is this phenomenal quality that reveals the existence of the world.4 The very 
fact that there is any experience of anything at all is part and parcel of the 
object-directed character of phenomenal consciousness, which presents the 
world through objects with phenomenal qualities. This world-revealing 
character is also notable in that it ‘illuminates’ diverse phenomena. When we 
consider the differences between a bird’s song and a sunset we can also 
recognise the fact that the same characteristic of awareness is capable of 
disclosing the distinct phenomenal characteristics of these two experiences at 
different times. This characteristic is also able to unify these diverse 
                                                 
 
 
 
2 Ibid., p.36. 
3 See Dan Zahavi, ‘Intentionality and Phenomenality: A Phenomenological Take on the Hard 
Problem’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supp.Vol.29, 2003, pp.63-92. 
4 Ibid., pp.63,67. 
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phenomena, bringing them together into a single awareness of both birdsong 
and sunset. 
However, to be phenomenally conscious of birdsong does not involve only 
awareness of birdsong, it also involves a degree of awareness of the very fact 
that there is awareness of birdsong. Jean-Paul Sartre understood this self-
awareness to be the very precondition required for consciousness of an object 
to be possible. He refers to consciousness as being ‘pour-soi’ or for-itself.5 This 
is to say that consciousness is ‘self-given’ in experience, it shows up as a 
constituting feature of every experience.6 Whether or not consciousness is 
intrinsically self-aware is a question that has been discussed and disputed by 
both Indian and western philosophers of consciousness.7 
Nevertheless, within both Indian and western philosophical traditions a variety 
of arguments have been put forward providing good reasons to suggest that 
consciousness is indeed intrinsically self-aware.8 If phenomenal consciousness 
is not intrinsically self-aware then an additional consciousness will need to be 
posited in order to account for the awareness of awareness. We are then left 
with two consciousnesses, one that is directed towards the object and a higher-
order consciousness that is directed towards the consciousness of the object. 
This model of two consciousnesses only works if we do not look too closely at 
the actual nature of consciousness. Insofar as object-directed consciousness 
                                                 
 
 
 
5 See Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trans. Hazel E. Barnes, London, New York, 
Routledge, 2008.  
6 Dan Zahavi, ‘The Experiential Self: Objections and Clarifications’, in Self, No Self?: 
Perspectives from Analytical, Phenomenological, and Indian Traditions, Siderits, 
Mark; Thompson, Evan; and Zahavi, Dan, (eds.) Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2010, p.56. 
7 See Self, No Self?: Perspectives from Analytical, Phenomenological, and Indian Traditions, 
Siderits, Mark; Thompson, Evan; and Zahavi, Dan, (eds.) Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2010. 
8 See Dan Arnold, Brains, Buddhas, and Believing, New York, Columbia University Press, 
2012, pp.158-198. See also Joel Krueger, ‘The Who and the How of Experience’, in 
Self, No Self?: Perspectives from Analytical, Phenomenological, and Indian 
Traditions, Siderits, Mark; Thompson, Evan; and Zahavi, Dan, (eds.) Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2010, pp.29-34. See also, Paul Williams, The Reflexive 
Nature of Awareness: A Tibetan Madhyamaka Defence, Curzon, 1998. 
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‘illuminates’ an object, it brings to awareness the phenomenal characteristics 
that constitute ‘what it is like’ to experience that object.9 
For example, the phenomenal characteristics of seeing a sunset or tasting 
apple juice include every feature that constitutes ‘what it is like’ to see the 
orange sun meet the horizon or ‘what it is like’ to taste apple juice. These 
phenomenal characteristics are those features of the object that are known only 
in the subjective experience of the object and are therefore defined in terms of 
the subjective experience in which they are known. In other words, the visual 
experience of the sunset or the taste of apple juice involves characteristics that 
are only known through the having.10 This particular form of knowing is precisely 
what is described as the ‘illuminating’ character of consciousness. 
Consciousness of an object is therefore always a subjective experience that 
involves a phenomenal character. Understood this way, object-directed 
consciousness does not require a higher-order consciousness to illuminate it 
because the very awareness of phenomena involves an awareness that these 
phenomena are appearing. Once we accept that awareness of phenomena 
requires an awareness that these phenomena are appearing, an awareness of 
the awareness that constitutes this appearing has already been assumed. For 
someone to taste apple juice in the phenomenally conscious sense is for there 
to be something that it is like for them to taste its sweet apple flavour in their 
mouth. The phenomenal characteristics of this sweet apple flavour arise 
because they are illuminated by consciousness. Without this illumination, there 
would not be anything that it is like for someone to taste the apple juice. But 
what it is like to taste apple juice is not simply a matter of certain phenomenal 
                                                 
 
 
 
9 As mentioned in the previous chapter, this phrase goes back at least as far as Thomas 
Nagel’s ‘What is it like to be a bat?’ in The Philosophical Review, pp.435-450, Vol. 83, 
No. 4, October, 1974. 
10 As Galen Strawson puts it ‘when it comes to particular experiences, the having is the 
knowing’. See Strawson’s ‘Physicalist Panpsychism’ in The Blackwell Companion to 
Consciousness, S. Schneider, and M. Velmans (eds.), Wiley, 2017, p.378. 
99 
 
characteristics being known. It is precisely the way in which these 
characteristics are known that makes them phenomenal characteristics.  
For there to be something it is like for someone to taste sweet apple flavour in 
their mouth they must be aware of the sensations and flavours of the apple juice 
as appearing to them. Phenomenal characteristics must arise as appearances 
to a subject in order to be genuinely phenomenal characteristics at all. Without 
appearing as if to a subject, the phenomenal characteristics involved in tasting 
apple juice would not amount to the kind of subjective qualities that constitute 
‘what it is like’ for someone to taste sweet apple flavour in their mouth. This is 
why any phenomenal consciousness of the taste of apple juice must also be 
accompanied by an awareness of this taste as appearing to a subject. At the 
same time as being aware of the taste of apple juice, the taster of the apple 
juice is also aware of this taste as appearing to them. This is required in order 
for there to be something it is like for the taster to taste the apple juice at all. 
And to say that someone is aware that appearing to them, within their 
awareness, is a taste of apple juice in their mouth is no different from saying 
that they are aware of their awareness of the taste of apple juice. This is why 
their experience of tasting apple juice already involves some degree of 
awareness of awareness. Some degree of self-awareness is built into this 
phenomenal experience. 
Nevertheless, perhaps we have been too quick to conclude that all awareness 
of phenomena involves an awareness that these phenomena are appearing. 
There might be a very basic awareness of objects in which the appearance of 
those objects to consciousness is not itself conscious. For example, we might 
be in a deep conversation with a friend who mentions that there is loud building 
work going on in another room. Once our friend has mentioned the noise we 
recognise that we were hearing it all along but it was not something that we 
noticed. We might then surmise that we were aware of the noise but we were 
not aware of this awareness until our friend mentioned the noise. In this case 
we might conclude that we were conscious of the noise in a way that did not 
involve any self-awareness. The important question here is whether this basic 
awareness could be considered to be a form of phenomenal consciousness or 
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not. If phenomenal consciousness always involves some degree of self-
awareness, a lack of self-awareness with regard to the noisy building work 
might simply demonstrate that whatever basic awareness that we had of the 
noise before it was mentioned was not a form of phenomenal consciousness.  
To ask whether we were phenomenally conscious of the noise before we 
noticed it is to ask whether there was ‘something that it was like’ to hear the 
noisy building work in the background but not to notice it (because we were 
focussed on a deep conversation). If not, our basic awareness of the noise 
cannot be considered to have been phenomenally conscious because there 
was nothing that it was like to hear the noise when it went unnoticed. In this 
case we cannot describe the noisy building work as appearing within 
consciousness or as appearing as if to a subject. The noise does not really 
appear at all. Rather than appearing to consciousness, the noise simply 
stimulates our nervous system and is then somehow “readied” for phenomenal 
consciousness without actually being phenomenally conscious. In this case we 
are dealing with something like what Ned Block refers to as access 
consciousness, which refers not to the phenomenal awareness of an object as 
an appearance but rather to the object’s ‘availability for use in reasoning and 
rationally guiding speech and action’.11  
While phenomenal consciousness involves the appearance of an object to a 
subject, access consciousness involves the capacity for certain information to 
be available for rational action. In other words, for a given system to be access 
conscious of an object is for that system to have a representation of the object, 
a representation which can guide rational action. Such a representation need 
not be phenomenally conscious at all. It could therefore be the case that I can 
represent the loud noises coming from another room while in a deep 
conversation without being phenomenally conscious of these representations. 
The loud noises would be represented as present while not necessarily 
                                                 
 
 
 
11 Ned Block, ‘On a confusion about a function of consciousness’, Behavioural and brain 
sciences, Vol. 18, 1995, p.227. 
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appearing within phenomenal consciousness. According to some theories of 
consciousness, these basic, non-conscious representations would be lower-
order representations. These lower-order representations are object-directed 
but can also become objects of higher-order representations.12 In the case of 
the unnoticed loud noise, phenomenal consciousness of this noise arises only 
once there is a higher-order representation of it: a higher-order representation 
of the lower-order representation of the loud noise. Once the other person 
mentions the noise, I begin to represent the phenomenally unconscious, lower-
order representation and at this point I become phenomenally conscious of the 
noise. 
However, neither access consciousness nor mental representations would 
involve the kind of object-directed ‘illumination’ exhibited by phenomenal 
consciousness. While we can be access conscious of a loud noise or otherwise 
represent that noise as occurring, in none of these cases is there any 
awareness of the phenomenal characteristics of the noise. Lower-order 
representations would certainly not amount to the kind of ‘illuminating’ that 
brings the phenomenal characteristics of an object into awareness. While 
lower-order representations of noise would be object-directed, they would not, 
according to higher-order theories, involve any kind of phenomenal character. 
Similarly, access consciousness is firmly distinguished from phenomenal 
consciousness insofar as only the latter form of consciousness has a 
phenomenal character.13 Lacking phenomenal character, both of these forms 
of awareness could not capture the phenomenal characteristics of their objects. 
The way in which phenomenal consciousness reveals the existence of its object 
as something with a qualitative nature would be completely absent in the case 
of lower-order representations and access consciousness. 
Insofar as they would merely be representations within a system, lower-order 
representations would not be the kind of appearances as if to a subject that 
                                                 
 
 
 
12 See, among others, Peter Carruthers, Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory, 
Cambridge University Press, 2003. 
13 Block, ‘On a confusion about a function of consciousness’, pp.230-231. 
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characterise phenomenal consciousness. Such appearances involve an 
intrinsic degree of self-awareness because such appearances involve some 
degree of awareness that they are appearing to a subject. This is not to say 
that neither access consciousness nor mental representations can be directed 
towards objects. Rather, the claim is that the kind of object-directedness 
involved in these forms of awareness does not seem to have much in common 
with the kind of ‘illuminating’ object-directedness involved in phenomenal 
consciousness. Phenomenal consciousness is what makes phenomenal 
qualities known. No other form of consciousness or awareness does this. In all 
cases where there is an awareness of an object that includes the object’s 
phenomenal qualities there will be ‘something that it is like’ for this awareness 
to occur. In these cases such awareness would be a form of phenomenal 
consciousness. Insofar as phenomenal qualities are those characteristics of an 
object that constitute how the object appears to a subject, such characteristics 
must remain unknown until they arise within phenomenal consciousness.  
Therefore, the kind of object-directedness that a lower-order or access 
consciousness might involve would be limited in an important way. In the case 
of hearing noisy building work there is ‘something that it is like’ to hear this noise 
coming from another room. This qualitative aspect of hearing noise only turns 
up within phenomenal consciousness. If we remove the phenomenal qualities 
of the noise, if we remove the way in which the noise appears to the subject, 
what is left is not the object that we are familiar with. What we experience is the 
phenomenally propertied noise, this is the object as we know it. The 
phenomenally propertied noises, sights, smells, textures, and so on, which we 
encounter in our lives, are objects as ‘illuminated’ by phenomenal 
consciousness. A type of consciousness that lacks any awareness of the 
phenomenal qualities of sounds, sights, smells, and so on is one that is directed 
at its objects in a completely different way from the way in which phenomenal 
consciousness is directed towards objects. And whatever form of object-
directedness such consciousness might involve, we are primarily familiar with 
the object-directedness of phenomenal consciousness precisely because it is 
this form of object-directedness that involves self-awareness. 
103 
 
Therefore, if there is nothing that it is like to hear the noisy building work whilst 
in a deep conversation, any awareness of such noise will be neither self-aware 
nor object-directed in the way that phenomenal consciousness is. Such an 
example would not present a challenge to those Indian and western 
philosophical positions in which phenomenal consciousness is always both 
intrinsically self-aware and object-directed.  
Of course, our answer to the question of whether there is ‘something that it is 
like’ to hear noisy building work in the background but not to notice it might be 
“yes”. In this case we can be taken to be asserting something along the lines 
that the noisy building work appears within consciousness as if to a subject but 
that there is only the most dull or vague recognition of this fact until our friend 
points it out to us. The claim is that there is some degree of awareness of 
awareness of the noise even though this self-awareness is barely noticed. Such 
awareness of awareness would simply be dull or peripheral in contrast to the 
vivid, focal self-consciousness of the conversation itself. For such a claim to 
work we must accept that we can be phenomenally conscious of more than the 
object of our vivid attention. This is not a particularly problematic claim given 
that there are a number of commonplace examples of peripheral phenomenal 
consciousness.  
For example, let us imagine that I am standing up whilst in deep conversation 
with my friend. My awareness of what it is like to talk with my friend is central 
to my experience and therefore vivid. When I am talking with my friend I am 
aware that I am involved in a conversation and this awareness exhibits reflexive 
self-awareness: I am aware that I am conscious of this situation. Now let us 
consider my awareness of being standing whilst conversing. If I am deep in 
conversation, we can presume that I am not vividly aware of ‘what it is like’ to 
be standing up. And yet, I would not claim that ‘what it is like’ to be in this 
particular deep conversation did not involve any of the phenomenal qualities 
associated with standing up. I would not, for example, claim that when talking 
to my friend I could not feel my legs or the floor under my feet. If that were the 
case I would presumably have entered into a trance-like state such that, when 
conversing, I lost all sense of myself as embodied from the waist down. This is 
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not impossible but it certainly isn’t what normally happens when I am in a deep 
conversation. In most normal cases I remain aware of the feeling of my body 
as I stand but this awareness is a background feature of my experience that is 
neither as vivid nor as central as the features involved in the conversing itself.14 
Background features of the experience are part of what it is like to be conversing 
with my friend and, as such, I am phenomenally conscious of my standing whilst 
conversing. Despite being a background feature, the experience of standing 
appears as if to a subject. At the same time as experiencing this standing-
whilst-conversing, I am also aware that the whole experience, of which standing 
is a part, is appearing. This is only possible because of the self-awareness that 
is part and parcel of phenomenal consciousness.  
In the same way, I may also be phenomenally conscious of the noisy building 
work in the next room whilst deep in conversation with my friend. If the noise is 
a background feature of my experience then I might be phenomenally 
conscious of it, complete with an awareness of this awareness, without the 
focus of my attention being on the noise. It may even be the case that the noise 
appears to me in the background of my phenomenally conscious experience 
despite the fact that the thought, “there is noisy building work going on” might 
not have entered my mind until my friend mentions it. If noticing is a matter of 
degree, we might only fully notice a noise once we have had a clear thought 
about it. In this case it would be quite likely that we are phenomenally conscious 
of many things that we do not fully notice.15 But in this case even the peripheral 
forms of phenomenal consciousness would involve a degree of self-awareness, 
albeit without this reflexive illumination being fully noticed. This is why such 
peripheral forms of phenomenal consciousness do not present a strong 
                                                 
 
 
 
14 More will be said on the background, or fringe, of consciousness in Chapter Eight, section 
8.5. 
15 Such a position could potentially make room for higher-order theories. Lower-order 
representations could be identified with the background features of experience, which 
are phenomenally conscious and self-aware albeit in a dull, peripheral manner that 
eludes proper notice whilst higher-order representations would be the foreground 
features of experience that are vivid, focal, and fully recognised. 
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challenge to those Indian and western philosophical positions in which 
phenomenal consciousness is both intrinsically self-aware and object-directed.  
To be aware of objects as phenomenally qualitied appearances is to be aware 
of the very fact of their appearing, and awareness of this fact is awareness of 
the phenomenal consciousness to which they appear. Models of 
consciousness in which self-awareness is separated from object-directed 
awareness do not capture the phenomenal character of experienced objects. A 
type of object-directed awareness that is devoid of self-awareness cannot be 
object-directed in the way that phenomenal consciousness is. Whether we 
imagine the access consciousness discussed by Block or lower-order 
representations found in higher-order theories, object-directed awareness 
without phenomenal character cannot capture the familiar objects that populate 
everyday experience. Such objects have phenomenal qualities, which can only 
be captured by a form of awareness that is simultaneously aware of its object 
as an object and also as an appearance within awareness itself. Phenomenal 
consciousness is aware of its object in both ways because it is reflexively self-
aware. 
It is clear from his arguments in the Pramānavārttika that Dharmakīrti accepted 
that phenomenal consciousness is reflexive.16 While there was much debate 
between Buddhist philosophers on this issue, I will not explore this here. The 
arguments for the intrinsic reflexive character of consciousness are compelling 
and, as we shall see, strengthen the argument for rebirth. Those Buddhist 
philosophers who wish to reject the idea that it is part of the character of 
consciousness to be reflexive will have one less feature to point to in order to 
demonstrate that consciousness does not simply arise from purely physical 
processes. Dharmakīrti’s argument proceeds on the basis that the reflexive 
luminosity of consciousness is not shared by the material factors that constitute 
the body. If Buddhist philosophers wish to argue that the reflexivity of 
                                                 
 
 
 
16 See Arnold, Brains, Buddhas, and Believing, pp.158-198. 
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consciousness emerges from other factors, so much the better for the 
materialist. 
However, it has hopefully become clear from this brief overview of the issue 
that there are good reasons to believe that a separation between phenomenal 
consciousness as object-directed and phenomenal consciousness as self-
reflexive cannot be made to work. 
 
4.3 Buddhist Approaches to Consciousness and Matter 
Dharmakīrti’s chief claim is that, because matter and consciousness have 
completely different characteristics, they cannot be substantial causes for each 
other, only contributory conditions.17 This view, as Thompson points out, 
depends on a particular view of causation in which there are at least two types 
of cause: ‘substantial’ or ‘homogeneous’ causes and ‘contributory conditions’ 
of an event.18 Within the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, which Dharmakīrti would 
have been very familiar with, ‘substantial’ or ‘homogeneous’ causes (Sanskrit: 
sabhāga-hetu) are those factors that determine the character of an event and 
make it the type of event that it is.19 The term for substantial cause can also be 
translated as homogeneous cause precisely because such causes are factors 
that have the same character as the event for which they are a cause. But a 
substantial or homogeneous cause (sabhāga-hetu) is not enough to give rise 
to an event. 
In line with the vast majority of Buddhist philosophers coming before him, 
Dharmakīrti accepted that any event arises due to multiple factors. Whether we 
refer to these factors as causes (Sanskrit/Pali: hetu), as the Sarvāstivādins tend 
                                                 
 
 
 
17 Thompson, Waking Dreaming Being, pp.81-84. See also Dan Arnold, ‘Dharmakīrti’s 
Dualism: Critical Reflections on a Buddhist Proof of Rebirth’, Philosophy Compass, 
Vol. 3, No. 5, 2008, pp.1082-1084. 
18 See Arnold, ‘Dharmakīrti’s Dualism’, p.1083 and Thompson, Waking Dreaming Being, p.82. 
19 Bhikkhu K. L. Dhammajoti, Sarvāstivāda Abhidhamma, Centre of Buddhist Studies, The 
University of Hong Kong, 2007, p.190. 
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to, or whether we generally describe them as conditions (Pali: paccaya), as the 
Theravādins tend to, the basic view of causation is the same.20 The substantial 
cause is simply one type of cause or condition that is required for an event to 
arise. As Richard Hayes describes it, the substantial cause is the ‘antecedent 
condition that belongs to the same class of things as the product itself.’21 In this 
case, ‘contributory conditions’ are those factors other than the substantial 
cause, which contribute to the arising of an event (Sanskrit: kāraṇa-hetu) as 
well as those that arise along with and thus modify the basic character of the 
event (Sanskrit: sahabhū-hetu and saṃprayuktaka-hetu).22 
A common example of the distinction between the substantial cause and 
contributory conditions is a seed and its environment.23 An acorn grows into an 
oak tree and provides the core characteristics that make it an oak but it is 
environmental conditions such as the soil quality, the rain, and the sun, which 
provide the conditions for the oak tree to develop. The acorn can only grow into 
a tree with the right conditions but, no matter how good the conditions, without 
the acorn there can be no oak tree. Applied to consciousness and matter this 
example illustrates the idea that the subjective character of consciousness can 
be modified and conditioned by material events just as the character of matter 
can be modified and conditioned by conscious events but neither type of event 
is sufficient to produce the other. If a conscious event arises, there must have 
been a prior conscious event that was responsible for its subjective character. 
If we follow this idea to its logical conclusion, we are left with the claim that even 
the very first conscious event of a sentient being’s life must have amongst its 
causes a preceding moment of awareness. If bodily processes are purely 
material, lacking in any degree of awareness, they cannot be the sole causes 
of conscious events. The cognitive, conscious character of mental events can 
                                                 
 
 
 
20 Ibid., pp.181-211. See also Y. Karunadasa, The Theravāda Abhidhamma: Its Inquiry Into 
the Nature of Conditioned Reality, Centre for Buddhist Studies, University of Hong 
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21 Richard P. Hayes, ‘Dharmakīrti on Punarbhava’, Studies in Original Buddhism and 
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only come about due to a prior event of the same kind. Therefore our current 
cognition must be the latest in a chain of mental events, each contributing to 
the arising of the next. Because we cannot posit a beginning to this causal 
chain, the beginning of this present life cannot be the beginning of our 
conscious existence. Dharmakīrti concludes that previous lives must be 
posited, following a pattern of birth, death and rebirth, in order to explain the 
origins of consciousness in this life. As Thompson summarises: 
[T]he death of the physical body doesn’t interrupt the causally 
continuous series of moments of mental consciousness belonging to 
an individual stream of consciousness or mental continuum, though 
it does interrupt sensory consciousness, and this mental continuum 
eventually acts as a contributing condition in relation to another body 
in a future life.24 
The strength of Dharmakīrti’s argument rests primarily on two key premises. 
The first premise is that consciousness, or the mental continuum, has 
characteristics that are distinct from physical characteristics. The second 
premise is that the substantial cause for any event is a prior event with the same 
character. Events of a distinct character type can only condition the way in 
which an event of a different character type arises, they cannot bring that event 
about on their own. Thompson ultimately accepts the second premise of 
Dharmakīrti’s argument and the reasons for accepting this premise will be 
explored later. 
However, it is the first of Dharmakīrti’s premises that Thompson ultimately 
rejects. As we shall see, Thompson does not believe that we can so easily 
distinguish the mental from the physical. In fact, he presents what he believes 
to be an alternative Buddhist approach to Dharmakīrti’s distinction between 
mental and physical characteristics. Thompson contrasts Dharmakīrti’s claim 
that consciousness isn’t physical with a claim coming from the Vajrayāna 
system of Buddhist thought. In The Universe in a Single Atom, the Dalai Lama 
presents the Vajrayāna or Tantric Buddhist view as follows: 
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According to the Guhyasamaja tantra, a principal tradition within 
Vajrayāna Buddhism, at the most fundamental level, no absolute 
division can be made between mind and matter. Matter in its subtlest 
form is prāṇa, a vital energy which is inseparable from 
consciousness. These two are different aspects of an indivisible 
reality. Prāṇa is the aspect of mobility, dynamism, and cohesion, 
while consciousness is the aspect of cognition and the capacity for 
reflective thinking.25 
Thompson makes reference to this passage and takes it to be a demonstration 
of the fundamental differences between the Vajrayāna approach to 
consciousness and Dharmakīrti’s approach. In exploring this passage, 
Thompson clarifies that, although this particular claim might appear to be a 
standard physicalist approach to consciousness, the physical basis of 
consciousness is considered to be far more “subtle” than anything dealt with by 
current physics.26 
According to the Vajrayāna system, the subtle physical energy called prāṇa 
denotes the aspects of ‘mobility, dynamism, and cohesion’, which are 
inseparable from the cognitive aspects of consciousness.27 This indivisibility of 
consciousness and physical reality allows us to understand how something like 
mental causation might operate. As long as alterations in consciousness are at 
the same time alterations in subtle physical energy, and vice versa, interaction 
between subtle materiality and the rest of the physical world provides a site for 
two-way causation between the mental and the physical. This sort of approach 
avoids the pitfalls raised by Owen Flanagan in The Bodhisattva’s Brain.  
As we saw in the previous chapter, according to Flanagan, if consciousness 
can exist independently of any physical basis then it is difficult to understand 
how it could have an impact on the physical world. Our current scientific 
understanding of the world is predicated on the laws of thermodynamics, most 
notably that physical energy can neither be created nor destroyed. If 
                                                 
 
 
 
25 Dalai Lama, The Universe in a Single Atom: The Convergence of Science and Spirituality, 
New York, Morgan Road, 2005, p.110. 
26 Thompson, Waking Dreaming Being, p.85.  
27 Dalai Lama, Universe in a single atom, p.110. 
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consciousness is not part of physical reality then its effects on the physical 
world amount to the creation of new energy. This would create numerous 
anomalies that scientific experiments would presumably have discovered by 
now.28 It is the possibility of avoiding these problems that motivates Thompson 
to advocate the Vajrayāna approach to consciousness.  
However, the Vajrayāna system is not alone in taking the view that 
consciousness continually arises with a physical aspect. Accounts of 
consciousness as being inseparable from a subtle physical aspect can be found 
in a range of the most influential Buddhist systems. Such a view can be found 
in the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma system and also in the work of Buddhist 
philosopher Vasubandhu, both of which are heavily influential in the Tibetan 
traditions and the Vajrayāna system. Both Vasubandhu and the Sarvāstivādins 
took the view that consciousness would not be able to make the transition from 
one life to the next if it were not always accompanied by physical factors 
(Sanskrit/Pali: rūpa) even after death. As Robert Kritzer explains, ‘for them, 
consciousness must be accompanied by the other skandhas, particularly rūpa, 
albeit in an attenuated state. They call this complete being antarābhava.’29 As 
Kritzer explains, the five aggregates (Sanskrit: skandhas, Pali: khandhās) of 
consciousness, physical form, feeling, cognitions, and volition do not separate, 
according to the Sarvāstivādins. They held that some form of subtle or 
‘attenuated’ physical factor accompanies consciousness even after death. 
The view that consciousness travels from one lifetime to the next as an 
antarābhava complete with all five aggregates was contested, particularly by 
the Theravāda tradition. According to the Theravādins, along with some other 
Buddhist schools, there is no antarābhava. Rather, as Kritzer explains, ‘rebirth 
is simply a matter of the succession of the last moment of consciousness in one 
life by the first moment of consciousness in the next.’30  
                                                 
 
 
 
28 Owen Flanagan, The Bodhisattva’s Brain: Buddhism Naturalized, MIT Press, 2011, p.66. 
29 Robert Kritzer, ‘Rūpa and Antarābhava’, in Journal of Indian Philosophy, pp.235-272, Vol. 
28, 2000, p.235. 
30 Ibid., p.235. 
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Nevertheless, it is notable that the Theravāda tradition did not deny that human 
and animal consciousness always arises with a physical factor.31 The 
Theravādins, like most Buddhist traditions, agreed that eye, ear, nose, tongue, 
and body-consciousness, which grasp physical objects such as sights, sounds, 
smells, tastes, and tactile features, arise in dependence on the relevant 
physical organs as their bases. But within the Theravāda tradition it was also 
held that mind-consciousness, which grasps mental objects, arises in 
dependence upon a physical basis.32 The earliest references to this physical 
basis of the mind within the Theravāda Abhidhamma do not specify exactly 
what part of the body it is. Within the Paṭṭhāna, the Abhidhamma Book of 
Conditional Relations, this physical basis of the mind is referred to simply as 
‘whatever materiality on which mental activity depends’.33 Karunadasa 
suggests that, rather than being an attempt at evasion, this phrase reveals ‘that 
the physical seat of mental activity was thought to be very complex and 
pervasive and therefore that its location was not limited to one particular part of 
the physical body.’34 Later in the Theravāda tradition we find that the physical 
basis of the mind is identified with the heart or, more accurately, the heart-base 
(Pali: hadaya-vatthu).35 But Karunadasa specifically points out that the heart-
base is ‘not absolutely identical with the heart as such. Like the physical sense-
organs, it is a subtle and delicate species of matter’.36 
Here we might begin to see that the claims coming from the Theravāda tradition 
regarding the relationship between consciousness and physical reality are not 
so different from those coming from the Sarvāstivāda and Vajrayāna systems. 
All make reference to ‘subtle’ forms of physicality, or matter, when discussing 
the relationship between consciousness and the physical world. Disagreements 
regarding what happens between lives do not undermine the underlying 
agreement that consciousness in this world is continually accompanied by 
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some form of subtle physical stuff, whether that consciousness belongs to the 
eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, or mind.37 When we bring this view together with 
the perspective on the physical basis of consciousness found in the Paṭṭhāna, 
the commonalities are even stronger. The Paṭṭhāna presents the materiality on 
which mind-consciousness depends as complex and pervasive, a view that is 
not far from the Vajrayāna perspective in which consciousness is inseparable 
from a subtle physical energy that pervades the body. 
The intention here is not to claim that the positions held by the Vajrayāna, 
Sarvāstivāda, and Theravāda systems are more or less the same. Rather, the 
point is to demonstrate that, in making reference to the Vajrayāna view, 
Thompson is not pointing to a highly exotic iteration of Buddhist philosophy. 
There has been much debate between Buddhist schools as to whether mental 
consciousness, in contrast to the five kinds of sense consciousness, has a 
physical basis.38 Neither position in this debate is particularly unorthodox. 
However, the Vajrayāna system simply adopts a position that is closer to that 
taken by the Sarvāstivādins and Theravādins than we might initially think.  
As for Dharmakīrti, evidence suggests that he was strongly influenced by the 
work of Vasubandhu.39 This fits insofar as, like Vasubandhu and the 
Sarvāstivādins, Dharmakīrti denied that mind-consciousness has a particular 
physical organ as a base.40 It is likely, therefore, that he will have been in 
general agreement with Vasubandhu and the Sarvāstivādins on the 
antarābhava issue. It certainly seems unlikely that he would have adopted an 
idiosyncratic view in which consciousness exists independently of any physical 
                                                 
 
 
 
37 Buddhist cosmology does posit formless or ‘immaterial’ beings who are conscious but 
without any physical factors. Immaterial beings are exceptional cases in that the 
Theravādin accepted that there was no physical base to their consciousness and 
Sarvāstivādins did not consider them to have a physical aggregate. However, insofar 
as immaterial beings do not play a role in physical reality, their non-physical 
consciousness does not raise the kinds of problems that human and animal 
consciousness would if it had no physical basis. See Karunadasa, The Theravāda 
Abhidhamma, p.82 and Dhammajoti, Sarvāstivāda Abhidhamma, p.248,249.  
38 Hayes, ‘Dharmakīrti on Punarbhava’, p.118. 
39 Ibid., p.118n2. 
40 Ibid., p.118. 
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factors whatsoever. Given that Dharmakīrti’s argument does not deny an 
intimate relationship between consciousness and physical reality, why does 
Thompson think that Dharmakīrti’s approach can be so easily contrasted with 
that of the Vajrayāna system?  
It is possible that a potential misunderstanding of Dharmakīrti’s argument for 
rebirth stems from his denial that consciousness is dependent upon the 
physical body. If we are not careful, we might take Dharmakīrti to be denying 
that human consciousness functions in dependence on any physical factors 
whatsoever. In fact, Dharmakīrti is not denying this. He is only denying, firstly, 
that consciousness can arise from physical factors alone, and secondly, that 
the arising of consciousness is dependent upon the functioning of the physical 
body. The second denial rejects the idea that consciousness is intimately 
connected with the physical body as a whole but does not reject the idea that 
consciousness is connected with physical factors located within or throughout 
the body. An antarābhava, for example, is a cluster of consciousness and 
physical factors that arises after the physical body has died and in which the 
mental and physical aggregates exist in dependence upon one another. If 
Dharmakīrti’s argument for rebirth denies that consciousness exists in a 
dependent relationship with any physical factors whatsoever, his argument will 
end up denying the possibility of an antarābhava. Insofar as Dharmakīrti’s aim 
was to defend the general Buddhist conception of rebirth he would not have set 
out an argument that undermines one of the mechanisms by which rebirth was 
believed to occur. 
Aside from the antarābhava issue there are good philosophical reasons why 
Dharmakīrti would not have wanted to argue for the complete independence of 
consciousness from physical factors. Irrespective of any particular tradition, a 
case can be made from the basic principles of Abhidharma philosophy for the 
inseparability of consciousness and some fundamental characteristics that are 
traditionally considered physical. These are principles with which Dharmakīrti 
would have been very familiar and which he would not have sought to 
undermine. In fact, the first premise of Dharmakīrti’s argument, that 
consciousness and matter have distinct characteristics, is rooted in the 
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Abhidharma analysis of reality. This is why it is now important to explore this 
analysis and how it strengthens the premises of Dharmakīrti’s argument. 
 
4.4 Mental and Physical Dharmas 
As we saw in Chapter Two, the earliest Buddhist philosophical systems, such 
as the Sarvāstivāda and Theravāda, analysed reality into fundamental distinct 
characteristics. A key principle behind this method of analysis was the Chariot 
Principle. According to this principle, wherever there are ‘multiple 
distinguishable and distinct’ parts, features, or characteristics that are jointly 
referred to as if they were a single entity, the reality must be that the entity in 
question is simply a conceptual label that ‘picks out several distinct individuals 
together, without there being some one thing thus picked out.’41 Just as a 
chariot is simply a label given to the parts that make it what it is, so too can 
every complex entity be analysed into the plurality of simple characteristics from 
which that entity has ‘borrowed’ its complex nature.42 Ultimately, every complex 
phenomenon is nothing but a configuration of simple factors, called dharmas. 
A dharma is defined as that which has a particular intrinsic nature.43 This 
intrinsic nature is not borrowed from anything more fundamental, it is simply 
what the particular dharma is. Dharmas are therefore taken to be the irreducible 
fundamentals of reality. 
According to Abhidharma philosophy, dharmas are discovered by deducting 
conventional phenomena in order to see what is left. As explained by the 
Buddhist philosopher Vasubandhu in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam: ‘Anything 
the idea of which does not occur upon division or upon mental analysis, such 
as an object like a pot, that is a conceptual fiction. The ultimately real is 
otherwise.’44 Vasubandhu’s claim is that a conceptual fiction is something that 
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disappears from view once we have either literally or imaginatively separated it 
into the parts or characteristics that make it the way that it is. A pot is not 
ultimately real because, when it is broken into shards, there is no more pot. 
There is nothing intrinsically pot-like about the shards. We can also mentally 
take each of the pot’s features in turn and recognise that none of these features 
involves the pot. For example, the colours of the pot are simply colours; the 
texture is just texture; the shape is just sections of extended material. None of 
these features have any intrinsic pot-ness to them and without them there is no 
pot. We can deduct pots from our vision of ultimate reality on the basis that they 
can be analysed into parts, features, and characteristics in which there is no 
“pot-ness”. 
Any characteristic that counts as a type of dharma will resist this process by 
remaining in at least one of the parts, features, or characteristics that we 
separate or analyse an entity into. Once more, as Vasubandhu explains: 
Where there is the idea even upon division, as well as upon 
exclusion of other properties by the mind, that is ultimately real. Like 
rūpa (physical things): even when it is divided up into atoms, and 
even when the mind takes away properties such as tastes and the 
like, there is still the intrinsic nature (svabhāva) of rūpa. Feeling, etc., 
should be seen in the same way. Because this exists in the highest 
sense, it is called ultimately real.45  
According to Vasubandhu, the reason why there are physical dharmas and 
dharmas of feeling is because one cannot analyse them away by dividing them 
up or by mentally separating out their different parts, properties, or 
characteristics. Even when a physical object is divided into atoms, we are still 
left with something with basic physical characteristics. If you try to strip away 
every characteristic of matter you will eventually have to remove the intrinsic 
characteristics of rūpa. In this case you cannot analyse materiality into 
something more fundamental, you would simply have to eliminate it. You can 
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only eliminate a dharma, you cannot smoothly reduce it to characteristics or 
parts in which the dharma is completely absent.  
Within most Abhidharma systems, there were considered to be four 
fundamental characteristics of physical matter (rūpa), which were: movement, 
cohesion, temperature, and obstructive resistance. These were referred to 
using terms borrowed from the traditional Indian philosophical assumption that 
matter is fundamentally composed of four ‘Great Elements’ of ‘wind’ 
(movement), ‘water’ (cohesion), ‘fire’ (temperature), and ‘earth’ (resistance).46 
The ‘earth’ characteristic, for example, denotes what we frequently encounter 
as obstructiveness. Once we strip away sensory qualities, movement, 
cohesion, and temperature from material objects we are left with a certain 
amount of spatially extended obstructiveness. This extended obstructiveness 
does not reduce smoothly into something non-extended, nor into something 
non-obstructive. Non-extended obstructiveness would not be any kind of 
obstructiveness at all because it would lack the extension needed to occupy, 
and so obstruct, a space. But the obstructiveness itself disappears when we 
strip away extension while extension alone is insufficient to produce 
obstructiveness. Nor can spatial extension be combined with some unknown 
factor in order to produce obstructiveness. The only thing that we can spatially 
extend in order to create an instance of obstructiveness is obstructiveness 
itself. Obstructiveness, resistance, or hardness must either be introduced 
wholesale into reality or eliminated from reality, it cannot be smoothly analysed 
into other elements, nor can it be constructed out of other elements.  
Were it a conceptual fiction, obstructive resistance would borrow its nature from 
more fundamental characteristics. But it simply does not seem plausible that 
fundamental phenomena lacking the characteristic of obstructiveness would be 
able to provide rūpa with its distinctive obstructive characteristic. Even when 
we consider the fact that physicists generally understand atoms and their 
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obstructive capacities in terms of magnetism, we can recognise that obstruction 
is intrinsic to the repelling relationship between particles with the same negative 
or positive charge. Instances of spatially-extended obstructiveness, or ‘earth’ 
dharmas, might therefore be a fundamental part of physics as well as 
Abhidharma philosophy. Likewise, according to the main Abhidharma systems, 
the other characteristics of matter that were stripped away to discover the 
‘earth’ dharma can also be analysed in order to discover more physical dharma 
types.  
Aside from physical characteristics (rūpa) Vasubandhu also suggests that 
pleasant, unpleasant and neutral feelings (vedanā) cannot be smoothly 
reduced to phenomena that completely lack these characteristics. There is 
‘something that it is like’ to feel pleasant, unpleasant or disinterested and this 
phenomenal quality cannot be easily reduced to factors that are devoid of the 
phenomenal characteristics that make feelings what they are. And Vasubandhu 
will not have stopped at rūpa (physical form) and vedanā (feeling). All five of 
the aggregates, physical form, feeling, cognition (Pali: saññā, Sanskrit: 
saṃjñā), volition (Pali: saṃkhāra, Sanskrit: saṃskāra, or sometimes cetanā) 
and consciousness (Pali: viññāṇa, Sanskrit: vijñāna) were considered to be 
irreducible types of dharma for the same reasons: when we apply the Chariot 
Principle to ourselves, we find five types of characteristic phenomena and none 
of these phenomena reduce smoothly to further factors devoid of these 
characteristics.47 
However, it is worth bearing in mind that we can accept the overall Abhidharma 
methodology without concluding that any one of the five aggregates must be 
considered to be an unanalysable dharma. It might turn out that there are a 
variety of irreducible, and perhaps inseparable, characteristics that make form, 
feeling, cognition, volition, and consciousness so distinctive.  
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But even if we do not fully accept the Abhidharma taxonomy of dharmas, we 
can still appreciate that the Chariot Principle helps us to recognise how 
phenomena such as pots, chariots, and persons borrow their natures from the 
distinctive characteristics or ‘intrinsic natures’ of more fundamental 
phenomena. The assumption underlying the Chariot Principle is that the 
apparent distinctiveness of certain phenomena reveals a genuine ontological 
distinctiveness, which is a distinctiveness rooted not just in the way things 
appear but rather in genuine reality. Wherever and whenever we recognise 
multiple distinctive and therefore different phenomena, analysis is possible, and 
this analysis reveals a plurality of features and characteristics. This is a valid 
assumption to make if we accept that nothing can be apparently distinctive 
without this apparent distinctiveness being something real. If a phenomenon 
appears within conscious experience, and it appears as having multiple distinct 
characteristics, its very appearance must depend on the arising of those 
distinctive characteristics.  
For example, if we are going for a walk in the woods we might look up through 
the canopy and see the distinctive colours produced by the sunlight shining 
through the leaves. The green glow of each leaf involves a variety of distinctive 
visual characteristics, these are the phenomenal qualities involved in the visual 
experience of looking up into the forest canopy. These phenomenal qualities 
are genuine aspects of our conscious experience. If these qualities were not 
real at all, they would not even appear in our experience. The fact that they 
appear is proof enough that they are real and that their reality involves nothing 
less than their distinctive phenomenal characteristics. To say that these visual 
phenomena do not really have these distinctive characteristics is to fail to 
understand that the phenomena in question are appearances, they are 
subjective phenomena and so are precisely what they seem to be.48 We cannot 
appeal to a distinction between the way that objects appear and what they really 
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are when we are dealing with phenomenal objects because phenomenal 
objects, such as the green glow of a sun-dappled leaf, are only real insofar as 
they appear to be something within conscious experience. This is why analysis 
of subjective phenomena should be taken as a reliable indicator that there are 
certain distinctive phenomenal qualities that constitute our conscious 
experience of the world. 
Of course, a consequence of this approach is that the only way of knowing the 
distinctive characteristics that constitute reality is through conscious experience 
of them. Insofar as dharmas are simple phenomena, they cannot be known by 
description, they can only be known by acquaintance.49 As Mark Siderits 
explains, we can ‘know what is meant by the name for a certain dharma only 
through having direct experience of it.’50 This places a great deal of weight on 
consciousness as a means of knowing the nature of reality. This is why it is so 
important for Buddhist philosophers to accept that consciousness is both real 
and also reflexively self-aware. Insofar as consciousness involves immediate 
awareness of both its own nature and the nature of its object, conscious 
experience becomes a paradigm case of directly knowing reality. This does, 
however, also limit our capacity to make claims about the intrinsic nature of 
dharmas that do not arise as part of conscious experiences. 
For example, the distinctive characteristics of a colour such as red are known 
through our conscious experience of them. If we had never had a conscious 
experience of anything red, we could not claim to be acquainted with “redness”. 
Furthermore, there does not seem to be another means by which this “redness” 
might come to be known if we cannot have a conscious experience of it. This 
has been most clearly illustrated in Frank Jackson’s famous essay in which he 
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introduces Mary, a brilliant colour scientist raised in a black and white 
environment. She learns everything physics can tell her about colour, including 
how it is processed by the human brain, from black and white books in a black 
and white world (even she herself is frequently made-up so as to remain 
colourless). Eventually she is allowed to enter the world of colour for the first 
time and sees a red rose.51 It seems plausible to suggest that Mary encounters 
“redness” for the first time in virtue of her conscious experience of it. Whatever 
particular types of dharma constitute “redness”, they can only be known through 
direct conscious experience of them.  
However, there might be features of reality that cannot arise within conscious 
experience. If this is the case, their definitive characteristics may remain 
unknown simply because no direct acquaintance with their nature is possible.52 
For example, although obstructiveness involves a phenomenal quality with 
which we can become acquainted through experience, the full nature of 
physical reality might be beyond the scope of Abhidharma analysis if the full 
range of physical characteristics includes thoroughly non-phenomenal ones. 
This issue will be discussed further in the next chapter. 
Nevertheless, what is most important for the coherence of the Abhidharma 
philosophical position is that consciousness has distinct characteristics that 
make it capable of illuminating and thus revealing the nature of other 
phenomena. This ties into Dharmakīrti’s argument for rebirth, which relies upon 
the claim that consciousness has characteristics that distinguish it from physical 
phenomena. For Dharmakīrti, consciousness is distinct from other phenomena 
because, somewhat like open space, it is capable of illuminating diverse 
objects, as well as itself, without these objects excluding each other. The claim 
that consciousness is like space acquires some plausibility when we consider 
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that each phenomenal quality involved in an experience, such as walking in the 
woods, is able to appear together with the others. This is akin to the fact that 
every spatial object is able to occupy its own position within the inclusive 
expanse of space. In this way consciousness involves the appearance of 
multiple phenomenal qualities together in a single “phenomenal space”, so to 
speak.  
Consciousness can be characterised as a phenomenal space because multiple 
phenomenal qualities can and do appear together as part of a single conscious 
experience. Multiple colours, sounds, shapes, smells, sensations, and much 
more are known in a single conscious experience. Even if these different 
phenomenal qualities are apprehended one at a time, they do not appear one 
at a time. If each quality appeared as a conscious experience one at a time we 
would only ever think that there was a single such quality in existence: the one 
that we are experiencing right now. If a walk in the woods appeared as a 
sequence of singular atomic phenomenal qualities we would never experience 
the walk in the woods. 
This, however, does not rule out the position taken within most Abhidharma 
schools that consciousness apprehends one object at a time.53 This is because 
these Abhidharma schools considered memory to be the key factor in giving 
rise to our sense that we apprehend multiple objects all at once.54 The 
mainstream Abhidharma view is that our awareness of objects involves at least 
two distinct processes: the apprehension of one basic phenomenon at a time, 
followed by the conceptual construction (vikalpa) of these into complex 
objects.55 Some form of conscious retention is essential to the second process 
insofar as each basic phenomenon must remain within awareness long enough 
to be conceptually constructed into the complex objects that appear to us. 
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Abhidharma philosophers must accept such a view in order to account for the 
fact that objects appear as if they are arising within our awareness 
simultaneously. 
Therefore, even if our experiences are initially apprehended as a stream of 
basic phenomena, at some point these phenomena must get “stuck” in a single 
conscious experience long enough for there to be a complex experience 
involving a multitude of objects, characteristics, and qualities. Our knowledge 
of multiple phenomena must come from the appearance of these phenomena 
together in a single inclusive conscious experience, even if all but one of these 
phenomena has been retained from the past. Whether consciousness includes 
multiple objects by apprehending them simultaneously within a “space of 
awareness” or whether it includes multiple objects by retaining them, 
phenomenal consciousness has distinctive characteristics in virtue of which it 
includes multiple objects within a conscious experience.  
However, insofar as phenomenal consciousness consists of inclusive as well 
as object-and-self-illuminating characteristics, it seems that we cannot consider 
it to be a dharma. Insofar as a dharma is an absolutely simple and unanalysable 
type of characteristics, any phenomenon with multiple distinct characteristics 
cannot be a dharma. 
Within Abhidharma systems, consciousness is considered to be a dharma 
because some of the features mentioned so far are taken to be separate from 
consciousness-proper. For example, the capacity of consciousness to include 
or retain multiple objects is not taken to be an aspect of consciousness within 
most Abhidharma systems. This capacity is considered separable from the 
illuminating character that defines consciousness. Of course, without the 
inclusive characteristic, consciousness would only illuminate one absolutely 
simple phenomena at a time. Nonetheless, according to many Abhidharma 
systems what remained would still be consciousness, albeit very simple atomic 
consciousness. We would not have dissolved consciousness by stripping out 
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its ability to include diverse phenomena.56 What would remain would be the 
definitive character of consciousness, its illumination of other entities, objects 
or qualities such that they appear in conscious experience. 
However, even if we were to ultimately conclude that consciousness is distinct 
from its capacity to include or retain multiple objects, it remains both self and 
other illuminating. Phenomenal consciousness is distinctive insofar as it 
illuminates other features of reality such that they appear as phenomenal 
features for which there is ‘something it is like’ for them to exist. And this other-
illuminating character cannot be separated from the self-illuminating reflexivity 
of phenomenal consciousness. As argued at the beginning of the chapter, 
attempts to separate phenomenal consciousness as object-directed from 
phenomenal consciousness as reflexively self-aware do not work. To be aware 
of objects as phenomena is to be aware of the very fact of their appearing, and 
awareness of this fact is awareness of the subjective, first-person perspective 
in which they appear.57 Even if there were only a single simple phenomenal 
quality appearing within conscious experience, its appearance must be known 
as an appearance in order for the quality, as a phenomenal quality, to appear. 
In order for even the most basic experience to be possible, for example the 
experience of phenomenal redness, there must also be awareness of this 
appearance of redness. The phenomenally conscious experience of redness is 
an appearance as if to a subject and so cannot avoid including, within itself, the 
consciousness of the experience as phenomenally conscious, subjective 
experience. This is why we cannot separate the self-illuminating aspect of 
consciousness from its other-illuminating aspect. 
The question this raises for anyone using the Abhidharma methodology is 
whether self-illuminating and other-illuminating consciousness must be two 
different phenomena, two different types of dharma. It seems that to claim that 
                                                 
 
 
 
56 In the forthcoming chapters I shall argue that the inclusive aspect of phenomenal 
consciousness cannot be stripped out at all but for brevity this substantial argument 
will be saved for later. 
57 Zahavi, ‘The Experiential Self: Objections and Clarifications’, p.60. 
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consciousness is intrinsically self-illuminating would require that it was either a 
type of complex dharma or otherwise a conceptual fiction composed of at least 
two types of dharma. The same question arises if it turns out that 
consciousness has the intrinsic capacity to include or retain multiple objects. 
However, if we review Vasubandhu’s approach to Abhidharma methodology, 
we find that he does not emphasise simplicity as a criterion of being ultimately 
real. Rather, he leaves room for the possibility that a phenomenon might be 
neither a conceptual fiction nor an absolutely simple dharma. A conceptual 
fiction is a phenomenon that disappears when we imaginatively or literally 
separate it into constituent features. But we could encounter a phenomenon 
that is a complex of multiple characteristics but in which none of these 
characteristics can be taken separately. This seems to be true of the 
illuminating characteristics that make consciousness distinctive. Insofar as the 
illumination of an object involves its appearance as if to a subject, and this 
appearance involves an awareness of the illuminating awareness itself, there 
can be no other-illumination in the absence of self-illumination. Likewise there 
can be no self-illumination if there is no object being illuminated. Here we have 
a case where you cannot even imagine the two types of illumination as separate 
phenomena. Nonetheless they can be distinguished as different characteristics. 
The complex phenomenon of self-and-other-illumination does not disappear 
under analysis because both features remain firmly intertwined. Here we have 
a case of an ultimately real complex phenomenon. 
At this point we could consider revising our definition of a dharma so that it does 
not need to be a simple and unanalysable type of characteristic. Such a revision 
would not only take us quite far from the principles of Abhidharma methodology, 
it is also unnecessary. We can instead accept as ultimately real not only the 
most simple dharmas but also those indivisible clusters of dharmas in which 
none of the characteristics could exist in isolation from the others. These 
absolutely indivisible clusters meet Vasubandhu’s criteria for being ultimately 
real whilst not being absolutely simple. Such clusters are not conceptual fictions 
because it is not our conceptualising alone that brings them together as one 
thing. Rather, the mutual dependence of each factor within the cluster means 
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that they always arise together, regardless of our conceptual activity. And yet, 
these clusters are not dharmas because they are complex configurations of 
more basic factors. 
If we adopt Vasubandhu’s particular definition of a conceptual fiction, we can 
maintain that phenomenal consciousness is intrinsically self-and-other-
illuminating without considering it to be a conceptual fiction. This also leaves 
room for phenomenal consciousness to have a range of intrinsic features that 
are absolutely inseparable from one another. Whilst this would mean that 
phenomenal consciousness could not be considered a type of dharma, its 
existence could not be said to be a matter of mere conceptualisation. Insofar 
as every distinctive characteristics of phenomenal consciousness disappears 
from view when we try to take any one of them separately, we cannot say that 
it disappears under analysis in the way that a pot does. 
According to Dharmakīrti, consciousness can illuminate diverse objects whilst 
also illuminating itself. This is what distinguishes the characteristics of 
consciousness, at a fundamental level, from physical characteristics. 
Furthermore, like obstructiveness, the characteristics of phenomenal 
consciousness must either be introduced wholesale into reality or eliminated 
from reality, it cannot be smoothly analysed into other elements, nor can it be 
constructed out of other elements. This irreducibility is the major reason why 
Abhidharma systems considered phenomenal consciousness to be a dharma. 
But even if Dharmakīrti’s characterisation of consciousness makes it too 
complex to be considered a dharma, this does not negate the fact that its 
distinctive characteristics cannot be analysed or separated into further non-
conscious factors. And whilst the application of the Chariot Principle reveals the 
ways in which phenomenal consciousness is a distinct feature of reality, the 
Cluster Principle gives us reasons to believe it is nonetheless inseparable from 
other aspects of reality, as we shall now see. 
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4.5 Inseparable Dharmas of Consciousness and Physicality 
As discussed already, in Waking Dreaming Being, Evan Thompson contrasts 
Dharmakīrti’s claim that consciousness and physical factors are distinct with 
the claim, coming from the Vajrayāna system, that a subtle physical energy with 
characteristics of ‘mobility, dynamism, and cohesion’, is inseparable from the 
core characteristics of consciousness.58 The characteristics of mobility, 
dynamism or ‘wind’ and cohesion or ‘water’ are also included as fundamental 
physical factors within Abhidharma systems. Along with consciousness, 
mobility and cohesion were classified as dharmas.59 But despite considering 
these phenomena to have fundamentally distinct natures, the Abhidharmikas 
did not consider these dharmas to exist as separate realities. Abhidharma 
principles rule this out thanks to what I have called the Cluster Principle. 
According to this principle, any distinct phenomenon, whether it is a dharma or 
not, never arises on its own but is always part of a cluster along with other 
dharmas.60 This is because it is the nature of dharmas to be connected to one 
another.  
If we were to apply the Chariot Principle to everything in our reality and were 
left with completely basic or “subtle” characteristics, which couldn’t be analysed 
into further distinguishable aspects, these basic characteristics would not exist 
as separate particles of reality.61 If reality was composed of intrinsically isolated 
particles, their composition and configuration into complexes would not be 
possible for the simple reason that each dharma would be, by its very nature, 
separate. Therefore, insofar as our reality is constituted by multiple distinct 
                                                 
 
 
 
58 Thompson, Waking Dreaming Being, p.83. See also Dalai Lama, Universe in a single atom, 
p.110. 
59 Dhammajoti, Sarvāstivāda Abhidhamma, p.250. See also Karunadasa, The Theravāda 
Abhidhamma, pp.153,154. 
60 As previously mentioned, this analysis of reality is common to the two earliest major 
Abhidharma systems, the Sarvāstivāda and the Theravāda. See Dhammajoti, 
Sarvāstivāda Abhidhamma, pp.255,275. See also Karunadasa, The Theravāda 
Abhidhamma, pp.76-83, 205-210. 
61 Karunadasa, The Theravāda Abhidhamma, pp.20-22. See also Dhammajoti, Sarvāstivāda 
Abhidharma, p.259. 
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characteristics, the only way that this is possible is if each of these distinct 
dharmas has an intrinsic connection to other dharmas.  
A genuine dharma must have an intrinsic connection with at least one other 
dharma in order for it to have any relationship, even if only indirectly, to the 
other dharmas that exist. In fact, according to Abhidharma systems, every 
dharma must be intrinsically connected to more than just one other dharma. 
For both the Sarvāstivādins and Theravādins, the smallest possible cluster of 
physical dharmas consists of eight distinct factors. This includes one dharma 
belonging to each of the four ‘Great Elements’ of ‘wind’ (movement), ‘water’ 
(cohesion), ‘fire’ (temperature), and ‘earth’ (resistance).62 When it comes to the 
smallest possible cluster of mental dharmas, the Theravādins take the minimum 
to be eight factors again while for the Sarvāstivādins the minimum is eleven 
distinct factors.63 Within both systems any mental cluster always includes a 
dharma of consciousness.64 
Regardless of the particularities of each Abhidharma system, the fundamental 
Abhidharma position is that any individual dharma can only ever arise within a 
configuration or cluster of dharmas in which each dharma is inseparable from 
the others. This is why, in accordance with the Cluster Principle, neither a 
dharma of consciousness, nor one of mobility, cohesion, temperature, or 
resistance could exist in isolation from other dharmas. In order to make a 
difference to reality as a whole, each dharma must arise in configuration with 
others. For such configuration to be possible, the intrinsic character of each 
dharma must enable it to arise in an inseparable cluster with other dharmas of 
a different character type. The way in which a particular type of dharma arises 
with another type of dharma must be part of the very nature of that type of 
dharma. And so, if each and every dharma is of the nature to arise in intimate 
configuration with at least some others, and if every dharma has a concrete 
                                                 
 
 
 
62 See Karunadasa, The Theravāda Abhidhamma, p.206 and Dhammajoti, Sarvāstivāda 
Abhidharma, p.262. 
63 See Karunadasa, The Theravāda Abhidhamma, p.99. 
64 See Karunadasa, The Theravāda Abhidhamma, p.71 and Dhammajoti, Sarvāstivāda 
Abhidharma, p.294. 
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impact on the way that reality as a whole is, it follows that every dharma must 
be connected to every other, even if some dharmas are only connected to 
others through intermediate dharmas. Therefore, the mental dharma of 
consciousness and the physical dharmas of mobility, cohesion, temperature, 
and resistance, both as individual dharmas and as types of dharma, were 
considered to be fundamentally connected to one another, either directly or 
indirectly through connections to other dharmas. 
If we now reflect on the core characteristics of consciousness we can examine 
the specific reasons why phenomenal consciousness cannot exist separately 
from the rest of reality. The key characteristic here is the fact that phenomenal 
consciousness is always consciousness of something. Conscious experience 
always involves consciousness of those factors that constitute ‘what it is like’ 
for there to be conscious experience. If phenomenal consciousness were not 
consciousness of anything other than itself, there would be nothing constituting 
‘what it is like’ for consciousness to exist. Purely self-illuminating phenomenal 
consciousness could not simply illuminate its own characteristics because 
phenomenal consciousness has no characteristics aside from those that arise 
during the illumination of other characteristics. This is why the arising of purely 
self-aware consciousness would not involve any phenomenal characteristics or 
qualities. There would be nothing that it was like to be conscious in this case. 
Such consciousness would not be phenomenal consciousness because it 
would not involve the appearance of phenomena and so would not illuminate 
or disclose anything at all. Such a consciousness would be devoid of any 
distinct character or defining features and so could not even be said to exist as 
anything in particular. 
For the Abhidharma philosopher, to exist is to be something in particular, to 
have a defining character. This is a minimal standard for saying that something 
exists, it requires only that an entity makes some difference to what reality is. 
But if the existence of an entity makes no difference to reality, we should 
probably join the Abhidharma philosophers in denying its existence. This is the 
reason why it would make sense to reject the possibility of a consciousness 
that illuminates nothing at all. A mere potential to illuminate lacks any particular, 
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concrete characteristics and so would lack the minimal degree of definition 
required to exist. To exist, consciousness must arise in a cluster with 
phenomenal qualities that constitute a particular conscious experience. For this 
reason, if we were to separate consciousness out into its object-directedness 
and its phenomenal quality, neither feature would amount to anything in 
particular and so could not be said to exist.  
Therefore, regardless of whether it is a single dharma or an indivisible cluster, 
phenomenal consciousness must involve the illumination of objects, which 
encompasses object-directedness, a certain phenomenal character, and the 
reflexive self-illumination that comes as a necessary corollary of this. Every 
instance of phenomenal consciousness would thus always be directed towards 
and illuminate an object. There is, however, an additional claim made within 
most Abhidharma systems, which is that only a single basic phenomenon can 
be apprehended in each instance of conscious apprehension. If this were the 
case, each instance of object-directed consciousness would be extremely 
short-lived.65 An instance of phenomenal consciousness, its basic object, and 
any memory of past objects, would arise and cease together as a single brief 
occurrence of conscious apprehension. A similar position is also taken by 
constitutive panpsychists, as we shall explore in the next chapter.66 
Nevertheless, even if consciousness arises in short-lived instances, each with 
a single object, such instances must arise in a series that illuminates multiple 
phenomenal objects over a period of time. This would have to happen in order 
for it to even appear as if different phenomena are arising within a single 
consciousness at different times. And this certainly is how conscious 
experiences appear to elapse. For example, the experience of listening to 
                                                 
 
 
 
65 See Karunadasa, The Theravāda Abhidhamma, pp.20-22. See also Dhammajoti, 
Sarvāstivāda Abhidhamma, pp.273-287. 
66 See Galen Strawson, ‘Realistic Monism’, in Real Materialism and other essays, Oxford 
University Press, 2008, p.72.See also Sam Coleman, ‘The Real Combination 
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birdsong appears as if it is being experienced by a single conscious witness 
who is aware of the different “tweets” elapsing over time. 
Two distinctive types of continuity are required in order for experiences like this 
to be possible. Firstly, each occurrence of conscious apprehension must be 
followed by another that “picks up where the last left off” so to speak. Any 
change on the side of the object must be met with a corresponding occurrence 
of consciousness in order for there to be the kind of stream of consciousness 
required for the experience of birdsong. Secondly, subsequence occurrences 
of conscious apprehension must include the object of the previous occurrence. 
This is required in order for birdsong, which elapses over many moments, to be 
experienced as if by a single observer. Each instance of conscious 
apprehension must be retained in future instances in order for temporal 
experiences like this to be possible. Substantial argument will be presented in 
the following chapters in order to make the case that both forms of continuity 
are exhibited in the case of phenomenal consciousness. This argument will aim 
to support the key premises of Dharmakīrti’s argument for rebirth. 
However, if Dharmakīrti’s approach to consciousness presents it as existing 
independently of physical reality, the question of how consciousness is able to 
influence the physical without creating noticeable scientific anomalies is difficult 
to answer. This is why it is important to accept that each instance in a 
continuous stream of phenomenal consciousness must be intimately connected 
to physical reality. In order to discover this connection between instances of 
consciousness and instances of physicality, we should search for the factor 
responsible for bringing such factors together.  
Insofar as we are able to consciously experience and respond to the physical 
world, there must be a factor or factors that act as the intermediary between 
consciousness and the physical. But such an intermediary would be capable of 
influencing physical factors and so would have to already have been 
incorporated, in some form, into current scientific models of the physical 
universe. If such an intermediary were not incorporated in this way, we would 
expect significant anomalies to have been discovered within the bodies and 
brains of conscious organisms. That such anomalies do not seem to have 
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arisen suggests that the intermediary factor that allows consciousness to 
experience and influence the physical world has already been incorporated into 
current scientific models. And, insofar as such an intermediary factor must have 
already been incorporated into current physical models, we are quite justified 
in calling such a factor a physical factor. 
Within the Vajrayāna system, this physical intermediary factor is identified as 
prāṇa, the subtle physical energy with characteristics of ‘mobility, dynamism, 
and cohesion’, that is inseparable from the core characteristics of 
consciousness. Within Abhidharma systems, the characteristic of mobility, or 
‘wind’, is the dynamic factor or impetus that gives rise to physical dharma 
clusters in new locations while cohesion, or ‘water’, is the factor that holds these 
clusters together.67 But despite the fact that the Abhidharmikas consider ‘wind’ 
and ‘water’ to arise only in physical clusters, similar factors must be operating 
within mental clusters. Insofar as consciousness is a distinct feature of reality 
that arises with different objects at different times and in different places, there 
must be dynamic factors that determine this “movement” from object to object, 
from place to place. While any particular occurrence of consciousness arises 
and ceases rapidly, its successor can arise with a different object in a different 
place. This is how Abhidharma systems understand what is best described as 
the movement of consciousness. This movement would not be possible if 
consciousness arose in configurations devoid of the impetus required to drive 
the arising of consciousness with a new object in a new place. While the 
aspects of intentional object-directedness and reflexive self-awareness define 
any occurrence of consciousness, such occurrences arise in streams of 
awareness in which different objects are apprehended at different times. All 
conscious activities occur within this kind of dynamic stream of awareness. 
However, according to Abhidharma systems consciousness is simply one type 
of dharma that is capable of arising in different configurations at different times. 
Dharmas of many different types must be able to arise in varying configurations 
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over time, otherwise the world would involve nothing but the same repeating 
configurations of dharmas forever. In such a reality, every instant would involve 
the same characteristics existing in the same places forever. We can quite 
easily verify that this is not our reality. Therefore, while the dharmas within a 
given cluster are inseparable from one another, there must be at least some 
types of dharma that are able to arise with a range of different dharma types at 
different times.  
This is why the characteristics of mobility and cohesion would have to be 
ubiquitous characteristics in a world of dharmas. In a world of dharmas that are 
capable of arising in cohesive configurations, a dharma of cohesion would have 
to be inseparable from every dharma that arose cohesively with another, 
including both physical dharmas and conscious mental dharmas. The same 
would be true for mobility or movement. While Abhidharma theories, particularly 
those of the Sarvāstivāda, deny that a dharma can move from one place to 
another, they do not deny that, over time, dharmas of a given type will cease to 
arise in one place and begin to arise in another.68 The capacity for dharmas of 
a particular type to arise in one configuration and then another can only be 
accurately characterised as a form of mobility. In a world of dharmas there 
would be a movement of characteristics, though not individual dharmas, from 
one configuration to another. Therefore, the characteristic of movement would 
have to be inseparable from every configuration of dharmas. 
Insofar as movement and cohesion are taken to be physical characteristics 
within Abhidharma systems it makes sense, given the fact that they ultimately 
seem to be ubiquitous, that the Vajrayāna system came to consider mobility 
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and cohesion to be physical characteristics that arise with every dharma, 
including conscious mental ones. The Abhidharma claim that mobility and 
cohesion are physical characteristics can be found in the Vajrayāna system but 
with the added claim that these physical characteristics arise along with every 
instance of consciousness. And, as mentioned above, there must be a physical 
intermediary factor between consciousness and physical reality in order to 
account for the lack of anomalies in scientific models. 
Instances of consciousness arise together with their object. In Abhidharma 
terms this means that consciousness of physical objects involves the arising of 
conscious mental dharmas with physical dharmas. So unless consciousness 
never actually apprehends a physical dharma, there must be a factor that gives 
rise to physical and conscious mental dharmas in combination. Physical and 
conscious mental dharmas must also arise together if they are ever to directly 
condition one another. Unless conscious mental events never directly influence 
physical dharmas, an intermediary factor must bring the conscious and physical 
dharma streams together. And insofar as this factor plays an active role in the 
arising of physical dharmas, it would be highly problematic if its effects were 
taken to have completely escaped the notice of those who are studying physical 
reality. This is why we would call such a factor physical. 
However, if we wish to deny the Vajrayāna claim and adopt a position closer to 
Abhidharma systems, we could maintain that physical objects are apprehended 
and influenced indirectly through intermediary mental factors. In order to act as 
intermediaries, mental factors of this type would have to be devoid of 
consciousness when arising in combination with the physical factors that they 
influence and are influenced by. They would then arise with consciousness 
when they influenced and were influenced by consciousness. The problem here 
is that every cluster of mental factors, according to most Abhidharma systems, 
arises with a dharma of consciousness.69 Intermediary mental factors would 
                                                 
 
 
 
69 See Karunadasa, The Theravāda Abhidhamma, p.71 and Dhammajoti, Sarvāstivāda 
Abhidharma, p.294. 
134 
 
have to be mental factors devoid of consciousness. Attempting to adopt a 
position closer to the Abhidharma which ends up contradicting the Abhidharma 
seems counterproductive, especially when we consider that an indirect 
approach to explaining consciousness of physical objects is so much more 
complicated. 
Overall, it is consistent with Abhidharma principles if not the exact positions of 
particular Abhidharma systems to claim that instances of consciousness arise 
continually with instances of other types, including factors that we could 
justifiably call “physical”. This does not call into question the fundamental 
distinction between mental and physical characteristics. Furthermore, as was 
explored in the second part of the chapter, the view that instances of 
consciousness are inseparable from physical factors can be found in one form 
or another within the Sarvāstivāda and Theravāda Abhidharma systems, it is 
also adhered to by those Buddhist philosophers such as Vasubandhu (and 
possibly Dharmakīrti) who accepted antarābhava. The Vajrayāna system is not 
alone in advocating such a position. 
Insofar as such a position is accepted, it is possible to explain how two-way 
causation between consciousness and the rest of physical reality could work 
within a traditional Buddhist account. According to this account, the unfolding 
of physical phenomena involves characteristics of ‘wind’ (mobility) and ‘water’ 
(cohesion) which also influence the arising of consciousness with different 
objects. Insofar as consciousness is intrinsically other-illuminating, it is a world-
involving and world-influencing phenomenon. This written document is an 
example of a physical phenomenon that has arisen due to the distinctive 
characteristics of consciousness. This entire project is about the nature of 
consciousness and involves the production of a physical document that will 
nonetheless be a product of consciousness. But this does not require that 
consciousness is reducible to physical phenomena, nor that consciousness 
could arise from purely physical phenomena. It only requires that the 
fundamental features of reality, such as consciousness, arise in clusters of 
distinct but mutually conditioning factors. 
135 
 
The suggestion that there are physical factors that are inseparable from 
consciousness does not, in any way, undermine Dharmakīrti’s premise that 
physical factors cannot be the substantial causes (Sanskrit: sabhāga-hetu) for 
the arising of consciousness. Insofar as ‘wind’ denotes the fundamental 
characteristic of impetus, ‘water’ the characteristic of cohesion, and 
consciousness the fundamental characteristics of intentional reflexive 
awareness, these factors cannot be the causes of one another’s distinctive 
character. But this does not rule out their being inseparable or mutually 
conditioning. There can be an intermediary physical factor that is responsible 
for producing the combination of consciousness with a particular physical object 
without this factor alone creating the intrinsic nature of the object-directed 
consciousness that arises. 
The process of giving rise to the combination of consciousness with a physical 
object might, in turn, condition the intermediary physical factor itself. In this way, 
a particular instance of consciousness would influence the intermediary 
physical factor without actually generating new physical energy. Neither of 
these two factors would be producing the other but they would nonetheless be 
conditioning how the other arises in future. And if this sort of conditioning 
relationship occurs frequently enough, those observing physical phenomena 
would not register an anomaly because this would simply be the way in which 
the intermediary physical factor normally behaves. 
Of course, if there is a factor that acts as the intermediary between 
consciousness and physical objects, we can ask whether this factor is 
detectable using scientific instruments. Evan Thompson suggests that 
neuroscience may in fact have already discovered the subtle physical basis for 
consciousness. Following the work of neuroscientists Roman Bauer and 
Norman Cook, Thompson suggests that perhaps this basis may well be the 
electromagnetic field generated by the living cells of the brain.70 Changes in 
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this dynamic field correlate with changes experienced by conscious subjects, 
making it possible that the dynamics of this field determine the objects that 
appear to consciousness.71  
However, insofar as Thompson identifies the subtle physical basis of 
consciousness with the electromagnetic fields of the brain, he deviates from the 
Vajrayāna perspective that he favours. The Vajrayāna system identifies the 
physical basis of consciousness with the fundamental characteristics of mobility 
and cohesion. As in most Abhidharma systems, within the Vajrayāna mobility 
and cohesion are recognised as irreducible characteristics that cannot dissolve, 
degrade or dissipate along with the complex forces generated within a living 
organism. If we recall Vasubandhu’s criteria for being ultimately real, the fact 
that the electromagnetic field of the brain borrows its characteristics from those 
more basic physical factors into which it dissipates means that it must be 
considered a conceptual fiction. In contrast, even if mobility and cohesion are 
not absolutely simple dharmas they cannot, according to the Vajrayāna and 
Abhidharma systems, dissolve into separable factors.  
According to Vajrayāna accounts, when a person dies, gross modes of sensory 
consciousness dissolve into more subtle states as brain function ceases. The 
collapse of gross consciousness is mirrored by the dissolution or collapse of 
gross physical energies into more subtle forces. Once this dissolution has been 
completed the fundamental physical basis of consciousness is still intact 
because it cannot dissolve any further. This is very similar to accounts given 
regarding the antarābhava, which arises after the death of the organism as an 
indivisible configuration of mental and physical factors. As it is described in the 
Vajrayāna account, subtle energy is more fundamental than the gross forms of 
the body and so survives death.72 The subtle consciousness that remains after 
death continues to arise with this fundamental energy and, in line with the 
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traditional cosmological view, both the subtle consciousness and the subtle 
energy eventually develop into gross forms as part of a new organism. In this 
way we can see how the Vajrayāna account does not undermine the core 
purpose of Dharmakīrti’s argument for rebirth. Both Dharmakīrti and the 
Vajrayāna Tantric Buddhist support their belief in rebirth through the claim that 
consciousness and any physical factors that are inseparable from 
consciousness are more fundamental than the bio-chemical processes of a 
living organism. 
 
4.6 Consciousness and Objective Evidence 
In Waking Dreaming Being, Thompson favours the Vajrayāna approach to 
consciousness over Dharmakīrti’s. He is not convinced by the metaphysical 
arguments put forward for the view that consciousness can exist independently 
of the brain. One of the main motivating factors behind Thompson considering 
the Vajrayāna system to be superior to Dharmakīrti’s approach is his perception 
that the former is based more on the observation of meditators than on the 
philosophical arguments of earlier schools. Thompson considers this increased 
emphasis on meditative experience to bring the Vajrayāna system closer to the 
empirical methods that he favours. 
However, Thompson is wary of the influence that traditional metaphysical 
positions can have on the observations reported by Buddhist meditators. On 
the one hand, Thompson is convinced that the kinds of observations of subtle 
consciousness from Vajrayāna practitioners are based on honest accounts by 
highly accomplished meditators. On the other hand he is aware that these 
accounts will involve interpretation based on the system of thought in which 
their observations were based. According to Thompson, the view that the most 
basic consciousness is not dependent upon the brain must be taken as a 
metaphysical interpretation of experience. He can see no way in which 
observation alone could justify this claim. He also points out that such a claim 
is the result of Buddhism’s interaction with modern science given that before 
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this encounter Buddhists had little, if anything, to say about the brain as a 
cognitive system.73  
Furthermore, he states that claims made based on meditative experiences rely 
on the assumption that such experiences are capable of providing information 
about the neural supports of experience. Such an assumption is unwarranted 
because experiences do not reveal anything about the neural activity that 
supports them. This relates to the fact that, as previously mentioned, the 
intrinsic nature of dharmas can only be known through direct experience of 
them. This means that meditators could use their direct experiences to support 
their claims about the nature of the phenomena that arise in conscious 
experience but when it comes to claims about non-experiential phenomena, 
such as the neural supports of experience, meditators would not be able to rely 
on direct experience. Thompson’s point is that consciousness could be 
dependent upon physical factors that do not appear within conscious 
experience. This means that the dependence relationship between 
consciousness and the brain might go completely unrecognised by even the 
most adept meditator.74 
Nevertheless, Thompson’s wariness about the potential influence that 
metaphysical positions might have on investigators should be applied to 
meditators and neuroscientists alike. One can just as easily say that holding all 
subjective experiences to be dependent upon the brain is also a metaphysical 
interpretation of experience. Just because changes in neural activity 
correspond to changes in subjective experience, this does not prima facie tell 
us that there is a dependence relationship. It only tells us that, barring 
coincidence, they are clearly interrelated. Neuroscience has yet to explain how 
neural activity can give rise to the subjective character of experience.75 Such 
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theories are currently the province of philosophy, specifically the metaphysics 
of mind. 
But Thompson is not ignorant of this fact. He is simply aware that neuroscience 
operates from certain basic assumptions, as he makes explicit: 
From the neuroscience perspective, if highly realized meditators with 
functioning brains can directly experience pure awareness, then the 
working assumption is that pure awareness is contingent on the 
brain.76  
The working assumption is that having a functioning brain means that all 
experiences are contingent upon its functioning. Even though, as Thompson 
explains, ‘the specific neuronal systems and functions on which pure 
awareness is supposed to be contingent are unknown to us at present’, the 
assumption is that pure awareness is nevertheless contingent on neuronal 
systems and functions.77 This assumption can only be challenged by evidence 
for the existence of a pure brain-independent consciousness. Ultimately, in this 
case, the burden of proof is on the Buddhist ‘to give positive evidence that 
consciousness isn’t contingent on the brain.’78  
Empirical proof for either the existence or the non-existence of consciousness 
independent of the brain would require a reliable, objective method for detecting 
consciousness itself.79 The detection of brain-independent consciousness 
using such a method would potentially overturn the current working assumption 
of neuroscience. On the other hand, the failure of this method to detect 
consciousness without a functioning brain would act as evidence for the non-
existence of such an independent consciousness. As it stands, the only means 
by which we are able to detect phenomenal consciousness directly is in our 
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own individual cases, via the reflexivity of consciousness. This method is 
thoroughly subjective insofar as each of us is only “self” aware, we do not detect 
each other’s consciousnesses directly. The only way that a consciousness 
existing independently of a functioning brain could be detected in this way 
would be via the reflexivity of the brain-independent consciousness itself. The 
problem here is that only the brain-independent consciousness would have 
access to the evidence of its existence. Without a functioning brain, there is no 
way to communicate the discovery of this evidence to others.80 
An objective method for detecting consciousness would have to be completely 
different from reflexivity in order to be reliable and objective. We would be 
looking for an objective phenomenon, observable by multiple people, which 
would reliably react to the presence of consciousness. The problem with 
making use of such a method is that we would need to know where to look for 
brain-independent consciousness. If we were to possess an objective, physical 
means to detect consciousness, we would also need an objective, physical 
location in which to seek brain-independent consciousness. The existence of 
consciousness existing independently of a functioning brain cannot be ruled out 
on the grounds that nobody knows where to look for it. On the other hand, until 
we have objective, reliable means to detect brain-independent consciousness 
and an idea of where to seek it out, the burden of proof falls on those who want 
to prove that the as-yet undetected phenomenon does exist.81 
However, if it is claimed that the only admissible evidence for brain-independent 
consciousness must come from an objective consciousness detector, it would 
be inconsistent not to demand the same standard of evidence in the case of 
claims for the existence of other types of phenomenal consciousness. 
But when you or I are dealing with other living humans with functioning brains, 
we take them to be phenomenally conscious without first requiring that we can 
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directly detect this phenomenal consciousness. Because we lack an objective 
way to measure such consciousness directly, we rely on what we take to be 
phenomenally conscious behaviour such as verbal reports and expressions of 
emotion or cognitive activity. We normally perceive such behaviours as 
expressions of a phenomenally conscious mind rather than as simply a series 
of physical events. Yet our observation of another does not involve a direct 
experience of those subjective characteristics that constitute the phenomenal 
quality of their phenomenal consciousness. And yet, recognising this absence 
of direct experience is not enough to undermine our confidence in our 
perception of other people as phenomenally conscious. 
Within contemporary analytic philosophy of mind there are a range of views as 
to what is happening when we take others to have conscious minds. There are 
two major approaches, which disagree as to whether we simulate the conscious 
minds of others using our own case or whether instead we, at some point in our 
development, adopt a theory according to which both ourselves and others 
have minds.82 Despite their disagreements, both approaches agree that we do 
not directly experience the minds of others, only their behaviour. The deeper 
debate is between both of these approaches and a third approach coming from 
the phenomenological tradition. This debate is touched upon in Shaun 
Gallagher and Dan Zahavi’s The Phenomenological Mind. 
Using a range of key sources from the phenomenological tradition, Gallagher 
and Zahavi argue that a radical distinction between mental states and 
behaviour is mistaken. They point out that we perceive both our own behaviour 
and the behaviour of others as a ‘natural expression’ of mental states.83 
According to Gallagher and Zahavi’s view, mental states are constituted by both 
internal and external aspects. This is the Direct Social Perception approach to 
other minds and is summarised by Joel Krueger as follows: ‘minds are hybrid 
entities: they consist of both internal (neural, physiological, and phenomenal) 
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and external (behavioural, environmental) parts and processes’.84 The external 
aspects are those that we can directly perceive embodied in a person’s 
expressive behaviour. For example, we could say that we can see someone’s 
happiness in their smile.  
Nevertheless, those advocating the Direct Social Perception approach are not 
arguing that this perception gives us direct access to the phenomenal features 
of their first-person perspective. Rather, their claim is that we directly perceive 
the external aspects of another’s mind, as embodied in their expressive 
behaviour. When it comes to the phenomenal features of the mind, we have 
direct experience of ours alone.85 Overall, the debate regarding whether we 
experience the minds of others does not involve any particular focus on 
phenomenal consciousness. So although we must recognise that there is 
disagreement as to whether mental states can be directly perceived, it seems 
far less contentious to claim that the phenomenal consciousness involved in 
the experience of these mental states cannot be directly perceived.  
Where the phenomenological tradition is most persuasive is in observing that 
our understanding of others is possible ‘precisely because some of our mental 
states find a natural expression in bodily behaviour, and because the language 
we learn for our mental states is a language that we learnt to apply to others 
even as we learn to apply it to ourselves.’86 Following this observation we can 
recognise that our own behaviours, which can be directly perceived by others, 
are intimately bound up with our own mental states and our own phenomenal 
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consciousness. It is our own direct experience of this intimate mental-physical 
interweaving that maintains our confidence in our usual perception of others as 
phenomenally conscious. But this perception of others as phenomenally 
conscious is rooted in our development as social beings rather than in any 
direct observation of another’s phenomenal consciousness. 
Insofar as empirical evidence for the existence of phenomenal consciousness, 
whether brain-independent or brain-contingent, requires an objective method 
for detecting consciousness, we cannot be said to currently possess any 
objective empirical evidence for the existence of phenomenal consciousness. 
Here we begin to see the problem facing objective approaches to empirical 
evidence gathering when it comes to something fundamentally subjective like 
consciousness. As Tibetan Buddhist philosopher Thupten Jinpa points out, the 
range of empirical methods currently accepted within mainstream scientific 
enquiry provide no direct, perspective-independent access to consciousness 
itself.87  
If we were to say that neuroscientists discover correlations between certain 
types of brain activity and certain conscious states, this would not be strictly 
accurate. Brain activity is not really correlated with conscious states, it is 
correlated with verbal reports and cognitive performances. There is no way to 
bypass these and go straight to consciousness itself, there is ‘no access to 
consciousness that’s independent of consciousness.’88 For this reason, 
neuroscience does not offer direct access to, or the ability to detect, 
phenomenal consciousness itself. Rather, each neuroscientist is reflexively 
aware of their own phenomenal consciousness and takes it as given that the 
same phenomenon is an internal aspect of the minds of other people. But while 
we can use such verbal reports or cognitive acts as indicators of the presence 
of phenomenal consciousness, we cannot use their absence to justify the claim 
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that such consciousness has been annihilated. The assumption that living, 
talking, cognitively competent people are phenomenally conscious leaves open 
the question of whether this consciousness disappears when these indicators 
are absent. 
While it is true that empirical evidence of brain-independent consciousness 
would require an objective method for detecting consciousness, the limits of 
empirical investigation when it comes to any form of consciousness might lead 
us to question whether empirical evidence is what we should be looking for. We 
only know that phenomenal consciousness exists because of reflexive self-
awareness and the fact that we are phenomenally conscious cannot be 
demonstrated objectively. All we can do is hope that others will take our 
expressive behaviours as external aspects of our phenomenally conscious 
mind. But the perception that such behaviours are expressions of a 
phenomenally conscious mind is only ever directly verified in our own case. We 
never get direct access to both the external and internal aspects of another 
person’s mind. This means that our everyday perception of others as 
phenomenally conscious is not based on particularly strong empirical evidence. 
As covered in the previous chapter, it is logically possible that there is a world 
where living human beings verbally claim to be conscious and have cognitive 
capacities without being phenomenally conscious at all. As David Chalmers 
makes clear in his Zombie Argument, nothing about verbal utterances or 
cognitive capacities themselves makes it necessarily true that they are 
phenomenally conscious.89 We take others to have phenomenally conscious 
minds because they are so much like us in every other way, but this confidence 
in our everyday perceptions is based on a single sample. Of course, we have 
no other example of phenomenal consciousness to work with. Nonetheless, 
what this demonstrates is that we do not have strong empirical grounds to 
support our perception of others as phenomenally conscious. 
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It is for these reasons that we should not expect objective methods alone to be 
adequate to the task of investigating claims that phenomenal consciousness 
can exist independently of the brain. With this in mind, to insist that the 
traditional Buddhist present objective evidence of brain-independent 
consciousness before such claims are taken seriously would be somewhat 
disingenuous. In order to engage with the question of what phenomenal 
consciousness is we must adopt certain methods that are not objective. Firstly, 
our only direct access to phenomenal consciousness is via our own subjectivity. 
Secondly, neuroscientific observations depend upon our assumption that 
phenomenal consciousness maps onto living humans in such a way that brain 
states can be correlated with conscious states. This is why, as Thompson 
points out, neuroscience cannot be said to provide ‘overwhelming evidence that 
every conscious experience is identical to some pattern of brain activity.’ Such 
an identity is, according to Thompson, a ‘metaphysical interpretation of what 
neuroscience does show, namely, the contingency or dependence of certain 
kinds of mental events on certain kinds of neuronal events.’90 Insofar as he 
believes that the dependence of mental events on neuronal events has been 
demonstrated, Thompson is ultimately unable to accept both Dharmakīrti and 
the Vajrayāna system’s claims that consciousness can exist independently of 
the brain. For him they do not ‘sit well with the scientific evidence’.91 
But this is a problematic conclusion for Thompson to come to given that he 
acknowledges the difficulties facing attempts to gather scientific evidence for or 
against the existence of consciousness independent of the brain. In order to 
demonstrate the dependence of certain kinds of mental events on neuronal 
events, we would first need to establish that those mental events involve some 
objectively measurable features. For example, we might define a mental state 
such as anger as being partly constituted by certain embodied reactions such 
as the tensing of muscles, furrowing of the brow and so on. In this case the 
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arising of anger, so defined, could be said to be dependent upon those neuronal 
events that make such embodied reactions possible. 
Nevertheless, while we might be able to demonstrate that the embodied aspect 
of mental events such as anger is dependent on certain neuronal events, an 
objective demonstration may not be possible in the case of what we might call  
“phenomenal anger”, the phenomenal characteristics of anger, or ‘what it feels 
like’ to be angry. It could be demonstrated in an objective manner that the 
embodied reactions that partly constitute anger cannot arise without the basic 
neuronal components necessary to make these bodily reactions mechanically 
possible. But we would have trouble demonstrating that “phenomenal anger” 
cannot arise without these embodied behaviours. We could use verbal reports 
to suggest that “phenomenal anger” does not arise in the absence of certain 
behaviours or neuronal events but this would not demonstrate that this 
phenomenal aspect is dependent upon those behaviours or neuronal events. 
There could be a relationship aside from dependence that explains their co-
arising.  
Given that there is no objective means to detect the phenomenal characteristics 
that only arise within consciousness, the subjective features of mental events 
such as anger cannot be detected let alone shown to be incapable of arising 
when certain neuronal events or behaviours associated with anger are absent. 
Where there is no means to identify phenomenal consciousness itself with 
something objectively detectable, no amount of correlation will demonstrate 
dependence. Just because event Y arises at the same time as event X, it does 
not prove that event Y is dependent on event X. Causal relationships like 
dependence are easily assumed but notoriously hard to prove.92  
Given this situation it is difficult to see how Buddhist accounts according to 
which consciousness can exist independently of the brain could fail to fit with 
the scientific evidence. Some form of interaction between consciousness and 
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the physical is always assumed in such accounts. All they need to do is explain 
how manipulation of the brain can be accompanied by reports of changes to, 
and perhaps even the absence of, certain kinds of conscious states. In this way, 
we can see that even Thompson’s claim about what the neuroscientific 
evidence shows is interpreted through certain assumptions about what 
demonstrates dependence. 
Whether via the assumption that verbal reports of consciousness have their 
origins in phenomenal consciousness or the assumption that certain conscious 
states arise in dependence upon certain brain states, neuroscience-based 
claims about consciousness are based on working assumptions. These 
assumptions are not rooted in empirical evidence in the normal sense because 
it is not clear how the key pieces of objective evidence could be gathered to 
support or overturn them. They are closer to being metaphysical assumptions 
about the relationship between the subjective and objective aspects of reality. 
The working assumption of neuroscience, that having a functioning brain 
means that all experiences are contingent upon its functioning, can only be 
supported or undermined using an objective method of detecting phenomenal 
consciousness. That this method does not currently exist means that, for now, 
once the working assumption of neuroscience has been presupposed, it cannot 
be overturned.  
This is a little unfair on those interlocutors, Buddhist or otherwise, who are 
invited to join the research programme seeking to understand consciousness 
but who are barred from challenging a neuroscientific orthodoxy that precludes 
their own claims from being taken seriously. Buddhist interlocutors in debates 
about the origins of consciousness are justified in asking why the burden of 
proof is on those who do not consider consciousness to depend upon the brain 
for its existence. They can ask this question given the following: (1) Given that 
current neuroscientific methods have no access to phenomenal consciousness 
itself, (2) Given that there has yet to be a satisfactory account of what, in the 
physical world, phenomenal consciousness actually is, and (3) Given that there 
is yet to be a satisfactory explanation of how phenomenal consciousness arises 
with a functioning brain in the first place. Given these factors, an interlocutor 
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can legitimately question whether there is an adequate basis for assuming, from 
the outset, that consciousness arises only with a functioning brain. 
In asking whether consciousness depends upon the brain we are engaging with 
two sets of phenomena, brain states and phenomenal consciousness. The two 
have not been observed together. Phenomenal consciousness is observed 
“from within” by reflexive self-awareness, brain states are observed objectively 
through the senses and through investigative technologies. At no point has one 
of these phenomena revealed an existential dependence on the other. Such 
dependence is a metaphysical assumption that should be defended using 
philosophical arguments. It is also an assumption that can be challenged by 
philosophical arguments. Buddhist philosophical arguments for the existence 
of brain-independent consciousness challenge the idea that phenomenal 
consciousness could depend for its existence on physical states. These are not 
empirical observations of a brain-independent consciousness; they are reasons 
to suggest that consciousness is, by its very nature, independent of the physical 
body and brain.  
If we attempt to avoid any metaphysical or philosophical arguments about the 
nature of reality and simply approach the question of whether consciousness 
can exist without the brain using observations alone we will encounter myriad 
problems. The lack of an objective method for detecting consciousness has 
already been addressed, but what about subjective or meditative 
investigations?  
Thompson, referencing the Dalai Lama, justifies his preference for the 
Vajrayāna system of investigation on the grounds that it has been devised 
through ‘the most comprehensive means of investigation’, which means it 
places emphasis on the observation of meditators as well as on the 
philosophical arguments of earlier schools.93 In Thompson’s case, the 
Vajrayāna system is seen as superior to other Buddhist systems because it 
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uses inner observation techniques that can be compared with scientific 
methods. 
But meditative observations cannot be appealed to in lieu of metaphysical 
arguments about the relationship between the subjective reality of 
consciousness and the objective reality beyond. Firstly, until we can directly 
access the conscious experience of adept meditators, any appeal to their 
claims will be on the grounds that we have taken them to be authoritative. An 
additional justification is required for taking the adept meditator’s claims about 
exotic experiences, which are unfamiliar to us, to be accurate or genuine. 
Secondly, even if we take meditative observations to be authoritative in 
shedding light on some of the fundamental characteristics of consciousness, 
we cannot assume that they can be used to make claims about its relationship 
to the world beyond. As Thompson points out, subjective experiences cannot 
tell us anything about whether or not there are objective, physical factors 
producing conscious experiences. This is because ‘the phenomenal character 
of an experience isn’t “transparent” with regard to its physical embodiment’.94 
This undermines claims made from meditative experiences about 
consciousness transcending the body. 
Overall, there are limits to the role that meditative observations can play in 
defending claims about the possibility of consciousness surviving the death of 
the body. Avoiding metaphysical arguments is not a viable option for those 
Buddhists who wish to present a case for their traditional approach to 
consciousness. Such arguments will need to be made if traditional Buddhists 
are unwilling to accept the widespread metaphysical assumption that 
consciousness arises from, or is reducible to, brain activity. These necessary 
philosophical arguments about the relationship between the subjective 
character of consciousness and the objective world beyond it will be the 
concern of the following chapters. 
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4.7 Conclusion 
Hopefully this chapter has gone some of the way in exploring how 
consciousness is understood within traditional Buddhist philosophy, with 
particular regard to Dharmakīrti’s argument for rebirth. We have seen that 
Dharmakīrti’s argument relies on two key premises: Firstly, consciousness is 
distinct from other non-conscious phenomena, particularly physical 
phenomena. Secondly, consciousness must have a substantial cause and this 
substantial cause must have the same intrinsic nature as the effect, namely 
consciousness. From here we explored Thompson’s attempt to find an 
alternative to Dharmakīrti’s dualism in the Vajrayāna system of Tantric Tibetan 
Buddhism. According to this system, consciousness is inseparable from subtle 
physical energies. This does not, however, distinguish the Vajrayāna approach 
to consciousness from Dharmakīrti’s. Both are influenced by early Abhidharma 
systems such as the Sarvāstivāda, in which consciousness is considered to be 
a fundamentally distinct and irreducible phenomenon. At the same time, the 
Abhidharma systems understood that consciousness was inseparable from 
other factors and connected, through them, to the rest of reality. With reference 
to the Chariot and Cluster principles adhered to by Abhidharma philosophers, 
we explored some of the reasons for taking phenomenal consciousness to be 
both something that we cannot analyse into separable factors and also 
something that is intrinsically connected to the rest of reality. 
Through this exploration it has become clear that, within Buddhist philosophy, 
consciousness is a fundamental means of acquiring knowledge. In particular, 
direct conscious experience is the only way to come to know the intrinsic nature 
of the fundamental features of reality. The limitation here is that consciousness 
may not be able to know the intrinsic nature of objects that lie beyond 
consciousness. This limitation is mirrored by the fact that the empirical methods 
of objective observation used in the sciences cannot gain direct access to 
consciousness. This is because any given consciousness is only known 
reflexively, by its own intrinsic self-awareness. While consciousness and the 
intrinsic natures that appear to it can only be known by consciousness, the 
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empirical sciences that provide information about our physical world and 
neurophysiology cannot access consciousness. 
In the next chapter we will begin to see that our understanding of the nature of 
the physical is so limited that we cannot even be sure that there are any factors 
that are completely devoid of consciousness. By exploring this possibility, we 
will be able to support Dharmakīrti’s claim that an instance of consciousness 
must arise from a previous instance of consciousness. However, we will also 
see that panpsychism, the view that consciousness is ubiquitous, could 
undermine the first premise of Dharmakīrti’s argument: that consciousness is 
distinct from physical factors. 
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5. Arguments against the Brute Emergence of Consciousness 
5.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter we explored some of the reasons why both empirical 
observations of the brain and meditative observations of conscious experience 
provide insufficient evidence to make claims about the relationship between the 
subjective reality of consciousness and the material reality of the brain. In 
particular, neither method is able to muster the full range of evidence needed 
to make a claim about whether the existence of consciousness depends on a 
functioning brain. In order to rule out the existence of consciousness without a 
functioning brain, we would need to have an objective method for detecting the 
existence of consciousness. But because this does not currently exist, 
neuroscientific observations cannot tell us whether a lack of brain activity 
correlates to a complete absence of consciousness. It is only through reflexive 
self-awareness that any of us are able to observe and recognise the presence 
of phenomenal consciousness. But reflexive self-observation is not an objective 
method because the subject’s particular experiences cannot be accessed by 
others. 
Furthermore, the reflexive observations that reveal the characteristics of 
conscious experience may not be enough to make reliable claims about the 
capacity for consciousness to exist without a functioning brain. In Waking 
Dreaming Being, Evan Thompson argues that, when it comes to those claims 
about consciousness transcending the body that are made from special 
experiences, ‘the phenomenal character of an experience isn’t “transparent” 
with regard to its physical embodiment’.1 As far as Thompson is concerned, 
subjective experiences cannot tell us anything about whether or not there are 
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objective, physical factors producing those experiences. This point has serious 
repercussions for Buddhist arguments for rebirth. 
The previous chapter explained how Dharmakīrti’s argument for rebirth relies 
on two key premises: Firstly, consciousness is distinct from other phenomena, 
particularly physical phenomena. Secondly, consciousness must have a 
homogeneous cause and this homogeneous cause must have the same distinct 
character as the effect, namely consciousness. While Thompson broadly 
agrees with Dharmakīrti’s characterisation of consciousness, he thinks that the 
Buddhist philosopher is too quick to characterise the physical as being distinct 
from it. It is for this reason that he challenges the first premise of Dharmakīrti’s 
argument. If experience is not transparent, we cannot simply “look through” 
experience at the physical world. This inability to directly access the nature of 
the physical precludes our ability to claim that it is completely devoid of the 
phenomenal characteristics that make consciousness so distinctive. We cannot 
justify the claim that physical matter and consciousness have completely 
different characteristics on the basis that ‘consciousness as experienced from 
the inside through mental awareness seems different from matter as 
experienced from the outside through the senses.’2  
In this way, Thompson’s rejection of the first premise of Dharmakīrti’s argument 
involves embracing the second. Thompson accepts Dharmakīrti’s claim that 
physical factors alone cannot produce consciousness if the physical is devoid 
of mental or phenomenal characteristics. But the reason Thompson accepts 
Dharmakīrti’s second premise is not because of neuroscientific evidence, nor 
because of meditative observations. He does so because of the metaphysical 
reasons for rejecting the view that consciousness can arise from physical 
processes that are completely devoid of any of the distinctive characteristics of 
consciousness. Where neuroscientific and meditative observations can go no 
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further, metaphysical argumentation can work to undermine the view that 
consciousness could arise from completely unconscious factors. 
Nevertheless, in contemporary philosophy of mind, this metaphysical 
argumentation has been used primarily to support panpsychism, the view that 
consciousness is an aspect of physical reality. The panpsychist denies that the 
physical processes of the body and brain are devoid of consciousness by 
defending what is essentially the second premise of Dharmakīrti’s argument for 
rebirth. According to panpsychism, consciousness cannot emerge from 
intrinsically unconscious phenomena but it can arise from purely physical 
factors as long as these factors are intrinsically conscious. Panpsychism of one 
sort or another has been defended by a number of philosophers and is 
attracting increasing attention within the philosophy of consciousness.3 One 
contemporary philosopher whose arguments have been quite influential is 
Galen Strawson. In Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism, 
Strawson argues that a realistic physicalist must accept that consciousness is 
real and that it is physical. But, as Strawson argues, it is only reasonable to 
consider consciousness to be physical if physical reality includes 
consciousness within its fundamental nature.4 
Insofar as Strawson’s argument is persuasive, it provides support to the second 
premise of Dharmakīrti’s argument for rebirth. Strawson masterfully and 
potently defends a number of premises that are needed before an argument for 
rebirth can get off the ground. It is fortunate for our purposes that Strawson 
                                                 
 
 
 
3 Gottfried Leibniz and Baruch Spinoza are two famous examples of philosophers who 
espoused panpsychist metaphysical theories. See Philip Goff, William Seager, and 
Sean Allen-Hermanson, ‘Panpsychism’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
Fall 2017 Edition, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), 2017. 
4 Given that Strawson argues for consciousness being fundamental to reality, we might 
wonder why he maintains that his position is a form of physicalism. The answer is that 
Strawson defines “the physical” to be that which is concretely real and 
spatiotemporally located. Insofar as he maintains that everything in reality is part of 
the kind of space-time continuum postulated within physics, Strawson is a physicalist. 
If this space-time continuum is also pervaded by consciousness it does not, for 
Strawson, stop ours being a fundamentally physical reality. See Galen Strawson, 
‘Physicalist Panpsychism’, in The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness, S. 
Schneider, and M. Velmans (eds.), Wiley, 2017. 
 
155 
 
adheres closely to what has thus far been referred to as the Chariot Principle, 
the Buddhist approach to reality in which any complex phenomenon is 
understood as a configuration of particular characteristics that make it what it 
is. Insofar as it can be smoothly reduced to these characteristics, the complex 
phenomenon cannot be said to ultimately exist. Strawson also provides good 
reasons to adopt what I have referred to as the Continuity Principle, the 
Abhidharma principle according to which no characteristic arises without 
precedent. Although a traditional Buddhist will need to challenge panpsychism 
in order to defend rebirth, they can also benefit from how effectively the 
panpsychist can absorb and transform physicalism into an account of the world 
where consciousness is a fundamental feature of reality. This is why, in this 
chapter, we will spend some time exploring the key points of Strawson’s 
argument for panpsychism. 
 
5.2 Arguments against Physicsalism 
Galen Strawson begins his argument for Panpsychism by establishing that the 
genuine, concrete existence of consciousness or experience cannot be 
questioned by a realistic physicalist: 
You’re certainly not a realistic physicalist, you’re not a real 
physicalist, if you deny the existence of the phenomenon whose 
existence is more certain than the existence of anything else: 
experience, ‘consciousness’, conscious experience, 
‘phenomenology’, experiential ‘what-it’s-likeness’, feeling, 
sensation, explicit conscious thought as we have it and know it at 
almost every waking moment.5 
In this way, Strawson points to the undeniable fact of our being conscious as 
the bedrock for any realistic approach to reality. Like the Abhidharma Buddhist 
philosopher, Strawson takes conscious experience to be the only means by 
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which we are directly acquainted with reality.6 To deny the existence of 
phenomenal experiences or appearances is to lose any foothold in reality.  
Strawson goes on to make a distinction between this view, which he calls real 
physicalism, and ‘physicsalism’. According to physicsalism, ‘the nature or 
essence of all concrete reality can in principle be fully captured in the terms of 
physics’.7 Physics tells us how the physical is structured, how physical events 
unfold and what kinds of laws determine the course of these events but it does 
not reveal the qualities, essences or natures that make physical reality what it 
is. The phenomenal qualities found in conscious experience are aspects or 
features of what reality is. Insofar as physical terminology does not deal with 
these sorts of qualities, the nature of experience cannot be captured in terms 
of physics: ‘Physics is one thing, the physical is another.’8 
While physics tells us a great deal about the physical, this does not mean that 
it offers an exhaustive understanding of what the physical is. Specifically, the 
essential nature of physical reality is left untouched by the mathematical and 
structural approach of physics. Here we can interpret Strawson’s approach 
through an Abhidharma lens and say that physics does not have any access to 
physical dharmas because the intrinsic nature of a dharma can only be known 
through the direct conscious experience of it. In the essay Real Materialism, 
Strawson presents this point as follows:  
No sensible person thinks that physics has nailed all the essential 
properties of the physical. Current physics is profoundly beautiful 
and useful, but it is in a state of chronic internal tension. It may be 
added, with Russell and others, that although physics appears to tell 
us a great deal about certain of the general structural or 
mathematical characteristics of the physical, it fails to give us any 
further insight into the nature of whatever it is that has these 
structural or mathematical characteristics.9 
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9 Ibid. 
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Here Strawson is echoing Bertrand Russell’s earlier recognition that physics 
cannot offer a complete picture of reality as long as it offers nothing aside from 
bare mathematical and causal structure. In The Analysis of Matter Russell 
makes the following brilliant point: 
There are many possible ways of turning some things hitherto 
regarded as “real” into mere laws concerning the other things. 
Obviously there must be a limit to this process, or else all the things 
in the world will merely be each other’s washing.10 
Concrete reality must involve real “stuff”: qualities, characteristics, or properties 
that have a nature, that are something in particular. If we reduce every real thing 
to its causal power or disposition to produce effects in other things we are left 
with only a bare structure with nothing grounding this structure in reality. Not 
only is this a fundamental principle of the Abhidharma, it is also a point that has 
been recently developed by a number of philosophers, among them Derek 
Pereboom and Howard Robinson. Pereboom points out that there is an intuitive 
reason for finding fault with a purely dispositional account of reality: 
Fragility and flammability are clear examples of dispositional 
properties; shape and size are often cited as paradigmatic 
categorical properties. Many find it intuitive that categorical 
properties are required to account for dispositional properties. For 
instance, a ball’s disposition to roll requires an explanation, and it is 
provided by its categorical properties of spherical shape and 
rigidity.11 
The intuition is that without concrete categorical properties like shape and size, 
a purely dispositional account of reality would fail to explain why dispositional 
properties are the way they are. But the problem goes deeper than this. Without 
categorical properties, dispositional properties lack the grounding to render 
them coherent. As Robinson points out: ‘A power is a power to produce some 
effect, but if everything is a power, it is the power to produce another power’.12 
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If every property is nothing over and above its tendency to produce effects in 
other things there will be no categorical property that grounds these powers; all 
things will, in Russell’s words, ‘be each other’s washing’.  
Fragility, the tendency to break, is an empty property without the possibility of 
breakage, which requires that there is some concrete stuff which could break. 
Flammability, the tendency to burn, is nothing without the possibility of fire, with 
all its properties. Rolling requires that there is something that rolls and a surface 
to roll on, with all the properties involved therein. These dispositional properties 
depend on further properties in order to exist as anything more than 
incoherently impotent tendencies. If those further properties are also 
dispositional then they will, in turn, depend on yet further properties in order to 
be more than impotent tendencies. But if there are only dispositional properties 
then reality is nothing but pure tendencies to produce other pure tendencies to 
produce other pure tendencies and so on ad infinitum. At no point would there 
be any grounding properties to make the effects of these tendencies into actual 
realities.  
If flammability, for example, is an empty disposition until fire arises, flammability 
is practically meaningless until fire occurs as a concrete phenomenon. But if 
fire is nothing but a complex system of tendencies to produce certain effects, it 
remains an empty disposition, as does flammability, until those effects arise. If 
those effects are further tendencies to produce certain effects, fire and 
flammability remain practically meaningless until those further tendencies 
produce their effects. But in a world of pure dispositions this would never 
happen and reality would be nothing but empty tendencies that never produce 
any actual effects. 
A world of pure powers collapses without a basis in non-dispositional, 
categorical properties.13 This is why Russell proposed a position in which the 
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13 When it comes to Abhidharma Buddhist philosophy dharmas seem to be the basic 
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159 
 
categorical features of physical reality ground its dispositional features. This 
position has come to be known as Russellian Monism and one of its notable 
features is that it takes the categorical properties of physical reality to be the 
basis for explaining how consciousness arises from purely physical nature. The 
Russellian Monist, unlike the physicsalist, recognises that physics cannot 
provide a complete understanding of reality because its exclusively 
dispositional account leaves out the categorical properties needed to ground 
dispositions in actuality, categorical properties such as those revealed by 
consciousness. As Pereboom has summarised:  
The most basic properties contemporary physics reveals are all 
dispositional, and thus it leaves us ignorant of the categorical 
properties needed to explain them. An electron’s negative charge is 
one of those basic physical properties, and it is a disposition to repel 
other particles with negative charge and to attract particles with 
positive charge. This dispositional property must have a categorical 
basis, and it, the Russellian Monist hypothesizes, is the sort of 
feature that can also account for our consciousness. Russellian 
Monists have proposed a range of such more fundamental but yet 
undiscovered properties – from conscious properties of, for instance, 
microphysical particles, to properties similar enough to paradigmatic 
physical properties to qualify as physical themselves, to properties 
unlike any we’ve ever encountered, but capable of explaining 
consciousness.14 
From this summary of Russellian Monism we can see that panpsychism is a 
single species within the broader category of Russellian Monist positions.15 
What all Russellian Monists have in common is a recognition that we do not 
know what the intrinsic nature of the physical is because we do not know all of 
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feelings, and so on are clearly taken to be categorical properties, not simply 
dispositions to produce other properties. See Y. Karunadasa, The Theravāda 
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its categorical properties. The only properties of this sort that we can access 
directly are the phenomenal properties found in conscious experience. This is 
why conscious experience is where all our investigations into the nature of 
reality must begin. This situation is also recognised by Thompson in Waking 
Dreaming Being. Accepting that we cannot ‘step outside of consciousness’ to 
see the nature of the world beyond, Thompson also accepts that this fact gives 
conscious experience ‘a kind of irreducible primacy.’16 It is from our conscious 
experiences that we create models based on consensus regarding the features 
of our experience, which we then model in terms of ‘certain abstract and 
invariant structural features of how the world appears to us at various spatio-
temporal scales of observation’.17 
The phenomenal qualities found in experience are the only examples that we 
have of the nature of reality itself. The phenomenal character of a red rose is a 
distinct aspect of reality in that it is defined by nothing other than what it is like 
as an experience. Once again we can recognise the relevance of Abhidharma 
principles; the definitive characteristics or dharmas that make a phenomenon 
such as a colour what it is can only be known through direct experience of them. 
No description of the redness of a rose would be sufficient for someone without 
any experience of colour to understand it. As we saw in the previous chapter 
(section 4.4), this was the point made in Frank Jackson’s famous essay in which 
he introduces Mary, the colour scientist raised in a black and white 
environment. Jackson asks his audience whether Mary learns a new fact. If she 
newly learns that there is a particular phenomenal character of red, this must 
be a fact unknown to physics.18 
This argument is often presented as if it demonstrates that there is something 
very special happening in the human (and non-human animal) brain that 
physics does not currently have the means to understand. From purely non-
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experiential processes, wondrous phenomenal qualities arise. But as Robinson 
has pointed out, Jackson’s argument shows that ‘standard physicalism cannot 
capture any conception of the physical that goes beyond the purely abstract or 
mathematically expressed.’19 According to Robinson, Mary cannot learn about 
the phenomenal qualities of colour despite knowing everything that physics 
knows about colour because physics does not deal with the sorts of qualities 
and categorical properties that colour experiences truly are. Standard 
Physicalism, what Strawson calls physicsalism, takes physics to be involved in 
a far more exhaustive exploration of reality than it actually is.  
When we imagine Mary the colour scientist in her black and white room, 
learning the physical facts about people looking at roses, we can recognise that 
she is missing a salient fact about the world. We are able to do this because 
we can recognise the difference between the physical facts about the colour 
red and the fact of its distinctive phenomenal character. What we might fail to 
recognise is that there are physical phenomena aside from colours, sounds and 
so on about which we have gathered many physical facts whilst completely 
missing out on the distinctive characteristics that make these phenomena what 
they are. 
At this point we could remain agnostic about the nature of the physical, simply 
accepting that its fundamental nature is not disclosed by physics. But Strawson 
wishes to claim that in order to be a real physicalist, one must accept that the 
physical is experiential. He uses the words of physicist Arthur Eddington in 
order to motivate his case: 
‘Our knowledge of the nature of the objects treated in physics 
consists solely of readings of pointers [on instrumental dials] and 
other indicators’. This being so, he asks, ‘what knowledge have we 
of the nature of atoms that renders it at all incongruous that they 
should constitute a thinking object?’ Absolutely none, he rightly 
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replies: ‘science has nothing to say as to the intrinsic nature of the 
atom’.20 
Eddington points out that the atom, according to what physics knows, is: 
a schedule of pointer readings [on instrument dials]. The schedule 
is, we agree, attached to some unknown background. Why not then 
attach it to something of a spiritual [i.e. mental] nature of which a 
prominent characteristic is thought  [=experience, consciousness]. It 
seems rather silly to prefer to attach it to something of a so-called 
‘concrete’ nature inconsistent with thought, and then to wonder 
where the thought comes from.21 
Both Eddington and Strawson push the physicalist to accept that, if conscious 
experience arises from the physical and we do not know the nature of the 
physical, why not assume that the nature of the physical is the same as that of 
conscious experience. This is how Strawson pushes the physicalist towards a 
panpsychist view, defined in Realistic Monism as ‘the view that the existence 
of every real concrete thing involves experiential being, even if it also involves 
non-experiential being.’22 Panpsychists of all stripes are committed to the view 
that whatever the fundamental level of reality is, it will involve the experiential, 
phenomenal character that makes consciousness so distinctive.  
 
5.3 Strawson’s Argument against the Brute Emergence of Consciousness 
Consciousness, for the panpsychist, does not arise from something devoid of 
any experiential character. On this point the panpsychist philosopher is aligned 
with Buddhist philosophers like Dharmakīrti. Both reject the possibility that 
conscious experience arises or originates solely from non-conscious, non-
experiential factors. The arising or emergence of experience from the non-
experiential is not like other forms of emergence. As an example of a normal 
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form of emergence, Strawson looks at two cases. The first is the case of liquidity 
emerging from water molecules: 
 Liquidity is often proposed as a translucent example of an emergent 
phenomenon, and the facts seem straightforward. Liquidity is not a 
characteristic of individual H2O molecules. Nor is it a characteristic 
of the ultimates of which H2O molecules are composed. And yet 
when you put many H2O molecules together they constitute a liquid 
(at certain temperatures, at least), they constitute something liquid. 
So liquidity is a truly emergent property of certain groups of H2O 
molecules. It is not there at the bottom of things, and then it is there.23 
The second example is the case of Bénard convection cells: 
When heat is applied evenly to the bottom of a tray filled with a thin 
sheet of viscous oil, it transforms the smooth surface of the oil into 
an array of hexagonal cells of moving fluid called Bénard convection 
cells.24 
Strawson points out that we ‘can easily make intuitive sense of the idea that 
certain sorts of molecules are so constituted that they don’t bind together in a 
tight lattice but slide past or off each other (in accordance with van de Waals 
molecular interaction laws) in a way that gives rise to – is – the phenomenon of 
liquidity.’25 It is just as easy, in the case of Bénard convection cells, to 
understand that ‘physical laws relating to surface tension, viscosity, and other 
forces governing the motion of molecules give rise to hexagonal patterns on the 
surface of a fluid-like oil when it is heated.’26 In both of these cases we are 
coming to understand emergence through a relatively small set of ‘conceptually 
homogeneous shape-size-mass-charge-number-position-motion-involving 
physics notions’.27 This form of emergence is not strange because the physics 
notions remain of the same type as we move from the molecules to their liquid 
constitution or hexagonal pattern. 
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Furthermore, in these cases we can also understand how emergent 
phenomena are reducible to other phenomena. Liquidity, for example, can 
‘reduce without remainder to shape-size-mass-charge-etc. phenomena.’28 A 
little work is required to ‘suppress our initial tendency to confuse liquidity as it 
appears to sensory experience’ with the physical description of liquidity. But 
once we have bracketed out our experiential notions about liquidity and all that 
remains is an understanding of liquidity according to ‘shape-size-mass-charge-
number-position-motion-involving physics notions’, we can see how liquidity 
smoothly emerges from and is reducible to molecular interactions.29 The same 
is true with Bénard convection cells. 
Nevertheless, the ease with which emergence and reduction can be understood 
in these cases follows from the nature of the constituents from which liquidity 
and convection cells are emerging. In order for this easily understandable form 
of emergence and reduction to be possible ‘there must be something about the 
nature of the emerged-from (and nothing else) in virtue of which the emerger 
emerges as it does and is what it is.’30 In other words, it is the nature of the 
constituents that makes the emergent properties what they are and this fact can 
be understood when we investigate what is happening in cases of emergence. 
Investigating liquids and convection cells, we find molecules that interact in 
ways that make emergent phenomena completely intelligible. 
But in order to take liquidity and convection cells to be analogous to the 
emergence of the experiential from the non-experiential ‘it would have to be just 
as plain how you get experiential phenomena from wholly non-experiential 
phenomena.’31 The problem Strawson highlights is that when trying to find an 
analogy for how experience emerges ‘we can’t make do with things like liquidity, 
where we move wholly within a completely conceptually homogeneous (non-
heterogeneous) set of notions.’32 The jump from the structural, non-experiential 
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notions of physics to the rich, phenomenal, experiential notions presented to us 
in appearance makes any emergence in this case completely different from the 
cases of liquidity and convection cells. 
Nevertheless, Strawson is able to devise a suitable analogy for the emergence 
of experience from the non-experiential: 
Suppose someone proposes that there are real, concrete, 
intrinsically, irreducibly and wholly non-spatial phenomena, and that 
when they stand in certain wholly non-spatial relations they give rise 
to or constitute real, concrete, intrinsically and irreducibly spatial 
phenomena.33 
This analogy works because the emergence of spatial from non-spatial 
phenomena requires a qualitative leap similar to the leap from the non-
experiential to the experiential. If phenomena existing in a context devoid of 
position, direction, or extension can give rise to spatial phenomena that are 
located and extended in spatial directions, this would be analogous to the 
emergence of conscious experience. 
But Strawson does not think that the emergence of the spatial from the non-
spatial makes any sense and it is easy to agree with him. Spatial characteristics 
such as extension, direction, position and so on do not seem to admit of 
reduction to anything lacking in similarly spatial characteristics. It simply does 
not seem plausible that non-spatial phenomena would be able to provide spatial 
phenomena with their distinctive spatial characteristics. The only way in which 
space could emerge from non-spatial relations is if spatial phenomena are mere 
appearances and so not really spatial at all. In this case, the emergence of the 
spatial from the non-spatial would no longer work as an analogy to the 
emergence of experience. Unlike an illusory space, which is not really spatial, 
an illusory experience is just as real as any other experience. 
If the emergence of the experiential from the non-experiential is analogous to 
that of the spatial from the non-spatial, this would go to show that neither space 
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nor experience can emerge solely from phenomena devoid of their distinctive 
characteristics. Neither type of phenomena can emerge if their defining features 
cannot be traced back to the factors from which they emerge in such a way that 
those factors determine precisely why the emergent phenomena are the types 
of phenomena that they are. As Strawson puts it: 
If it really is true that Y is emergent from X then it must be the case 
that Y is in some sense wholly dependent on X and X alone, so that 
all features of Y trace intelligibly back to X (where ‘intelligible’ is a 
metaphysical rather than an epistemic notion). Emergence can’t be 
brute. It is built into the heart of the notion of emergence that 
emergence cannot be brute in the sense of there being absolutely 
no reason in the nature of things why the emerging thing is as it is.34 
One of Strawson’s main claims here is that the intelligibility with which the 
features of an emergent phenomenon can be traced back to the phenomenon 
from which it emerged is a metaphysical rather than epistemic notion. To say 
that emergent features can be traced intelligibly back to the emerged-from 
phenomenon is to say that the emergent features are the way they are because 
of the way that the emerged-from phenomenon is. To say this is to say that it is 
in the nature of the emerged-from phenomenon for it to give rise to certain 
emergent features. As Strawson explains: 
For any feature Y of anything that is correctly considered to be 
emergent from X, there must be something about X and X alone in 
virtue of which Y emerges, and which is sufficient for Y.35 
The nature of X, the emerged-from phenomenon, is at the heart of what 
emergence is because every feature of the emergent phenomenon must, by 
definition, emerge from X. ‘For Y truly to emerge from X is for Y to arise from or 
out of X or be given in or with Y given how X is.’36 Insofar as it is within the 
nature of X to give rise to Y, it is possible for us to recognise that Y is given in 
X. This is what makes the tracing of a feature back to an emerged-from 
phenomenon intelligible. But this intelligibility is not a matter of whether or not 
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we do recognise that Y is given in or follows from X. Rather, the intelligibility is 
in the things themselves. Intelligibility is the state of affairs in which the nature 
of X determines, by its very nature, what Y is. Given an intelligible state of 
affairs, knowledge and understanding of the nature of X involves knowledge 
that the feature Y can arise from it. An intelligible state of affairs is due to the 
nature of the emerged-from basis and its intimate relationship with emergent 
features; it is not primarily a matter of our epistemic capacities. 
For example, in the case of liquidity its fluid structure follows from the nature of 
H2O molecules at a certain temperature. If H2O molecules vibrating with a 
certain amount of heat energy are X and the feature liquidity is Y, we can see 
that Y is given in the way that these molecules are. It is the nature of the H2O 
molecules vibrating as they do at certain temperatures that brings liquidity with 
it. The liquidity of water is given in a proper understanding of H2O just as the 
nature of H2O is given in a full understanding of the particular liquidity of water. 
The intelligibility with which we can trace the way liquidity is back to its 
molecular dynamic is not primarily a matter of our epistemic capacities. Our 
epistemic capacities could be optimal but would still fail to trace the nature of 
liquidity back to the nature of its emerged-from basis if the nature of liquidity 
was nothing to do with the nature of H2O molecules. This is why such 
intelligibility is a metaphysical rather than epistemic notion. 
If there were features of the emergent phenomenon that were not given in, or 
did not follow from, the nature of the emerged-from phenomenon, the 
relationship between the two would be unintelligible. And an unintelligible 
relationship between the emerger and the emerged-from renders the process 
of emergence in such a case unintelligible. This in turn brings highly problematic 
consequences to our attempts at making sense of reality, as Strawson 
illustrates: 
Y must arise out of or be given in X in some essentially non-arbitrary 
and indeed wholly non-arbitrary way. X has to have something – 
indeed everything – to do with it. That’s what emerging is (that’s how 
liquidity arises out of non-liquid phenomena). It is essentially an in-
virtue-of relation. It cannot be brute. Otherwise it will be intelligible to 
suppose that existence can emerge from (come out of, develop out 
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of) non-existence, or even that concrete phenomena can emerge 
from wholly abstract phenomena. Brutality rules out nothing.37 
Insofar as we entertain the possibility of brute emergence, we are entertaining 
the possibility that there are phenomena that come into being with features and 
properties that have nothing to do with the nature of the phenomena from which 
they emerge, aside from the brute fact that the former emerge from the latter. 
In each case the relationship between the emergent features and the emerged-
from phenomenon will be arbitrary. In the time before the emergent 
phenomenon arose there will not have been anything about the nature of 
existing phenomena from which it followed that the particular features of the 
eventual emergent phenomenon would arise. That such features then go on to 
arise would be an unprecedented brute fact, an inexplicable event that would 
not follow from the nature of events that went before. And, as Strawson makes 
clear, taking such brute events to be a genuine possibility leaves nothing ruled 
out. Once we have accepted brute emergence into our metaphysics, there is 
no claim that is too bizarre to be plausible because every possible phenomenon 
could emerge from any other phenomenon at any time. 
The problems facing the notion of brute emergence are very much like those 
facing the notion of an uncaused event. If we were to accept that some events 
occur without being caused, we would be accepting the possibility that, at any 
time, any number of events of any possible type could occur without prior 
causes or conditions. In such a world, prediction, understanding, and therefore 
intelligibility would be impossible.38 A theory built on such a foundation could 
not develop beyond this foundation without first admitting that its every 
supposition was as good a guess as even the most outlandish conjecture. 
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A theory that accepts brute emergence fairs no better. To claim that a 
phenomenon has “brutally emerged” is not to claim that it arose without cause 
but it is to claim that the features of the brutally emergent phenomenon are 
without precedent. In such a case, the fact that particular features emerged is 
simply a brute fact; there is nothing about the emerged-from phenomenon that 
prefigures the arising of those features. So while we can claim that a brutally 
emergent phenomenon has causes, these causes are brute causes. Brute 
causation is like brute emergence in that its occurrence would amount to a 
reality in which one set of phenomena give rise to a particular phenomenon 
without there being anything about the nature of the causal phenomena that 
gives us the features of the newly arising phenomenon. The relationship 
between the causes and the effect would be strictly arbitrary. If phenomena A 
and B are brute causes of phenomenon C, nobody, not even an epistemically 
optimal agent, would be able to discern that A and B cause C if they didn’t 
simply know that A and B cause C. 
The only difference between an event arising without cause and an event 
arising from brute causation is that in the latter case there is a cause. But this 
is nothing more than a nominal difference. If phenomenon C has brute causes, 
nothing about the way it is other than the mere fact that it exists comes from its 
causes; its causes are simply the triggers by which C comes into being. Being 
mere triggers for the creation of C, the brute causes of C do not have any 
intrinsic, non-arbitrary relationship to C. Such a triggering relationship might 
hold between phenomenon C and a vast array of other phenomena. As a result, 
by accepting that phenomenon C has brute causes, we would not be able to 
rule out any phenomenon as a brute cause of C. We would have to accept that 
phenomenon C as well as any other possible phenomenon could arise at any 
time from any cause whatsoever. The view that there is brute causation is 
practically the same as the view that there are uncaused phenomena. And 
insofar as the relationship between a brutally emergent phenomenon and its 
emerged-from basis is just as arbitrary, brute emergence encounters the same 
problems as brute causation. 
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To summarise, brute emergence is a form of emergence in which the features 
of the emergent phenomenon are not given in the nature of the emerged-from 
basis. Insofar as emergent features are not traceable back to the nature of the 
emerged-from basis, these features arise as if via brute causation. The 
emergent features do not follow from anything about the nature of the emerged-
from basis and so could arise from any basis at all. Ultimately, admitting brute 
emergence, brute causation or uncaused phenomena into a view of the world 
wreaks havoc with any attempts at dealing with reality as intelligible. This is why 
Strawson rejects brute emergence so forcefully, it is also the reason why any 
attempt to make sense of the world will need to jettison brute emergence as a 
viable possibility. From his recognition that experience is unquestionably real 
combined with his rejection of brute emergence, Strawson concludes that the 
distinctive features of experience can only emerge from phenomena that have 
those experiential features in their nature. This is why he pushes the ‘realistic’ 
physicalist towards accepting a view in which at least some of the fundamental 
constituents of a living, experiencing organism are, themselves, experiential. 
 
5.4 Homogeneous Causes and Brute Emergence  
If we wish to avoid assuming brute forms of emergence or causation and the 
serious problems that they bring, we would do well to adopt Dharmakīrti’s 
approach to causation in which every event must have at least one cause that 
is ‘ontologically homogeneous’.39 As we explored in the previous chapter, 
according to Dharmakīrti and his Abhidharma predecessors, ‘homogeneous’ or 
‘substantial’ causes (Sanskrit: sabhāga-hetu) are the factors that determine the 
distinctive character of a phenomenon, the intrinsic nature that makes it the 
type of phenomenon that it is.40 A phenomenon must also have some non-
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40 See Richard P. Hayes, ‘Dharmakīrti on Punarbhava’, Studies in Original Buddhism and 
Mahāyāna Buddhism, Vol. 1, 1993, p.116. While the term ‘homogeneous cause’ is 
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substantial, heterogeneous causes but these factors will simply condition the 
way in which the distinctive character of the phenomenon arises. In order for a 
phenomenon to be a homogeneous or substantial cause for another 
phenomenon, it must be the cause for that phenomenon having the intrinsic 
nature and distinctive character that it does. In order to do this, the 
homogeneous cause must have a distinctive character that explains the 
distinctive character of the caused phenomenon. If one phenomenon has a 
completely different, heterogeneous character from another phenomenon, it 
can only play a conditioning role.41  
For example, among the homogeneous causes of a marble statue there must 
be something with the distinctive hardness of the statue, there must also be 
something with the distinctive shape of the statue. The hardness of marble 
provides the hardness of the marble statue but this hardness is shaped into a 
statue by heterogeneous factors. These heterogeneous factors are the tools of 
the sculptor, which have modified the marble into the shape of a statue. But the 
distinctive shape of the statue has as its homogeneous cause the intention of 
the sculptor. The particular shape that the sculptor intended to produce from 
the marble explains why the sculpture is that shape. But the intentions of the 
sculptor, as well as their skills and tools, are only contributory conditions for the 
hardness of the marble statue. They are insufficient to produce a marble statue, 
they can only condition the hard marble into a statue. Equally, the marble is 
only a contributory condition for the shape of the statue. A marble boulder 
cannot sculpt itself into a statue, it can only provide the material needed to 
realise the sculptor’s intention.  
Furthermore, in order for an event to occur it must have at least one 
homogeneous cause. Without a homogeneous cause, an event will lack any 
distinctive character, it will lack the basic particular property needed for it to be 
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41 See Hayes, ‘Dharmakīrti on Punarbhava’, pp.116-117. For more on these heterogeneous 
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anything at all. For brute emergence or brute causation to occur would be for a 
phenomenon to arise from contributory conditions, which trigger its arising, but 
without any homogeneous causes to determine its distinctive character. The 
problems facing the idea that brute emergence and brute causation are 
possible are equally present for the idea that a phenomenon can arise without 
homogeneous cause. And it is necessary for each distinctive characteristic of 
a phenomenon to be traceable back to a homogeneous cause. 
Returning to the example, if a marble statue had no homogeneous causes at 
all, there would be nothing to explain its hardness, shape, or any of the 
distinctive features that define it. These features would have arisen arbitrarily, 
as if by magic. This would be brute causation. But it would also be brute 
causation for a marble boulder to turn into a precisely shaped statue of 
Hercules, complete with every culturally expected detail, without these precise 
features being traceable back to any prior process. It would equally be brute 
causation if a sculptor produced a marble statue from thin air, using only their 
tools and sculpting skills. In both these cases there is nothing giving the statue 
its details or its marble material, they have simply appeared from nowhere. 
This is where the second premise for Dharmakīrti’s argument for rebirth comes 
from. As we explored in the last chapter, conscious mental events are 
distinctive in that they involve phenomenal qualities, reflexive self-awareness, 
and object-directedness. Insofar as we are ruling out brute causation or brute 
emergence, every such mental event must have homogeneous causes for its 
particular reflexive, object-directed, phenomenal quality. If these characteristics 
cannot be found among the homogeneous causes of a mental event, there 
must be something about the intrinsic nature of those causes that explains how 
these characteristics are produced. In either case, the homogeneous causes of 
mental events cannot be entirely devoid of consciousness-related 
characteristics. 
Nevertheless, this does not yet get us the second premise of Dharmakīrti’s 
argument. The second premise can be summed up as claiming that physical 
factors alone cannot produce consciousness if the physical is devoid of mental 
or phenomenal characteristics. But so far we only have reasons to believe that 
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physical factors alone cannot produce consciousness if the physical is devoid 
of the power to produce or constitute mental or phenomenal characteristics. 
Dharmakīrti’s argument rests on the claim that a homogeneous cause must 
have the same quality as its effect. Strawson’s argument against brute 
emergence, and by extension brute causation, has not yet established this. It 
still seems plausible to claim that physical factors that are devoid of 
consciousness could produce or constitute consciousness as long as it was 
part of their intrinsic nature to do so. This is exactly how Evan Thompson is able 
to qualify his acceptance of Dharmakīrti’s second premise in Waking Dreaming 
Being. 
In agreement with Strawson, Thompson does not believe subjective 
experiences could emerge from physical nature if it were fundamentally non-
experiential. In this respect, Thompson adopts what he sees as the ‘crucial 
insight’ of Dharmakīrti’s argument: if matter and mind have completely different 
natures, one cannot emerge from the other.42 But Thompson is also 
uncomfortable with the mental-physical dualism inherent in Dharmakīrti’s first 
premise and so joins Strawson in rejecting the claim that consciousness and 
physical reality have completely different natures.  
And yet, Thompson does not wish to follow Strawson to panpsychist 
conclusions. Thompson wishes to develop an account of consciousness in 
which it emerges from physical nature without this either implying panpsychism 
or amounting to brute emergence. He suggests that the fundamental 
constituents of physical reality might have an experiential nature without 
necessarily being conscious in any normal sense. Physical being, according to 
Thompson, should be ‘understood as naturally including, at its most 
fundamental level, the potential for consciousness or experiential being’.43 
What Thompson refers to as potential consciousness is precisely the kind of 
factor that is devoid of the characteristics of consciousness but has the capacity 
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to produce or otherwise constitute consciousness under the correct 
circumstances. So far, Strawson’s argument against brute emergence has not 
decisively ruled out the ‘qualified’ emergence of consciousness from potential 
or proto-consciousness. This allows Thompson to suggest qualified 
emergentism as an alternative to panpsychism.  
According to qualified emergentism, the emergence of consciousness from 
purely physical factors is possible because physical reality consists of potential 
consciousness. The qualification in Thompson’s suggested form of 
emergentism is the fact that potential consciousness is a feature of physical 
reality. He is not claiming that consciousness emerges brutally from non-
experiential physical factors but nor is he claiming that full-blown conscious 
experience can be found at every level of physical reality. By introducing the 
concept of potential consciousness, Thompson believes he can avoid the 
problems faced by the panpsychist who attributes rudimentary conscious states 
or ‘micro-experiences’ to microphysical phenomena like protons. This is a move 
which he thinks is an ‘ad-hoc’ position unsupported by evidence.44 He also 
thinks it presents us with serious problems when we try to understand how 
conscious particles combine into a coherent conscious subject.  
However, Thompson’s notion of potential consciousness encounters a number 
of problems if we take it to be something that is devoid of the characteristics of 
consciousness but has the power to produce or otherwise constitute 
consciousness under the correct circumstances. These problems are explored 
by Strawson in an attempt to show that panpsychism is the logical conclusion 
once we have ruled out brute emergence. And, once again, Strawson’s 
arguments help to show how the second premise of Dharmakīrti’s argument for 
rebirth does not accommodate Thompson’s qualified emergentist position. Both 
Dharmakīrti and the panpsychist agree that physical factors alone cannot 
produce consciousness if the physical is devoid of mental or phenomenal 
characteristics. Strawson aims to show that the power to produce or constitute 
                                                 
 
 
 
44 Ibid., p.105. 
175 
 
the characteristics of consciousness requires the presence of these 
characteristics. 
 
5.5 Arguments against Potential and Proto-Consciousness 
In his argument for panpsychism, Strawson explores the notion of the proto-
experiential, that which gives rise to experience without being fully experiential. 
Strawson considers a variety of possible meanings of proto-experiential, some 
that might be equivalent to potential consciousness and others that are not. 
Firstly, Strawson offers his preferred definition of the proto-experiential, in which 
it refers to that which is ‘already intrinsically (occurrently) experiential, although 
very different, qualitatively, from the experience whose realizing ground we are 
supposing it be’.45 This form of proto-experiential phenomenon would involve a 
degree of conscious experience, though not necessarily of a sort that we would 
be able to imagine. For example, as Thomas Nagel argues, the experiences of 
a bat must involve phenomenal qualities associated with echolocation that we 
simply cannot imagine.46 Given that we struggle to imagine the phenomenal 
quality of a bat’s experience, we should be ready to accept that any 
phenomenal qualities associated with the factors that precede our own 
conscious existence will be vastly beyond imagination.47 It is the vast number 
of unimaginable possibilities for what such phenomenal qualities might be like 
that offers some justification for calling the factors in question proto-experiential. 
Using the term “proto-experience” distinguishes the unknown range of possible 
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experiences associated with fundamental non-living physical nature from the 
less exotic range of experiences associated with living beings. 
Nevertheless, while we could call these radically unimaginable experiences 
proto-experiences rather than just experiences, we could not avoid calling these 
experiences conscious. It is only insofar as this form of proto-experiential factor 
would involve consciousness that it can be considered a suitable basis from 
which our conscious experience could emerge. The proto-experiential, 
according to Strawson’s favoured definition, still involves consciousness, albeit 
consciousness of radically unimaginable experiences. In contrast, potential 
consciousness, Thompson’s favoured term, suggests a phenomenon that does 
not involve occurrently conscious experiences. For Thompson to adopt 
Strawson’s preferred definition would involve the same fundamental 
commitments as panpsychism, commitments that Thompson wishes to avoid.  
Thompson’s definition of potential consciousness is closer to another presented 
by Strawson in which he takes proto-experiential to mean ‘not actually 
experiential, but just what is needed for experience.’48 According to this 
definition, the constituents of experience will not be experiential themselves but 
will nevertheless be the conditions needed for experience to arise. This is 
exactly what Thompson needs in order to avoid panpsychism. There are two 
possible interpretations of this definition.  
According to one interpretation ‘just what is needed for experience’ means 
something like being intrinsically suited to ‘giving rise to’ or ‘producing’ 
experience: ‘The idea will be that X remains in itself wholly and utterly non-
experiential, but gives rise to something wholly ontologically distinct from 
itself’.49 In this case the relationship between the proto-experiential 
phenomenon and conscious experience is not a constitutive one; proto-
experiential factors do not combine to form experience, rather they produce it. 
As a result this is not so much a case of emergence as one of causation. Insofar 
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as Thompson makes reference to potential consciousness as a suitable basis 
for the non-brute emergence of ordinary consciousness, a causal account in 
which potential consciousness produces consciousness might not be what he 
is looking for.  
In particular, the liquidity and convection cell analogies discussed in the 
previous section would become completely inappropriate in this case as they 
work as examples of emergence rather than causal production. Strawson for 
one is confident that ‘nothing like this happens with liquidity and Bénard 
convection cells’ describing such a power as ‘magic’.50 The reason for this 
description is that none of the proto-experiential phenomena are experiential 
and yet are supposedly able to produce from themselves a phenomenon with 
completely novel features. What makes the producers proto-experiential is that 
they have a special “brute” power to create experience. 
Under this definition, proto-experiential factors break all of Dharmakīrti’s rules 
of causation; they also collapse when we apply Abhidharma principles. Proto-
experiences are the homogeneous causes for the distinctive characteristics of 
consciousness but are devoid of those characteristics. The intrinsic nature of 
proto-experiences would allow them to give rise to conscious experiences but 
would not involve the characteristics of those experiences. At this point the 
proto-experiential or potential consciousness can be analysed into two factors. 
On the one hand we have the special power to produce the distinctive 
characteristics of consciousness, its reflexivity, object-directedness, and 
phenomenal quality. On the other hand we have the intrinsic nature that makes 
this special power possible. 
According to the Chariot Principle, if the special power of a given proto-
experiential phenomenon is distinct from its intrinsic nature, that phenomenon 
cannot be said to exist as a single thing. In order for the intrinsic nature of proto-
experiential phenomena to be able to give rise to consciousness, the special 
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power to produce consciousness must be part of its intrinsic nature. In other 
words, it must be the nature of proto-experiential factors to give rise to the 
characteristics of consciousness. The only purpose of talking about proto-
experiential factors is to explain the origins of the distinctive qualities of 
consciousness. This means that those characteristics must have their origins 
in the nature of the proto-experiential. But, under this definition, none of the 
characteristics of consciousness can be found in the proto-experiential, the 
proto-experiential simply produces them. For this reason, the defining 
characteristics of any given proto-experiential property must be the experiential 
property that it produces. 
However, special powers of this kind are not intrinsic natures, they are simply 
powers to produce phenomena that do have intrinsic natures. A pure “power to 
produce” is defined exclusively by its product, it cannot be anything other than 
the trigger for the creation of an unprecedented phenomenon. To return to 
Howard Robinson’s points about any conception of the world in which it is 
nothing but pure powers: ‘A power is a power to produce some effect, but if 
everything is a power, it is the power to produce another power’.51 Anything that 
is nothing over and above its tendency to produce something with an intrinsic 
nature can only be said to exist in virtue of the intrinsic nature that it produces. 
Therefore, if potential consciousness or proto-experiential factors are nothing 
over and above their capacity to produce conscious experiences, they do not 
exist as anything in particular until their product appears. In this case, if we 
adhere to the Abhidharma standard of the real, a proto-experiential factor does 
not exist until it has produced the experiential phenomenon that defines its 
special power. In this case, any given proto-experiential factor cannot exist prior 
to the experiential phenomenon that it is producing. But this puts the cart before 
the horse. Proto-experiential potential consciousness cannot exist until it has 
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produced consciousness but cannot produce consciousness if it does not exist. 
What has happened here is that we have defined something by nothing more 
than what it does. If proto-experientiality is nothing other than the capacity to 
produce experiences, it is literally nothing but the occasional production of 
experiences. Such a capacity only exists as and when experiences are 
produced, but this means that it does nothing to explain why those phenomena 
are arising. 
A pure power to produce is simply not the sort of thing that can exist if we are 
adhering to Abhidharma principles because its defining characteristic, that 
which makes it anything at all, is the characteristic that it produces. This is why 
proto-experiential phenomena or potential consciousness cannot exist if they 
are nothing but a special power to produce conscious experience. 
However, if we try to backtrack and define proto-experiential phenomena in 
terms of their own intrinsic nature, this nature will have to be fundamentally 
distinct from the nature of conscious experience. In this case there is nothing 
about the intrinsic nature of proto-experiential phenomena that explains their 
capacity to produce experiential phenomena. We will be back to brute causation 
insofar as one set of phenomena is giving rise to a particular phenomenon 
without there being anything about the nature of the causal phenomena that 
gives us the features of the newly arising phenomenon. Insofar as proto-
experiential phenomena are devoid of consciousness, they do not possess the 
characteristics of the phenomenon that they produce. 
In this way, the application of Abhidharma principles further reveals why the 
definition of proto-experiential in which it involves the brute production of 
conscious experience is so problematic. Strawson is correct to suspect that a 
special power to produce the experiential from the non-experiential would be 
some kind of magic. Insofar as this definition of proto-experiential only works if 
it implies brute causal production, Strawson strongly doubts that it will work for 
a physicalist because they will have to ‘throw away the conservation principles 
and say that brand new physical stuff (mass/energy) is produced or given rise 
to when experiences are emergent from the non-experiential, i.e. all the time, 
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as we and other animals live our lives.’52 Instead of causation being the 
confluence of factors into new combinations or iterations of those same factors, 
causation would involve the creation of completely unprecedented types of 
physical reality with unprecedented characteristics. This definition of proto-
experience implies brute causation and so is one that the physicalist should 
reject. It is also a possibility that, as we have seen so far in this chapter, should 
be rejected if we are looking for an account of reality in which it is at least 
marginally intelligible. 
For these reasons, Strawson rejects as unworkable the causal interpretation of 
the proto-experiential according to which it ‘remains in itself wholly and utterly 
non-experiential, but gives rise to something wholly ontologically distinct from 
itself’.53 And in the light of the problems facing such a definition, Thompson 
could not plausibly present potential consciousness as an unconscious 
producer of consciousness. Instead, he could adopt a definition of potential 
consciousness according to which it is the proto-experiential constituents of 
experience. These would be factors that are not themselves conscious but 
become conscious when put together. This is the only remaining definition of 
potential consciousness that Thompson could adopt in order for his qualified 
emergentist alternative to panpsychism to work.  
Nevertheless, even this is a definition that Strawson finds problematic. If 
potential consciousness or proto-experiential factors are devoid of experiential 
properties, then there is a qualitative jump from non-experiential properties to 
experiential ones when we move from the constituent scale to the scale of the 
whole. This is not the sort of jump that we encounter with the emergence of 
liquidity because, as Strawson points out, ‘liquid bodies of water and H2O 
molecules have exactly the same sorts of properties’.54 Liquidity is not a 
property found in H2O molecules but it is a property that can be fully explicated 
using shape-size-mass-charge-number-position-motion-involving physics 
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notions. Whether at the scale of H2O molecules or liquid bodies of water we 
are dealing with a phenomenon with the same type of characteristics. 
Strawson’s doubts about the workability of this second definition of proto-
experientiality stem from his doubts about the possibility of analysing conscious 
experience into unconscious constituents. Such analysis would require that a 
close look at experience reveals that it is ultimately nothing more than a 
combination of intrinsically unconscious factors.  
Once again we can apply Abhidharma principles to show why Strawson’s 
doubts are spot-on. An application of the Chariot Principle shows that an 
analysis of conscious experience into unconscious factors should be 
impossible. If conscious experience is nothing over and above a configuration 
of intrinsically unconscious factors, consciousness cannot be present in any of 
the factors that constitutes conscious experience. Consciousness would have 
to be a mere label applied to the configuration of the constituents. In this case 
there would be no distinctive characteristic that makes consciousness what it 
is. But when we analyse conscious experience into the myriad sensory, 
cognitive, and emotional phenomenal qualities, the awareness directed 
towards them and its reflexive self-awareness, we can see that each and every 
one of these factors involves consciousness. Consciousness does not 
disappear under analysis. 
Of course, one might doubt that an analysis of conscious experience “from the 
inside” can reveal the constituents of conscious experience. After all, in the 
previous chapter we saw that Thompson claims that ‘the phenomenal character 
of an experience isn’t “transparent” with regard to its physical embodiment’.55 
For Thompson, conscious experiences cannot tell us anything about the factors 
producing those experiences or the full range of conditions on which those 
experiences depend. 
                                                 
 
 
 
55 Thompson, Waking Dreaming Being, p.94. 
182 
 
But Thompson is claiming that conscious experience doesn’t reveal the factors 
that produced it, he is not claiming that conscious experience doesn’t reveal its 
constitutive factors. As an example, we cannot examine a marble statue in 
order to discover who carved it but we can examine the statue to discover that 
it is made out of marble. In the same way, an examination of a conscious 
experience will not reveal the processes that produced it but it should reveal 
the constituents that it is composed of. 
Furthermore, barring brute causation, the processes that produced a conscious 
experience will have made it out of its constitutive factors. This is analogous to 
the fact that a sculptor will have carved the statue out of marble, they will not 
have produced the marble. This is in fact one of the ways in which Dharmakīrti, 
as well as Buddhist philosophers and meditators generally, can challenge 
Thompson’s doubts about the veracity of their introspective observations. 
Although the contributing conditions that produce conscious experience might 
remain hidden even from acutely concentrated awareness, the homogeneous 
causes that constitute what conscious experience is must be observable. 
Nevertheless, one might still question why we would assume that conscious 
experience is supposed to be transparent as to its own constitution. After all, 
even materials like marble cannot be fully known through natural human means 
of observation. Electron microscopes and such like are needed to get to the 
bottom of their nature. Examining marble with human senses does not reveal 
the electrons, protons, and neutrons that constitute it. But this does not count 
as a reason against the view that simple physical constituents combine to form 
the complex structures of marble that appear very different to us. A complex 
physical construct can appear very different from the fundamental physical 
factors that constitute it because the way that we subjectively experience 
physical objects is not necessarily what they objectively are.  
However, as both Strawson and Nagel have pointed out, you can’t say the 
same for subjective experience itself. The subjective experience of something 
is precisely how it seems to us. We can’t then say that a subjective, conscious 
experience is not really how it seems. The appearance-reality distinction has to 
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give way eventually, lest we fall into a vicious infinite regress.56 With this in 
mind, we can say that if non-experiential proto-experiences do not seem to be 
the constituents of our conscious experiences, this does give us reason to 
doubt that the former construct the latter. If we could not experience the 
constituents of a conscious experience, it would not be possible to experience 
the complex conscious experience that they construct. 
If conscious experience is a complex configuration of factors it is presumably 
nothing over and above the configuration of these constituents. For this reason 
the characteristics of the complex should reduce easily to the constituents. To 
claim otherwise would be to commit to the view that potentially conscious proto-
experiential constituents can form into a phenomenon with features over and 
above those of its constituents. According to such a view the features of 
complex conscious experience would not be traceable back to its constituent 
factors, an analysis of consciousness would not reveal unconscious 
constituents. But the overall claim here is that conscious experience cannot be 
analysed into unconscious factors but that it nonetheless emerges from them. 
These unanalysable features of conscious experience must either be 
accounted for with reference to a further factor or must arise through brute 
emergence. If conscious experience involves a single feature that cannot be 
traced back to the features of its constituent factors then we are dealing with 
some degree of brute emergence. In this case there is no benefit in appealing 
to potential consciousness in order to avoid brute emergence. It is for these 
reasons that we should follow Strawson and maintain that conscious 
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experience cannot be constituted by non-experiential factors if it cannot be 
analysed into them.  
To offer a Buddhist philosophical gloss on this argument, any complex 
phenomenon must be constituted by the distinctive characteristics from which 
it borrows its nature. It is these distinctive characteristics that make the complex 
phenomenon what it is. Such characteristics are the homogeneous causes of 
the complex phenomenon. If conscious experience is a complex phenomenon, 
it borrows its nature from the homogeneous causes that make it what it is. For 
this reason, the homogeneous causes of conscious experience must involve 
the distinctive characteristics of conscious experience itself. We would 
therefore do well to adopt the second premise of Dharmakīrti’s argument for 
rebirth on these grounds. Consciousness cannot arise solely from any factors, 
physical or otherwise, if those factors are devoid of the mental and phenomenal 
characteristics of consciousness. The factors that give rise to consciousness 
only have the capacity to produce or constitute consciousness, along with its 
distinctive characteristics, because these distinctive characteristics are present 
in the original factors themselves. Productive power on its own is not a 
distinctive characteristic and so does not amount to something real enough to 
explain how consciousness arises. 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has shown how arguments in support of panpsychism, particularly 
those presented by Galen Strawson, can also support the second premise of 
Dharmakīrti’s argument for rebirth. Philosophers such as Russell, Strawson, 
Robinson, and Pereboom have shown how a conception of physical reality in 
which it is devoid of any categorical properties is nothing but a pure structure, 
empty of any defining qualities. Physics offers a purely mathematical, causal, 
and structural vision of reality and so cannot be taken as an exhaustive account 
of the world. In contrast, conscious experience involves the categorical 
properties that physics leaves out, phenomenal properties like those arising in 
experiences such as colours, sounds, sensations and so on. These sorts of 
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properties are not determined purely in terms of relationships with other 
properties, they are categorical. This can be compared with the Abhidharma 
Buddhist approach to reality in which the ultimately real constituents of reality 
are dharmas with their own intrinsic nature or quality. As with phenomenal 
properties, the nature and quality of these dharmas can only be directly 
experienced. 
Strawson goes on to argue that to suggest that the defining qualities found in 
conscious experience emerge from factors devoid of these qualities would be 
to posit a brute form of emergence. Emergence is brute when there is a jump 
during the emergence process from one set of qualities to a completely different 
set. The emergence of liquid water from H2O molecules involves no such jump. 
Characteristics that constitute H2O, which involve mass, space, charge, and so 
on, are also those that constitute liquid water. There is nothing about what liquid 
water is that cannot be traced back to the movement of H2O molecules. If we 
introduce qualitative jumps during the emergence process, emergent properties 
will be completely unprecedented and their emergence will be unintelligible. 
Nothing about the intrinsic nature of the emerged-from constituents would 
explain the qualities of the emergent-phenomenon. Introducing brute forms of 
emergence makes the world immediately unintelligible. For this reason, 
Strawson recommends we reject the possibility of brute emergence. Therefore, 
the definitive qualities of conscious experience can only have emerged from 
factors that have an intrinsic nature that explains the arising of these qualities. 
At this point we explored Evan Thompson’s qualified emergence, in which 
consciousness emerges from potential consciousness, which is not intrinsically 
conscious but has the capacity to give rise to consciousness. We saw why a 
definition of potential consciousness in which it is intrinsically devoid of 
consciousness but has the power to produce consciousness is untenable. This 
is because potential consciousness must have an intrinsic nature and a special 
power to produce something else does not amount to an intrinsic nature. But 
without either an intrinsically conscious nature or a special power to produce 
consciousness, potential consciousness could only give rise to consciousness 
via brute causation. This leaves a definition of potential consciousness in which 
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it is intrinsically devoid of consciousness but can be configured so as to give 
rise to consciousness. The only way in which such a definition would work is if 
conscious experience can be analysed into distinctive characteristics, none of 
which involves consciousness. But conscious experience does not seem to be 
amenable to such an analysis, each aspect of consciousness seems to involve 
consciousness and when it comes to conscious experience seeming is being. 
If it lacks the characteristics found in consciousness, potential consciousness 
does not seem to be the sort of thing that could produce consciousness. 
We therefore have good reason to accept the second premise of Dharmakīrti’s 
argument for rebirth. Among the causes of consciousness there must be factors 
that share in the characteristics of consciousness. The next chapter will take 
these arguments further and explore reasons to believe that consciousness is 
not analysable into separate factors. 
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6. The Constitution of Conscious Experience 
6.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter explored the reasons for accepting the second premise 
of Dharmakīrti’s argument for rebirth: conscious mental events cannot arise 
from factors that are completely devoid of the distinctive characteristics of 
consciousness. This is because a conscious event, like any other phenomenon, 
must have at least one homogeneous cause (Sanskrit: sabhāga-hetu).1 The 
homogeneous causes of an event are those factors that give the event its 
distinctive qualities. A homogeneous cause can refer to an event that occurred 
prior to the phenomenon in question but it can also refer to a constituent factor 
of that phenomenon. A marble statue can have, among its homogeneous 
causes, the marble boulder from which it was carved but also the marble 
material of which it is composed. This is because the distinctive qualities that 
make a marble boulder what it is have given rise to the distinctive qualities that 
make the statue a marble statue. Insofar as the distinctive qualities of the 
marble boulder disappear into the statue, there is a sense in which the marble 
boulder has become the material that constitutes the statue. To say that both 
are homogeneous causes of the marble statue is to say that both are 
responsible for the marble qualities found in the statue. One of these 
homogeneous causes is the preceding cause; the other is the constituting 
cause. 
However, a preceding homogeneous cause must disappear into an event in 
order to become a constituting homogeneous cause of that event. If the 
preceding cause does not disappear into, and in a sense become a constitutive 
cause, it must have the power to produce or create a separate constitutive 
cause from nothing. But such a brute creative power is not a distinctive quality 
and so cannot be a homogeneous cause because it has a completely different 
                                                 
 
 
 
1 See Bhikkhu K. L. Dhammajoti, Sarvāstivāda Abhidhamma, Centre of Buddhist Studies, The 
University of Hong Kong, 2007, p.190. 
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character from the phenomenon that it produces. In this case, the brute creative 
cause could not be responsible for the distinctive qualities of the phenomenon 
that it produces; these qualities would have come from nowhere. For example, 
the distinctive qualities of a marble boulder are not responsible for the 
distinctive qualities of a marble statue if it is the brute creative power of the 
boulder that produces the material that constitutes the statue. In this case, none 
of the boulder’s qualities have gone into constituting the statue. The only way 
that the marble boulder can be the homogeneous cause for the marble statue 
is if the distinctive qualities of the former disappear as they give rise to the latter. 
Likewise, if a phenomenon does not have any preceding homogeneous causes, 
its constitutive causes must have come out of nowhere. A marble statue without 
preceding homogeneous causes must be made of material that popped into 
existence when the statue did. Such magical production is what we can call 
brute causation. If we accept that brute causation is possible, the world cannot 
be intelligible. We must reject the possibility of brute causation in order to make 
sense of the world. Therefore, every phenomenon must have preceding 
homogeneous causes, which become its constitutive factors.  
In this way, every phenomenon must have constitutive homogeneous causes, 
constituents which determine precisely what that phenomenon is. If the 
constituting causes of a phenomenon did not have the distinctive qualities of 
the phenomenon in question, these qualities would have to appear as if by 
magic when those constituents come together. This would be what we can call 
brute emergence. As was explored in the previous chapter, if we accept that 
brute emergence is possible, we face the same problems as if we accepted that 
brute causation were possible. Therefore, the constitutive homogeneous 
causes of any phenomenon must have the qualities necessary to explain 
precisely what it is, while the preceding homogeneous causes must become 
these constitutive homogeneous causes. When applied to conscious mental 
phenomena, this approach to causation entails that the distinctive qualities of 
such phenomena must be traceable back to their constituents and the 
distinctive qualities of these constituents must have existed in a preceding form. 
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In the previous chapter we explored two opposing views on where to take 
Dharmakīrti’s argument from here. According to Galen Strawson, the 
fundamental constituents of conscious phenomena must themselves be 
conscious. In Strawson’s terminology, the fundamental constituents of the 
experiential must themselves be experiential. He does not believe that purely 
non-experiential phenomena could give rise to experiential phenomena, such 
a situation would involve brute emergence. His reasoning is rooted in the 
premise that experiential phenomena cannot be analysed into non-experiential 
factors. Insofar as experience is precisely what it seems to be, our inability to 
analyse experience into non-experiential factors counts against the claim that 
experience is constituted by non-experiential factors. For this reason, 
experience would have to brutally emerge if it emerged from non-experiential 
factors. Strawson’s argument supports Dharmakīrti’s position regarding the 
need for the preceding homogeneous causes of conscious mental events to be 
prior conscious mental events. And while Dharmakīrti uses this position to 
argue for an unbroken stream of consciousness, Strawson uses it to argue for 
the panpsychist view that the physical constituents of organisms such as 
ourselves are conscious entities.  
However, a contrasting view comes from Evan Thompson. He is uncomfortable 
with Dharmakīrti’s dualistic suggestion that consciousness is an additional 
factor to the physical factors of the body and brain. But he is also uncomfortable 
with Galen Strawson’s panpsychism. Thompson suggests that the 
homogeneous causes of conscious experience might be potential 
consciousness. These would be factors that are not themselves conscious but 
give rise to consciousness when configured together. Consciousness would be 
an emergent property, in a “qualified” sense, of potentially conscious factors.  
In order to avoid positing brute emergence, a qualified emergentist like 
Thompson must take Strawson up on the challenge of analysing conscious 
experience into non-conscious factors. Any non-conscious or potentially 
conscious factors that constitute conscious experience must appear as features 
of conscious experience. This is because conscious experience is, by definition, 
appearance itself and the constituents of appearance must “show up” insofar 
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as their presence makes appearance different in a particular, recognisable way. 
Therefore, in order to challenge the view that conscious experience cannot be 
analysed into purely non-conscious factors, the opponent of Dharmakīrti and 
the panpsychist must analyse what Strawson calls experientiality into further 
factors, none of which have all the features that he describes as experiential. 
However, in his argument for panpsychism, Strawson does not consider what 
he calls experientiality to be analysable into anything other than further forms 
of experientiality. For Strawson, experientiality is synonymous with conscious 
experience and this is why I have used the two terms as synonymous thus far. 
In his major essays ‘Real Materialism’ and ‘Realistic Monism’, Strawson refers 
to experientiality in a way that does not ultimately distinguish between 
experiences, consciousness, the experienced objects of consciousness, and 
the phenomenal quality of these object-experiences. This is despite the fact that 
a conscious experience seems to be analysable into, on the one hand, an 
object of experience and, on the other hand, the awareness of that object. For 
Strawson, the distinction between phenomenal objects and the awareness of 
them does not entail that the two are separable elements.2 
The initial part of this chapter will explore the reasons behind Strawson’s view 
and the reasons for rejecting the idea that conscious experience can be 
separated into unexperienced objects and object-less awareness. In this way, 
the chapter will present further reasons for rejecting the qualified emergence of 
conscious experience from mere potentials for conscious experience. The 
chapter will then go on to address the fact that Strawson’s constitutive version 
of panpsychism presents a threat to Dharmakīrti’s argument for rebirth. In 
particular, the view that a single stream of conscious experience survives death 
and continues into future lives is not compatible with constitutive panpsychism. 
This is why an argument against constitutive panpsychism will be presented in 
                                                 
 
 
 
2 Galen Strawson, ‘Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism’, in Real 
Materialism and other essays, Oxford University Press, 2008, p.72. See also Galen 
Strawson, ‘What is the Relation Between an Experience, the Subject of the 
Experience, and the Content of the Experience?’, in Real Materialism and other 
essays, Oxford University Press, 2008, pp.151-187. 
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order to show that the conscious subject of our current conscious experience 
cannot be produced from multiple conscious subjects. 
 
6.2 Conscious Experience: Analysis and Separation 
As already mentioned, Strawson does not think that it is possible to separate 
the object of a phenomenal experience from the awareness of it. This is despite 
the fact that we can recognise that conscious experience involves both a 
phenomenon and an awareness of this phenomenon. Here the panpsychist 
seems, initially, to be at odds with the Abhidharma Chariot Principle according 
to which any phenomenon that can be analysed into its constitutive parts or 
distinct aspects cannot be taken as an ultimate reality. If we apply the Chariot 
Principle to a conscious experience by analysing it into its constituent features 
we find that the awareness of a phenomenon has a distinct nature from the 
phenomenon itself. If conscious experience has, as distinct features, an 
objective aspect (the phenomenon) as well as a subjective aspect (the 
awareness of that phenomenon), conscious experience cannot be a simple or 
unanalysable constituent of reality. 
But this does not, however, mean that these two aspects of a conscious 
experience can be separated from one another. This is because there are two 
ways in which the application of the Chariot principle can reveal that a 
phenomenon is fundamental. Firstly, when applying the Chariot Principle, it is 
possible that analysis might reveal a distinct phenomenon that cannot be 
analysed into further discrete constituents. It might be that the phenomenon is 
so simple that you can neither divide nor analyse it into more features. This 
would be because the phenomenon in question is an absolutely simple dharma.  
However, there is also a second possibility. As explored in the fourth chapter 
(section 4.4), there may be a phenomenon that can be analysed into distinct 
features but cannot be actually divided or separated into these features. Such 
features would be those that cannot be separated from others without 
disappearing altogether. In this case, the complex configuration can be 
analysed into features, some of which cannot exist separately from the 
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configuration itself. If a seemingly complex phenomenon has features that 
cannot exist when separated from others, the phenomenon could not have 
arisen as a result of these features coming together from a state of separation. 
The inseparable features must have always already been together in order to 
exist at all. These inseparable features would form a “cluster” that is analysable 
but nonetheless indivisible. This would not be a dharma but it would be an 
indivisible cluster of dharmas.3 Such clusters are indivisible because the 
absence of certain constituents would destroy the possibility of the cluster ever 
existing. 
With this in mind, we can surmise that if either the objective or subjective aspect 
of a conscious experience could not exist without the other, there is no way in 
which conscious experience could be the result of the coming together of the 
two. The combination in question could never have occurred because before it 
took place the two factors would have been separate. But if one factor cannot 
exist separately from the other, there cannot be a point before the combination 
of the two factors. For this reason we can say that such factors form an 
indivisible cluster. The panpsychist view that conscious experience cannot be 
separated into phenomenal awareness and phenomenal object although it can 
be analysed into them is viable insofar as these two factors form an indivisible 
cluster. Shortly we will look at the reasons for believing conscious experiences 
are such indivisible clusters but first we must clarify precisely which two factors 
we are claiming are inseparable. 
 
6.3 Against Unexperienced Phenomenally Propertied Objects 
Firstly, it is important to clarify that the phenomenally propertied objects that 
appear within conscious experience are distinct from any unexperienced 
                                                 
 
 
 
3 See Bhikkhu K. L. Dhammajoti, Sarvāstivāda Abhidhamma, Centre of Buddhist Studies, The 
University of Hong Kong, 2007, pp.255,275. See also Y. Karunadasa, The Theravāda 
Abhidhamma: Its Inquiry Into the Nature of Conditioned Reality, Centre for Buddhist 
Studies, University of Hong Kong, 2010, pp.76-83, 205-210. 
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entities that we might wish to claim those experiences are of. Such entities 
might well exist without conscious experience but this is simply because, being 
unexperienced, such entities do not play a constitutive role in conscious 
experience. The important point here, one that both Strawson and Thompson 
recognise, is that we do not know objects outside of their appearance in 
conscious experience.4 We encounter objects as the content of conscious 
experiences. Every object that we know of is known through its appearance 
within our consciousness. This appearance is precisely what that object is like 
for us, which is to say the overall phenomenal quality of the appearing object. 
The phenomenal quality of an appearing object can be described in terms of its 
phenomenal properties. Nevertheless, phenomenal properties are not so much 
properties belonging to the object as they are the qualities that constitute the 
appearing object. Ultimately the phenomenal properties of an object cannot be 
separated from the appearing object because the object is only known in terms 
of the phenomenal qualities, or properties, that constitute its appearance within 
our consciousness. 
For example, we do not experience a sunset and also its phenomenal 
properties; the sunset, as we experience it, is those phenomenal properties or 
qualities that constitute the experience. If watching a sunset is the beautiful 
activity of attending to the magnificent orb of orange-red light as it descends 
into a shining strip of watery horizon, then it is precisely every feature of this 
experience, including our consciousness of it. What it is like to watch a sunset 
is the conscious experience of watching a sunset. Without there being this 
phenomenal character, this ‘what it is like’ to watch a sunset, there would be no 
subjective experience of watching the sunset. We can, of course, imagine 
someone watching a sunset in a purely objective manner without there being 
any subjective experiences involved but such an image would exist for us and 
not them. The person watching the sunset in this case is simply what David 
                                                 
 
 
 
4 See Evan Thompson, Waking, Dreaming, Being: Self and Consciousness in Neuroscience, 
Meditation, and Philosophy, Columbia University Press, 2015, pp.100-1. See also 
Strawson, ‘Realistic Monism’, p.53. 
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Chalmers describes as a ‘Philosophical Zombie’, an object behaving in such a 
way that we can say “they are watching a sunset”, there would be no visual 
experiences for them in this case.5 
Therefore, while we cannot simply rule out the possibility of mind-independent 
objects devoid of all phenomenal properties, such objects do not play a 
constitutive role in conscious experience. When we analyse conscious 
experience we do not find mind-independent objects, we find phenomenally 
propertied objects, which are known because of the way that they “show up” in 
conscious experience. These objects might also involve non-phenomenal 
properties but such properties or qualities, by their very nature, do not appear 
within conscious experience. While mind-independent objects and non-
phenomenal factors might condition conscious experience by modifying the 
phenomenal qualities that constitute it, they do not themselves constitute what 
conscious experience is like. Mind-independent phenomena and non-
phenomenal qualities are not constitutive homogeneous causes of conscious 
experience, they do not give conscious experience its distinctive 
characteristics. If we were to separate phenomenally propertied objects from 
mind-independent objects, conscious experience would still have its distinctive 
phenomenal qualities. This is why such a separation does not reduce conscious 
experience to something that is not conscious experience. 
 
6.4 The Inseparability of Consciousness and Phenomenal Properties 
The panpsychist’s claim is that we cannot separate phenomenally propertied 
objects from the object-directed consciousness of them. This is why conscious 
experience cannot be separated into non-conscious factors. And yet, it does 
seem plausible to imagine an isolated object-directed consciousness to which 
phenomenal objects could appear and independent objects with special 
                                                 
 
 
 
5 See David Chalmers, The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory, Oxford 
University Press, 1997, p.94. 
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properties that only become fully apparent when consciousness is present. We 
might call these special properties “proto-phenomenal” properties. They would 
be the properties of objects that result in there being a particular phenomenal 
quality that appears within conscious experience if and when these properties 
are apprehended by consciousness.  
For example, the particular orange-red of a setting sun would appear as it does 
due to particular proto-phenomenal properties involved in the visual process 
when watching a sunset. These proto-phenomenal properties would not 
intrinsically appear orange-red but they would be the conditions in virtue of 
which orange-red phenomenal qualities appeared as and when there was 
consciousness of them.  
The problem here is that we are not able to analyse conscious experience into 
consciousness and the proto-phenomenal properties of objects. This is 
because such proto-phenomenal properties do not appear within conscious 
experience. The full-blown phenomenal appearance of an orange-red sun 
exists within conscious experience, it does not exist when there is no 
phenomenal consciousness for it to appear to. When taken separately, neither 
phenomenal consciousness nor the particular proto-phenomenal properties of 
sunset watching involve the distinctive orange-red visual phenomenal quality 
whose origins we are trying to explain. Although it is quite plausible to suggest 
that there are conditioning factors that determine when orange-red visual 
experiences appear within conscious experience, if these factors have no 
intrinsic phenomenal quality they cannot be the constitutive homogeneous 
causes that make orange-red experience what it is. It is for these reasons that 
we cannot easily assume that the particular phenomenal qualities of colours, 
sounds, smells, sensations, and so on can exist when not experienced. 
There are, of course, philosophers who entertain the possibility of special 
qualities or ‘qualia’ that are not intrinsically conscious but nonetheless are 
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precisely the phenomenal qualities that we consciously experience.6 Strawson, 
however, rejects outright the possibility of phenomenal experiences that are not 
phenomenally experienced.7 To accept such a possibility is to accept the 
existence of phenomenal qualities that are devoid of their nature as an 
appearance within conscious experience. It would be incorrect to refer to such 
unexperienced qualities as phenomenal in any sense since they would not be 
appearances. And yet it is precisely how they appear as conscious experiences 
that makes the phenomenal qualities of colours, sounds, sensations, and so on 
what they are. The visual and emotional experiences involved in watching a 
sunset are conscious experiences and to posit entirely unconscious versions of 
them seems to involve positing a version of them that has been stripped of all 
defining features. This is why non-conscious proto-phenomenal qualities 
cannot be homogeneous constitutive causes for particular phenomenal 
qualities. Any such proto-phenomenal quality will lack the distinct characteristic 
that makes a particular phenomenal quality what it is. 
As we saw in the last chapter, purely physical accounts of phenomena such as 
sunsets, birdsong, and emotions, are structural and causal accounts devoid of 
the categorical features that make conscious experiences what they are. A 
standard physical account will therefore be insufficient to account for the 
existence of phenomenal properties. But even if we adopt an agnostic 
Russellian Monist position and suggest that there are unknown categorical 
features within physical objects, which determine the phenomenal properties of 
conscious experiences, these will need to have features that are capable of 
accounting for phenomenal properties as phenomenal. It is no use positing a 
set of categorical features in order to explain why the experience of birdsong 
has the phenomenal quality that it does if these explanatory features are devoid 
of all phenomenal properties. And phenomenal properties are fundamentally 
the properties of conscious experiences. This is why we might take the view 
                                                 
 
 
 
6 Sam Coleman, ‘The Real Combination Problem: Panpsychism, Micro-Subjects, and 
Emergence’, Erkenntnis, Vol. 79, No. 1, February, 2014, pp.39,40. 
7 See Strawson, ‘What is the Relation Between an Experience, the Subject of the Experience, 
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that the phenomenal qualities that constitute our experiences must be 
conscious by their very nature.  
However, if we deny that unexperienced phenomenal properties or qualities are 
possible we will need to assume that all possible phenomenal characteristics 
are continually appearing within conscious experience. The fact that I can go 
and watch the sunset, have a delightful experience, and then go and experience 
something else, seems to rule out the idea that the phenomenal properties of 
the sunset continue within my own consciousness. That said, according to the 
Yogācāra school of Buddhism, there is in fact a subtle level of consciousness 
in which phenomenal qualities, such as those that arise when watching a 
sunset, are preserved.8 Alternatively we might posit an omniscient 
consciousness that maintains phenomenal qualities when others are not 
apprehending them; this is what philosopher Bishop George Berkeley 
suggested.9  
Understandably, we might conclude that these possibilities commit us to far too 
much. For simplicity’s sake, we might maintain that neither a storehouse level 
of consciousness nor the warehouse-mind of God are required. But this is 
where Strawson’s constitutive panpsychist view provides its solution.  
According to the constitutive version of panpsychism, the specific phenomenal 
qualities that make watching a sunset what it is are always, by their very nature, 
conscious experiences, even if they do not combine into the particular 
conscious experience of watching a sunset. In this case it seems as if Strawson 
will need something like the Yogācāra storehouse level of consciousness or 
Berkeley’s warehouse god to preserve the intrinsically conscious features of 
phenomenal qualities. But Strawson and others do not follow this route. The 
constitutive panpsychist position that Strawson adopts is one in which a sunset, 
                                                 
 
 
 
8 See Rupert Gethin, The Foundations of Buddhism, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998, 
pp.248,249. 
9 See Howard Robinson, ‘Idealism’, The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind, Brian 
McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann, and Sven Walter (eds.), Oxford University Press, 
2009. 
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for example, does not appear to a single consciousness and then disappear 
into god’s mind or drop into a storehouse consciousness. Rather, each 
phenomenal quality involved in a conscious experience contributes its own 
intrinsic consciousness to the mix. Each of these micro-experiential 
consciousnesses combines to form a single conscious experience of, for 
example, a sunset. 
Furthermore, a panpsychist like Strawson is able to claim the mantle of 
physicalist insofar as the constituents of conscious experience are physical 
entities, albeit entities with experiential properties. A constitutive panpsychist 
such as Strawson approaches the task of separating conscious experience into 
constituent factors by distinguishing not between consciousness and the 
objects of that consciousness but between the different phenomenal qualities 
that constitute a given conscious experience. Given the serious issues facing 
attempts to separate phenomenal qualities from phenomenal consciousness, 
Strawson, along with other constitutive panpsychists, takes the view that the 
only workable way to separate a conscious experience into constituent factors 
is to separate it into phenomenal qualities. If there are constitutive factors that 
combine to form our conscious experiences it is the fundamental phenomenal 
qualities that constitute the overall phenomenal quality of the experience.  
For example, in the case of watching a sunset, Strawson might suggest that 
each phenomenal property of the experience, from the spots of red-orange 
colour to the rush of appreciation felt at the beauty of the scene, is a constituent 
factor in the whole experience. And, for the constitutive panpsychist, these 
phenomenal properties or qualities are micro-experiences, they are always 
phenomenally conscious irrespective of any ordinary physical properties that 
they might also have.10 So the visual points of red-orange colour and the 
sensation of appreciation are intrinsically conscious micro-experiences 
regardless of whether or not they are part of our macro-experience of watching 
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the sunset. Being intrinsically conscious qualities, these micro-experiences 
have been conscious experiences since before they constituted our experience 
and will continue to be conscious experiences afterwards. 
It is therefore part and parcel of constitutive panpsychism to hold that each 
micro-experience has its own individual consciousness. For each fundamental 
constituent of an experience there is a consciousness, or subject, of that 
constituent micro-experience. In order for a phenomenal quality to be a 
conscious experience, it must appear to a conscious subject. Constitutive 
panpsychists such a Strawson therefore posit a conscious subject for each and 
every fundamental phenomenal quality, this conscious subject renders the 
micro-experience a conscious experience of a particular phenomenal quality 
rather than merely an unexperienced proto-phenomenal quality. It follows from 
this view that, at any given time, our individual consciousness of multiple 
phenomenal qualities is the result of the combination of the multiple individual 
consciousnesses associated with each of those phenomenal qualities. Micro-
experiences are therefore micro-consciousnesses and these combine to form 
our complex human consciousness.11 
According to the constitutive panpsychist account, every constituent of 
conscious experience is intrinsically conscious. This is why there is no 
emergence of consciousness from an unconscious basis, nor is there a point 
at which consciousness decomposes into non-conscious constituents. The 
similarities between what Strawson is suggesting about the origins and fate of 
consciousness and what Dharmakīrti tries to prove should not be overlooked. 
If we take the concrete reality of conscious experience as seriously as Strawson 
does, if we also accept his argument against brute emergence, and if we accept 
that conscious experiences cannot be analysed into non-conscious factors, 
then we have good reason to believe that our current conscious experiences 
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will continue in some conscious form in future and also existed in a conscious 
form before our conception and birth. 
However, what Strawson’s account does not suggest is that there is an 
individual stream of conscious experiences that continues from one life to 
another. For the constitutive panpsychist, every moment of consciousness is 
constructed from micro-experiences, which are physical entities that come and 
go from the brain. This position is given a clear summary in Sam Coleman’s 
article ‘The Real Combination Problem: Panpsychism, Micro-Subjects, and 
Emergence’: 
Any phenomenal qualities figuring in the macro-experience are put 
there through being carried by the phenomenally-qualitied ultimates 
jointly composing the relevant part of the subject’s brain. Thus we 
can trace the macro-phenomenology to the phenomenal states of 
the ultimates in a smooth way, and panpsychists can account for the 
macro-experiential state in terms of the matter composing it. This 
explanatory operation is essentially no more difficult than accounting 
for the overall composition of a painted canvas by reference to the 
various patches of paint filling it, along with their qualities. In the case 
of phenomenal paint, this is achieved by taking phenomenal qualities 
to belong to basic matter, and by taking this matter not only to 
materially constitute the subject, but to phenomenally compose her 
experiential field as well; that is to say, the phenomenal quality of 
each experiential field-composing ultimate finds its way into the 
conscious state enjoyed by the subject.12 
In this way, Strawson’s constitutive panpsychist position is more than 
compatible with a view in which an individual conscious subject is a short-lived 
configuration of physical micro-subjects, which quickly decomposes. Strawson 
even imagines that this individual conscious subject may not last much longer 
than a few seconds before decomposing into physical constituents that are 
flushed out of the relevant neurons.13 Alternatively an individual consciousness 
might be a physical structure that remains stable throughout a lifetime before 
collapsing into micro-experiences when the body dies. Any number of 
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possibilities can be imagined using a constitutive panpsychist framework but, 
in any of these cases, what we call an individual consciousness is the 
intersection of many streams of conscious phenomenal qualities.  
While it might be possible to accept Strawson’s version of panpsychism and 
attempt to develop a version of rebirth in which it refers to the continual recycling 
of micro-experiences, this would differ from the traditional Buddhist account. 
According to the account that Dharmakīrti tries to defend, there is an unbroken 
stream of mental factors that continues from one lifetime to another without 
decomposing into distinct consciousnesses. Each stream of mental factors is 
individuated and it is for this reason that an individual mental stream can be 
said to continue throughout multiple lives of birth, death, and rebirth. This is at 
odds with a constitutive panpsychist approach to consciousness in which birth 
involves the combination of micro-experiences into an individual consciousness 
and death involves the decomposition of this consciousness into multiple micro-
experiences. In such a case there would not be an individual stream of 
consciousness that continues from one life to another; the traditional Buddhist 
multi-life perspective would be untenable. It is for this reason that Strawson’s 
constitutive panpsychism, unlike his argument against brute emergence, 
presents a serious challenge to arguments for rebirth such as Dharmakīrti’s. 
Nevertheless, while Strawson adopts the sort of constitutive panpsychism 
detailed by Coleman, it is important to clarify here that neither the arguments 
against brute emergence nor the arguments against proto-phenomenal 
qualities entail a commitment to constitutive panpsychism. This is fortunate for 
the traditional Buddhist insofar as they are able to make use of Strawson’s 
arguments without becoming committed to a view as problematic as constitutive 
panpsychism. 
And constitutive panpsychism is indeed problematic, not just for traditional 
Buddhist ideas but also on its own terms.  
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6.5 Phenomenal Qualities and the Combination Problem 
Constitutive panpsychism runs into severe problems insofar as it is committed 
to the view that micro-experiential consciousnesses combine to form a single 
complex experience and can decompose back into these. Coleman describes 
the constitution of conscious experiences in terms of ‘phenomenal paint’, which 
suggests that there is a fundamental physical entity for every recognisable 
phenomenal quality within experience. But if this were the case, it would render 
constitutive panpsychism incompatible with physicalism. This is because there 
would have to be a wide range of fundamental, intrinsically conscious, 
phenomenal qualities accounting for each and every distinct property of our 
ordinary experiences. For example, insofar as the experience of watching a 
sunset involves an orange-red colour experience there must be particles of 
orange-redness knocking about within the physical world. Similarly, each 
distinct sound heard when listening to Vaughan Williams’ The Lark Ascending 
would have to originate as a distinct intrinsically conscious sound experience. 
Likewise, each distinct smell that a sommelier detects in a particular whiff of 
wine would also arise from an intrinsically conscious micro-experience of smell. 
And we could go on and on populating the world with micro-experiences for 
every distinct phenomenal quality that anyone has ever experienced.  
To bring such a view together with physicalism would involve the claim that the 
fundamental physical constituents of reality are experientially diverse to an 
incredible degree despite their physical properties being comparably limited. 
While a human body can be composed using a small range of basic physical 
particles, properly arranged, human experience would require a vast range of 
distinct and unique experiential particles. This results in an extreme mismatch 
between the physical and experiential accounts of human composition. The 
processes that bring physical constituents together to maintain a living human 
being do not seem to involve sourcing myriad specialist particles with their own 
unique phenomenal quality. But these processes would be needed in order to 
avoid our conscious experiences becoming incoherent when our body runs out 
of the required micro-experiences. We can imagine a situation where our body 
runs out of the sounds needed to experience Vaughan Williams’ The Lark 
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Ascending and we would instead start hearing someone playing the xylophone 
because those experiences are still in stock. 
In order to avoid such an absurd situation the constitutive panpsychist will need 
to assume that there is a relatively small set of fundamental phenomenal 
qualities that account for the variety of conscious experience through their 
combination into various structures. But this combination cannot simply involve 
a gathering together of discrete phenomenal “patches” into a picture of the 
world. If this were the case, our conscious experience would appear to be 
nothing but a collection of very basic phenomenal patches. In order for basic 
phenomenal qualities to compose complex experience they must be able to 
completely mix and merge in order to transform into the variety of qualities that 
we encounter in ordinary conscious experience.  
And this is precisely what Strawson assumes.  
As an avowed monist, Strawson is committed to the view that there is 
fundamentally one type of thing, one fundamental physical nature out of which 
everything arises. For Strawson, once we have accepted that the physical is 
also experiential we can move forward with the idea of emergence without there 
being brute qualitative leaps.14 This is why he is comfortable with the idea that 
phenomenal qualities like orange-redness might emerge from the fundamental 
phenomenal qualities of physical nature itself. As physical factors combine and 
merge to form new physical formations, this would also involve the merging of 
phenomenal qualities to form new experiences. The orange-red of the sunset 
would be the result of a particular merging of conscious phenomenally qualitied 
physical energy in the human body and brain. While this phenomenally qualitied 
energy would not involve the experience of sounds, smells, tastes, sights, 
sensations or thoughts, it would have the phenomenal qualities needed to 
transform into these when structured in the right way. 
                                                 
 
 
 
14 See Strawson, ‘Realistic Monism’, p.72. 
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However, the suggestion that different sorts of sensory experience can emerge 
from a common fundamental qualitative experience seems to involve the kind 
of qualitative leap that panpsychism aims to rule out. Insofar as phenomenal 
qualities are, by definition, qualitatively different from one another, we must ask 
how one set of phenomenal qualities is able to emerge from another.  
The constitutive panpsychist may be able to answer this question by moving 
away from the view that physical reality is fundamentally particulate. If each 
phenomenal quality is a discrete entity or “patch” of experience, the emergence 
of one set of discrete patches from another set will indeed involve brute 
qualitative leaps. We will simply be replacing one set of distinct qualities with 
another. To claim that fundamental experiential factors form up into a complex 
one would be akin to claiming that if you gather certain sound experiences 
together in the right way you create a certain visual experience. The argument 
against brute emergence rules out this sort of thing. 
Fortunately for the constitutive panpsychist, the phenomenal qualities that 
constitute our conscious experiences are not discrete patches. Each 
phenomenal quality, particularly sensory ones, are completely embedded. 
Phenomenal colour qualities, for example, are distinctive regions of a visual 
field, tactile sensations are distinctive regions of a bodily field, while sounds, 
smells, and tastes are distinctive appearances within auditory, olfactory, and 
gustatory fields. This thorough embeddedness of phenomenal qualities is 
something that was recognised by Gestalt theories of consciousness. Gestalt 
theorist Aron Gurwitsch describes the situation as follows: 
Since data exhibit phenomenal features only derived from the 
configuration into which they are integrated, it follows that such a 
configuration cannot be considered as built up out of the ‘parts’ of 
which it consists, if these parts are regarded as independent and 
self-contained elements. More precisely, the configuration cannot be 
accounted for in terms of these properties and attributes which its 
constituents display when they are extracted from the actual 
configuration and are taken isolatedly. The reason is that if a 
constituent of a configuration is isolated and taken by itself as an 
independent and self-contained element, it may be affected so 
radically and by such deep reaching modifications as to destroy its 
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phenomenal or experiential identity, the constancy of the external 
stimuli notwithstanding.15 
 
As Gurwitsch makes clear, the very phenomenal identity of a phenomenal 
property may well be completely destroyed were it to be separated from the 
field in which it is embedded. Visual and tactile phenomenal properties in 
particular can only have the phenomenal quality that they do in virtue of the fact 
that they are part of extended sensory fields. Without a visual field, the 
phenomenal qualities of colour, shade, and so forth would lack the extension 
necessary for them to be the distinctively visual experiences that they are. If we 
return to the example of the specific orange-red of a setting sun, there is nothing 
about this distinctive orange-red colour that remains if we collapse the visual 
field because this orange-red colour is part of an extended visual field. If we 
strip out the visual field, nothing that remains has the visual-experiential 
phenomenal qualities required to constitute the orange-red sunset.  
In this case, when we remove the visual field we completely lose one of the 
distinctive characteristics that makes the experience of watching a setting sun 
what it is. We have not reduced phenomenal colour qualities to their constitutive 
factors, we have simply lost them entirely. This is why it makes sense to 
conclude that phenomenal colour qualities are always also visual field qualities 
because it is only in virtue of being extended in a visual field that they are the 
type of phenomenal quality that they are. The same is true for tactile 
phenomenal qualities, which are always also bodily field qualities because it is 
only in virtue of being extended in a bodily field that they are the type of 
phenomenal quality that they are. If we examine other sensory phenomenal 
qualities we will find that the situation is the same: stripped of the field in which 
they are embedded, these sensory phenomenal qualities disappear without 
remainder. It is for this reason that the phenomenal qualities that constitute 
                                                 
 
 
 
15 Aron Gurwitsch, Field of Consciousness, Pittsburgh, Duquesne University Press, 1964, 
p.114. 
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sensory experience cannot exist in isolation from the sensory field in which they 
are embedded. 
At this point we can recognise that phenomenal qualities are adhering to the 
Abhidharma Cluster principle. Just as basic characteristics such as solidity are 
inseparable from spatial extension, so too are sensory phenomenal qualities 
inseparable from the characteristics that constitute the sensory fields in which 
they are embedded. Despite seeing the world in terms of unanalysable 
dharmas, an Abhidharma approach need not necessarily adopt a particulate 
view of reality or human experience. A world of particles evokes images of 
separate atoms drifting about in a void. In contrast, a world of dharmas is more 
like an ocean of interwoven clusters where no single dharma type ever 
completely separates from the others. And this fluid, as opposed to particulate, 
view of reality comes closer to how conscious experiences exist. 
Therefore, in order for the constitutive panpsychist position to be viable it must 
approach the physical in terms of fluid phenomena such as fields rather than 
atomistic phenomena like particles. They could take the view that micro-
experiences are not ultimate physical particles with phenomenal properties but 
rather physical fields of inseparably embedded physical and phenomenal 
qualities. The precise nature of the phenomenal qualities would then be 
dependent upon the characteristics of the field in which they were embedded. 
Changes in physical-experiential fields would condition and reconfigure the 
phenomenal qualities of those fields in a gradual way so that there would not 
be a qualitative leap from one conscious experience to another. In this way, the 
panpsychist approach to emergence would not involve the kind of brute leap 
involved in the experiential emerging from the non-experiential. 
Furthermore, the emergence of one phenomenal quality from another would be 
explicable in qualitative terms. Coleman’s paint analogy works quite well in this 
case. If we take phenomenal qualities to be like paints, we can understand how 
certain basic qualities might merge to form more complex qualities just as blue 
and yellow paint mixes to form green paint. The merging of different fields would 
alter their dimensional characteristics and this could determine whether they 
were, for example, a visual field, an auditory field, or some other type of 
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experiential field altogether. The idea is that an understanding of the 
experiential quality of different physical fields would allow us to understand how 
those fields can merge to form fields with new phenomenal qualities.  
For a suggestion as to how this might look, we could recall that Thompson 
suggests that the electromagnetic field generated by the living cells of the brain 
might be the key to understanding how conscious experiences are constituted. 
According to the theories of neuroscientists Roman Bauer and Norman Cook, 
changes in this dynamic field correlate with changes experienced by conscious 
subjects, making it possible that the dynamics of this field determine the 
phenomenal quality of any given conscious experience.16 The constitutive 
panpsychist could claim that all such fundamental physical fields involve 
conscious experiences of the phenomenal qualities that are embedded in the 
particular structure of the field in question. 
Of course, in order for this to work for the constitutive panpsychist, they must 
be willing to approach the attribution of consciousness in ways that do not 
involve a commitment to subatomic particles with their own individual 
consciousness. Luckily, none of Strawson’s arguments lead inexorably towards 
the attribution of consciousness to sub-atomic particles. Nor is it a foregone 
conclusion that the fundamental constituents of physical reality are particles 
such as protons and neutrons. As Strawson points out, many physicists 
consider a field such as space-time to be the fundamental substance of physical 
reality.17 This is why the constitutive panpsychist need not assume that physics 
is wedded to a particulate view of reality, which enables them to reject any kind 
of experiential pluralism in which conscious experience is composed of myriads 
of different types of phenomenally propertied particles. Physical phenomena 
are far too interchangeable for there to be a vast array of fundamentally distinct 
                                                 
 
 
 
16 Thompson, Waking Dreaming Being, 2015, pp.342,343. See Roman Bauer, ‘In Search of a 
Neural Signature of Consciousness – Facts, Hypotheses, and Proposals,’ in 
Synthese, pp.233-245, Vol. 141, 2004. See also N. D. Cook, ‘The Neuron Level 
Phenomena Underlying Cognition and Consciousness: Synaptic Activity and the 
Action Potential,’ in Neuroscience, pp.556-570, Vol. 153, 2008. 
17 Strawson, ‘Realistic Monism’, p.71. 
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types of experiential constituent.18 By dropping a particulate view, constitutive 
panpsychism can avoid relying on intrinsically distinct particles of experience.  
Therefore, in order for constitutive panpsychism to work as a form of 
physicalism, it must commit to the view that micro-experiences do not simply 
combine, rather they merge or fuse to form qualitatively distinct but nonetheless 
explicable formations. It would be through this fusion that extremely simple 
phenomenal qualities could form into the complex and varied experiences that 
we enjoy. However, it would also be through fusion that the multiple 
consciousnesses of each fundamental experiential field would merge into a 
single consciousness. And, as it turns out, the claim that multiple individual 
consciousnesses can fuse into a single consciousness generates some serious 
problems for constitutive panpsychism. 
 
6.6 Conscious Subjects and the Combination Problem 
Of all the aspects of panpsychism that Evan Thompson pushes against in 
Waking Dreaming Being, the view that there is an individual consciousness 
associated with each phenomenal quality and that these combine to form a 
single ordinary complex consciousness is the most strongly rejected. 
Thompson thinks that the problems facing the view that particles of conscious 
experience can ‘co-exist or combine coherently into a human or other kind of 
animal subject’ are insurmountable.19 These insurmountable problems can be 
used as reasons to reject constitutive panpsychism and are given a clear 
presentation by Coleman in ‘The Real Combination Problem: Panpsychism, 
Micro-Subjects, and Emergence’. 
Unfortunately, Coleman uses these problems in order to justify a view in which 
subjects, rather than combining, emerge from phenomenal qualities that are 
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S. Schneider, and M. Velmans, Wiley, 2017, p.385. 
19 Thompson, Waking Dreaming Being, p.105. 
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devoid of subjective or conscious characteristics. In this way he uses 
arguments against constitutive panpsychism in order to encourage a return to 
a view in which consciousness emerges from non-conscious factors.  
But nothing about Coleman’s argument against constitutive panpsychism 
actually requires a return to brute emergence because his reasoning regarding 
the impossibility of subjects combining is very straightforward: The combination 
of micro-experiences requires that a number of them become configured in 
such a way that none of the entities cease to exist but rather become modified 
or ‘deformed’ versions of themselves as part of the configuration.20 In the case 
of phenomenal qualities, we have been able to understand how these qualities 
are embedded in fields that could merge into more complex fields with more 
complex phenomenal qualities. A complex field would be a configuration in 
which the qualities of each constituting field still existed though they would be 
modified or otherwise transformed in some way. 
However, each micro-experience entering into a configuration is a single 
conscious experience with an individual conscious awareness of the 
experience itself. This awareness of the phenomenal quality of the micro-
experience is the subject of the micro-experience: the micro-subject. And when 
individual micro-experiences merge into a single complex experience, the 
micro-subjects of these micro-experiences must become part of it as well. But 
insofar as the merging of micro-experiential fields requires that multiple 
experiences must become one experience, all but one of the micro-subjects 
must be annihilated. 
If we return to the example of the sunset, we can imagine a number of micro-
experiential fields, each being an experience for a subject. For simplicity’s sake 
let us imagine that one subject experiences a field of red-orange, another 
experiences visual roundness, yet another might experience a sense of beauty. 
These phenomenal qualities might combine to form an experience of a beautiful 
                                                 
 
 
 
20 Coleman, ‘The Real Combination Problem’, p.30. 
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red-orange roundness. In this case the multiple qualities are still present in the 
combined experience. But the subjects of these experiences have not 
combined. There is only one subject of the sunset, there is no trace of the 
multiple subjects that existed before. Before the combination of subjects there 
are multiple subjects; after the combination of subjects there is only one subject. 
While the combination of micro-experiences produces a complex configuration 
of phenomenal qualities in which each quality continues to exist, it also causes 
the annihilation of conscious subjects. The individual consciousness of any 
given phenomenal quality does not survive the combination process and so 
cannot be said to have combined or merged with others at all. 
The problem here is that an individual consciousness is, by definition, 
individual. To speak of a consciousness is to speak of a unified point of view on 
the world. If you combine multiple unified points of view all you have is a 
collection of unified points of view, they have not combined. This was first 
recognised by William James, whose famous formulation of the problem, 
presented by Coleman, is as follows: 
Take a hundred [feelings], shuffle them and pack them as close 
together as you can (whatever that might mean); still each remains 
the same feeling it always was, shut in its own skin, windowless, 
ignorant of what the other feelings are and mean.21 
This is the first half of James’ formulation of the problem and captures the way 
in which an individual consciousness can only be a distinct point of view, it 
cannot be a collection of points of view.  
For there to be consciousness is for there to be something it is like for the 
consciousness as subject to experience an object, or objects, where this 
experience is understood as a single appearance of any number of phenomenal 
qualities. The phrase “something it is like for consciousness” describes 
something singular: an experience. Consciousness is unified in that it does not 
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matter how many objects or phenomenal qualities appear within 
consciousness, they always appear together as part of a single conscious 
experience. If there are multiple consciousnesses, each of these will involve a 
single conscious experience, even if diverse qualities or objects are unified 
within each experience. In order that multiple individual consciousnesses could 
do more than exist in ignorant co-existence with one another they would have 
to form into a complex consciousness in which each individual consciousness 
is still present as an individual consciousness but is also aware of the others. 
But such a complex consciousness is nothing like ours; ours is a single 
consciousness insofar as it is a unified appearance or experience and not a 
complex of multiple individual consciousnesses.  
In order to be a true combination, our consciousness must include the multiple 
consciousnesses of which it is a combination, but a combination of 
consciousnesses must be a singular conscious experience in order to still be 
considered consciousness. It is for these reasons that the combination of 
consciousnesses is not possible. The only way for multiple consciousnesses to 
come together into a single consciousness is if they all merge, losing their 
distinct individuality and forming a unified subject. This newly formed 
consciousness would be more complex than its precursors insofar as it was a 
complex conscious experience involving multiple phenomenal qualities. But it 
would be complex in virtue of the combination of phenomenal qualities rather 
than the combination of consciousnesses.  
This is why such a process is not a combination of micro-experiences but rather 
the fusion of micro-experiences in which micro-subjects entirely disappear into 
a single subject.22 The counterpart process would be fission, in which the 
singular consciousness of multiple qualities separates and produces multiple 
consciousnesses, each being conscious of a distinct phenomenal quality. The 
fusion and fission of consciousness involves the complete appearance and 
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disappearance of particular subjects. If we imagine a case in which a single 
complex subject undergoes fission into three micro-subjects, we can recognise 
that at least two new subjects must be created. And in order for three micro-
subjects to fuse into a single complex subject, at least two of those subjects 
must disappear. In this case we are assuming that one of the micro-subjects 
becomes the macro-subject and brings together the phenomenal qualities 
experienced by the other two. Alternatively we might imagine that all three 
micro-subjects disappear in giving rise to the macro-subject. In this case the 
macro-subject is a completely new subject that has appeared as a result of the 
micro-subjects’ “sacrifice”. 
The intuitive discomfort that we might feel at these possibilities is shared by 
James in the second half of his formulation of the combination problem:  
There would be a hundred-and-first feeling there, if, when a group or 
series of such feelings were set up, a consciousness belonging to 
the group as such should emerge. And this 101st feeling would be a 
totally new fact; the 100 original feelings might, by a curious physical 
law, be a signal for its creation, when they came together; but they 
would have no substantial identity with it, nor it with them, and one 
could never deduce the one from the others, or (in any intelligible 
sense) say that they evolved it.23 
In Coleman’s interpretation, he clarifies that the 101st feeling that James 
mentions is the macro-subject of the newly complex experience. This macro-
subject would indeed be ‘a totally new fact’ unless it was nothing other than a 
micro-subject that had survived the fusion process and inherited the 
phenomenal qualities of the other micro-subjects, which had been annihilated 
during fusion. 
Whether the macro-subject is totally new or the sole survivor of fusion, the 
creation and annihilation of subjects is involved in fusion and fission. In the case 
of fusion, we can avoid positing an instance of creation if we assume that a 
micro-subject became the macro-subject by absorbing and destroying the other 
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micro-subjects. In the case of fission, we can avoid positing the annihilation of 
the macro-subject if it becomes a micro-subject whilst creating other micro-
subjects. But to fully avoid either creation or annihilation we would have to 
remove either fusion or fission from the picture. To do either would be to posit 
an unstable reality in which the overall number of subjects was either ever-
shrinking or ever-growing ad infinitum. Therefore, as long as fusion and fission 
are part of our metaphysical approach to consciousness, we will be assuming 
both the creation and annihilation of individual consciousnesses or subjects.  
Insofar as constitutive panpsychism implies the creation and annihilation of 
individual consciousnesses, it relies on an appeal, not to brute emergence, but 
to brute causation. In order to see why this is the case we must first remind 
ourselves that all events must have preceding homogeneous causes, causes 
which determine the distinctive characteristics of an event by becoming the 
constitutive factors of that event. If this preceding cause did not become a 
constitutive factor, it would have nothing to do with the intrinsic nature of the 
phenomenon in question. This is the problem that the constitutive panpsychist 
is faced with.  
To return to a prior example, a marble boulder can only be a preceding 
homogeneous cause of a marble statue if some of its material has gone into 
constituting the statue. Likewise, a particular preceding consciousness can only 
be a homogeneous cause of the intrinsic qualities of a succeeding 
consciousness if some of the former’s characteristics go into constituting the 
latter. But when multiple micro-experiential phenomenal qualities combine into 
a single complex conscious experience, only one micro-experiential 
consciousness can be the homogeneous cause of the complex consciousness. 
This is because the complex consciousness, which involves a single subject, 
only has the characteristics of a single consciousness. If there were more than 
one consciousness as homogeneous causes, the complex conscious 
experience would have to involve more than one consciousness. But a single 
conscious experience is, by definition, the experience of a single instance of 
consciousness and so cannot have more than one instance of consciousness 
as a preceding homogeneous cause.  
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This means that fusion would involve the complete annihilation of an individual 
consciousness. The annihilated consciousness would have quite literally 
become nothing just as the surviving consciousness would have become the 
consciousness of the macro-experience. This amounts to brute causation 
because there will have been a complete and inexplicable transformation of a 
phenomenon, which has particular characteristics, into nothing at all, which also 
has particular characteristics, albeit negative ones. Of course, we might deny 
that it is possible to become nothing, in which case we have simply recognised 
that it is probably not possible to fall out of existence. If existence is not a place 
you can fall out of, and nothingness is not something you can become, it seems 
equally likely that annihilation is not something that can actually happen. 
Nonetheless, even if fusion does not involve brute causation in an obvious way, 
fission certainly does. Any phenomenon that does not have any preceding 
homogeneous causes must have constitutive homogeneous causes that 
appeared out of nowhere. If a marble statue has no preceding homogeneous 
causes, it must be made of material that popped into existence when the statue 
did. Likewise, a particular consciousness without a preceding consciousness 
as homogeneous cause must be constituted by factors that appeared out of 
nowhere. 
Let us take the case of a single complex conscious experience that 
decomposes into multiple micro-experiential phenomenal qualities, each with 
their own individual consciousness. In this case, the individual consciousness 
of the complex experience can only be the preceding homogeneous cause of 
one of the subsequent micro-experiential consciousnesses. This is because a 
preceding homogeneous cause must become a constitutive factor of its effect. 
The preceding homogeneous causes of a micro-experiential consciousness 
must include those factors that account for its character as a singular conscious 
perspective. Those preceding homogeneous causes must become constitutive 
factors in the micro-experiential consciousness just as the marble of the boulder 
becomes the marble of the statue. In this way, the singular conscious 
perspectival character of a micro-experiential consciousness is transferred to it 
from a preceding factor that becomes this character. But this transfer involves 
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the preceding homogeneous cause disappearing into its effect. Such a transfer 
can only happen once because the homogeneous cause in question no longer 
exists once it has disappeared into its effect. This is what it means for the 
singular conscious perspectival character of the complex conscious experience 
to become the same character in the micro-subject.  
Although a single macro-subject can become a single micro-subject, both 
sharing the same characteristic of individual consciousness, the single macro-
subject lacks the characteristics to become multiple micro-subjects. This is why 
a macro-experiential consciousness can only produce a single micro-
experiential consciousness as successor, any other micro-experiential 
consciousnesses would appear via brute causation. And if we accept that brute 
causation is possible, the world cannot be intelligible. We must reject the 
possibility of brute causation in order to make sense of the world. Every 
phenomenon must have preceding homogeneous causes, which become its 
constitutive aspects. Likewise, no phenomenon can simply turn into nothing at 
all.  
Therefore, the constitutive panpsychist cannot offer an intelligible account of 
the world if they take the view that multiple conscious subjects can fuse into an 
individual conscious subject or that an individual subject can fissure into 
multiple subjects. At this point Strawson’s constitutive panpsychism falls apart 
insofar as micro-experiences must fuse in order to form complex macro-
experiences. If each micro-experience has its own subject and the fusion and 
fission of subjects is not possible, the fusion and fission of micro-experiences 
is not possible. This means that the fusion and fission of phenomenal qualities 
is not possible. The merging and fusion of phenomenal qualities into interesting, 
new, and complex phenomenal experiences cannot mirror the merging and 
fusion of physical formations if micro-experiences cannot fuse. 
This also rules out any theory in which an individual conscious subject is taken 
to result from fusion or fission. Any constitutive approach to consciousness in 
which many consciousnesses become one will rely on the brute causation that 
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comes with fusion and fission. It also rules out any theory in which one 
consciousness emerges from another.24  
To summarise, in order for the fundamental constituents of conscious 
experience to be physical constituents, the experiential features of these 
constituents must be able to mirror the processes undergone by their physical 
features. Most importantly, fundamental physical phenomena are 
interchangeable because basic physical factors can combine to form into the 
full range of physical phenomena. In order for experiential factors to mirror this, 
there must be basic experiential qualities that can form up into the full range of 
possible experiences. These basic experiential qualities must be able to 
combine coherently into the complex and vast array of phenomenally qualitied 
experiences that are involved in conscious experience. The variety of sights, 
sounds, smells, tastes, sensations, and thoughts that are involved in conscious 
experiences require more than a mere combination or organisational 
structuring. In order for basic phenomenal qualities to form everything from 
sights to smells to thoughts they will need to be able to completely merge and 
transform their phenomenal quality.  
                                                 
 
 
 
24 Any form of theism in which an individual consciousness separates from a universal 
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217 
 
But the complete merging of micro-experiences results in the annihilation of 
conscious micro-subjects just as the separation of such micro-experiences 
results in the creation of micro-subjects. While phenomenal qualities may well 
be embedded in fields that can merge into one another, forming more complex 
phenomenal qualities, individual consciousnesses cannot merge in this way. 
Consciousness is the unified phenomenal perspective from which certain 
objects and phenomenal qualities appear. It is a single point of view on objects 
and qualities. To move from there being multiple instances of phenomenal 
consciousness to a single instance is simply to have removed all but one 
instance of phenomenal consciousness. This is a distinctive characteristic of 
phenomenal consciousness.  
Insofar as the panpsychist claims that all physical phenomena are conscious 
phenomena, they cannot also claim that physical phenomena can merge to 
form new complex phenomena. If each constituent of physical reality has its 
own consciousness, physical constituents cannot merge. This rules out an 
approach to physical reality in which it is fundamentally composed of fields that 
merge together to form more complex fields. Insofar as the constitutive 
panpsychist maintains that the constituents of physical reality have their own 
individual consciousness, they are in fact wedded to a particulate view of 
physical reality. This, in turn, rules out the kind of emergence that Strawson 
relies on. Complex phenomenal qualities cannot emerge from more basic ones 
if the basic constituents of experience cannot merge or fuse into new 
experiences.  
Therefore, in being committed to the idea that every physical constituent has 
its own individual consciousness, the constitutive panpsychist is thrown back 
onto the idea that every distinct phenomenal quality in conscious experience, 
every sound, smell, colour, thought, and so on and on must belong to a distinct 
constituent of reality. This entails an extreme mismatch between the physical 
and experiential accounts of human composition. While a human body can be 
composed out of a small set of basic physical constituents, properly arranged, 
human experience would require a vast range of distinct and unique 
experiential constituents. 
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As mentioned above, to hear The Lark Ascending would require that certain 
phenomenally qualitied sound particles were gathered to produce this 
experience. There would have to be specialist physical constituents and 
specialist physical processes that gather these constituents in order to 
compose the appropriate conscious experiences at the correct times. These 
constituents would not be currently known physical constituents because they 
would not arrive in the body via the normal processes. The processes that 
gather the phenomenal qualities of listening to music, watching sunsets, or 
smelling grass would be additional to the known biological processes that 
manage and metabolize ordinary physical constituents. 
Furthermore, the constitutive panpsychist would have to posit specialist 
processes to explain how intrinsically conscious physical constituents are able 
to experience each other’s phenomenal qualities in such a way that this joint 
experience was more than simply a collection of discrete phenomenal qualities. 
Without being able to merge into a single subject, each micro-subject must 
somehow experience the phenomenal qualities of every other. The micro-
subject for any colour in my visual field must be able to experience the colour 
in every other part of my field for the whole visual experience to be possible. In 
this case, each micro-subject must have the capacity to become aware of 
phenomenal qualities aside from its own.  
However, once the constitutive panpsychist is entertaining the possibility that a 
single micro-subject can experience different phenomenal qualities at different 
times, they have abandoned the idea that each phenomenally qualitied 
constituent of reality has its own micro-subject. If conscious micro-subjects can 
become aware of more than just their own phenomenal quality, they are no 
longer the intrinsic consciousness of a particular physical constituent. 
 
6.7 Conclusion: Reconsidering Proto-Phenomenal Qualities 
At this point it may have become unclear why anyone would even assume that 
any micro-subject is intrinsically linked with any phenomenal quality. The 
answer, if we recall, is that the constitutive panpsychist posits intrinsically 
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conscious phenomenally qualitied physical constituents in order to explain what 
happens to phenomenal qualities when they are not part of a complex 
conscious experience such as our own. Insofar as phenomenal qualities are 
distinctive conscious appearances, they cannot be phenomenal qualities if 
there is no consciousness of them. And without this phenomenal character, the 
distinctive nature of phenomenal qualities disappears completely. The 
phenomenal qualities that make hearing violin music or smelling grass what 
they are disappear without remainder without phenomenal awareness. 
Everything about what it is like to hear violin music or smell grass is an 
appearance within conscious experience. These phenomenal qualities must 
arise from preceding factors that can explain their phenomenal quality and non-
conscious factors could not have the required phenomenal qualities. 
However, our exploration of constitutive panpsychism has also made it clear 
that phenomenal qualities are not separable particles of conscious experience. 
We have reasons to doubt that “what it is like” to smell grass or hear violin music 
is composed of particles of experience that can exist on their own. Each 
phenomenal quality, whether it is the orange-red of a setting sun, a particular 
note in The Lark Ascending, or the particular smell of grass on a particular 
summer’s day, is embedded within a wider sensory field. This means that the 
experience of listening to the violin solo in The Lark Ascending is not to be 
accounted for in terms of independent phenomenal qualities that come together 
to form the experience. The phenomenal qualities of the music are embedded 
in the auditory field and can only exist as the qualities that they are in virtue of 
this sensory field.  
Furthermore, the sheer variety of discrete phenomenal qualities that would be 
required in order to account for every single phenomenal quality would render 
constitutive panpsychism completely incompatible with a physicalist account of 
conscious experience. This was why Strawson opted for an experiential 
emergentist view in which the vast variety of phenomenal qualities in our 
experiences arise from the merging of more basic phenomenal qualities. In this 
way, the micro-experiences that constitute our experiences must be able to 
merge to form a coherent field of experience. But, insofar as the constituents of 
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phenomenally qualitied experience must merge with one another to produce 
other distinctive experiences, they cannot have their own intrinsic 
consciousness. As we have already seen, individual conscious subjects cannot 
merge, which is why the problems facing the constitutive panpsychist solution 
are, as Thompson and Coleman claim, insurmountable. 
Nevertheless, the failures of constitutive panpsychism do not undermine its 
arguments against brute emergence, nor do they make the problems with 
unexperienced phenomenal qualities any less severe. The continued existence 
of phenomenal qualities depends on there being at least one consciousness 
that experiences them at any given time. And if phenomenal qualities are an 
intrinsic feature of physical “stuff”, as the panpsychist argues, phenomenal 
qualities must be as capable of merging and transforming as the physical “stuff” 
that they are a feature of. But because conscious subjects cannot merge, in 
order for any set of phenomenal qualities to be able to merge they must already 
share a single conscious subject. Therefore, every phenomenal quality that is 
capable of merging with another must already be appearing to a subject along 
with every other phenomenal quality with which it could ever merge. 
Ultimately, if the panpsychist is going to remain committed to the view that the 
complex phenomenal qualities that we experience are ultimately physical, they 
will need to adopt a view in which the whole of the phenomenally qualitied 
physical universe is maintained by a single conscious subject. This is firstly 
because, if complex phenomenal experiences are physical, they must be the 
result of the fusion and fission of more basic phenomenally qualitied physical 
factors. But, secondly, these phenomenally qualitied physical factors can only 
freely fissure and fuse to become more complex if these processes do not 
involve the fission and fusion of conscious subjects. As we have seen, such 
fission and fusion is highly problematic. 
However, there must be a subject that experiences a phenomenally qualitied 
physical factor even as it undergoes fusion and fission. Such physical factors 
cannot remain phenomenally qualitied if there is no consciousness of them 
when they are merging to form complex phenomena. What is required is a 
single subject that constantly experiences phenomenally qualitied physical 
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factors, even when they fuse and fissure. The fusion and fission of subjects 
does not need to happen if all such processes take place within a single all-
encompassing consciousness.  
Therefore, in order for there to be basic physical phenomenal qualities that can 
merge and form into complex experiences, there must be a single all-
encompassing conscious experience in which the phenomenally qualitied 
aspect of physical energy maintains its phenomenal quality. Ultimately, such a 
version of panpsychism might be indistinguishable from metaphysical idealism. 
If the all-encompassing conscious experience is not ours within this adapted 
version of panpsychism, our conscious experience would not be involved in any 
processes of fission and fusion. Rather, our conscious experience would be an 
awareness of the phenomenally qualitied physical universe, which would be 
maintained in its entirety by an all-encompassing consciousness that is distinct 
from our own. This approach would lend itself to a theistic interpretation, such 
as Bishop George Berkeley’s, in which God preserves the whole of reality in his 
own mind and we simply experience the mind of God.25 Alternatively, an 
adapted version of panpsychism might posit an all-encompassing but subtle 
level of consciousness that is connected to our own, much like the storehouse 
consciousness within the Yogācāra school of Buddhism, in which phenomenal 
qualities are preserved.26 
Regardless of the idealist possibilities, such an adapted version of panpsychism 
would be consistent with Dharmakīrti’s approach to consciousness and rebirth. 
Insofar as the fusion, fission, annihilation and brute creation of conscious 
subjects has been thoroughly ruled out, the subject of each conscious 
experience would arise in dependence upon a single prior conscious subject. 
With each singular conscious subject giving rise to or “becoming” another with 
                                                 
 
 
 
25 Robinson, ‘Idealism’, 2009. Alternatively, this version of panpsychism might be comparable 
to some variants within the Vedānta school of Indian Philosophy. See Perrett, An 
Introduction to Indian Philosophy, 2016, pp.210-220. 
26 See Rupert Gethin, The Foundations of Buddhism, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998, 
pp.248,249. In Chapter Eight, particularly section 8.5, arguments will be made that 
suggest ways in which our own conscious experience might in fact be all-
encompassing in certain ways. 
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each new instance of conscious experience, there would be an unbroken 
continuum of individual conscious subjects. Such an unbroken continuum 
would persist regardless of bodily death and, assuming that our own birth was 
not an absurdly unique occurrence, must be capable of being recurrently born 
with other physical bodies.  
However, insofar as a commitment to intrinsically conscious physical 
phenomenal qualities pushes the panpsychist towards metaphysical idealism, 
many would be tempted to abandon their attempt at a physicalist account of 
phenomenal qualities. But this would not avoid the problem that partly motivates 
both panpsychism and idealism: what happens to the particular phenomenal 
qualities of an experienced object when there is no longer any individual 
awareness of those qualities?  
To avoid idealism, one would need to posit phenomenal qualities that can exist 
separately from a consciousness of them. This would involve positing some 
kind of proto-phenomenal qualities. In this case, phenomenal qualities would 
ultimately be non-experiential qualities that have somehow become 
“illuminated” by a process which makes them phenomenally conscious and 
therefore phenomenally qualitied. There would not be an individual 
consciousness for every quality that shows up in conscious experience. 
Instead, phenomenal qualities would arise from a universe of non-conscious 
qualities and a phenomenal consciousness to which they can appear. This 
would be the kind of Russellian Monist approach explored in the last chapter. 
The particular qualities that make listening to violin music, watching the sunset, 
or smelling grass what they are would be distinctive formations of non-
conscious qualities that have simply been apprehended by consciousness and 
thus become phenomenal qualities. 
And yet, even if idealism is avoided in this way, phenomenal consciousness 
remains a distinctive factor that must have preceding causes capable of giving 
rise to it. In this kind of Russellian Monist reality, phenomenal consciousness 
would be the process in virtue of which the qualities that are intrinsic to the 
fabric of the universe are transformed into full-blown phenomenal qualities. 
Such a process would have, as part of its intrinsic nature, the capacity to 
223 
 
illuminate the qualities of reality. Such an illuminating characteristic would be 
the intrinsic characteristic that defines this process of “quality illumination”. 
Unless this “quality illumination process” arises from factors that are devoid of 
any characteristic that involves “illuminating the qualities of the world”, we will 
be left with conscious illumination as a fundamental feature of reality. As a 
fundamental feature of reality, a single instance of conscious illumination would 
only be able to arise as the result of a preceding instance of conscious 
illumination.  
Furthermore, as we have already seen, an instance of conscious illumination 
involves an individual conscious subject. This means that, if conscious 
illumination cannot be reduced to further factors, the conscious subject of our 
experiences must arise from a single preceding conscious subject. There 
would, therefore, be an unbroken series of instances of conscious illumination. 
In this case we have a form of dualism akin to Dharmakīrti’s. Even if we adopted 
an Idealist approach, the fact that a conscious subject cannot split off from 
another means that there would also have to be an unbroken series of 
instances of consciousness in this case. The only way to avoid Dharmakīrti’s 
conclusion that each instance of consciousness is part of a beginningless and 
endless stream is to take the distinctive characteristics of phenomenal 
consciousness and show how they can be decomposed into unconscious 
factors. In the following chapters we shall see why this is not possible. 
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7. The Unbroken Continuity of Individual Consciousness 
7.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapters, we have found some good reasons for accepting the 
second premise of Dharmakīrti’s argument for rebirth: conscious mental events 
cannot arise from factors that are completely devoid of the distinctive 
characteristics of consciousness. This is because a conscious event, like any 
other phenomenon, must have homogeneous causes. The homogeneous 
causes of an event are those factors that give the event its distinctive qualities 
by, in a sense, becoming the constitutive factors of the event. At no point in the 
causal process can unprecedented types of factor appear as if by magic. Every 
factor must have precedents in virtue of which it is the type of thing that it is. 
When applied to conscious phenomena, this approach to causation entails that 
the distinctive qualities of such phenomena must be traceable back to their 
constitutive factors and these constituents must have existed in a preceding 
form. For every distinctive quality found within conscious experience there must 
be adequate preceding factors to explain why that quality is precisely what it is. 
Furthermore, we have seen that, insofar as any phenomenon can be analysed 
into distinct factors, its reality depends upon those more fundamental factors 
coming together in a certain way. The complex phenomenon cannot have any 
reality over and above the reality of its constituents insofar as those constituent 
factors are precisely what make the complex phenomenon what it is. But this 
does not mean that the constituent factors of every complex phenomenon are 
separable. Even if a phenomenon can be analysed into its constituents, it may 
also be the case that none of these constituents can exist in isolation from the 
others. These constituents would, together, be an indivisible cluster. Such 
clusters are complex phenomena that would be impossible if each constituent 
were not always combined with the others. 
In this chapter, we will continue to explore reasons for believing that the core 
conditions for conscious experience form an indivisible cluster. In particular, 
these core conditions will be shown to consist of an individual instance of 
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phenomenally conscious apprehension, anticipation, retention, and immediate 
recollection of objects embedded within a temporal structure. It will be argued 
that every instance of phenomenally conscious experience requires these 
factors and that the separation of any one of them from the others not only 
makes phenomenal consciousness impossible but also makes every remaining 
factor incapable of accounting for the particular characteristics found in 
conscious experience. In this case, the division of a consciousness cluster 
would preclude any possibility of phenomenal consciousness ever existing. 
This is why we must assume that, for every instance of phenomenal 
consciousness, there is a cluster of factors that have never, in the history of 
reality, arisen in isolation from one another. This justifies believing that any 
instance of conscious experience involves an indivisible consciousness cluster 
and that this instance is part of an unbroken stream of such instances. Such a 
stream would continue even through physical death. 
 
7.2 The Temporal Embeddedness of Phenomenal Qualities 
In the previous chapter we explored the possibility of separating conscious 
experiences into their constituent phenomenal qualities. This was the route 
taken by the constitutive panpsychist and allowed for the possibility that 
conscious experience is unceasing and yet is still something that decomposes 
at death, albeit into constituent conscious entities. During this exploration it 
became clear that phenomenal qualities are not separable particles of 
experience. We have reasons to doubt that we can parcel out “what it is like” to 
smell grass or hear violin music into discrete qualities that could then be put 
back together into a different experience. This is because each phenomenal 
quality, whether it is the orange-red of a setting sun, a particular note in The 
Lark Ascending, or the particular smell of grass on a particular summer’s day, 
is embedded within a wider sensory field. The experience of listening to the 
violin solo in The Lark Ascending is not simply a collection of independent 
phenomenal qualities, they are embedded in the auditory field and only exist as 
the qualities that they are in virtue of this sensory field. 
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But auditory experiences such as listening to music are not only embedded in 
the auditory field, they are also embedded within a temporal structure that is a 
necessary feature of phenomenally conscious experience. 
For example, an auditory experience such as listening to music is not possible 
without at least a minimal experience of time. Whilst the experience of an entire 
song is clearly a temporally unfolding phenomenon, even a single beat of such 
a song is temporal. Such a beat is heard as happening, occurring or unfolding 
over time, no matter how briefly it sounds. A similar situation holds true for 
sensations, which elapse over time, no matter how brief. Sensations are 
generally vibrating, pulsing, throbbing things that are experienced as temporal. 
These temporal phenomena are experienced as flowing from one state to 
another without gaps or breaks. They appear within conscious experience as 
an unbroken flow of events. Even if we were to imagine that our conscious 
experience of sounds, sensations, urges and thoughts were simply a series of 
discrete, inert experiences, there would still need to be a single experience that 
brought each experience in the series together.1 When listening to The Lark 
Ascending, for example, I cannot hear a single note without this experience 
already involving multiple phases of that particular note as one conscious 
experience.  
This feature of conscious experience was famously investigated by Edmund 
Husserl in his lectures on the phenomenology of internal time consciousness. 
He recognised that the flow of experiences requires that conscious experience 
has a temporal structure in virtue of which each experiential event is embedded 
so as to appear as flowing. This temporal structure is an undeniable aspect of 
conscious experience. With regard to listening to a melody, Husserl himself 
                                                 
 
 
 
1 This argument regarding the temporal nature of experience was made by Immanuel Kant 
but, as we shall now see, was further developed by Edmund Husserl. See, for 
example, passages A103 and A104 in Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 
trans. Norman Kemp Smith, Basingstoke, New York, Palgrave MacMillan, 2007, 
pp.133, 134. See also Edmund Husserl, The Phenomenology of Internal Time 
Consciousness, trans. J. S. Churchill, Indiana University Press, 1964, and Analyses 
Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis: Lectures on Transcendental Logic, trans. 
A. J. Steinbock, Dortrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001. 
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puts it as follows: ‘The evidence that consciousness of a tonal process, a 
melody, exhibits a succession even as I hear it is such as to make every doubt 
or denial appear senseless.’2 In order for one sound in the melody to appear as 
earlier than another, there must be at least a minimal awareness of a 
succession of sound events, one following another. Without this temporal 
awareness, it would not be possible to experience even a single phase of a 
note of music because even the briefest phase involves the present becoming 
the past. A sound experience is an experience of the present flowing into the 
past, which means that without the ability to experience events as flowing into 
the past, the experience of listening to The Lark Ascending is impossible. 
Even the briefest of sound experiences appears as something flowing into the 
past and giving way to more sound experience. This requires that different 
temporal phases, from present to immediate past, are experienced together so 
that the sound can appear as flowing from one to the other. In this way, a 
dynamic conscious experience, such as a sound, involves an experience of 
every temporal phase from the immediate past to an anticipated immediate 
future. This gives the experiential present what we can call a ‘temporal 
thickness’ insofar as it extends through these temporal phases.3 
Any dynamic experience, whether it is a sound, a bodily sensation, visual 
movement, an urge, or an unfolding thought, cannot be possible without 
temporal awareness. The very appearance of a sound, a sensation, an urge, a 
moving vision, or an unfolding thought, is the appearance of something moving 
through time. And this movement through time is experienced as the receding 
of moments into the past. Husserl describes this movement in the case of sound 
as follows: 
The same sound which is heard now is, from the point of view of the 
flux of consciousness which follows it, past, its duration expired. To 
my consciousness, points of temporal duration recede, as points of 
                                                 
 
 
 
2 Edmund Husserl, The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness, trans. J. S. 
Churchill, Indiana University Press, 1964, p.23.  
3 Ralph Pred, Onflow: Dynamics of Consciousness and Experience, MIT Press, 2005, p.77. 
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a stationary object in space recede when I “go away from the object.” 
The object retains its place; even so does the sound retain its time. 
Its temporal point is unmoved, but the sound vanishes into the 
remoteness of consciousness; the distance from the generative now 
becomes ever greater. The sound itself is the same, but “in the way 
that” it appears, the sound is continually different.4 
In this way, the precise object that was experienced during a past moment is 
retained within experience but as something that belongs to a past time. But 
the past time to which a past object belongs is always receding from us and we 
are aware of this recession as a feature of every conscious experience. 
Furthermore, the temporal thickness of our experience does not only include 
the retention of previous present objects. Even before we hear, feel, see, or 
otherwise sense a particular object we have already anticipated the range of 
ways in which it might be perceived. As Husserl describes it:  
[T]he perception has horizons made up of other possibilities of 
perception, as perceptions that we could have, if we actively directed 
the course of perception otherwise: if, for example, we turned our 
eyes that way instead of this, or if we were to step forward or to one 
side, and so forth.5 
So, for example, before we actually hear the next tone in a melody such as The 
Lark Ascending we have already anticipated the ways in which we might 
perceive it. We know that if we move our head this way or that the sound will 
appear to us in this or that modified way. What we might think of as a particular 
sound ‘impression’ does not even appear to us as a single instant but rather as 
the realisation of an already anticipated possibility.6 Such possibilities are 
already anticipated as dynamic, unfolding experiences which, as they are 
realised, arise into the present from the horizon of possibilities and then on into 
the retained past. And even the anticipated possibilities are retained. Using the 
example of a visible object, Husserl presents it as follows: 
                                                 
 
 
 
4 Husserl, The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness, p.45. 
5 Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology, trans. Dorion 
Cairns, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1960, p.44. 
6 Husserl, The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness, p.51. 
229 
 
In the corresponding memory this recurs in modified form, perhaps 
in the consciousness that, instead of the sides then visible in fact, I 
could have seen others – naturally, if I had directed my perceptual 
activity in a suitably different manner.7 
The immediately retained past includes not just how an object actually 
appeared within experience but also the ways that it could possibly have 
appeared under different circumstances. This adds an additional complexity to 
the temporal thickness of experience. 
Accordingly, in order for temporally extended experiences to appear as they do 
within consciousness, they must be embedded within an awareness of temporal 
periods stretching from the retained receding past to the anticipated future 
through the present and its possibilities. Without this temporal awareness there 
cannot be sounds, sensations, and so on, as conscious experiences. Whatever 
might remain were this temporal awareness removed would have none of the 
phenomenal qualities of sounds, sensations, and so on. Such phenomenal 
qualities are firmly embedded within dynamic experiences of unfolding time. 
Ultimately, there is nothing that it is like to listen to birdsong or have an itchy 
leg outside of the temporal structure in which these experiences are embedded. 
It is not possible for the particular phenomenal qualities of a dynamic 
experience to exist in isolation from the awareness of unfolding time that makes 
them the dynamic experiences that they are. This is a case where stripping out 
temporal awareness also strips out the distinctive phenomenal qualities of 
every dynamic experience from sounds, to sensations, to urges, and so on. A 
sound cannot be separated from the temporal awareness in virtue of which the 
different phases of the sound appear as flowing from one temporal phase to 
another. This is why we can conclude that the phenomenal qualities of dynamic 
experiences such as listening to The Lark Ascending are completely embedded 
in a temporal structure with its in-built awareness of time. 
                                                 
 
 
 
7 Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, p.44. 
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7.3 Phenomenal Consciousness and Its Inseparable Temporal Structure 
In order for conscious experience to come to an end at death, the fundamental 
factors that constitute and give rise to it must be non-conscious factors. As we 
have seen in previous chapters, this requires that the distinctive features of 
conscious experience can be traced back smoothly to non-conscious factors. 
In order for this tracing back to be intelligible, the distinctive features of 
conscious experience must not completely disappear but rather must reduce 
smoothly. 
As we have just seen, there are reasons to believe that none of the phenomenal 
qualities of a dynamic experience such as listening to music would survive if 
separated from the temporal structure in virtue of which a sound can appear as 
a flowing experience. In order to trace these phenomenal qualities back to non-
conscious factors, we cannot simply separate them from the temporal structure. 
Without this structure, dynamic experiences and the qualities that they consist 
of completely disappear. And this difficulty separating phenomenal qualities 
from the temporal structure of consciousness is mirrored in the difficulty we 
have in separating phenomenal qualities from consciousness itself. 
As was discussed in the fourth section of the previous chapter, phenomenal 
consciousness is required in order for the phenomenal qualities of experienced 
sounds, colours, sensations, and so on, to be phenomenal qualities. Being 
phenomenal, such qualities, properties, or features are those that appear within 
conscious awareness. It is precisely what it is like for them to appear as 
conscious experiences that makes the phenomenal qualities of sounds, 
colours, sensations, and so on what they are.  
Being equally phenomenal, the phenomenal qualities of dynamic experiences 
require a phenomenal awareness or consciousness in virtue of which a sound, 
sensation or another dynamic experience appears as a conscious experience. 
The auditory, bodily, and emotional experiences involved in listening to The 
Lark Ascending are dynamic conscious experiences. These phenomenally 
qualitied experiences are what it is like to listen to The Lark Ascending. 
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Unconscious versions of these experiences would lack the qualitative 
characteristics that make phenomenal qualities what they are. And insofar as 
phenomenal qualities can only exist as appearances to phenomenal 
awareness, we might question whether it is possible to trace such qualities back 
to factors that exist independently of such awareness.  
Nevertheless, it does seem plausible to take the qualities that constitute what it 
is like to experience something like birdsong, for example, and trace them back 
to factors that are not necessarily appearances to consciousness. Prior to 
consciousness, there could be proto-phenomenal qualities, qualities which 
constitute everything that an experience like birdsong sounds like without these 
qualities necessarily existing only for a given consciousness. As we have seen 
previously, there are problems with treating phenomenal qualities this way. The 
phenomenal qualities of sounds, sights, smells, and so on, are precisely the 
quality of their appearance to consciousness. But to reject proto-phenomenal 
qualities out of hand would beg the question in favour of conscious experience 
being a fundamental and unceasing feature of reality. 
However, separating conscious experience into phenomenal consciousness 
and the proto-phenomenal qualities that consciousness is of requires that 
consciousness is capable of reaching beyond itself and into the nature of other 
things in the world. This is what it means to say that consciousness involves 
intentionality, it is directed beyond itself.8 If the qualities that make a particular 
sound, sight, smell, taste, sensation, or thought what it is like are qualities of 
things-in-the-world, consciousness must be the factor that turns these things-
in-the-world into conscious experiences. In this case consciousness becomes 
a distinct factor capable of “illuminating” objects and transforming dull potentials 
for experience into full-blown conscious experiences.9 Such a distinct factor 
would have to be traced smoothly back to preceding factors with the 
                                                 
 
 
 
8 Dan Arnold, Brains, Buddhas, and Believing, New York, Columbia University Press, 2012, 
p.7. 
9 Evan Thompson, Waking, Dreaming, Being: Self and Consciousness in Neuroscience, 
Meditation, and Philosophy, Columbia University Press, 2015, pp.14, 82. 
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characteristics necessary to explain and account for this “illuminating” power. 
These factors must become said illuminating power and so cannot simply be 
dull potentials themselves. 
Furthermore, as we have just seen, there must be a temporal structure in virtue 
of which dynamic experiences can have any of their defining phenomenal 
qualities. While the proto-phenomenal qualities of sounds and such-like could 
exist without there necessarily being a consciousness that they appear to, these 
proto-phenomenal qualities could not exist without the temporal structure that 
makes these the qualities capable of constituting dynamic experiences. This 
means that the proto-phenomenal qualities of sounds and the like cannot be 
separated from a temporal structure. Rather, the temporal structure must play 
a constitutive role in making the phenomenal qualities of dynamic experiences 
what they are.10 Without this temporal structure the phenomenal qualities of 
music, birdsong, itchiness, and so forth would not be possible. 
If phenomenal consciousness involves an inseparable temporal structure, in 
virtue of which it both illuminates and temporally structures the objects of its 
experience, this would offer further reason to believe that phenomenal 
consciousness cannot be smoothly reduced to non-conscious factors. Insofar 
as phenomenal consciousness would not only apprehend or illuminate but also 
constitute the very nature of the objects and qualities that appear to it, any 
attempt to explain the origins of conscious experience would struggle to find 
preceding factors that could smoothly develop into such an intrinsically complex 
phenomenon. To avoid such an inflated view of consciousness, one would have 
to separate phenomenal consciousness from the temporal structure that 
constitutes the phenomenal qualities of most, and perhaps all, of our conscious 
experience. 
                                                 
 
 
 
10 See Husserl, On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time. See also 
Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi, The Phenomenological Mind: An Introduction to 
Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science. Routledge, 2008. 
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However, the phenomenal qualities of dynamic experiences, those which 
involve sounds, bodily sensations, moving visual objects, urges, and so forth 
are embedded in a temporal structure. In order to separate this structure from 
phenomenal awareness, it must be possible for there to be proto-phenomenal 
qualities that are temporally structured even if there is no phenomenal 
awareness of them. If this were the case, phenomenal awareness would be an 
awareness of a separate temporal structure in which dynamic experiences, and 
their proto-phenomenal qualities, were embedded. But in this case we must 
account for the fact that dynamic objects such as sounds and the like are 
experienced as constantly flowing into the past. Every dynamic experience is 
embedded in a “thick” present in which the immediate present is always already 
disappearing into the immediate past only to be replaced by a new immediate 
present, which is also already disappearing into the immediate past. To say that 
the present is “always already” disappearing into the immediate past is to say 
that we do not experience a break, gap, pause, or interruption between the 
presently occurring and that which has just passed. Within the flow of conscious 
experience the end of one event is the beginning of another. For this reason, 
where objects such as sounds are experienced as a series of flowing events, 
the distinction between the remembered and presently apprehended is not a 
clear one.  
In this way, dynamic conscious experiences exemplify what Ralph Pred calls 
‘Onflow’ in his book of the same name.11 One experience flows into the next, 
which flows into the next, without any apparent break. The experience of 
listening to The Lark Ascending while hiking, for example, is a stream of 
phenomenal qualities. The very fact that these qualities flow from one to the 
next defines the conscious experience insofar as conscious experience is “what 
it is like” to listen to a particular song while walking. But as the conscious 
experience unfolds, it brings different types of experience at different times. A 
walk on the hills might flow into a picnic on the hills, which flows on to other 
                                                 
 
 
 
11 Pred, Onflow, p.21. 
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experiences. This flow of experience is likewise a flow from one set of 
phenomenal qualities to another. These phenomenal qualities and the objects 
of experience in general are always embedded in the temporal onflow of 
conscious experience. We cannot speak accurately of a dynamic experience 
as if it could be analysed into static moments of conscious experience, each 
with their own phenomenal qualities. The phenomenal qualities of a dynamic 
experience are only the qualities that they are because they are always already 
flowing from one to the next. 
In this way there is nothing “gappy” about the experience of hiking or listening 
to music. We do not experience a series of completely discrete notes or hiking-
moments because each sound, sight, or sensation flows unbroken into the next. 
If there were a gap in which experience completely stopped, this gap would not 
be part of the experience because such a gap would not appear within 
experience. Even if, whilst hiking, we were to experience a gap in which the 
hiking experience was briefly replaced by complete disembodied darkness, this 
would simply be another, very strange, experience. This strange experience 
itself would not be “gappy” because it would be embedded within a gapless 
temporal onflow in which hiking flows into darkness, which flows into hiking 
again. 
Nevertheless, there are situations where experiences appear to jump 
incongruously from one event to a much later event without any obvious 
intervening experiences. For example, someone might lie down in the afternoon 
to listen to an entire album of music but, after what seems like mere moments, 
notice that the album has finished and that it is early morning. Our experience 
of time can involve jumps in which long stretches seem to disappear, whether 
through falling rapidly into a deep sleep, undergoing general anaesthetic or 
suffering from an unusual physiological or neurological condition.12 But in these 
cases the flow of time as experienced is not interrupted. If anything we could 
                                                 
 
 
 
12 For more on the pathologies that can affect temporal experience see Shaun Gallagher, 
‘Pathologies in Narrative Structures’, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, Vol. 
60, May 2007, pp.203-224. 
235 
 
say that the flow of time is experienced as having rapidly sped up. In our 
example the afternoon has flowed so rapidly into the following morning that 
there is no recollection of anything in between.  
Admittedly, here there is something of a gap insofar as there are missing events 
that would normally have been experienced during the intervening time 
between the afternoon and morning. But failure to apprehend the passing of 
particular events does not entail an interruption in the conscious experience of 
time flowing. If an alarm sounded during the evening, the fact that this was 
neither experienced at the time nor recalled later does not mean that there was 
a complete break in the flow of experience. Rather it could be akin to a situation 
in which someone is in such a deep conversation that an alarm goes unheard 
despite being within earshot. All that is required in order for there to be a 
continual flow of experiential time is for one experience to flow unbroken into 
the next. 
If we fall rapidly into a deep sleep or into an unusual state of a similar kind, the 
content of our experience shifts away from ordinary sensory objects. But this 
does not mean that there is no content to our experiences in such states.13 
Rather there is simply no easy recollection of the sorts of objects that arose 
between entering a sleep-like state and leaving it. For example, during general 
anaesthetic, the cessation of sensory awareness might result in a stream of 
experiences so unusual that, while these experiences flow uninterrupted from 
earlier ordinary sensory experiences, they are ultimately retained in such a way 
that they are not properly recalled. If they are recalled at all, such experiences 
may not be recalled as occurring between the ordinary experiences on either 
side of being under general anaesthetic.  
Ultimately, what is being claimed here is that conscious experience exhibits an 
onflow in which one phenomenal experience flows unbroken into the next and 
                                                 
 
 
 
13 As discussed in the fourth chapter, it is difficult to say what degree of phenomenal 
consciousness might occur during states in which verbal reports and cognitive acts 
are not possible. 
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is experienced as such when these experiences are occurring. This claim does 
not involve an additional claim that every object within this flow can be recalled 
with equal ease. The experiences of a day’s hike can flow uninterrupted from 
one to the next until the end of the day and still lead to a moment, at the end of 
the day, when an entire segment of the walk is difficult to recall. It is when they 
are occurring that conscious experiences demonstrate unbroken onflow. 
Returning to the main discussion, in order to separate phenomenal awareness 
from the temporal structure of experience, the onflow of conscious experience 
must be accounted for. It must be possible to explain how dynamic experiences 
can appear as an unbroken flow. If the temporal structure of experience is 
ultimately separate from phenomenal awareness, it cannot be as dynamic as 
the flowing experiential objects, such as sounds, sensations, and so on, 
embedded within it. If the temporal structure were as dynamic as the objects 
embedded within it, phenomenal awareness would require yet another 
temporal structure just to be capable of experiencing this dynamic external 
temporal structure. In this case phenomenal awareness would still have an 
intrinsic temporal structure and the attempt to separate the two will have failed. 
Therefore, a separable temporal structure must be a static object that presents 
the qualities embedded within it as flowing. In this case, a dynamic experience 
such as birdsong would not arise in real-time. Rather, there would be an 
unconscious temporal structure that organises sensory and other stimuli before 
they become phenomenally conscious. In this case all conscious experience 
would simply be awareness of pre-structured memories. Events would have 
passed and been retained by unconscious processes before they arose as 
conscious experiences. In this case the flow of conscious experience would not 
be the real-time unfolding of events. Such flow would be merely an appearance 
of time passing, it would not involve the passing of actual time. 
This sort of possibility is dealt with by Barry Dainton in Stream of 
Consciousness, his exploration of the unity and continuity of consciousness. 
Part of Stream of Consciousness discusses the fact that, in order to account for 
the appearance of time passing without any real time, we must appeal to what 
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Dainton calls a representational anti-realist approach to temporal experiences. 
He describes such an approach as follows: 
At any instant, we are apprehending a content which although 
instantaneous also represents or encodes a temporal spread of 
phenomena, such as a sequence of notes or a perceived movement. 
When these contents are apprehended, in a momentary act of 
experiencing, the result is an awareness of a temporal spread of 
phenomena. A stream of consciousness consists of a continuous 
succession of these momentary acts of awareness, each 
apprehending a representation of a temporal spread of 
phenomena.14 
According to the representational anti-realist, conscious experience of flowing 
phenomena is merely a representation of events as if they were unfolding in 
real time. Experiences of dynamic objects such as sounds and sensations are 
represented in a structure so as to appear as if there were an unbroken flow 
from one state to another in genuine time.  
In order for such an account to work, the true object of phenomenal awareness 
must in fact be a representation that is structured so that the objects that appear 
within conscious experience appear as if they were flowing without breaks from 
one to the next.15 For example, the experience of listening to birdsong would 
be a representation in which each “tweet” of birdsong seems to pass into short-
term memory as a new “tweet” arises. In fact, both tweets would already be 
memories but the earlier one would be represented as being in the immediate 
past whilst the latter would be represented as being present-but-moving-into-
the-immediate-past. This representation would then be followed by another in 
which both tweets were in the immediate and slightly-less-immediate past. 
                                                 
 
 
 
14 Barry Dainton, Stream of Consciousness: Unity and continuity in conscious experience, 
London, New York, Routledge, 2010, p.135. 
15 Something like this is envisioned by Daniel Dennett and Marcel Kinsbourne. See Daniel C. 
Dennett and Marcel Kinsbourne, ‘Time and the Observer: The Where and When of 
Consciousness in the Brain’, The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates, 
Ned Block, Owen Flanagan, and Güven Güzeldere (eds.), MIT Press, 1997, pp.148-
153.  
238 
 
However, even if all experiences are already memories, there will need to be a 
way for these memories to appear as the unbroken flow of events that we 
experience. When listening to birdsong we do not experience a distinct point at 
which one tweet ends and the next begins. The end of one tweet blends into a 
very brief pause, which blends into the next tweet. We do not even experience 
the point at which one tweet ends and the pause begins, or the point at which 
the pause ends and the tweet begins. These events flow rapidly, and without 
gaps or divisions, into one another.  
To take a different example, when listening to Vaughan Williams’ Lark 
Ascending we can recognise different sounds and phases of the music, we can 
also discern when one of these phases is beginning or ending. But these events 
are nonetheless experienced as the unbroken flow of one into the next. This 
experience involves awareness that within a sound or phase of a song there 
are more subtle dynamics and phases. Our ability to penetrate these more 
subtle or rapidly passing phases within the music is limited but we experience 
this limitation; we get a sense that there are distinct events going on but these 
are happening too rapidly for our temporal perspective to keep up with them. 
The unbroken flow of events is experienced as exceeding our apprehension of 
them. This is why the object of awareness appears intrinsically dynamic. If 
awareness of birdsong is awareness of remembered birdsong, or awareness 
of music is awareness of remembered music, these memories must still involve 
the exceedingly rapid, unbroken flow of events in order that the conscious 
experience of remembered birdsong and remembered music can be a 
subjectively unbroken one.  
The problem here is that, in order to present awareness as an unbroken flow of 
events, such memory must either be (a) a real-time replay of the remembered 
events to awareness, or otherwise (b) a representation of events as unbroken 
flow. If we opt for (a) then the memory of birdsong or music will be just as 
dynamic and flowing as the original objects were. We would need to posit 
another temporal structure in order to allow awareness to experience the 
unbroken flow of the memory. Memory will have failed to explain the 
phenomenon that it was supposed to explain. Therefore we must opt for (b) if 
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we are looking to provide an account of temporal experience in which it does 
not involve any real-time flowing phenomena. 
However, a representation of events as if they were unfolding in an unbroken 
flow must present all of those events to awareness and must do so by 
presenting the events together so that they can appear as if they flow from one 
to the other. A conscious experience of birdsong involves an unbroken flow of 
tweets, which means that any representation that accounts for this experience 
must represent each tweet as occurring within an unbroken flow. This means 
that any such representation of events must take a specific “block” of events 
and present this to awareness in order to produce the conscious experience of 
flowing events. 
But such a “block” will have a distinct end-point. The final tweet that appears to 
occur in such a “block” will be experienced as the definitive present-moment-
tweet. This would mean that we would experience a distinct, inert present 
moment that was the end-point in the unbroken flow of events. Of course, this 
is not what conscious experience is like. We do not experience the present 
moment as the stopping-point in a line of events but rather as a relentless 
continuing flow of events. To experience the present moment as relentlessly 
changing is part and parcel of experiencing events as an unbroken flow. The 
lack of gaps or breaks in the subjective experience of time is due to the fact that 
the present is experienced as the constant and continuous unfolding of events. 
Whether it is a single tweet or a burst of music, any dynamic experience is a 
flurry of flowing events. If this experience was the result of a representation of 
events as if they were flowing in real-time, such a representation would 
represent the present as if it were constantly unfolding. But to experience a 
constantly unfolding present is to constantly experience new events that were 
not previously part of conscious experience. The experience of birdsong is a 
series of new experiences, each one a different tweet. But even the experience 
of a single tweet is a series of new experiences in which every subtle sound 
that constitutes a tweet appears and flows into the next. A representation of 
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such an experience would have to be just as dynamic and flowing as the 
experiences that it is supposed to explain.16 
It is for these reasons that our experience of the unbroken flow of events and 
the constant unfolding of the present cannot be accounted for using a temporal 
structure that is not itself dynamically unfolding. It does not matter whether this 
temporal structure takes the form of preformed memories or representations of 
events, it must involve constant change in order to account for the kind of 
unbroken conscious experience that we have. But this means that such 
temporal structures do not explain how it is possible to be aware of constantly 
unfolding, dynamic phenomena. If awareness of constantly unfolding, dynamic 
phenomena is only possible in virtue of a structure which is also a constantly 
unfolding dynamic phenomenon, this structure cannot be an object of 
awareness. Such a temporal structure could not be an object of awareness 
because awareness would require another temporal structure in order to 
experience it. Any intrinsically dynamic flowing object such as a tweet, musical 
beat, or throbbing sensation, can only be experienced if there is a temporal 
structure to bring the different phases of the object together in a single 
experience. But if the temporal structure is yet another dynamic object, it is 
useless in explaining how flowing experiences are possible.  
Therefore, the only way to adequately account for dynamic, flowing conscious 
experiences is to posit a temporal structure that is inseparable from 
consciousness, being precisely the way in which dynamic phenomena are 
apprehended by phenomenal awareness. Phenomenal awareness would 
apprehend dynamic phenomena by “illuminating”, retaining, temporally 
structuring, and recalling them as they pass. Conscious experience of a 
dynamic phenomenon would require that phenomenal awareness is 
                                                 
 
 
 
16 The full range and seriousness of the problems facing representational anti-realist 
approaches to temporal experience are dealt with in much greater depth in Dainton, 
Stream of Consciousness, pp.113-182. 
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relentlessly apprehending, retaining, anticipating, temporally structuring, and 
recalling the flow of the phenomenon in question. 
 
7.4 Interlude: Abhidharma Philosophy and Time 
In order to understand why it is so important that phenomenal awareness has 
this relentlessly operating temporal structure we must first gain some clarity on 
how the unfolding flow of events must be just as unbroken as our experience 
of them. Reasons for considering everything in reality to be a matter of 
relentlessly unfolding events can be found by exploring the Abhidharma 
principles that operate as the foundations of Buddhist philosophy. According to 
the third principle of Abhidharma philosophy, which was introduced in the 
second chapter, there are no breaks or gaps in the flow of events. Events unfold 
in an uninterrupted continuity and this uninterruptedness exists at every level 
of reality.17 But this Continuity Principle is rooted in the first principle of 
Abhidharma, the Chariot Principle.  
As explained in the second chapter, just as a chariot is simply a label given to 
the parts that make it what it is, so too can every complex entity be analysed 
into the plurality of simple constituents from which that entity has ‘borrowed’ its 
complex nature.18 Any complex phenomenon can only have the characteristics 
that it has in virtue of its parts or qualities. If a phenomenon has a property that 
cannot be traced back to the configuration of its parts, this property must either 
be yet another part or must have appeared by brute emergence. As we have 
seen, the occurrence of brute emergence is something that no intelligible theory 
should include. Therefore, no complex phenomenon can be anything over and 
above the configuration of more fundamental phenomena. This entails that, 
ultimately, reality consists of those fundamental factors out of which every 
complex phenomenon is configured. These simple and fundamental factors 
                                                 
 
 
 
17 Y. Karunadasa, The Theravāda Abhidhamma: Its Inquiry Into the Nature of Conditioned 
Reality. Centre for Buddhist Studies, University of Hong Kong, 2010, p.234. 
18 Mark Siderits, Buddhism as Philosophy, Hackett Publishing, 2007, p.113. 
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must exist in order for there to be something that accounts for the internal 
constitution of complex phenomena. And, most importantly, these factors must 
be instances of particular simple qualities. Configurations of these basic 
qualities account for every more complex phenomenon. Each basic quality is a 
single instance of a single simple fundamental quality, called a dharma, which 
is defined by its particular intrinsic nature.19 This intrinsic nature is not borrowed 
from anything more fundamental, it is simply the type of quality that the 
particular dharma is. And, if there were no fundamental dharmas with their own 
distinctive, intrinsic natures, there would be nothing to give anything any 
distinctive nature at all.20 
Insofar as reality is constituted out of configurations of dharmas, the evident 
changes in this reality must be the result of changes to the way in which 
dharmas are configured with one another. But this does not mean that a 
particular dharma travels around, joining with other dharmas and then 
separating later. Dharmas are too simple to exist as independent entities 
separated from any configuration with others. Once we have reduced every 
complex phenomenon to irreducible, unanalysable factors we are left with basic 
qualities that cannot exist without other qualities to support them. No particular 
dharma lasts longer than the particular configuration of which it is a part.21 
To return to an example used in the second chapter, the quality of solidness, 
taken in its simplest form, requires qualities like extension or shape. Without 
any kind of extended shape, an instance of solidity would lack any spatial 
dimensions and so could not be said to exist at all. Ultimately every dharma can 
only arise in a configuration with other dharmas.22 This configuration allows a 
dharma to exist but also determines precisely how it exists. An extended field 
                                                 
 
 
 
19 Ibid., p.111. 
20 Paul Williams, ‘Response to Mark Siderits’ Review’, Philosophy East and West, Vol. 50, No. 
3, July 2000, p.439 
21 According to Abhidharma philosophical principles, no dharma can last long enough to 
move, rather a new instance arises in each new location. See Karunadasa, The 
Theravāda Abhidhamma, pp.165,166. 
22 Ibid. pp.20-22. See also K. L. Dhammajoti, Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, Centre of Buddhist 
Studies, The University of Hong Kong, 2007, p.259. 
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of solidity is a different instance of solidity depending on its shape, but without 
any shape there would be no instances of solidity at all. Insofar as neither shape 
nor solidity can exist in isolation, the way in which they exist is determined by 
the whole configuration of which they are a part. A change in a configuration 
brings about a change in every dharma that depends for its existence on that 
configuration and so brings about a new instance of every dharma in that 
configuration. Insofar as a dharma is an instance of a particular dependent 
quality, it cannot last longer than the other qualities on which it depends for its 
existence.  
Of course, in order for the world to be as intelligible as it is, each instance of a 
particular type of dharma must be followed by an instance of the same type: an 
instance of solidity follows another instance. This is because the homogeneous 
cause of any dharma is a prior dharma of the same type: an instance of 
fundamental solidity would have as its homogeneous cause an immediately 
preceding instance of fundamental solidity. Without this preceding 
homogeneous cause there would be nothing determining the precise nature of 
any particular occurrence of a quality. In this case qualities of any type could 
appear at any time. Causation, so far as it existed, would be brute and the world 
would be unintelligible. Insofar as we rule out brute causation, we must accept 
that every instance of a dharma of a particular type is the latest in a 
beginningless stream of dharmas, a stream of instances of the same type of 
quality.23 
However, each instance in a dharma stream is dependent upon other types of 
dharma, instances of other qualities. Just as solidity must intersect with and be 
conditioned by shape in order to exist, it must be the case that different dharma 
streams are constantly intersecting and conditioning one another, thus 
producing the configurations in virtue of which each instance exists. And in 
order for configurations of dharmas to account for our evidently changing 
reality, these configurations must be able to change. This means that different 
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types of dharma must arise in different configurations at different times, which 
entails that different streams of dharmas intersect differently at different times. 
Given that reality is ultimately constituted by dharmas, there is nothing else in 
reality that could guide the intersection of streams other than the dharmas 
themselves.  
But any particular dharma, on its own, would be far too simple to determine the 
variety of configurations that constitute our reality. An instance of solidity, for 
example, lacks the complexity to determine which other factors future instances 
will arise with. A complex configuration of dharmas, on the other hand, could 
bring together the variety of factors needed to determine future configurations. 
An extended region of solidity with momentum could give rise to extended 
solidity in a different region. In this case it is the momentum that turns one 
configuration of qualities into another and this momentum continues into the 
next configuration. But if each instance of momentum performed the same 
operation, the particular configuration would only ever change in one way. In 
this case instances of extended solidity would arise in a stream going in one 
direction only. 
The problem here is that every instance of every quality other than momentum 
would be an inert epiphenomenon, having no influence on the momentum that 
gives rise to these qualities at different locations. The fact that an extended field 
of solidity occupying a particular place in space-time was extended and solid 
would have no influence over its direction even if there was another extended 
field of solidity that made contact with it. If there were distinct dynamic forces 
that determined every future configuration of dharmas, it would not be the 
solidity or the extended shape of an object that influenced its interactions with 
other solid objects, it would simply be the result of a fixed force.  
The situation becomes even more absurd when we consider the fact that the 
particular quality of colours, sounds, smells, sensations, and thoughts influence 
bodily behaviour all the time by virtue of their having the intrinsic qualities that 
they have. A bad smell is what motivates us to leave a room; a beautiful vista 
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encourages us to linger for a time rather than walk on.24 These experiences 
only have the qualities that they do by virtue of the particular configuration of 
fundamental factors that they are. Each factor that constitutes an experience 
exerts an influence on every other such that its influence is felt. This is true of 
all configurations of dharmas because dharmas are not inert particles, they are 
factors that condition other factors so as to enable configuration. If an instance 
of solidity did not solidify a region of space and obstruct other instances of 
solidity it would not be an instance of solidity. But to solidify and obstruct are 
effects or influences, they are activities or operations rather than just inert 
states. To put it another way, dharmas are doings not just beings. A dharma is 
defined by the particular quality instance that it is but this instantiation or quality 
does not simply have an influence, it is an influence: every dharma does 
something particular to others and this is how it is known.25 
Therefore, insofar as a dharma is an instance of a particular type of influence 
on other dharmas, there cannot be an inert dharma. Every dharma that 
constitutes what a complex phenomenon is also determines what that complex 
phenomenon does. This is why the particular configuration of dharmas that 
determines precisely what a complex phenomenon is also determines how that 
phenomenon transforms. Each dharma has a conditioning influence on every 
other factor involved in the configuration and so influences the way in which 
streams of dharmas will be configured in future. Insofar as an instance of 
momentum, for example, arises in a configuration, it must be conditioned by the 
other factors that it is configured with, just as solidity is conditioned by shape. 
Momentum, solidity, and extension would all condition and modify one another. 
Of course, each factor will condition the others in its own way and momentum 
would condition the other factors by transforming them into another iteration in 
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25 See Karunadasa, The Theravāda Abhidhamma, p.22. See also Rupert Gethin, The 
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a new location. But with each new iteration there would be new factors involved 
and these would condition the dynamic dharma of momentum, thus modifying 
its operations. In this way, the factors determining how any given stream of 
dharmas intersects with another must be responsive to the nature of particular 
configurations just as those factors are, in turn, reconfigured by it.  
Furthermore, in virtue of the intrinsic dynamism of dharmas, no configuration of 
dharmas can last for longer than the time it takes for each dharma in that 
configuration to be conditioned or modified by the other factors with which it is 
configured. Once this conditioning has occurred, each dharma will perform a 
modified version of the operation that defines it. In the case of momentum, this 
would amount to something like transforming a set of dharmas into another set 
in a new location. This operation would be different depending on the type of 
dharma and the way in which it was modified. An instance of volition, for 
example, might respond differently to other dharmas and transform in a different 
way to the way that an instance of momentum would. 
At this point it is worth clarifying that neither momentum, solidity, extension, nor 
volition need to be taken as dharma types in order for it to follow that dharmas 
must be defined by their particular conditioning influence on others. Insofar as 
dharmas are doings not just beings every dharma conditions the others with 
which it is configured according to its very nature as a dharma. This conditioning 
influence is part and parcel of what a configuration of dharmas is.  
Furthermore, as soon as conditioning has taken place, none of the original 
dharmas that constituted the configuration remain. For example, if a dharma of 
solidity (Dharma S1) arises into a new configuration with another instance of 
solidity (Dharma S2), both dharmas will condition each other. This mutual 
conditioning will alter each instance of solidity in some way. As just discussed, 
if being in a configuration did not alter dharmas themselves, the configuration 
of dharmas would make no difference to reality. But this inevitable alteration 
means that Dharmas S1 and S2 will both become different instances of solidity 
as a result of mutual conditioning. And insofar as dharmas are single instances, 
this entails that “Dharma S1 before being conditioned” and “Dharma S1 after 
being conditioned” are actually two different dharmas. Let’s call them Dharma 
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S1 and Dharma S1+. Equally there will be a Dharma S2 and a Dharma S2+. 
We are now dealing with four dharmas: S1, S1+, S2, and S2+, which are all the 
same type of dharma. And yet, we are only dealing with two dharma streams. 
S1 and S1+ belong to the same stream of dharmas insofar as S1 is the 
homogeneous cause for S1+. The same goes for S2 and S2+. Nonetheless, 
the conditioning process means we are dealing with different instantiations of 
solidity, different particular dharmas. 
Hopefully, this example has demonstrated why a particular dharma lasts no 
longer than the time it takes to condition other dharmas and be subjected to 
their conditioning influence. Once a particular configuration has arisen, the 
conditioning influence of each dharma in that configuration transforms every 
dharma, as well as the whole configuration, into something different. This 
entails that any particular configuration of dharmas lasts no longer than the time 
it takes to exist as a particular configuration. Once a particular configuration has 
arisen, each dharma in that particular configuration conditions and is 
conditioned by every other in a particular way. This mutual conditioning alters 
the whole configuration. The result is that the arising of a particular 
configuration of dharmas brings about the end of that particular configuration.  
For example, if we take a ball that has been thrown through the air, we can 
analyse this object into a range of dharmas. There might be dharmas of solidity, 
extension, momentum, and others besides, all configured into the thrown ball. 
But this configuration does not remain the same from one moment to the next. 
The precise way in which the momentum, extended shape, and solidity are 
configured keeps changing as the ball moves through the air. As the solidity of 
the ball interacts with the solidity of air particles, the momentum of the ball 
alters. This alteration is a modification of the entire configuration and as such 
brings about a new instantiation of every dharma that constitutes the moving 
ball. Every interaction between the moving-ball-configuration and its 
environment, or between the dharmas within the moving-ball-configuration, 
amounts to an alteration that marks a new instantiation of dharmas. We could 
say that each instance of the moving ball decays into new dharmas. If these 
new dharmas remain in a similar configuration then we say that the ball 
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continues to exist. But if these dharmas are conditioned so as to enter different 
configurations, the ball might disintegrate.  
Likewise, we can say that every complex phenomenon, being a configuration 
of inter-conditioning dharmas, decays into other phenomena as soon as it has 
finished arising from the decay of preceding phenomena. The only gap or break 
in the process that one might try to identify would be the point at which a 
configuration has finished arising but is not yet decaying. 
But such a break or gap cannot be found. 
Configurations arise in virtue of the interplay of fundamental inter-conditioning 
constituents, which are defined by their particular conditioning influence. These 
constituent factors must exert and influence constantly otherwise they would 
stop being the fundamental conditioning factors that they are. These 
conditioning factors must be fundamentally involved in conditioning others in 
order to be the ultimate factors that explain particular changes. If we analyse 
any changing phenomenon down to its fundamental constituents, there must 
be constituent factors that account for the changes that take place in the 
phenomenon. If any such factor were to stop its defining conditioning activity, it 
would cease to exist, and insofar as it ceased to exist there would be no way to 
get it back short of brute causation or emergence. But there is no reason to 
suppose that a stream of instances of conditioning activity would suddenly, 
inexplicably, turn into factors that are no longer active or influential: this would 
also involve brute causation. For this reason, fundamentally active factors must 
be part of any view of the world that can account for the evident changes that 
take place in reality. 
Fundamentally the factors that constitute complex phenomena are intrinsically 
active or dynamic, which means that they are always changing, by their very 
nature, rather than occasionally or when certain extrinsic conditions are met. 
Inert, inactive factors play no role in conditioning or influencing anything in wider 
reality and so cannot be said to exist in any meaningful way. This leaves only 
dynamic factors capable of conditioning others. For a dynamic factor to exist is 
for it to change constantly in virtue of the intrinsic conditioning activity that 
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defines it. Insofar as dynamic factors must be the conditions in virtue of which 
different configurations arise at different times, those configurations cannot be 
inert or static. This is why, in the very moment when a particular configuration 
of factors has arisen, the dynamic factors that gave rise to it must continue 
operating and so immediately begin the process of bringing it to an end. 
Therefore, the changing phenomena that we encounter in our experience are 
fundamentally fleeting configurations of intrinsically dynamic factors. Every 
complex phenomenon, being such a configuration, is constantly transforming 
into another. Every fundamental factor that constitutes a complex phenomenon 
is, likewise, constantly transforming into a new iteration as part of a new 
configuration. The fundamental factors or dharmas, which constitute reality, are 
relentlessly reconfiguring. Every event or phenomenon that we can encounter 
or be influenced by, whether it is a conscious phenomenon or not, is embedded 
in this unbroken flow of reconfiguration. This flow is unbroken because there is 
no temporal part of it in which there is not some degree of dynamism. This is a 
foundational principle of Buddhist philosophy that is well summarised by Rupert 
Gethin: 
[H]owever one looks at it, reality is a process; analyse reality down 
to its smallest possible components or constituents, and what one 
finds are, not static building blocks, but dynamic processes.26 
No matter how much we analyse an unfolding event, there cannot be a temporal 
slice of it that is inert. Such inertia would mean that the temporal slice in 
question was something unchanging and such an unchanging micro-event 
would not involve any dynamic factors. In that briefest of moments, the factors 
driving the flow of events would stop and become completely different, inert 
factors. At this point in time the factors driving the whole flow of events will have 
completely disappeared and time itself would come to an end. It is quite 
reasonable to assume that this kind of brute micro-transformation has never 
happened in the past and cannot be said to happen in an intelligible universe. 
                                                 
 
 
 
26 Gethin, The Foundations of Buddhism, p.155. 
250 
 
It would be most reasonable to assume that all events are changing and flowing 
in some way “all the way down”. The radical, bottomless dynamism of events 
means that there are no gaps or breaks in the flow, no interstices or pauses 
between moments in which nothing happens. Put simply, if events stop 
happening, there is no event left that could happen in order to make the world 
start up again. 
Insofar as all phenomena and all events are radically dynamic, any awareness 
of even the shortest imaginable event is awareness of something that is passing 
away as it occurs within conscious awareness. Conscious experience, being a 
concrete, temporally unfolding phenomenon, is only possible in virtue of an 
awareness of events as they unfold. This actually rules out an approach to 
conscious experience in which awareness of the present can be separated from 
the recollection of past objects. Here we might recall that in the fourth chapter 
(section 4.4) it was mentioned that some Abhidharma systems considered 
consciousness to be an absolutely simple dharma that can be separated from 
any capacity for memory or recollection. At this point we must recognise that 
such separation is impossible. Any awareness of a genuinely flowing object 
requires that retention is inseparable from awareness. For events to occur is 
for them to pass away. Therefore, awareness of these events requires an 
awareness that can consciously “hold on” as the event is passing away.  
For example, if I am listening to a chorus of birdsong I cannot have a present 
experience of a single tweet without this already involving immediate retention 
and recall. Even the shortest of tweets consists of temporal parts, which means 
that an experience of the tweet itself requires that some of these parts were 
retained and are recalled with the present temporal part of the tweet. But this 
assumes that there is a static present “tweet-moment” that can be given in 
conscious experience without needing to be retained in awareness. Such an 
event would not be part of the relentless flow of time. A genuinely temporal 
tweet flows from temporal part to temporal part no matter how brief these parts 
are. Therefore, the conscious experience of a tweet must involve the constant 
retention of the unbroken flow of temporal parts of the tweet and this retention 
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must be retention-in-awareness. Passing temporal parts must remain in 
awareness long enough to constitute the conscious experience of a tweet. 
Of course, the experience of listening to birdsong involves more than a series 
of discrete tweets. Each tweet that passes is retained in awareness as the next 
tweet arises. This conscious retention of passing events is what makes the 
twittering of birds possible as a conscious experience. Phenomenal objects like 
birdsong must remain in conscious experience as they pass away in order for 
them to appear as “thick” experiences. Without this “thickness” there would not 
even be a brief momentary experience because such a moment would have to 
be inert. Conscious experience of genuine, concrete, temporally embedded 
events must be temporally extended, or “thick”, in order to show up at all. And 
this thickness depends on the “backlog” of passing events within conscious 
experience. Passing events are retained long enough to extend into the 
conscious experience of a “thick” present. Without this immediate retention and 
conscious recall of events, the temporal extension or “thickening” of conscious 
experience would not be possible and dynamic, temporal experiences would 
not be possible. That such experiences are possible tells us that conscious 
experience involves an immediate retention and conscious recall of events. 
Furthermore, insofar as this process is one of immediate retention and 
immediate conscious recall, the illuminating character of phenomenal 
consciousness cannot be separated from it. Without a retentive-recollecting 
capacity, illuminating awareness would not be anything at all. To illuminate 
events is precisely to bring them into phenomenal consciousness. Retentive-
recall is required in order for passing events to be illuminated as they pass. 
Without arising with an inseparable factor of retention, illumination would not be 
able to bring more than a single moment into phenomenal awareness. 
Illumination would involve the present moment and nothing more. But because 
the present moment is not an inert state, even conscious illumination of the 
present moment requires the capacity to retain the present moment as it 
passes. To put it another way, conscious experience of passing events is 
necessarily thick and such experience requires a form of awareness that retains 
passing events in order to produce thick experiences. Insofar as our conscious 
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experiences are thick experiences, we can assume that the phenomenal 
awareness that is a constituent factor in these conscious experiences has an 
inseparable retentive-recollecting factor. 
 
7.5 Conscious Retention and Mindfulness 
As has been previously mentioned, the earliest Buddhist philosophers did not 
consider any instance of consciousness to arise alone. Any conscious event 
arises along with a variety of concomitant factors. Some of these factors are 
occasional, arising with consciousness under certain conditions. Other factors 
were considered universal mental factors, arising with every instance of 
consciousness. One of the factors considered to be universal within the 
Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma system was called smṛti (Sanskrit) or sati (Pali).27 
Nowadays this universal mental factor is almost exclusively referred to in 
English as “mindfulness” but in his essay ‘On some definitions of mindfulness’, 
Rupert Gethin examines other ways of describing the factor in which it is closely 
related to memory: 
The early Abhidhamma literature lists a number of terms that are 
intended to illustrate the nature of sati and which are of some 
interest: recollection (anussati), recall (paṭissati), remembrance 
(saraṇatā), keeping in mind (dhāraṇatā), absence of floating 
(apilāpanatā), absence of forgetfulness (asammussanatā).28 
Gethin goes on to explore how, according to canonical descriptions, to be 
mindful is to recall or remember, particularly in the short-term sense. To be 
mindful of the breath is to continually remember that one is attending to the 
sensations of the breath. To be mindful of the body is to continually remember 
the posture of the body, or the composition of the body, or the impermanence 
of the body: 
                                                 
 
 
 
27 Dhammajoti, Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, p.285. 
28 Rupert Gethin, 'On some definitions of mindfulness', Contemporary Buddhism: An 
Interdisciplinary Journal, Vol. 12, No. 1, May 2011, p.270. 
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The key element in the early definitions, it seems to me, is that they 
take the sense of sati as ‘remembering’ seriously. The basic idea 
here is straightforward: if one is instructed to observe the breath and 
be aware whether it is a long breath or short breath, one needs to 
remember to do this, rather than forget after a minute, five minutes, 
30 minutes, and so forth. That is, one has to remember that what it 
is one should be doing is remembering the breath.29 
Mindfulness carries with it the connotation of something like the short-term 
memory that allows each passing moment to involve a recollection of what went 
before. In fact, this definition of mindfulness is essential if another Abhidharma 
claim is to be viable. According to both the Theravāda and Sarvāstivāda 
Abhidharma systems, there is only ever consciousness of one object at a 
time.30 When there seems to be awareness of multiple objects at once there is 
in fact only a series of rapidly passing moments of awareness of different 
objects.31 This account is only adequate if we make a distinction between the 
apprehension of objects by consciousness and the actual conscious 
experience of them. If there was only ever conscious experience of singular 
objects, there would not even appear to be an experience of multiple objects at 
once.  
However, this does not rule out the possibility that there is only ever the 
apprehension of a single object at a time. As long as consciousness continually 
arises with a capacity for mindfulness as retentive-recollection the 
apprehension of single objects will rapidly result in a conscious experience of 
multiple objects. Of course, all but one of these objects will be nothing more 
than recollections of events retained by the temporal structure that arises with 
consciousness. Regardless, the Abhidharma assumption that consciousness 
apprehends or “illuminates” a single passing object at a time would be accurate. 
In this way we can bring together our independent argument for the intrinsically 
retentive-recollecting nature of consciousness and the Sarvāstivāda 
                                                 
 
 
 
29 Ibid. 
30 See Karunadasa, The Theravāda Abhidhamma, pp.20-22. See also Dhammajoti, 
Sarvāstivāda Abhidhamma, pp.273-287. 
31 See Gethin, The Foundations of Buddhism, p.211. 
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Abhidharma Buddhist claim that consciousness always arises with 
mindfulness. For ease we could refer to retentive-recollection as mindfulness. 
The inseparability of phenomenal consciousness and mindfulness allows the 
relentless flow of events to be captured in the form of conscious experiences 
as they pass away. These inseparable factors also maintain an unbroken flow 
of conscious experience and an unbroken flow of subjectivity through time. 
Each object of experience is experienced as flowing into the past and being 
immediately replaced by a new object, which in turn is flowing into the past and 
being immediately replaced, and so on without interruption. The conscious 
subject of each of these different objects flows unbroken into the next such that 
the subject of one experience becomes the subject of the next. This unbroken 
flow of conscious subjects could only stop if either mindfulness, phenomenal 
consciousness, or its objects were to disappear or these three factors were to 
become separated. 
However, we now have good reasons to believe that the separation of any of 
these factors would result in their complete disappearance and the irreversible 
unviability of the whole configuration of conscious experience. Mindfulness 
must be inseparable from phenomenal consciousness in order for conscious 
experience of fundamentally dynamic events to be possible. As we saw in the 
last section, all phenomena are constantly reconfiguring and transforming such 
that there is no gap, break, or pause in the relentless flow from one dynamic 
event to the next. Conscious experiences are just as concretely real as any 
other phenomenon, which means that they too must be constantly changing. 
But conscious experiences are appearances within phenomenal 
consciousness, which means that the ever-changing nature of these 
appearances must be “captured” within phenomenal consciousness. 
Mindfulness, as retentive-recollection, is required in order to “capture” dynamic 
conscious experiences as they pass so that they can occur as conscious 
experiences and so arise at all. If there were no mindfulness involved in 
conscious experiences, there would not be any conscious experience. 
Therefore, conscious experiences, as dynamic phenomena, could not be 
conscious if the consciousness of them was incapable of being conscious of 
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their dynamism. There is nothing to any phenomenon, including a conscious 
experience, once we remove dynamism or activity because every phenomenon 
has an intrinsically active nature. Every fundamental factor that constitutes what 
reality is actively conditions and influences others, which leads to a constant 
unfolding process of inter-conditioning configuration of fundamental factors. 
Without this conditioning activity, and without the time in which this activity takes 
place, there is nothing left of the reality in which we live. Without time there is 
no activity but without conscious experience of time there is no conscious 
experience of this activity. Mindfulness is required in order for experience of 
time to be possible. In this way, the separation of mindfulness from any other 
constituent factor of conscious experience completely removes those other 
factors. 
For example, without mindfulness there cannot be any dynamic objects of 
consciousness, neither can there be phenomenal objects or proto-phenomenal 
objects. Sounds, smells, tastes, sights, sensations, thoughts, and urges are all 
actively unfolding processes “all the way down”. Without the mindful 
consciousness to retain and consciously recollect these objects as they pass 
there is simply nothing that it is like to experience them. Nor can these dynamic 
objects survive as proto-phenomenal objects with proto-phenomenal qualities. 
Proto-phenomenal qualities are only coherent if they are the qualities that 
determine what it is like for something to arise within conscious experience if 
and when it does arise in conscious experience. When there is no 
consciousness of them, proto-phenomenal qualities are merely the potential for 
a particular conscious experience.  
As we have already seen, there must be a temporal structure in virtue of which 
dynamic experiences, which we now know means all experiences, can have 
any of their defining phenomenal qualities. While the proto-phenomenal 
qualities of sounds, sights, sensations, and so on, could exist without there 
necessarily being a consciousness that they appear to, these proto-
phenomenal qualities could not exist without the temporal structure that makes 
these qualities capable of constituting dynamic experiences. Timeless objects 
without duration would not have any of the qualities that are necessary in order 
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to account for what our experience of sounds, sights, sensations, and so on is 
like. The proto-phenomenal qualities of these experiences cannot be separated 
from the temporal structure that conditions them into “thick” temporal 
phenomena that occur over time. 
However, in order for this temporal structure to play an integral role in making 
the phenomenal qualities of dynamic experiences what they are, it must involve 
both the retention of passing events and their recollection alongside the newly 
occurring present. Without this retention and then immediate recollection, 
passing events could not be “thickened up” into temporal objects with the type 
of qualities that arise in conscious experience. But it is not at all clear what this 
essential recollection would be if it were not conscious recollection through 
which events that have passed remain as constitutive factors in the “thick” 
moment of conscious experience. When we speak of the “thickness” of a 
moment, we are referring to the way in which passing events appear within 
consciousness. Without the conscious recollection of events as they pass, any 
retention of passing events would be a mere storing of those events as 
information in some non-conscious form. 
Furthermore, even if there was a kind of storing process that also involved a 
kind of retrieval, none of these processes would amount to anything like the 
phenomenally conscious structure that is evident when we experience, for 
example, a note of music fading into the past as new notes arise. In this case 
we cannot posit a proto-phenomenally conscious structure because the fading 
of the music into the past is a feature of the phenomenology of time, it is a 
feature of the way that time is consciously experienced. Phenomenal qualities 
are conscious dynamic qualities, not simply dynamic qualities that have 
become conscious.  The musical notes fade into a memory that is no less 
conscious for being a peripheral feature of our awareness. Without 
consciousness there can be no experience of a sound fading into memory nor 
are there any of the qualities that make this experience the way it is. The 
qualities in question are inseparable from the temporal structure of 
consciousness. I remember which song it is that I am listening to in large part 
because I am still aware, in an implicit sense, of the musical notes that have 
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passed away. To put it another way, I am mindful of the notes that are now 
gone from vivid, present awareness. 
 
7.6 Conclusion: The Impossible Beginnings of Conscious Experience 
The temporal structure of phenomenal consciousness is the temporal structure 
of phenomenal consciousness. To speak of “thick” moments and events 
receding into the past is precisely to describe “what it is like” to be conscious of 
dynamic phenomena. The factors that account for these features of conscious 
experience are inseparable from phenomenal consciousness. Without 
phenomenal consciousness, none of these features could exist, nor can they 
exist as proto-phenomenal features. The precise quality of what it is like to hear 
a sound or feel a sensation drift into the past is not analysable into non-
conscious qualities because these qualities are inseparable from conscious 
experience and the way that events are retained and recollected within it. A 
form of mindfulness or temporal structure without phenomenal consciousness 
would completely lack the qualities required to account for the phenomenal 
features involved in experiencing the fleetingness of objects. The objects 
themselves, insofar as we take them to be devoid of phenomenal 
consciousness, would also lack the required qualities to account for these 
features. This leaves only phenomenal consciousness itself. But in isolation 
from mindfulness, phenomenal consciousness cannot experience dynamic 
objects and so would also be incapable of accounting for the specific qualities 
involved in experiencing the dynamism and fleetingness of events.  
Taken separately, none of the above three factors have any of the 
characteristics, features, or qualities necessary to account for what it is like to 
experience things happening. We cannot trace the phenomenal qualities of 
dynamic conscious experience back to any of the features found in an isolated 
phenomenal consciousness, an isolated temporal structure, or non-conscious 
unstructured events. This means that we would have to appeal to brute 
emergence in order to get these qualities from a combination or configuration 
of these factors, if they were separate. To avoid such an appeal, all we need to 
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do is take phenomenal consciousness to have an inseparable temporal 
structure in virtue of which dynamic objects can be retained within 
consciousness as they pass away and then immediately consciously 
recollected along with the newly arriving present. This would involve accepting 
that there is an indivisible cluster of factors that includes both phenomenal 
consciousness, which illuminates phenomena so that they can appear within 
conscious experience, and mindfulness, which retains and immediately 
recollects phenomena so that they can appear as dynamic events. It is worth 
pointing out here that neither phenomenal consciousness nor mindfulness 
needs to be considered an unanalysable dharma. Despite being complex, 
insofar as consciousness and mindfulness form an indivisible cluster it follows 
that whatever dharmas they might consist of would be no more separable than 
the factors into which they are configured. 
Furthermore, instances of phenomenal consciousness and mindfulness must 
constantly arise together in a stream of illuminating and retaining activity. Given 
that these activities define what mindfulness and consciousness are, the 
cessation of such activity would mean the complete annihilation of these 
streams. As was established in the last section, the fundamental phenomena 
that constitute reality are activities, not just inert states. Conscious illumination 
and retention are processes with distinctive features that cannot be reduced to 
other processes without the whole complex structure of conscious experience 
becoming not only non-existent but completely impossible. If we try to offer an 
account of the origin of consciousness in which we go back to a time before a 
particular stream of conscious experience existed, we must posit either the 
absence or isolation of mindfulness, phenomenal consciousness, or both. If 
there is the illuminating, retaining-recollection of objects then there is an 
unbroken stream of conscious experience with an unbroken stream of 
conscious subjects. But if any one of these factors is stripped out or 
decomposed into something else, whether it is the illumination of objects, the 
retaining-recollection of objects, or the possibility of objects themselves, the 
phenomenal qualities that define what makes conscious experience so 
distinctive vanish without a trace. 
259 
 
Any distinctive phenomenon that cannot exist as the distinctive phenomenon 
that it is without conscious experience cannot exist prior to conscious 
experience. But nor can such distinctive phenomena emerge brutally once 
conscious experience arises. There must be preceding factors that determine 
the precise qualitative nature of a subject experiencing, for example, a series 
of musical sounds. But these precise qualities are what constitutes the 
experience itself, without these qualities there is not enough to constitute the 
precise nature of the experience. If we posit a time when there were no streams 
of consciousness we have already removed too much. We will never be able to 
explain the arising of consciousness because the phenomenal qualities that we 
need in order for this explanation to work exist in virtue of the distinctive 
temporal and subjective structure of conscious experience. 
It is for these reasons that the origins of any given stream of consciousness can 
only coherently be accounted for with reference to a prior instance in that same 
stream of consciousness. In previous chapters we have encountered reasons 
to doubt that streams could merge or separate as this would annihilate subjects 
of experience. In this chapter we have seen how the separation of phenomenal 
consciousness from the retaining-recollecting process of mindfulness makes 
phenomenal consciousness of dynamic, ever-changing phenomena 
impossible.  
Any view that considers a stream of conscious experience to arise from non-
conscious factors is committed to the view that phenomenal consciousness, the 
phenomenal qualities that arise during the experience of dynamic objects, and 
the subject of experiences, all appear out of factors devoid of the phenomenal 
qualities that make these distinctive features what they are. But without these 
phenomenal qualities the factors in question would be inadequate to the task 
of constituting conscious experience. We would need to posit brute emergence 
in order for conscious experience to arise. This is why any view that considers 
a stream of conscious experience to arise from non-conscious factors is 
committed to appealing to brute emergence. As we have seen, a view that 
appeals to brute emergence renders the world unintelligible, which is why a 
view that seeks the origins of a stream of consciousness in non-conscious 
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factors presents the world as an unintelligible one in which no view or theory 
can be relied upon because factors could appear from anywhere at any time. 
Therefore, we are much better off taking the view that an instance of conscious 
experience is preceded by a prior instance of conscious experience and that 
this stream of instances is unbroken. We can also now say that each instance 
in this stream must also be an instance of retaining-recollection in which the 
immediate past is retained along with the present. This means that each 
instance of conscious experience maintains an unbroken stream of subjective 
experiences in which the subject of one experience becomes the subject of the 
next without gaps or breaks. In this way, we have found reasons to support 
Dharmakīrti’s overall argument for the unbroken continuity of conscious events. 
Physical birth cannot be the point at which conscious experience brutally 
emerges from non-conscious factors nor can death be the point at which the 
stream of illuminating, retaining-recollection brutally transforms into completely 
different non-conscious factors. 
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8. Psychological Continuity Between Lives 
8.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter we explored the reasons for adopting the view that an 
instance of conscious experience is preceded by a prior instance of mindful 
conscious experience in which the immediate past is retained and recollected 
along with the present. According to such a view, the flow from one instance of 
mindful conscious experience to the next is relentless and unbroken, entailing 
a beginningless and endless stream of consciousness. Insofar as each instance 
of mindful conscious experience maintains an unbroken stream of subjective 
experiences, the subject of one experience becomes the subject of the next 
without gaps or breaks. These reasons support Dharmakīrti’s overall argument 
for the unbroken continuity of conscious events before birth and after death. 
Physical birth cannot be the point at which conscious experience brutally 
emerges from non-conscious factors nor can death be the point at which the 
stream of illuminating, retaining-recollection brutally transforms into completely 
different non-conscious factors.  
However, Dharmakīrti’s argument is an argument for rebirth and as such must 
be able to establish that, after bodily death, a particular stream of 
consciousness can become configured with a different body and so live a 
different life.1 In order to establish that a stream of consciousness is capable of 
reconfiguring coherently with different physical bodies we must consider how 
the physical body and wider physical world are related to conscious events. 
This will involve addressing the question of mental causation, which is the 
question of how conscious mental events can interact with physical events 
                                                 
 
 
 
1 It is worth pointing out here that traditional Buddhist cosmology does not consider every 
future or past life to involve physical embodiment. The Formless God realms, for 
example, are realms without physicality. Nevertheless, there must be means by which 
a stream of embodied consciousness can become a stream of differently-embodied 
consciousness in order for Buddhist cosmology, as a whole, to be maintained. For 
more on the issues around being reborn as a non-physical Formless being, see Paul 
J. Griffiths, On Being Mindless, Delhi, Sri Satguru Publications, 1999.  
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without breaking energy conservation laws. It will also involve addressing the 
neuroscientific evidence suggesting that our cognitive lives are dependent upon 
brain functions. This relationship between conscious events and physical 
events must be addressed before we can begin to suggest ways in which a 
stream of conscious events that are configured with one set of physical 
phenomena comes to be configured with another after death. 
And yet, establishing that a stream of consciousness can arise with different 
physical bodies is not enough to establish sufficient psychological continuity 
between one life and the next to allow for Buddhist practices of mental 
cultivation to bear fruits in future lives. This is perhaps the most important point 
to be established given that the entire purpose of Dharmakīrti’s argument for 
rebirth was to offer reasons to believe that the Buddha was no ordinary being. 
Dharmakīrti’s purpose was to give reasons for believing that the Buddha was 
extraordinarily compassionate and wise due to multiple lifetimes of diligent 
practice and mental cultivation. If there is no rebirth, the Buddha would not have 
had enough time to develop these qualities to a supreme degree. Without 
rebirth, the Buddha would have to either have been simply “born special”, which 
makes his advice on self-cultivation somewhat suspect, or otherwise the 
Buddha may have only been as much of a virtuoso in compassion and wisdom 
as any other serious spiritual practitioner of the time. The authority of the 
Buddha and his teachings comes from the idea that his claims to have spent 
countless lifetimes perfecting certain qualities are true. But these claims can 
only be true if rebirth is possible. 
Nevertheless, even if streams of conscious events arise over countless 
lifetimes, this does not establish any practically important psychological 
development across lives. If the decomposition of the body and brain at death 
results in the dissolution of all psychological traits, there is nothing to carry 
psychological development over from one life to another. As a result, rebirth 
loses its relevance when it comes to mind training practices, such as 
mindfulness, because nothing about a person’s psychology remains after they 
die. Whether they cultivated the most miserable disposition or the most joyful 
openheartedness, their subjectivity would dissolve into its most basic 
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constituents with nothing maintaining these tendencies. Any mind that arose 
after death would have no psychologically relevant connection to a past life 
regardless of any other continuities between one life and another. 
However, we have already encountered reasons to believe that conscious 
experience is inseparable from an intrinsic form of mindfulness, understood as 
a fundamental process of retention and recollection in which events are 
maintained within a conscious temporal structure after they have passed away. 
Insofar as this process of mindfulness is inseparable from consciousness, 
mindful conscious events can maintain an unbroken subjective continuity in 
which immediately past conscious events arise with present ones. This means 
that psychological factors from the immediate past are retained in present 
consciousness.  
In sections 8.2 and 8.3 of this chapter it will be argued that, while the 
mindfulness that is inseparable from consciousness seems to establish only a 
very short-term psychological continuity between conscious events, it does in 
fact establish that all past experiences play a constitutive role in every 
subsequent instance of phenomenal consciousness. These past experiences 
are not retained as memories in the ordinary sense but rather as impressions 
embedded within the temporal structure that makes presently occurring 
conscious experiences what they are. It is nevertheless the precise character 
of these embedded sense experiences, feelings, thoughts, and volitional 
impulses that conditions the character of any presently occurring psychological 
factors. 
Sections 8.4 to 8.7 will address the question of how a conscious event, with its 
retained history, interacts with physical events. In particular it will suggest ways 
in which we might try to understand the relationship between the physical 
processes and the illuminating, retaining, and temporal structuring processes 
of consciousness. At this point the question of mental causation will be 
addressed and different options will be explored. It will be argued that it makes 
the most sense to assume that physical events are, by their very nature, 
responsive to conscious events. This provides the basis for a continuing 
relationship between the physical world and the stream of consciousness after 
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bodily death. Such a relationship, combined with the retention of feelings, 
thoughts, and desires within post-mortem consciousness, makes it plausible to 
suggest that such a stream of consciousness could eventually become re-
embodied.  
 
8.2 The Retention and Recollection of Experiences 
In the previous chapter we explored how conscious experiences are of dynamic 
objects, objects that change constantly. This dynamism means that any 
phenomenon that appears within conscious experience is always already 
passing away even as it arises within awareness. Given this relentless flow, 
conscious experiences are only possible in virtue of mindfulness, the constant 
retention and immediate recollection of passing events, which is inseparable 
from any instance of conscious experience. To briefly recap, a dynamic 
conscious experience such as hearing birdsong requires that the immediately 
past phase of the birdsong sound is retained whilst the present sound is 
occurring. Without the retention of the immediate past, the present could not be 
experienced as flowing into the past. Given the relentless flow of events, there 
is no static present phase of a sound that arises in consciousness, remains 
unchanging for a time, and then departs. 
Therefore, in order for the experience of a sound to be possible, the sound must 
be retained and recollected as a constitutive condition of the experience itself. 
Any phase of the experience of listening to birdsong is precisely what it is in 
virtue of the constantly growing history that develops due to the retention of 
passing events. This entails that any specific conscious experience is precisely 
the way it is because of a retained history of which the present is an always-
new addition. If every instance of conscious experience must be followed by 
another instance of the same type, even after death, each new instance will 
presumably be an instance of conscious experience. Such experiences will be 
dynamic insofar as they are events and, as we explored in the previous chapter, 
all events are dynamic. Each new conscious experience would require a 
retained history for the experience to arise as the new addition to. Thus, each 
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new instance of conscious experience will arise immediately after the last, 
without any interruption and with mindfulness of its immediate past. This is what 
gives each instance of conscious experience a sense of subjective continuity 
with the previous instance. Whether during life, during the process of death, or 
during whatever occurs afterwards, the stream of conscious experience must 
retain an awareness of the immediate past in order that each instance amount 
to a conscious event.  
For an example, let us look at the case of Clive Wearing, a musician, conductor 
and music producer who, in 1985, was ‘struck down with one of the most 
extreme cases of amnesia ever recorded’.2 The following is quoted from a 
feature in The Guardian written about his situation: 
A virus destroyed a part of his brain essential for memory. It's not 
only most of the past from before the illness that he can't recall. It's 
practically everything since then. Every conscious moment is like 
waking up for the first time. New information, as [Clive’s wife] 
Deborah describes it, 'melts like snow, leaving not a trace'. The one 
part of his previous life that he does remember - when he was a 
sought-after conductor and classical music producer for Radio 3 - is 
Deborah. Every time he sees her again, even if she's only been out 
of the room to make a cup of tea, he'll greet her with a rapturous 
hug.3 
If we were to uncritically accept the claim that, for Wearing, every conscious 
moment is ‘like waking up for the first time’, we would assume that his memory 
lasted for no longer than a single moment. This would leave Wearing incapable 
of doing anything other than spend a single moment trying to make sense of 
the world, and these attempts would have to be repeated in every moment. This 
would leave Wearing with no capacity to do anything accept try to make sense 
of a single moment. But this is not Wearing’s situation. He is able to hold 
conversations, write in his journal, and play the piano. All of these activities 
require more than a single moment of experience. Despite his profound 
                                                 
 
 
 
2 Louise France, ‘The Death of Yesterday’, in The Guardian, 23rd January 2005, available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/books/2005/jan/23/biography.features3 
3 Ibid. 
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amnesia, Wearing remains able to experience the flow of time from one 
moment to the next. He therefore still has the capacity to retain and recollect 
moments as they pass even if this does not result in continuously developing 
autobiographical understanding. 
In fact, the skills that Wearing has retained require more than even what short-
term memory would provide. Wearing remembers how to talk, how to play the 
piano, how to write, and by extension, he remembers everything that one must 
remember in order to be able to maintain a conversation, play the piano, and 
write. At this point I do not wish to enter into discussions about the different 
types of memory, rather I wish to point out that, despite Wearing’s profound 
amnesia regarding his own personal history and the history of the world around 
him, the most intimate memories to do with how he experiences the world and 
interacts with it seem to be well maintained. It is facts about himself and the 
world around him that Wearing seems to be unable to recollect. He does not 
know his own name or the name of his wife but be does remember his wife. 
While Clive Wearing is described as falling in love with his wife every time he 
sees her, this does not seem like an entirely accurate description. Given that a 
love for his wife arises immediately and without fail upon seeing her again and 
again, it seems more accurate to say that Wearing remembers that he loves 
her every time they meet. He does, however, seem unable to present any 
memories of her to himself as objects of vivid awareness. And in this way 
Wearing’s situation reveals an important distinction. This distinction is between 
the overt recollection of past events as objects of awareness and the retention 
of those events within the structure of consciousness. This distinction was 
elaborated by Edmund Husserl, and Dan Zahavi offers a clear account of it in 
Husserl’s Phenomenology: 
If we compare the retention and the recollection, the first is an 
intuition, even if it is an intuition of something absent, something that 
has just existed. The recollection, in contrast, is a re-presenting 
(vergegenwärtingende) intentional act directed toward a completed 
past occurrence. Whereas the so-called retentional modification is a 
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passive process which takes place without our active contribution, a 
recollection is an act which we can initiate ourselves.4 
In this way, the distinction between retention and recollection is a difference 
between passive intuitions of what has gone before and an active re-presenting 
of complete past events.  
Taking Clive Wearing’s case as an example, I wish to suggest that cases of 
profound amnesia do not demand an interpretation in which events that were 
previously retained in consciousness are completely annihilated. Instead we 
can approach ordinary biographical memory as the active recollection of events 
that have been automatically and passively retained within the temporal 
structure of conscious experience itself. This structure influences the way in 
which the world in the present is experienced without being a focal object of 
present experience. When sitting in front of a piano, for example, the 
experience of the piano at the present time is shaped by previous encounters 
with the piano.  
Retained experiences of the piano might influence and enhance our capacity 
to anticipate what will happen if we press different keys as well as our bodily 
experience of how we could move in order to produce a beautiful sound. But 
such retained experiences would not need to be recalled and re-presented as 
objects within present experience in order to have an influence. Wearing, for 
one, doesn’t seem to need to vividly recall his previous experiences of playing 
a piano in order to recall how to play the piano. It seems that we can also desire 
to play a song and know that we can play it without recalling the song into vivid 
awareness beforehand. 
In this way, retained experiences seem to become, over time, part of our 
habitual engagement with the world. Phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty, 
developing Husserl’s work, recognised how past experiences and activities 
                                                 
 
 
 
4 Dan Zahavi, Husserl’s Phenomenology, Stanford University Press, 2003, p.83 
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become ‘sedimentations’ in what he called a ‘habit body’.5 Such sedimentations 
are autonomous and anonymous in that we do not have to reflect on or think 
about them for their presence to influence the overall nature of our experience. 
These sedimentations are embedded within the fabric of our temporally 
structured, embodied experience of the world without us needing to notice or 
overtly recognise them. This is why the virus that damaged Wearing’s brain 
need not have altered the fact that each instance of his conscious experience 
involves sedimentations of past experiences in virtue of which he knows what 
a piano is and how to play it. These experiences may have been retained and 
become sedimentations that exert an influence later on without this influence 
being mediated by the vivid recollection of the experiences in question.  
Of course, in most cases we also have the ability to vividly recollect these 
experiences and re-present past events as objects in the present. As we are 
playing the piano we might recall the first piano lesson we had or the first tune 
we ever played. But it might be this additional ability to re-present retained 
events, which have long since passed away, as objects of present awareness 
that depends upon certain brain processes. In Wearing’s case, damage to the 
brain structures that manage these processes might have left him unable to 
recollect experiences in the way that he used to. As a result, once an event has 
been retained and become embedded in the temporal structure of Wearing’s 
consciousness, it might play a constitutive role in his present experience without 
being re-presentable as an object. But whenever Clive is visited by his wife, the 
past experiences that he has retained of her are nonetheless able to condition 
the way that he experiences her in the present. 
At this point it is worth recalling that one of the purposes of this chapter is to 
defend the relevance of rebirth by offering something of an account of how 
psychological traits and tendencies could persist after bodily death. If, when the 
brain is destroyed, every aspect of our personality ‘melts like snow, leaving not 
                                                 
 
 
 
5 See Ted Toadvine, ‘Maurice Merleau-Ponty’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
Spring 2018 Edition, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), 2018. 
269 
 
a trace’, the prospects for any meaningful psychological continuity across lives 
would be thin on the ground.6 The interpretation of Wearing’s situation offered 
above will provide the basis for a more elaborate account in which meaningful 
psychological continuity across lives is possible.  
Nevertheless, we can still question why anyone should be persuaded to adopt 
this interpretation rather than simply assuming that, without the physical brain, 
memories of the past disappear.  
The answer lies in the fact that mindfulness, the process of retaining-
recollection, which is inseparable from every instance of conscious experience, 
is not simply a matter of short-term storage in which only the immediate past is 
retained. Mindfulness actually requires the full history of the stream of 
conscious events to be embedded in the very nature of present experiences. 
To understand how this is possible let us return to the example of birdsong. The 
experience of listening to birdsong involves more than a series of discrete 
tweets. Each tweet that passes is retained in awareness as the next tweet 
arises. This is what makes the twittering of birds possible as a conscious 
experience. Even when we have stopped actively listening to birdsong, this 
experience has become part of the structure of our ongoing awareness.  
For example, the experience of listening to birdsong during a walk in the woods 
might flow into the experience of having a picnic in the woods, but the overall 
phenomenal quality of the picnic will be informed by the experiences that went 
before. Precisely what it was like to listen to birdsong while walking in the woods 
will be the recent historical backdrop of the picnic. Of course, unlike in the case 
of birdsong, retention of the past activity is not necessary for the experience of 
picnicking in general to be possible. To hear birdsong is to hear twittering birds, 
which is a sound constituted by tweets, which in turn must be retained in order 
to be heard as tweets. The latter parts of a tweet must be experienced along 
with the preceding parts in order to constitute a “tweet experience”. In contrast, 
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picnicking is not constituted by parts that depend upon previous experiences of 
birdsong. 
However, this contrast only holds in a general sense. In general, experiences 
of picnicking are possible without any prior experiences of listening to birdsong. 
One can experience picnicking having watched a football match or gone 
swimming. Listening to birdsong is not, in general, a prerequisite to picnicking 
because birdsong experiences are not necessarily constitutive of picnicking 
experiences. This contrasts with the way in which tweet experiences constitute 
the experience of birdsong. In general, it is not possible to experience birdsong 
without experiencing a tweet along with a prior experience of a tweet. And both 
the specific and general rules for birdsong experience are the same. In general, 
listening to a single tweet does not amount to listening to birdsong. In specific 
cases it is also not possible to experience birdsong without experiencing a 
procession of tweets. 
But in the case of picnicking, the specifics matter a great deal. A specific 
conscious experience of picnicking has a particular phenomenal quality. This 
phenomenal quality is precisely “what it is like” to experience a particular 
episode of picnicking. An episode of picnicking is not generic, it will involve very 
particular experiential moments and phenomenal qualities relating to the 
thoughts, sensations, feelings, volitions and conceptualisations that constitute 
The Picnic that So-and-so had on Such-and-such Day. And “what it is like” for 
an individual to experience a specific picnic will be influenced by previous 
experiences. For example, there are likely to be a number of differences 
between “what it is like” to have a picnic having arrived by car and “what it is 
like” to have a picnic having just walked in the woods listening to birdsong.  
Moreover, I wish to argue that the influence of previous experiences on the 
phenomenal quality of current experience goes beyond the overt psychological 
and physiological effects of previous events. The difference in “what it is like to 
be at a particular picnic” is not entirely a matter of physiological or psychological 
variations resulting from the different ways of arriving at the picnic. 
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Let us imagine two identical people in almost entirely parallel realities who 
arrive at exactly the same picnic via different means. One arrives by car, the 
other via woodland walk. Let us add that both people end up in exactly the same 
bodily states once they have arrived at the picnic despite the disparity in prior 
bodily activity. Let us also imagine that, once at the picnic, they are so 
engrossed in the wonderful food and company that they do not vividly recall any 
of the experiences associated with how they arrived. In this way, neither their 
bodily states nor their overt memories carry the impact of the journey. 
Taking the above example, I wish to suggest that there will be a difference in 
“what it is like” for these two people to undergo the same picnicking experience 
despite neither engaging in vivid recollection of their journey beforehand and 
despite no disparity in their initial bodily sensations. This difference in 
phenomenal quality comes from the fact that “what it is like” for each individual 
to experience the picnic is partially constituted by impressions of previous 
activities even if these activities have neither left a lasting impact on their body 
nor been overtly recalled. In order to explore why this should be the case I will 
draw on Husserl’s phenomenological account of temporal experience. 
 
8.3 The Necessity of Retained Experiential History 
Husserl’s analysis of temporal experience begins with a recognition that there 
is an aspect of awareness that is, as Zahavi puts it, ‘narrowly directed towards 
the now-phase of the object’.7 This narrow awareness of an object’s ‘now-
phase’ results in what Husserl calls the ‘primal impression’ of the object.8 But 
to speak of a primal impression or a now-phase of an experienced object is 
ultimately to abstract from the reality of experience. In reality, the now-phase of 
an object is never experienced on its own. Central to Husserl’s phenomenology 
of time-consciousness is a recognition that any primal impression of an object 
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8 Ibid., p.83. 
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must be experienced along with a retention of the previous primal impression 
as well as a protention of the possible impressions that might follow.9 
With this analysis in mind, we can recognise that any of the experiences 
involved in a particular picnic will involve a structure of retention, primal 
impression, and protention. But the most important feature for our argument is 
the continuous retention of past experiences. In the case of our two 
simultaneous picnickers, “what it is like” for them to taste a cucumber sandwich 
or feel the texture of a blanket is constituted in part by retained experiences. 
For any given “sandwich tasting” or “blanket-feeling” there will be a continuous 
flow of primal impressions along with constant retention of past impressions in 
virtue of which the whole experience is made possible. But this raises a 
question regarding how much needs to be retained for there to be a “sandwich 
tasting” or “blanket-feeling”. How much of the primal impressions of the past 
must be retained in order for an experience of picnicking to be possible in the 
present? 
To answer this question we can look closely at Husserl’s analysis of how 
retention operates. He uses the example of hearing the musical notes C, D, E, 
and F, played in order. As each note is heard, it replaces the previous one as 
a primal impression. D replaces C as a primal impression but C is retained 
within the experience of D. Zahavi expands on this as follows: 
[W]hen E sounds, it replaces D in primal impression, while D is now 
retained by the retention. The retention, however, is not simply a 
consciousness of the tone that has just been. When C is succeeded 
by D, then our impressional consciousness of D is accompanied by 
a retention of C (Dc). When D is replaced by E, then our impressional 
consciousness of E is accompanied by a retention of D (Ed), but also 
by a retention of the tone which was retained in D (Ec).10 
With the help of this analysis we can begin to see why the retention of past 
experience cannot simply amount to the retention of only recent experiences. 
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Our experience of E is accompanied, not just by a retention of D, but also by a 
retention of C, which was retained during D. E involves the retention of the 
previous experience, D, and through D it retains the experience of C. When F 
sounds, the experience will retain E, D, and C, with each prior note being 
embedded within the retention of the next. F, as a primal impression, is 
experienced with a retention of E, with which there is a retention of D, with which 
there is a retention of C. The result is a retained experience of C, embedded 
within a retained experience of D, embedded within a retained experience of E, 
embedded within the experience in which F is a primal impression. 
What's more, if we hear the musical notes C, D, E, and F, there will have been 
experiences prior to hearing the C sound. Hopefully the arguments in previous 
chapters have given us good reason to doubt that the note C could appear as 
an initial, unprecedented moment of experience. When the C note is the primal 
impression it is experienced with a retention of the immediately prior 
impression. Let us call this impression “C minus 1” (C-1). C-1 could be an 
impression of auditory silence, or a visual impression that caught our eye before 
the music began. Whatever the specific phenomenal quality of C-1, as a primal 
impression it will have been accompanied by a retention of the previous primal 
impression. We can call this prior impression C-2. When the C note is the primal 
impression it is experienced with a retention of C-1, and embedded within this 
retained impression will be the retention of C-2. And these deeper layers of 
embedded retentions presumably reach back through the C-3 embedded in C-
2 to the retained impressions of C-4, C-5, C-6, and so on into an entire retained 
history.  
Of course, at this point it might be claimed that there is no need for the depth 
of retentions embedded within an instance of conscious experience to be 
limitless. While the structure of experience may well be as Husserl describes it, 
this structure might only have the capacity to retain so many past impressions. 
We could, for example, imagine that the capacity for retention extends only as 
far as several seconds into the past. In this case, when the notes C, D, E, and 
F are played quite slowly, by the time the F sounds there might be no retention 
of the C note. The experience of the F sounding would include a retention of 
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the E note, which would retain the D note. But the D that is embedded within 
the retention of E no longer has a retention of C embedded within it. And when 
the silence that follows the F note comes, the D will no longer be retained within 
the retention of F that also contains E within it. In this way, as time moves on, 
new primal impressions would push out the oldest remaining retentions. 
Such an account could work if impressions were discrete constituents of 
temporal experience with independent characters. Being discrete in this way, 
impressions could appear as primal impressions, remain for a time as retained 
impressions, and ultimately disappear, without this impacting on the temporal 
character of more recent impressions. But if this were the case, there would be 
no grounds for thinking that a retained impression would contain within it a 
retention of a previous impression. If the impressions that constitute the 
experience of an E note sounding are all discrete, there is no basis for 
suggesting that the primal impressions of the E note retain the impressions of 
the D note. It may be true that our experience of the E note also involves 
retentions of the D note and the C note but these would just be additional 
impressions. The E note impressions would be just the same if there were no 
retentions of D or C.  
However, impressions can only be completely distinct from one another if they 
do not reflect the dynamic, flowing nature of the events that they are 
impressions of. A dynamic impression flows from previous impressions and 
onward to new impressions in virtue of being an impression of reality’s dynamic 
flow. This dynamism precludes the possibility of impressions having 
independent characters from one another. If, on the other hand, impressions 
are not dynamic, we are left with an account in which temporal experience is 
constituted by static impressions. Such static impression could do little more 
than represent abstract points within the flow of time. In this case, our 
experience of objects as constantly flowing would be something that is 
constantly reconstructed within the structure of consciousness as a mere 
representation of time passing. 
Chapter Seven explored the problems with this representational anti-realist 
approach. To reiterate, if temporal experience were constructed out of 
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impressions as discrete temporal points, any given moment of conscious 
experience would be experienced as having a distinct end-point. When listening 
to music we would experience a distinct and inert “absolute very-latest 
impression to arise in consciousness”. This is not what our experience of music 
is like. We do not experience the present moment as the stopping-point in a line 
of impressions but rather as a relentless onflow of impressions. This 
experiential onflow involves constantly experiencing new impressions, which 
immediately recede into the retained past, making way for yet-newer 
impressions.11 
Ultimately, if there is a point that divides the past from the future, this point 
moves relentlessly onward, without stopping for even the briefest of moments. 
And insofar as consciousness “illuminates” the fundamentally unfolding nature 
of reality, the impressions that it retains must mirror this ever-moving point. In 
order to result in genuinely dynamic experiences, consciousness must retain 
the very unfolding that makes an event the sort of thing that it is. But to retain 
the unfolding of an event involves more than simply producing a discrete 
representation of an abstract moment taken from the flow of events. It does not 
work to posit discrete impressions that are captured during a discrete moment 
in time. Instead, impressions must be a thick swathe of retained experience in 
which the present moment is simply an abstract origin point from which the 
whole of experience is constantly renewed. In this way, an account of temporal 
experience in which old retained impressions can separate from others and 
completely disappear fails to appreciate what an impression actually is. 
We can demonstrate this by returning to the example of the musical notes 
sounding. The experience of hearing the D note consists of impressions that 
originate in the now-phase of the temporal structure and immediately become 
part of a retained history. When impressions have just arisen in the now-phase, 
                                                 
 
 
 
11 As previously mentioned, the full range and seriousness of the problems facing this kind of 
representational anti-realist approach to temporal experience are dealt with in much 
greater depth in Barry Dainton, Stream of Consciousness: Unity and continuity in 
conscious experience, London, New York, Routledge, 2010, pp.113-182. 
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they can be called primal impressions. But a primal impression of the D note is 
not a discrete impression of a static moment. There is no static point in time 
when a particular impression of the D note sounding is the absolute very-latest 
impression to arise in consciousness. An impression flows through the temporal 
structure of experience, and does so constantly, leaving no time to inertly “be” 
in a definitive “position” in the temporal structure. This would misrepresent the 
temporal structure of experience as being, at a fundamental level, non-dynamic. 
And insofar as the experience of a D note sounding is a dynamic temporal 
experience it is a seamlessly flowing stream of impressions. Every impression 
of the D note sounding is always flowing through the temporal structure of 
consciousness, from the origin point that is the now-phase and into retained 
history. And this movement results in the unavoidable intersection of what we 
might mistakenly take to be discrete impressions. 
In order to recognise this intersection, we must appreciate that a genuinely 
temporal experience of something like the D note sounding requires an 
awareness that the phase of the sound that is immediately present is already 
receding into the immediate past. This recession of present sound into the 
immediate past requires the simultaneous arrival of a new impression of the 
immediate present. This awareness of a new impression arriving is the onflow 
from one experience to the next that causes impressions to intersect or overlap. 
To illustrate this point, consider a particular impression of the D note sounding 
and call it “D(i)”. D(i) is an event that extends across time. This temporal 
extension is necessary in order for the sound to be experienced as receding 
from the present and into the past, being replaced by a new impression of the 
present. When we recognise that a particular impression of the D note sounding 
is extended in this way, we must also recognise that it therefore overlaps with 
the adjacent impressions of the D note sounding. To hear the D note sounding 
is to hear a particular impression, D(i), give way to a new impression, which we 
can call D(ii). But D(ii) is no less flowing and so no less extended that D(i). The 
impression D(ii) begins during impression D(i) and continues until it has 
receded into the immediate past, having been replaced by D(iii). So too does 
the impression D(iii) begin during the impression D(ii) and end during D(iv). 
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Each of these impressions of the D note sounding overlap with one another 
until the D note stops sounding and the E note begins. In this case an 
impression such as D(v), which begins within D(iv), ends when it has receded 
and been replaced as present experience by a pause in the music. The 
impression of this pause begins during D(v) and ends once it has been replaced 
by the newly arriving E(i). And impressions of the E note sounding continue to 
overlap from here.12  
Using this analysis we can say that the true impressions that constitute our 
temporal experience transform from being primal impressions to being retained 
impressions in the very process of occurring as impressions. Each impression 
begins as the new arrival that displaces a previous impression and ends by 
being displaced by another new arrival. This means that any impression 
includes within itself the retention of the impression that it replaces. Without this 
retained predecessor, the impression would not be of having replaced a 
previous impression. And without this feature, an impression cannot be an 
impression of a dynamic, flowing event such as a musical note sounding. 
Impressions of temporal objects are only possible so long as they overlap with 
impressions of temporally adjacent phases of the object. This overlap is 
preserved as long as each successive impression retains within itself the 
previous impression. The impression D(ii) is an impression of a particular phase 
of the D note sounding only so long as it is an impression of D(i) receding and 
giving way to D(ii). This is what that particular phase of the D note sounding 
consisted in. Without any retention of D(i), the impression D(ii) is no longer an 
impression of that phase of the D note sounding. Without any retention of D(i), 
the impression D(ii) ceases to be part of the seamless flow of temporal 
experience. In this case, any retained experience of the D note sounding would 
lose both D(i) and D(ii) as constituent impressions. And the complete absence 
of D(i) and D(ii) from the temporal structure of experience would cause 
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impression D(iii) to collapse just as D(ii) would if it lost retention of D(i). And this 
collapse would have a knock-on effect on every impression retained within the 
temporal structure of consciousness.  
Therefore, we can return to the claim that began this tangent and say the 
following: If, as the F note sounds, retention of the C note sounding is lost, the 
whole structure of retained impressions would collapse. It is retained 
impressions that make temporal experiences such as those of an F note 
sounding possible. This is why there could be no experience of the F note 
sounding if retained impressions of the C note sounding were lost. And this is 
not only true of the experience of the F note sounding. Nor is it only true of our 
experiences of music or sound. The entirety of dynamic conscious experience 
is structured in such a way that impressions of the present depend upon the 
retention of their predecessors. Each impression that arises within conscious 
experience and is retained depends on the prior impression with which it 
overlaps in order for it to be the particular impression that it is. 
To summarise, the reality of conscious experience consists of phenomenal 
awareness of the flow of events, which includes impressions of a now-phase 
that flow seamless into being impressions of the retained past, as well as 
protention of potential futures. A primal impression cannot be part of this 
seamless flow of conscious experience on its own. A primal impression must 
intersect and overlap with a preceding impression insofar as it arises as that 
preceding impression recedes. This intersection means that there is no 
phenomenal quality to a primal impression that can be separated from the 
phenomenal quality of its predecessor. There is nothing that “it is like” to 
experience a primal impression on its own because a primal impression is an 
impression of a now-phase arising as another recedes. “What it is like” for the 
previous now-phase to recede is part and parcel of “what it is like” for the new 
now-phase to arise. Ultimately, the phenomenal quality of a conscious 
experience or “what it is like” consists of the movement of primal impressions 
into retained impressions and their simultaneous replacement by new primal 
impressions. If we begin with Husserl’s account, as well as our own experience, 
and develop it in the light of an appreciation for the seamless flow of experience, 
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we can conclude that the overlap between primal and retained impressions is 
integral to their appearance as part of a conscious experience. 
Furthermore, by developing Husserl’s initial insights in this way we can begin 
to entertain certain possibilities that he himself did not anticipate. Insofar as a 
dynamic experience is a seamless flow of impressions, it is the phenomenal 
quality of these impressions that determines the phenomenal quality of the 
dynamic experience. And the phenomenal quality of each impression intersects 
with the phenomenal quality of its predecessor. This means that the 
phenomenal quality of a primal impression will be different if there is a 
difference in any of the impressions that preceded it. For any dynamic 
experience, its phenomenal quality is determined primarily by the primal 
impression. But the phenomenal quality of the primal impression is determined, 
in part, by the phenomenal quality of its predecessor, the phenomenal quality 
of which is partially determined by the impression before. And this partial 
determination of phenomenal quality stretches all the way back into the history 
of the stream of conscious experience. And, in the light of this significant 
development of Husserl’s account, we can now answer our earlier question 
regarding the identical picnickers and how much needs to be retained for there 
to be a “sandwich tasting” or “blanket-feeling”. 
Insofar as they are constituted by seamlessly flowing impressions, the 
phenomenal quality of experiences such as “sandwich tasting” and “blanket-
feeling” are dependent upon a history of embedded impressions. If they arrived 
via different means, our two identical picnickers would have different 
experiences of an identical picnic. This is because the impressions that 
constitute these present experiences would have, embedded within them, 
impressions of past experience. Even if they do not actively recollect their 
journey nor undergo different bodily sensations as a result of their different 
journeys, these journeys resulted in impressions that have become embedded 
constituent factors that now partially determine what it is like for them to be 
having the picnic. The impressions of birdsong that one of these picnickers had 
during their woodland walk are now embedded within their impressions of 
eating a sandwich or feeling their hand resting on a blanket. These impressions 
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of the picnic overlap with their predecessors in a way that requires each 
impression to have its predecessor embedded within it. What it was like for our 
picnicker to hear birdsong on a woodland walk played a role in determining 
what it was like for them to arrive at the picnic, which now plays a role in 
determining what the rest of the picnic will be like for them in future. In this way, 
the phenomenal quality of a specific experience of picnicking can indeed be 
constituted, in part, by the phenomenal quality of an experience of listening to 
birdsong. 
At this point it is worth clarifying that the picnicker who arrived via woodland 
walk does not continue to vividly experience birdsong even as they enjoy their 
picnic. For the phenomenal quality of listening to birdsong to partially constitute 
the phenomenal quality of the picnic experience does not require the continual 
vivid presence of the birdsong experience. In the case of the picnicker, 
impressions of birdsong have transformed and become constitutive factors that 
are embedded in the presently occurring impressions of picnicking. Insofar as 
their role in the structure of experience has changed, the past impressions of 
birdsong do not continue to appear as they did when they were primal 
impressions. This is why there is a sense in which old experiences fade away.  
However, this fading is not akin to the way in which a sound reverberates, 
dissipates, and ultimately disappears completely. To explore why, we can 
return to Husserl’s insights into the nature of experience. In his analysis of how 
retentions are experienced, Husserl is very clear in pointing out that a retained 
experience is nothing like a reverberation or an echo. A loud sound is not 
retained as a weaker sound that rings in the background of our auditory 
awareness.13 Husserl explores these differences as follows: 
When a sound dies away, it is first sensed with particular fullness 
(intensity), and thereupon comes to an end in a sudden reduction of 
intensity. The sound is still there, is still sensed, but in mere 
reverberation. This real sensation of sound should be distinguished 
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from the tonal moment in retention. The retentional sound is not 
actually present but “primarily remembered” precisely in the now. It 
is not really on hand in retentional consciousness. The tonal moment 
that belongs to this consciousness, however, cannot be another 
sound which is really on hand, not even a very weak one which is 
qualitatively similar (like an echo). A present sound can indeed 
remind us of a past sound, present it, symbolize it; this, however, 
already presupposes another representation of the past.14 
Given that a retained sound is not like a reverberation, it would be a mistake to 
imagine that past impressions might disappear as an echo does. 
Elsewhere, Husserl describes the movement of a sound into deeper retention 
as being a process of receding or vanishing ‘into the remoteness of 
consciousness’.15 And yet, as it is vanishing, moving further from the ever-new 
‘generative now’, the ‘sound itself is the same, but “in the way that” it appears, 
the sound is continually different’.16 Here Husserl is pointing out that retained 
impressions continue to be the same even as their position within the temporal 
structure of consciousness changes. It is unclear how far into the depths of 
consciousness Husserl thought that impressions would be maintained in this 
way. But regardless of Husserl’s own view, in the light of points made just 
previously we have reason to believe that there is no point where an impression 
could completely disappear during its journey into the depths of the temporal 
structure without compromising the integrity of the whole structure.  
For an impression to lose the preceding impressions that are embedded within 
it would not be consistent with the seamless flow of our experience. Our 
impressions of the immediate present recede seamlessly into the past, which 
means that primal impressions move seamlessly into retained impressions. For 
this to be possible, any particular primal impression must continue to play a role 
in conscious experience even as it moves away from the ‘generative now’ 
where it began. The retained impressions that make a particular impression 
what it is must likewise continue to play a constitutive role in that impression 
                                                 
 
 
 
14 Ibid., p.53. 
15 Ibid., p.45. 
16 Ibid., p.45. 
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even as it too becomes a merely retained impression. As we have seen, if older 
retained impressions were completely lost, the temporal structure in which new 
impressions are embedded would collapse also. This is why, when an 
impression of the now-phase becomes a retained impression, the impressions 
that are embedded within it must persist also. Such deeply embedded 
impressions can be considered to have faded when compared to a retained 
impression just as a retained impression can be said to have faded when 
compared to a presently occurring impression. 
Nevertheless, while we can say that impressions fade as they move through 
the temporal structure of consciousness, this is only in the sense that they have 
become deeply embedded within the temporal structure that makes dynamic 
experiences possible. Just as Merleau-Ponty recognised that past experiences 
and activities become sedimentations embedded within our habitual embodied 
engagement with the world, so too can we recognise that retained impressions 
become sedimentations embedded within the temporal structure of our 
conscious experience. 
In this way, impressions do not disappear, rather they become temporal 
sedimentations, embedded features of the temporal structure in virtue of which 
vivid impressions of the now-phase are what they are. By first being retained 
and then becoming sedimented within the temporal structure of consciousness, 
past impressions become constitutive features of those impressions that 
succeed them. The birdsong experience does not remain as a discrete 
experience alongside the picnic experience. Rather it becomes a sedimented 
feature of the temporal structure of the picnicking experience itself. It is 
precisely because they are embedded within the deep structure of present 
experience that past experiences make a difference to the phenomenal quality 
of conscious experience in the present. This is how different ways of arriving at 
a picnic make a difference to the phenomenal quality of the picnic experience 
itself, even without the active recollections or physiological changes that might 
come from these different ways of arriving. 
Furthermore, this is also how past experiences continue to influence and shape 
our feelings, intentions, and reactions in the present. In the case of our two 
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picnickers, differences in the phenomenal quality of the picnic experience will 
likely influence how they respond to their companions and to events around 
them. If, for example, the picnicker who drove to the picnic was caught in a 
traffic jam on the way, they might have become deeply frustrated by the sound 
of car horns. This impression of frustration at car horns sounding will be 
embedded within successive impressions, becoming likewise a constitutive 
factor in the experiences that follow. Upon hearing a car horn from the nearby 
car park, our picnicker might feel a frustration that is deepened by the fact that 
embedded within its structure is a duplicate frustration at the same object. The 
picnicker who walked to the picnic will lack this embedded frustration and so 
feel a shallower version of it. 
This might also be how we could understand Clive Wearing’s continued ability 
to play the piano or his reaction to seeing Deborah, the wife that he does not 
overtly remember. Years’ worth of embedded impressions of playing the piano 
might have deepened and enriched the phenomenal quality of sitting in front of 
a piano to such a degree that it enables him to play the piano without overt 
memories of how to do it. The embedded impressions in question would have 
once been felt sensations of playing the piano and perhaps the feelings of 
elation and competence that come from consistently performing well. As we 
have seen, these past experiences will have become both habitually and 
temporally sedimented, playing a constitutive role in the phenomenal quality of 
every subsequent experience, including experiences of pianos. Insofar as 
these past experiences will have included an awareness that it was a piano that 
was being played, Wearing’s embodied experience of the present will involve 
sedimented impressions of playing a piano well. Despite his severe condition, 
when sitting in front of a piano Wearing’s primal impressions of the large 
wooden artefact will have, as constitutive features, sedimented impressions of 
playing something just like it with love and competence.17 
                                                 
 
 
 
17 Insofar as we might still wish to call this sort of sedimented impression “memory” it is 
somewhat akin to the phenomenon of ‘Rilkean Memory’ discussed by Mark 
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Similarly, a lifetime’s worth of sedimented impressions of love for his wife may 
influence the way that she appears to him, even when he cannot recall who 
exactly she is. Despite his condition, Wearing’s primal impressions of his wife’s 
features, her voice, the way she moves, the shape of her face, will nonetheless 
have, as constitutive factors, deeply embedded impressions of these same 
features, accompanied by great affection. This affection may well influence his 
experience of her in the present while the precise details of her name, history, 
and relationship to him remain buried. This could be due to labels and facts not 
being as important to the phenomenal quality of an experience as a feeling like 
affection. Using my own case as an example, “what it is like” to know someone’s 
name seems to play a very minor role in “what it is like” to spend time with them. 
This is in contrast to “what it is like” to feel strong affection towards them, which 
plays a major role in the phenomenal quality of time spent in their company. 
Insofar as the phenomenal quality of an impression that has become 
sedimented influences the quality of impressions in the present, it makes sense 
that factors that have a weak impact on the overall phenomenal quality of the 
experience that they originally arose as part of will have a weak impact on future 
impressions also. 
For these reasons it is not necessary to assume that Clive Wearing’s past 
experiences were completely annihilated when his brain was severely 
damaged. Nor do we need to assume that, without the physical brain, 
experiences of the past disappear. If we accept that consciousness of genuinely 
dynamic events requires that past impressions are embedded within all 
subsequent ones, it follows that Clive Wearing, along with any other being that 
is phenomenally conscious of the genuine flow of time, retains their experiential 
history as sedimentations within the temporal structure of their presently 
occurring experiences. To be phenomenally conscious of time in the way that 
you and I are phenomenally conscious of time, a being must have the kind of 
                                                 
 
 
 
Rowlands. See Mark Rowlands, ‘Rilkean Memory’, The Southern Journal of 
Philosophy, Vol. 53. Spindel Supplement, 2015.   
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stream of conscious instances that includes either retained or sedimented 
impressions from all previous experiences. 
And in order for us to the take the traditional Buddhist belief in rebirth seriously, 
it must be the case that all previous experiences leave a lasting impression 
within the structure of consciousness. This, or some equivalent account, must 
be the case in order for the traditional Buddhist belief in rebirth to play a 
meaningful role in Buddhist practice. As we shall see in the next section, there 
are two claims coming from the Buddhist tradition that depend on an account 
in which the history of the consciousness stream is retained or at least 
sedimented in some form. The first of these is the claim that the Buddha 
exemplifies the results of multiple lifetimes of mental cultivation. The mental 
states cultivated in one lifetime must become embedded in successive 
instances of the same mind-stream in order for such a claim to be taken 
seriously. The second of these claims is that adept meditators, such as the 
Buddha, are able to recall memories from past lives. Like the first, this claim is 
only plausible if impressions from past experiences can survive in some form 
within the ongoing consciousness. 
 
8.4 Retaining and Embedding Experiences across Lifetimes 
As we have seen, the temporal structure of conscious experience must have, 
embedded within it, a history of impressions or otherwise collapse altogether. 
And the necessity of this embedded history can be tied in with our previous 
arguments to the effect that phenomenal consciousness must always arise with 
reflexivity, retention, and temporal structure or otherwise be impossible. Insofar 
as conscious experience always involves an awareness of overlapping 
temporal events unfolding, there cannot be conscious experience without a 
temporal structure to make this possible. This temporal structure must have, 
embedded within it, the entire history of conscious experience in order to 
maintain the structure of genuinely temporal events. This structure consists of 
overlapping impressions in which prior impressions are embedded within the 
structure of their successors. At no point in the depths of this temporal structure 
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can there be an embedded impression with nothing embedded within it. Such 
an “empty” impression would lack any temporality and so could not play a role 
in the temporal structure of experience. This is why any instance of conscious 
experience that arises must have, embedded within it, all previous instances 
within its own stream. 
We have also seen that there are good reasons to assume that neither 
conception nor birth is the point at which conscious experience brutally 
emerges from non-conscious factors. These reasons likewise support the view 
that death is not the point at which the stream of illuminating, history-retaining-
and-embedding, reflexive awareness brutally transforms into completely 
different non-conscious factors. Therefore, insofar as a particular stream of 
conscious experience persists after bodily death, each successive surviving 
instance of conscious experience must have the history of prior impressions 
embedded within it. This is how the experiences from even the most distant 
past lives could remain as constitutive features of present experience, shaping 
the phenomenal quality of sounds, smells, sensations, feelings, volitions, and 
thoughts. 
If we then consider our present life, we can assume that our current thoughts, 
volitions, feelings, and sensory experiences will become constitutive features 
of future instances of conscious experience. If we cultivate a particular set of 
attitudes or mental dispositions in this life, our experience of the world in this 
life will be shaped by those attitudes. So if our past relationships to others have 
been permeated by a sense of indifference or causal cruelty, this experience of 
others will become sedimented and influence “what it is like” for us to relate to 
others in the present. Our experience of distance or contempt for the feelings 
of others will be deepened by the fact that such experiences have, embedded 
within them, sedimented impressions of the same attitude of distance or 
contempt. But these sedimented attitudes will not simply disappear when this 
life ends. The impressions of callousness, compassion, insight, or hatred, which 
are sedimented within the structure of consciousness, will continue to shape 
the quality of all future experiences within the ongoing stream. 
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Using this account we can support the claim that the Buddha was 
extraordinarily compassionate due to lifetimes of practice. If the Buddha had 
previously spent countless lifetimes returning again and again to mind training 
practices that develop compassion and wisdom, so many instances of these 
qualities will have become embedded within his mind-stream that they will have 
come to suffuse the Buddha’s consciousness and character. This would put the 
Buddha in the optimal position to teach the way out of suffering. 
This account could also explain how rebirth connects to the path of practice 
taught by the Buddha. Insofar as mindfulness arises uninterruptedly with every 
instance in a stream of conscious experience, every effort that is made to 
cultivate wholesome mental qualities will result in retained and then sedimented 
impressions, embedded within the temporal structure of conscious experience, 
which will continue to influence future experiences. If feelings of trust and hope 
are frequently aroused when practising or listening to Buddhist teachings, many 
layers of impressions of these feelings and their association with the Buddhist 
path will become sedimented within the structure of consciousness. This will 
deepen future experiences of such trust in Buddhist teachings and practice. It 
could then be possible that, in a future life, one encounters Buddhist teachings 
and has a reaction in which there is a deep undercurrent of trust and hope. One 
may then choose to listen to such teachings and adopt Buddhist practices again 
in that future life. In this way, a practitioner can engage in multiple lifetimes of 
deepening mind-training without overtly recollecting practice in previous lives. 
Of course, an account that takes past experiences to be embedded within the 
structure of consciousness itself, rather than stored in the brain, must address 
the evidence suggesting that there are integral brain processes that are 
responsible for our capacity to recall past experiences when needed.  
The role of the brain in the overt recollection of experiences can be dealt with 
by approaching the regions of the brain associated with memory as being 
required for the triggering rather than production of remembered experiences. 
Insofar as impressions fade into the deep structure of consciousness, vividly 
recollecting the past might only be possible in virtue of specific brain processes 
that operate as shortcuts to particular deeply embedded impressions. As 
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already mentioned, the capacity to “re-present” past events as objects of 
present awareness is distinct from the intrinsic capacity of consciousness to 
retain passing events.18 Given that the temporal structure of consciousness 
operates with the thick present as the focus of attention, there must be 
additional factors that enable us to cut across this linear structure and facilitate 
the re-presentation of relevant embedded experiences. Without such factors, 
important information and experiences would be left buried in the depths of the 
temporal structure of consciousness. 
In cases of profound amnesia, such as Clive Wearing’s, we can understand 
them as a loss of the ability to re-present embedded impressions as part of vivid 
awareness in a way that makes knowledge of his own biography or his wife’s 
name possible. This re-presentational ability might have been possible in virtue 
of particular neurophysiological processes that were capable of triggering 
recollection of those past experiences at the appropriate times. Due to the 
damage caused by the illness, these neurophysiological processes no longer 
trigger past experiences, leaving Wearing with a reliable memory that lasts only 
a few seconds. And yet, in Wearing’s case, his immediate affectionate response 
to his wife might be due to fact that his past experiences, including his love for 
her, have become sedimented and remain constitutive features of his conscious 
experience despite the fact that their recollection is no longer forthcoming. In 
this way we can see how it need not necessarily follow from cases of amnesia 
and brain damage that past experiences are stored in the brain itself. 
However, another common claim coming from Buddhist meditation literature is 
that advanced meditators are capable of recalling the events of past lives. If 
recollection depends upon certain brain functions we might wonder if these 
claims are plausible. The issue of whether or not there is a conflict here 
ultimately comes down to whether recollection of a past life memory requires 
the past life brain. Recollections of past lives are probably not possible if the 
recollection of deeply embedded impressions requires the same brain as the 
                                                 
 
 
 
18 Zahavi, Husserl’s Phenomenology, p.83. 
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one associated with the instance of consciousness that retained the impression 
in the first place. But it seems fair to assume that, so long as the correct brain 
processes are in play, these processes are able to facilitate recollections from 
the entire deep history of consciousness. Unless a one-to-one connection is 
required between each particular neuron and each particular recollected 
experience it could be that simply having a fully functioning brain is enough for 
deeply embedded impressions to be dredged up under the right conditions. 
As an example we can consider an advanced meditation practitioner who is 
purposefully trying to recall the experience of past lives. This practitioner would 
have a functioning brain and so would have the neurological processes required 
to recollect events from their own past and to attend purposefully to them. With 
a moderately refined attention it is possible to repeatedly recollect a retained 
impression at will. This is a basic mindfulness practice that is quite easy to try. 
We can, for example, recall a specific experience from our past and maintain 
our attention on it until it becomes quite stable. If we now consider the case of 
a practitioner with a highly refined attention, they might be able to go one step 
further. Such a practitioner could move their attention from their retained 
impression of a past experience onto those experiences that overlap with it. In 
this case they could take one experience and move their refined attention to an 
earlier experience. With sufficient attentional refinement, such a practitioner 
might be able to move their attention back through their retained history of 
impressions to their more deeply embedded, temporally sedimented history of 
impressions.19 And given the seamless overlap of impressions there seems to 
be no reason why this practice of backward-moving recollection would have to 
stop at a specific point. Our imagined practitioner could use their powers of 
recollection and concentration, which are only possible due to certain brain 
processes, in order to dredge up experiences embedded deep within their 
                                                 
 
 
 
19 This type of meditation practice is described in manuals such as Buddhaghosa’s 
Visuddhimagga, Chapter XIII, Verses 22-24, trans. Bhikkhu Nanamoli, Buddhist 
Publication Society, 2011, p. 406. 
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temporally structured consciousness, including experiences from any past 
lives. 
However, insofar as we take memory processes in the brain to enable vivid 
recollections of experiences embedded within the temporal structure of 
consciousness, there must be a basis for the interaction between the physical 
processes of the brain and the structure of consciousness. In order to 
understand the basis of such interaction we must take a step back and consider 
the precise relationship between physical processes and the illuminating, 
history-retaining-and-embedding process of phenomenal consciousness. 
So far we have come to two important conclusions. Firstly, each instance of 
phenomenal consciousness must always be preceded and followed by another 
instance of phenomenal consciousness. Secondly, phenomenal consciousness 
always arises with an inseparable temporal structure in which impressions from 
the entire history of the consciousness stream have become embedded. 
Independent of these conclusions I take it to be part of common understanding 
that every brain process arises from more basic non-brain processes and 
eventually collapses back into these. If brain processes were a necessary 
condition for the existence of (a) phenomenal consciousness, (b) its temporal 
structure, or (c) its continuous retention of conscious experiences, it would 
follow that either (a), (b), or (c) would cease to exist without brain processes. 
But this would contradict our first and second conclusions. This is why we have 
taken the view that the unbroken stream of phenomenal consciousness and its 
constantly retaining-embedding temporal structure does not depend for its 
existence on continuous brain processes. 
And yet, certain brain processes are clearly necessary in order for us to be able 
to recollect past experiences in a way that makes certain experiences and 
cognitive abilities possible. This is the motivation for spending the following 
section suggesting ways to account for this dependence. Such suggestions will 
gesture towards ways in which we might be able to maintain that the stream of 
phenomenal consciousness persists unbroken across lifetimes, with embedded 
sedimentations from historical impressions conditioning present experience, 
whilst also depending upon certain brain processes in order to reliably and 
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vividly recollect much of its embedded history. These suggestions are not 
attempts to present a full account of how the consequences of this argument 
for the plausibility of rebirth can be made to fit with existing neuroscientific 
evidence. Instead, I will attempt to point to those features of the account of 
phenomenal consciousness presented so far that could enable a fuller account 
to be developed. Hopefully this will be enough to prevent doubts about the 
compatibility of current neuroscientific evidence with what has been said so far 
from undermining the overall argument for the plausibility of Buddhist belief in 
rebirth. 
 
8.5 Brain Processes and the Stream of Consciousness  
When it comes to considering the relationship between instances of 
phenomenal consciousness and instances of physicality it is important to 
reiterate a point that has been made in previous chapters: despite being distinct 
from other factors, phenomenal consciousness is not separate from them. We 
have explored reasons for believing that an instance of phenomenally 
conscious experience cannot arise without there being a prior instance with the 
same basic characteristics. But this does not mean that such instances exist as 
isolated mental substances. Each instance of conscious experience must be 
conditioned by other factors, which will include the factors that constitute the 
physical body and world. 
Although the structure of consciousness constitutes much of “what it is like” to 
experience sounds, sensations, and such like, this cannot be the whole story. 
The physical energies that constitute the processes of brain, body, and world 
must also play a role in constituting what these experiences are if we are to 
assume that there are actually physical processes behind sounds, sensations, 
and other objects of consciousness. Insofar as phenomenal consciousness is 
defined in terms of its illuminating character, its object-directedness gives it an 
in-built relationship with the other factors of reality, which it illuminates and 
retains. This is why it is not difficult to understand how an instance of conscious 
experience comes to be conditioned by physical factors. Given that those 
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physical factors are the objects of consciousness, they play a role in 
determining what a particular conscious experience is. 
But it seems as if there are also physical processes that condition 
consciousness without appearing as constituents of conscious experience. 
Cases such as Clive Wearing’s suggest that there are unexperienced brain 
processes that play a key role in conscious experience. Brain processes that 
are responsible for the recollection of events, information, and so on do not 
appear as vivid features of experience and yet, if they are damaged or 
destroyed, recollection is severely curtailed. It seems as if there must be a way 
for physical processes to condition a conscious experience without entering into 
the configuration that is that conscious experience. 
Such a conclusion is not, however, necessary. We have already spent some 
time exploring how experiential events become embedded within the temporal 
structure of consciousness. These embedded sedimentations go on to 
influence the phenomenal quality of future experiences without being overt 
features of those experiences. This means that there are features of conscious 
experience that do not need to be overt, vivid, or easily noticeable in order to 
influence or otherwise condition that conscious experience. A possible 
mechanism for the way in which neurological events influence conscious events 
might be via features that are embedded within the deeper structure of 
consciousness in this way. When past experiences are recollected, this return 
of deeply embedded sedimentations into present experience might be triggered 
by events within this deeper structure. Experiential events at this deeper level 
might mirror, or even be partially constituted by, events within the brain and 
body. In this way, the physical processes that trigger recollections could 
perform this function in virtue of being fundamentally inseparable from deeper 
structural features of conscious experience. These deeper structural features 
would respond to the brain processes associated with memory in such a way 
that the recollection of specific experiences is triggered. 
In order to motivate this idea of “deeper structural features of consciousness” I 
would like to highlight two different ways in which something can be a feature 
of phenomenally conscious experience. Firstly we have those features that 
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appear at, or close to, the focus of conscious attention. Secondly we have those 
features that remain at the periphery of consciousness, playing a role in the 
overall quality of a phenomenally conscious experience but without being 
central to it. That consciousness is a field with a focus and a fringe was 
recognised by William James. In A Pluralistic Universe, James described these 
aspects as follows: 
My present field of consciousness is a centre surrounded by a fringe 
that shades insensibly into a subconscious more. I use three 
separate terms here to describe this fact; but I might as well use 
three hundred, for the fact is all shades and no boundaries. Which 
part of it properly is in my consciousness, which out? If I name what 
is out, it already has come in. The centre works in one way while the 
margins work in another, and presently overpower the centre and 
are central themselves. What we conceptually identify ourselves with 
and say we are thinking of at any time is the centre; but our full self 
is the whole field, with all those indefinitely radiating subconscious 
possibilities of increase that we can only feel without conceiving, and 
can hardly begin to analyse.20 
According to James, consciousness is roughly structured into a centre, a fringe, 
and a ‘subconscious more’. Here the ‘subconscious more’ seems to refer to 
something like the deepest depths of the structure of consciousness. While we 
can consider each of these aspects of consciousness to be constituent features 
of the overall structure, none of them can be separated from the others. 
Alongside inseparability, there is also an unbroken continuity between that 
which is at the centre of an instance of conscious experience and that which is 
at the fringe. Likewise there is an unbroken continuity between the fringe and 
the deeper structure. 
An example of this structure can be found when we look at Gestalt images such 
as Figure-Ground visual illusions. These illusions involve an image that can 
appear as at least two different objects depending on the visual focus of the 
observer. Perhaps the most famous image is the Rubin Faces-Vase figure: a 
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vase, which can also appear as two faces in profile, looking at one another.21 If 
the observer focusses on the vase, the faces become the background for the 
appearance of the vase. If the observer focusses on the faces, the vase 
becomes the background for the appearance of the faces. In both cases the 
visual phenomenal qualities of both faces and vase appear as part of the 
experience but they might appear as the fringe of the central experience. 
The centre of the experience, be it the faces or the vase, comprises the overt, 
vivid object of the experience.22 We will usually have no problem recognising 
that we are phenomenally conscious of such central objects. In this respect, 
objects at the centre of a conscious experience are very much both 
phenomenally conscious and access conscious, where access consciousness 
refers to an object’s ‘availability for use in reasoning and rationally guiding 
speech and action’.23  
Contrastingly, the fringe of the experience comprises those features and 
processes that are implicit, forming the background of the experience. In the 
case of phenomena at the fringe of experience it is difficult to offer a clear 
account of “what it is like” to experience them. This difficulty exists in virtue of 
the nature of the fringe itself. As James points out, if our awareness of features 
at the fringe of conscious experience was crisp and clear, those features would 
not be at the fringe at all. Insofar as there are processes and features of 
conscious experience that operate at its fringes, it is difficult to say whether we 
                                                 
 
 
 
21 For an image of this illusion, see section 3.4 of Eric Schwitzgebel, ‘Introspection’, The 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Winter 2016 Edition, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), 
2016.  
22 It is worth pointing out that while the centre of conscious attention seems to be capable of 
apprehending multiple objects, the claim coming from most Abhidharma systems 
would be that this centre of experience is not the focal point of attention. For the 
Abhidharmikas there must be a focal point, even to this centre, a small region of 
single-pointed attention that illuminates only one object at a time with the most acute 
degree of awareness.   
23 Ned Block, ‘On a confusion about a function of consciousness’, Behavioural and brain 
sciences, Vol. 18, 1995, p.227. 
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are access conscious of them. They may certainly impact how we think and 
behave, but our awareness of them seems at best implicit. 
As an illustration of this distinction between the centre and fringe of experience, 
let us consider subtle sensations like the feeling of the ground under one’s feet. 
Such sensations arise frequently as constituent features of a conscious 
experience whilst rarely being the focus of conscious attention. But being 
peripheral to conscious attention does not mean that such sensations are 
completely absent from conscious experience. If I were to walk to the shops 
whilst thinking about what I need to buy, there would be an implicit expectation 
that I constantly feel the ground beneath my feet. Were the ground to disappear 
I would receive an immense shock, but I would only receive this shock in virtue 
of feeling the absence of the ground. Such a shock at feeling this absence of 
ground involves experiencing the rapid loss of an immediately prior feeling of 
the presence of the ground. Therefore, feeling the presence of the ground must 
have been a feature of the prior conscious experience of walking to the shops. 
Furthermore, if we only became consciously aware of something when our full 
attention was on it, our experience of the world would be incredibly choppy in 
that each new object would appear as if from nowhere whenever we paid 
attention to it. There must be peripheral impressions of fringe objects, such as 
the ground beneath us, which we can go on to pay attention to. Insofar as I am 
phenomenally conscious of the ground beneath my feet, these impressions are 
at the fringe of my conscious experience rather than being phenomena that I 
am aware of in the sense of paying attention to them. And given that they are 
at the fringe of my consciousness, it is only through the fact that these 
impressions of the ground are entailed by the central experience of walking that 
we can clarify that they are indeed there at the fringe of consciousness. 
It is this fringe that James claims ‘shades insensibly’ into the depths of 
consciousness. But while we can gesture towards what is going on at the centre 
of conscious experience in order to suggest the existence of certain features at 
the fringe, this is not a method for exhaustively examining the entire fringe of 
conscious experience, let alone the deeper structure. There may well be 
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phenomena arising at the fringes or in the depths of conscious experience that 
cannot simply be inferred from phenomena at the vivid centre. 
This suggests that, if we are looking for a site where myriad interactions could 
plausibly take place between processes within the physical body and processes 
within the structure of phenomenal consciousness, the fringes and depths of 
conscious experience may well be that site. This would help to explain why 
experiences that have become embedded sedimentations within the temporal 
structure of consciousness, rather than the physical structure of the brain, 
nonetheless require certain brain processes in order to move from the deep 
fringes of consciousness to its centre. Processes within the brain may be 
responsible for organising or enabling certain processes within the deep 
structure of conscious experience, which in turn trigger the return of sedimented 
experiences into vivid awareness. This could explain why recollection cannot 
happen without the correct brain processes despite the retention, embedding, 
and recollection of experiences occurring entirely within the structure of 
conscious experience. 
All in all, three things are being suggested here. Firstly, I am suggesting that 
there are deep structural features that are part and parcel of the constitution of 
our phenomenally conscious experiences. These features include those that 
occupy the fringe of consciousness as well as those features that occupy the 
deepest structure of consciousness. Such features constitute “what it is like” to 
have a phenomenally conscious experience just as my fringe awareness of the 
ground beneath my feet is part of “what it is like” to walk to the shops.  
Secondly, I am suggesting that some of these features might be inseparable 
from, and in a mutually influential relationship with, physical events in our 
bodies and brains. To put this in terms that refer to the Abhidharma principles 
used already: any instance within the stream of our conscious experience is an 
indivisible cluster that includes an unbroken continuum of central, fringe, and 
deep structural features where some of these features are inseparably 
configured with physical factors that constitute our body and brain. Putting 
these two suggestions together, I am suggesting that “what it is like” to have a 
phenomenally conscious experience, such as seeing a familiar face, includes 
297 
 
features at the very fringe of the experience. These fringe features contribute 
to the phenomenal quality of the experience while also being inseparable from, 
and responsive to, the physical factors that comprise certain brain processes. 
As an illustration of what is being suggested, consider the way in which “what 
it is like” to walk to the shops includes a range of phenomenal qualities. These 
include phenomenal qualities associated with my feet touching the ground, wind 
on my face, the smell of the air, and so on. Some of these phenomenal qualities 
are easy to notice and reference when using walking to the shops as an 
example, others are not so obvious. There will be sensations in my body and 
thoughts going through my mind that I did not notice when I walked to the shops 
and do not remember now. These were nonetheless aspects of the experience 
that were occurring at the fringe of consciousness. There may likewise be 
sensations that never get noticed simply because they are so basic or so 
ubiquitous that it is never relevant to place our attention on them. Such 
sensations might be embedded deep within experiences, despite being varied 
and complex. These are the sorts of deep fringe features that might be 
inseparable from physical processes in the body and brain.  
The third suggestion being made is that it is the relationship between central 
and fringe features of conscious experience that determines whether or not 
sedimented impressions return to the centre and so are recollected. Putting this 
third suggestion together with the previous two, I am suggesting that if the brain 
processes required for memory or recognition were to cease functioning, the 
fringe features with which they are inseparable would be altered in such a way 
that they would no longer trigger the return of sedimented impressions required 
for an instance of recollection or recognition. 
Overall, this allows us to explain why physical brain processes are necessary 
for cognitive abilities such as recollection whilst avoiding positing a one-way 
triggering relationship in which the physical simply “makes things happen” 
within consciousness in a brute manner. In such a relationship, consciousness 
would be a passive recipient of physical powers rather than a member of an 
inseparable cluster of mutually conditioning mental and physical factors. To 
approach mental-physical causation in a way that is consistent with 
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Abhidharma principles involves approaching conscious events and physical 
events as inseparable as well as mutually conditioning. At the same time, we 
can maintain that this inseparability is most pronounced in the deeper structure 
of conscious experience. This allows us to posit a thoroughgoing inseparability 
between conscious experience and the physical factors that constitute neuronal 
events without this entailing that the vast array of intricate events going on in 
our brains ever appear anywhere near the centre of our conscious attention. 
To illustrate how this might work, let us imagine a person recalling the name of 
their cat. There are experiences that constitute “what it is like” to know that a 
cat is called Boots: the sound of the name, how it is written, how it feels to say 
“Boots”, as well as the name’s conceptual and personal significance. These 
phenomenally qualitied experiences arise together in the experience of 
knowing that Boots is called “Boots”. Nevertheless, each experiential feature of 
this “knowing” will arise at varying “distances” from the centre of consciousness 
depending on the situation. For example, how it feels to pronounce the name 
“Boots” is closely tied to the embodied capacity to call out to the cat. The act of 
calling out to Boots involves a clear recollection of “what it feels like” to perform 
the act of pronouncing his name.  
Furthermore, it is quite possible that, embedded within the experience of 
hearing, saying, reading, and comprehending a name, are a vast array of deep 
fringe experiences that always arise in a cluster with certain neuronal events. 
Insofar as these fringe experiences are inseparable from physical processes in 
the brain, their role and structure within consciousness will have developed in 
tandem with that of the brain. This role and structure will alter as the brain 
changes.  
In this way, particular types of deep fringe experience could have developed 
alongside the brain processes involved in language use. For example, my 
understanding of language might depend, in part, on my recollecting the 
different ways that a word such as “Boots” or “Cat” can be used. These 
recollections would remain at the fringe of experience but near enough the 
centre of attention that I would not need to vividly attend to every single instance 
in which the words could be used. Rather, I would have a general sense of the 
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word’s possible uses in virtue of the fact that specific instances of word-use 
would remain in the “near fringe”, heavily informing the overall character of the 
conscious experience. In this way the world would appear as a world of word 
and language possibilities. This experience of linguistic possibilities would be 
maintained by the presence of certain “near fringe” features of experience. 
These “near fringe” features would include, not only recollections of word use, 
but also deeper features that keep those recollections close enough to the 
centre of awareness that they can be informative. Such deeper linguistic 
features will have arisen with and been closely associated with the use of words 
and language throughout this lifetime.  
When it comes to knowing that Boots is called “Boots”, such specific instances 
of language ability might involve specific brain processes. These brain 
processes will have developed alongside features within the depths of 
consciousness with which they form a cluster of inseparable mental and 
physical factors. We might imagine that, throughout my life, the experience of 
spoken language, initially as used by my parents, might have triggered certain 
brain and body processes that were inseparable from modifications in the deep 
structure of consciousness. There might have been “something it was like” to 
hear speech, as opposed to any other type of sound, in virtue of distinctive 
features at the fringe of such experiences, which arose in tandem with certain 
physical process in my nervous system. 
Such distinctive linguistic features of experiences could have developed in 
complexity as I grew older until I had an ability to use and embody language. 
As a result, every experience that I have had relating to Boots the Cat might 
have involved linguistic features within their deep structure that are part of “what 
it feels like” to comprehend that my cat is called Boots. Insofar as these deep 
structural features have arisen repeatedly with all “Boots the Cat experiences”, 
they might effectively tie such experiences together. With this deep structural 
tie in place, when I see a cat with a distinctive black mask and white boots, it 
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would result in a cascade of associated sedimented impressions being dredged 
up.24  
But this deep structural tie would exist in virtue of the linguistic features of 
experience, which condition my perspective on the world. Were specific 
processes within my brain to collapse, the distinctive linguistic experiences that 
enabled me to use language might likewise collapse and the world of words 
and language would recede infuriatingly into the depths of consciousness. In 
such a situation, the “near fringe” of my experience would become devoid of 
the relevant recollections of how I use the name “Boots”, especially its 
association with the cat in front of me. I would be left unable to name the cat, 
perhaps not even recalling that I know the cat, or that it even is a cat. This would 
be despite the fact that all of the impressions involved in fully comprehending 
that this is my good friend Boots would be embedded in the deep structure of 
my consciousness. 
This has been a mere illustration of how it might be possible to account for the 
development and loss of cognitive abilities within a framework in which the 
fundamental structures of consciousness do not depend on the structures of 
the brain. This illustration explains how, within this framework, there can also 
be structures and features of conscious experience that do depend for their 
existence on certain brain processes. It is these sorts of structures and features 
that might be the basis for the ability to recollect and make use of past 
experience in a way that enables key cognitive capacities. If, due to brain 
damage or death, certain structures within consciousness collapse, conscious 
experience will be reduced to an attenuated form. But this form will still include 
                                                 
 
 
 
24 In order to develop this sort of account further one might be able to make use of “field 
theories” of consciousness aside from James’ such as the one provided by Gestalt 
theorist Aron Gurwitsch. See Aron Gurwitsch, Field of Consciousness, Pittsburgh, 
Duquesne University Press, 1964. See also P. Sven Arvidson, ‘The Field of 
Consciousness: James and Gurwitsch’, Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce 
Society, Vol. 28, No. 4, Fall, 1992, pp.833-856.  
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the basic structures that constitute an ongoing stream of conscious experience 
that has a sedimented experiential history. 
Nevertheless, whilst we can now comprehend how conscious experiences 
might be conditioned and enabled by physical processes, this relationship must 
go both ways. Physical processes must, in turn, be conditioned by conscious 
events in order for conscious experiences as conscious experiences to have 
an influence on what goes on in the physical world. Such a two-way relationship 
would not only explain how the tandem development of the brain and 
consciousness has been so harmonious, it would also offer a basis for 
understanding how a stream of consciousness might be reborn with a new 
physical body. This is why the final section of this chapter will explore the 
relationship between consciousness and physical reality as a whole. 
 
8.6 Physical Reality and the Stream of Consciousness  
In order for phenomenally conscious experiences as phenomenally conscious 
experiences to have an influence on what goes on in the physical world, 
physical events must be conditioned by phenomenally conscious events. Given 
that discussions regarding the precise nature of “what it feels like” to exist take 
place in the physical media of printed journals and audible conversations we 
can only assume that the phenomenal quality of experience influences physical 
events. And yet, precisely how the phenomenal quality of experience conditions 
physical events is difficult to ascertain. When investigating influences in the 
opposite direction we benefit from the fact that the conditioning of conscious 
experience is evident within experience itself. We know the physical through its 
impact on our experiences. 
However, the primacy of conscious experience makes an investigation into the 
nature of the physical itself highly problematic. If physical events are of the 
nature to be conditioned in certain ways by conscious events, we do not have 
direct access to this nature. Instead we must simply begin with what we do 
know, which is that conscious events influence the course of physical events. 
But as soon as we assume that there is two-way influence between the 
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conscious aspects of reality and the non-conscious physical features of reality 
we raise deep questions regarding where and when this influence takes place. 
The widespread assumption that physical reality is causally closed is generally 
taken to rule out the possibility that something that is not a constituent of the 
physical universe could play an influential role in its unfolding.25 The 
assumption is that the physical sciences are too successful at predicting events 
for their models of the universe to have erroneously missed out an important 
factor such as phenomenal consciousness.26 This is what motivates the 
argument that phenomenal consciousness is epiphenomenal, having no 
influence on physical events. 
Nevertheless, we do not need to assume that the predictions of scientific 
models are inexplicably successful given their failure to include phenomenal 
consciousness. We can understand how conscious events could influence 
physical events without this implying that the physical sciences have excluded 
a fundamental factor from their models. To begin with, we can schematise the 
relationship between the physical and phenomenal consciousness in terms of 
a number of possible realities. In order to understand these possible realities 
we can first conceive of two different kinds of phenomenal consciousness: “Z-
Consciousness” and “X-Consciousness”. We can also think of two different 
kinds of physical reality: the “Z-Physical” and the “X-Physical”.  
The Z-Physical is a closed system, which is unresponsive to the phenomenally 
conscious character of anything. The X-Physical is responsive to and 
influenced by phenomenally conscious events. Z-Consciousness is conscious 
only of itself and therefore involves a subjective experience of its own nature 
and nothing else. I will assume that such a subjective experience would be 
constant and invariant. X-Consciousness, on the other hand, is conscious of 
objects in the world, namely physical events.  
                                                 
 
 
 
25 See John Heil, Philosophy of Mind: A Contemporary Introduction, New York, Routledge, 
2013, pp.26,29,30,42. 
26 This assumption is used against traditional Buddhist claims by Owen Flanagan. See The 
Bodhisattva’s Brain: Buddhism Naturalized, MIT Press, 2011, p.2. 
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We can now enumerate a number of possible worlds:  
Reality A consists of Z-Consciousness and Z-Physical events. Z-
Consciousness experiences only itself and Z-Physical events are not 
responsive to this Z-Conscious experience. 
Reality B consists of X-Consciousness and the X-Physical. X-Consciousness 
involves phenomenal awareness of physical objects and the X-Physical world 
responds to the conscious experiences that result from this.  
Reality C consists of X-Consciousness and the Z-Physical. This X-
Consciousness involves phenomenal awareness of Z-Physical objects but the 
Z-Physical world is causally closed to all such phenomenally conscious 
experiences so they have no impact on Z-Physical events.  
Reality D consists of Z-Consciousness and the X-Physical. Z-Consciousness 
experiences only itself but the X-Physical is responsive to this basic experience 
in some way. Insofar as the subjective experience associated with Z-
Consciousness illuminating only itself would be unvarying, any influence that 
this experience had on the X-Physical would be equally unchanging. While 
Reality D might be different in constitution from Reality A, there would be little 
practical difference as neither would involve the physical responding to changes 
in consciousness. Z-Consciousness would involve a single continuous 
experience of itself and so would never have any interesting influence on wider 
reality. 
We can now ask which reality we exist in. Due to our direct acquaintance with 
phenomenal consciousness we can recognise immediately that we are aware 
of more than simply the nature of consciousness itself. We experience a range 
of dynamic factors with distinct characteristics. We also frequently distinguish 
between a given object and our awareness of it. If this direct acquaintance is 
genuine it tells us that our consciousness is X-Consciousness and not Z-
Consciousness. This means that our reality cannot be Reality A or Reality D. 
What remains are Realities B and C. The difference here is whether the 
physical is responsive to phenomenal consciousness or not.  
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As already mentioned, we are able to discuss phenomenal consciousness, 
which means we are able to engage in physical behaviours and produce 
utterances that are only meaningful because they are the result of our being 
phenomenally conscious. If our talk about phenomenal consciousness is not 
the result of our being phenomenally conscious, it would be deeply odd that an 
explanation in which it is the result of our being phenomenally conscious works 
so well. If such consciousness were generated by a physical process that also 
causes our talk about being phenomenally conscious, we would be faced with 
an unfathomable mystery as to where all the talk about the specific features 
and character of phenomenal consciousness comes from. Our physical speech 
capacities seem to be capable of forming utterances that, to our own 
satisfaction, successfully communicate something of the subjective character 
of our experiences. Therefore, it certainly seems as if our physical bodies are 
responsive to our conscious experiences as phenomenally conscious 
experiences. Our subjectivity seems to be quite evident in the way that we 
conduct ourselves through the physical world. If we can take this evidence 
seriously it seems fair to reject the idea that we live in the physically 
unresponsive Reality C. If there is phenomenal consciousness of physical 
objects and the physical world is responsive to this phenomenal consciousness, 
we must exist in Reality B. 
At this point we can ask whether this means that physical reality is not causally 
closed. If it is not causally closed, we can then ask how the physical sciences 
have not stumbled upon a gap in their explanatory power where phenomenal 
consciousness should be. 
The answer to these questions lies in another distinction we can make within 
Reality B. If the physical responds to certain conscious experiences at certain 
times but at other times unfolds in its own way, it follows that our reality involves 
what we could call the “Y-Physical”. The Y-Physical is such that, under specific 
circumstances, it responds to phenomenal consciousness, behaving like the X-
Physical. But when these circumstances are not in place the Y-Physical 
operates as its own unfolding process, unresponsive to phenomenally 
conscious events, much like the Z-Physical does. In this case Reality B would 
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be something closer to Reality AB, a reality in which there is an independently 
unfolding physical universe that is occasionally affected by phenomenally 
conscious events. If we exist in Reality AB we would expect the physical 
sciences to eventually encounter some serious anomalies around conscious 
behaviour in which the natural unfolding of physical events seems to be 
interfered with by an unknown force. That no such anomalies have been 
encountered counts against the idea that we exist in Reality AB. 
The alternative is that we exist in Reality B proper, which involves pure X-
Physical events that respond constantly and continuously to X-Conscious 
events. In this case there is no unfolding of the physical universe that is 
unresponsive to phenomenally conscious events. If we exist in full-blown 
Reality B, our scientific understanding of the physical universe already 
unwittingly includes or otherwise “factors-in” the responsiveness of physical 
events to phenomenally conscious events. The physical laws that have been 
formulated are based on calculations and observations of a reality that 
continuously responds to phenomenal consciousness. 
In this case, the influence that human or non-human consciousness has on the 
physical universe would not be some additional force. Rather, the way in which 
physical forces operate would already be a response to consciousness. This 
close and continuous relationship between phenomenally conscious events 
and physical events would make it very hard to distinguish a phenomenally 
conscious event from a physical event from the outside. Both types of event 
would arise in response to the other. Consciousness of physical events would 
arise in response to those physical events arising just as physical events would 
arise in response to conscious events arising. If this relationship between the 
physical and the conscious is at the fundamental level of reality, the physical 
sciences would have to reach a fundamental degree of accuracy before they 
noticed that physical events were responding to something not-entirely-
physical. 
If we assume that we exist in Reality B, there will not be some specific region 
of the brain where conscious events have their special influence. Rather, just 
as every physical event is conditioned by other features of the physical universe 
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such as space and time, so too will they be conditioned by the features of 
phenomenal consciousness. To take the example of a conversation about the 
phenomenal quality of consciousness, it would not be the case that, upon our 
deciding to talk about consciousness, previously independent physical 
processes are interfered with by some supernatural power of consciousness. 
Rather, the phenomenal quality of consciousness will have been continually 
influencing physical events such that those events have never arisen as 
independent processes. Any study of neurological or biological processes will 
have already observed the influence of phenomenal consciousness. The 
reason why no unusual causal influences will have been noticed is because 
there are no independent, influence-free physical phenomena to compare 
neurological or biological processes to. If we exist in Reality B, even the most 
fundamental physical processes that constitute chemical, biological, and 
neurological processes are conditioned by conscious events. 
Of course, one could scientifically ascertain whether or not our reality is Reality 
B by achieving a completed physics. In such a complete physics, every 
fundamental physical phenomenon would belong to a predictable class of 
physical entities and every complex physical phenomenon would be 
exhaustively accounted for and its behaviour predicted purely in terms of these 
fundamental physical entities. In this case every physical event would have a 
known set of exhaustive physical causes and conditions, leaving no room for 
anything but prior physical events. I am confident that physics has not reached 
this point. But even if it were to do so, we would still be faced either with 
anomalies at the points where conscious events as phenomenally conscious 
events influenced fundamental physical events or otherwise with the most 
unfathomable coincidence in the history of humanity: it would seem as if 
phenomenal consciousness has an influence on the world when, in fact, it does 
not. 
If we now return to the question of memory and psychological development 
across lives, we begin to see how the brain processes that are responsible for 
triggering the recollection of specific sedimented impressions might be capable 
of doing so. If all physical events are conditioned by conscious events, the 
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neuro-physical events that constitute our brain processes will be likewise 
responsive to and conditioned by ongoing conscious events. The precise ways 
in which neurological events and conscious events condition one another are 
beyond the scope of this investigation but attempts have been made to suggest 
more detailed theories.27 
Nevertheless, we could assume that, through this mutual conditioning, the 
structure of a particular brain and the structure of a particular consciousness 
would come to mirror one another such that the stimulation of one produces a 
response in the other. If this were the case, sedimented impressions of the past 
would be mirrored by neurological features that, when operative, would trigger, 
stimulate, or otherwise “reawaken” those sedimented impressions such that the 
spotlight of vivid attention would fall on them, resulting in recollection of past 
experience as past experience. And it would be through the triggering of 
sedimented impressions that the synergy of neuro-physical and conscious 
processes would amount to the full range of capacities that humans and other 
sentient organisms possess.  
Furthermore, this synergy would exist in some form at every level of reality. It 
would not be the case that the only physical processes that respond to 
conscious processes are those occurring in the nervous system. Rather, every 
physical process would be responsive in its own way to the conscious events 
within every stream of consciousness, whether these are configured with a 
functioning body or not. 
However, insofar as we have suggested that every physical event is 
conditioned by and responsive to conscious events, we run the risk of giving 
the impression that every neuro-physical event is conditioned equally by every 
conscious experience. This would entail that every brain and nervous system 
was equally responsive to the conscious experiences of every subject, which is 
not the case. My brain and body consistently respond to the set of conscious 
                                                 
 
 
 
27 For a selection of such theories see Contemporary Dualism: A Defence, edited by Andrea 
Lavazza and Howard Robinson, New York, Routledge, 2014. 
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experiences that I call my own, just as the bodies of others seem to respond to 
their conscious experiences. 
Despite the general responsiveness of physical events to conscious events, 
there seems to be a privileged relationship between the particular physical 
events in a given nervous system and a particular stream of conscious events. 
This state of affairs is mirrored by the fact that, at least in my own case, my 
conscious experiences are only of a small set of physical events rather than 
every single physical event. The physical events that constitute the vivid centre 
and near fringe of my experience might be most heavily conditioned by my 
conscious experiences. Likewise, the physical events that constitute the vivid 
centre and near fringe of another’s experience might be the most heavily 
conditioned by their own conscious experiences. But as we move away from 
the centre of conscious experience and into the deep fringe we might find that 
the conditioning relationship between physical events and a particular stream 
of conscious events becomes less privileged. Where physical events do not 
constitute or condition any vivid, central experiences, these events might be 
conditioned by and responsive to all conscious events more or less equally. 
This idea of a particular conscious subject being privileged with regard to 
certain events goes back at least as far as Descartes and has been recently 
defended by Richard Swinburne.28 But I wish to additionally suggest that the 
privileged access that a conscious subject has to certain events is mirrored by 
a privileged influence that the conscious subject’s experiences have on those 
events. Furthermore, following something of William James’ logic, I wish to 
suggest that both forms of privilege, access and influence, are a matter of 
degree. One conscious subject’s privileged access and influence ‘shades’ into 
                                                 
 
 
 
28 See Richard Swinburne, Mind, Brain, and Free Will, Oxford University Press, 2013. And, of 
course, see René Descartes, Meditations, trans. Desmond M. Clarke, London, 
Penguin Books, 2000. 
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a non-privileged background, which ‘shades’ into another subject’s privileged 
access and influence.29 
That said, if we were to try and detect these varying degrees of privileged 
relationship we might have to take into account the likelihood that, as physical 
processes become increasingly complex, they become increasingly constitutive 
of vivid experience. We presumably find vivid, complex conscious experiences 
in complex organisms rather than in rocks or particles. This is why we cannot 
simply compare two similar physical systems and hope to find evidence of 
consciousness via differences in the type of behaviour that these systems 
exhibit. If both systems consist of the basic physical processes that we find in 
particles or molecules, both would behave in similar ways insofar as neither 
would respond to or be conditioned by a specific stream of conscious 
experience.  
On the other hand, if both systems involved complex neurological processes, it 
would be the case that both would be responding to a different stream of 
conscious experience. In order to tell the difference between the general 
responsiveness to conscious events and the specific responsiveness to a single 
stream, every feature of the neurological processes would have to be 
accounted for in terms of the homogenous behaviour of more basic physical 
processes. In this case, any additional behaviours that result from a particular 
stream of consciousness, rather than from the general behaviour of all physical 
events, could be noticed. This is why a fully reductive physical account of living 
organisms is required in order to rule out the possibility that we live in Reality 
B. Until such an account is provided, the evidence from our own conscious 
experiences and the responsiveness of our bodies suggests that physical 
reality is engaged in an ongoing mutually conditioning relationship with our 
particular stream of conscious events. 
                                                 
 
 
 
29 James, A Pluralistic Universe, p.103. 
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Furthermore, insofar as we accept that death does not bring an end to a stream 
of conscious experience, we can also surmise that death does not bring an end 
to the mutually conditioning relationship between events in a conscious stream 
and physical events in the body and world. The dysfunction and decay of the 
physical body would be mirrored by the collapse of certain conscious capacities 
but this would not amount to an annihilation of the stream of conscious 
experience. If the process of illuminating and retaining events in the world 
cannot decompose into further factors, this process will continue to operate in 
the absence of certain physiological processes. Nor would the dysfunction, 
decay, and death of the body lead to the processes of consciousness 
transcending any relationship with the physical world. If the relationship 
between physical and conscious processes is part of their mutually conditioning 
nature, this nature will not radically change simply because certain complex 
synergetic processes have collapsed into more basic ones. 
 
8.7 Conclusion: And In That Sleep of Death What Desires May Come 
Without certain body and brain functions, the complex variety of capacities 
made possible by the mutual conditioning of conscious events and neuro-
physical events would be lost. But the process of illuminating, retaining, and 
temporally structuring events would not cease. Conscious experiences would 
continue to arise albeit with a severely attenuated capacity to recollect past 
experiences in a co-ordinated manner. Without the predictability provided by an 
organised nervous system, sedimented impressions would trigger purely in 
dependence upon the whims of conscious attention. And the objects of 
conscious attention will no longer be provided by organised sensory input. The 
precise scope for possible conscious experiences after death is vast once we 
accept that a given stream of conscious events must continue even without a 
functioning nervous system. 
However, this scope is not so vast that we could expect the complete 
annihilation of all of our psychological features. Given that the temporal 
structure, in which past experiences are embedded, is an inseparable feature 
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of consciousness, death would not bring about the automatic cessation of all 
desires, impulses, urges, and so forth. While easy access to the objects of our 
desires might be lost when the body dies, every instance of the desiring will 
have involved impressions becoming sedimented within the structure of 
conscious experience. Like Clive Wearing and his feelings for his wife, our 
strongest feelings will be embedded within the ongoing stream of conscious 
experience, where they will influence and shape any reactions to what appears. 
In this respect, although all sensory and many intellectual objects would no 
longer arise within consciousness, the desire for such objects to arise might still 
occur. 
Furthermore, the majority of desires are intimately tied to an embodied 
experience of the world. Most of the time, if not all of the time, to desire involves 
a bodily urge for something that is not the case to be the case. And the 
satisfaction of these urges is as closely tied to the felt body as the urges 
themselves. The urge to bite into a bar of chocolate is satisfied by the biting. 
Without a bar of chocolate, the urge is frustrating and demands satisfaction. 
This urge can recur again and again, pushing us to find a bar of chocolate and 
take that satisfying bite. 
But let us imagine if we no longer even experienced a body capable of finding 
and biting into a bar of chocolate. If we accept that past experiences have 
become embedded impressions within the structure of conscious experience 
itself, it follows that the full range of past urges will have become embedded in 
the same way. Even as the body becomes incapable of moving, biting, seeing, 
hearing, even thinking coherently, the capacities associated with conscious 
experience will become severely attenuated. But the urges and desires 
embedded within the stream of conscious experience itself will remain. The 
desire to take a bite of a chocolate bar will remain even if neither biting nor 
tasting is possible. As mentioned already, without a bar of chocolate, the urge 
for one is frustrating. But without a body capable of even comprehending what 
this urge is, let alone acting to satisfy it, the frustration involved would be 
intense. Even if it remained only at the fringe of whatever conscious experience 
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arose during or after death, the intensity of such frustration at losing our 
embodied experience must be a powerful influence. 
Moreover, as already suggested, instances of phenomenally conscious 
experiences elicit a response from physical events. Most importantly, those 
physical factors that are inseparable from deep structural features of 
consciousness could quite plausibly be responsive to sedimented desires and 
the intense frustration that they could become within a disembodied stream of 
consciousness. And frustration of this kind would be felt for every bodily urge 
that had not been exhausted or transformed into something else. The sheer 
magnitude of having bodily desires but no body capable of satisfying them 
would produce an anguish akin to that associated with the most profound bodily 
paralysis. 
However, in cases of paralysis, the sensory faculties continue to function and 
so provide a range of sensory objects. Conscious attention, in these cases, is 
continually drawn towards visual, auditory, tactile, gustatory or olfactory 
objects. These objects are presumably constituted in part by the physical 
processes of the body. In contrast, conscious experience after bodily death 
would not have access to these kinds of organised sensory objects. Therefore, 
conscious attention would not be continually drawn to objects constituted by 
physical processes within the body. But consciousness of physical events 
would not simply cease. The processes of consciousness would continue to 
constitute experience out of events in the world such that, in the absence of 
sensory processing, conscious attention would be drawn towards something 
else. And given the powerful anguish at being bereft of embodiment that, in 
most cases, would be conditioning every moment of conscious experience after 
death, we can easily imagine that conscious attention would be drawn towards 
the kind of sensory-motor processes that constitute the sort of embodied 
experiences that most of us so sorely crave. 
Insofar as we accept that, at their deepest level, conscious processes and 
physical processes are inseparable and mutually conditioning, there are a 
variety of ways in which we might imagine the post-mortem state to play out. 
Given the intense desires that are sedimented within the deep structure of 
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phenomenal consciousness, along with the mutually conditioning relationship 
between this deep structure and physical reality, it would follow that the physical 
world would still be an available object of attention as well as influence for a 
post-mortem instance of phenomenal consciousness.  
Traditional Buddhist cosmology has much to say on the subtle operations as 
well as the possible destinations of a post-mortem consciousness and it is 
beyond the scope of this project to investigate them. It is not even considered 
inevitable, within this cosmology, that a consciousness stream will be reborn in 
anything that resembles a physical body as we commonly understand it. For 
this reason it would not help the case for the traditional Buddhist belief in rebirth 
for us to spend much more time exploring precisely what happens to a given 
stream of phenomenal consciousness after bodily death.  
Needless to say, we know that in each of our own cases phenomenal 
consciousness has arisen with a physical body at least once already. If we also 
accept that our stream of phenomenal consciousness is not the sort of thing 
that begins or ceases to exist, the simplest conclusion we could draw would be 
that our embodiment is one instance in a repeating pattern of lives. To assume 
that embodiment is an unrepeatable fluke would be to assume that something 
is going on now that is unprecedented. And, as we have seen in previous 
chapters, appeals to unprecedented factors risk positing instances of brute 
causation or emergence, which present the world as ultimately unintelligible. 
The simple, sober option is actually to assume that the unbroken stream of 
consciousness is reborn. 
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9. Conclusion 
This project began with a recognition that the adoption of mindfulness into 
clinical and secular self-help contexts has been aided by attempts to modernise 
Buddhism, which have marginalised the role of traditional Buddhist cosmology 
in an attempt to align with the attitudes of a modern, broadly secular, audience. 
Implicit within this marginalisation of the traditional cosmology, and especially 
the central role of rebirth, is the assumption that a modern audience has no 
reason to take Buddhist cosmology seriously. In response to this assumption I 
have presented the case for the plausibility of rebirth as an afterlife possibility 
that modern audiences have reasons to take seriously. 
Chapter Two explored the key principles for an argument for rebirth that would 
be recognised and supported by the earliest Buddhist philosophers. It was 
argued that, despite the historical debates that took place between the 
adherents of different early Buddhist philosophical Abhidharma systems, 
common principles can be found. This led to the isolation of three principles 
that were common to many of the Abhidharma systems. These principles are 
the Chariot, Cluster, and Continuity Principles. It was shown that these 
principles were used within the earliest known argument for rebirth made by 
Buddhist philosopher Dharmakīrti. 
Chapter Three provided an overview of the relevant literature within 
contemporary philosophy and Buddhist scholarship that deal with rebirth and 
the potential afterlife of consciousness. We found that an increased interest in 
Buddhist philosophy has not been accompanied by a deeper engagement with 
Buddhist claims about the afterlife. This is despite the fact that, as was 
addressed in the chapter, the question of whether consciousness survives 
death depends upon increasingly contested assumptions about the nature of 
consciousness. 
In Chapter Four we explored how consciousness is understood within 
traditional Buddhist philosophy, with particular regard to Dharmakīrti’s 
argument for rebirth. This argument relies on two key premises: (1) 
315 
 
Consciousness is distinct from other phenomena, particularly physical 
phenomena. (2) An instance of consciousness must be preceded by a cause 
with the same intrinsic nature. During this exploration it became clear that, 
insofar as Dharmakīrti was influenced by early Abhidharma systems such as 
the Sarvāstivāda, his view that consciousness is a fundamentally distinct 
phenomenon would have been complemented by the view that consciousness 
is inseparable from other factors and connected, through them, to the rest of 
reality. By exploring the Chariot and Cluster principles adhered to by 
Abhidharma philosophers, we looked at some of the reasons for considering 
consciousness to be a distinct feature of reality whilst also recognising its 
intrinsic connectedness to other phenomena. 
In this fourth chapter it also became clear that, within Buddhist philosophy, 
consciousness is a fundamental method of acquiring knowledge. In particular, 
direct conscious experience is the only way to come to know the intrinsic nature 
of the fundamental constituents of reality, the dharmas. The limitation here is 
that consciousness may not be able to know the intrinsic nature of objects that 
lie beyond consciousness. This limitation is mirrored by the fact that the 
empirical methods of objective observation used in the sciences cannot gain 
direct access to consciousness. This is because any given consciousness is 
only known reflexively, by its own intrinsic self-awareness. While 
consciousness and the intrinsic natures that appear to it can only be known by 
consciousness, the empirical sciences that provide information about our 
physical world and neurophysiology cannot access consciousness. 
Chapter Five showed how arguments in support of panpsychism, particularly 
those presented by Galen Strawson, can also support the second premise of 
Dharmakīrti’s argument for rebirth. Philosophers such as Russell, Strawson, 
Robinson, and Pereboom have shown how physics offers a purely 
mathematical, causal, and structural vision of reality and so cannot be taken as 
an exhaustive account of the world. In contrast, conscious experience involves 
phenomenal qualities that cannot be defined purely in terms of relationships 
with other phenomena. Strawson goes on to argue that to suggest that the 
defining qualities found in conscious experience emerge from factors devoid of 
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these qualities would be to posit a brute form of emergence. Emergence is brute 
when there is a jump during the emergence process from one set of qualities 
or properties to a completely different set. If we introduce qualitative jumps 
during the emergence process, emergent properties will be completely 
unprecedented and their emergence will be unintelligible. Similar reasons were 
offered for rejecting brute causation. If we reject brute emergence and brute 
causation, the definitive qualities of conscious experience can only have arisen 
from factors that have an intrinsic nature that explains the arising of these 
qualities. 
We also found that the only way that consciousness could arise from factors 
that are intrinsically devoid of consciousness would be if conscious experience 
could be analysed into distinctive characteristics, none of which involves 
consciousness. But conscious experience does not seem to be amenable to 
such an analysis. Each aspect of consciousness seems to involve 
consciousness and, when it comes to phenomenally conscious experience, 
seeming is being. This is why it was concluded that there are good reasons to 
accept the second premise of Dharmakīrti’s argument for rebirth. Among the 
causes of consciousness there must be factors that share in the characteristics 
of consciousness. 
In Chapter Six we challenged Strawson’s constitutive panpsychist claim that 
individual conscious subjects can merge to form a single, more complex 
conscious subject. It was argued that consciousness is the unified phenomenal 
perspective from which certain objects or phenomenal qualities appear. It is a 
single point of view on objects or qualities. To move from there being multiple 
instances of phenomenal consciousness to a single instance is simply to have 
annihilated all but one instance of phenomenal consciousness. To suggest the 
annihilation of instances of phenomenal consciousness would be to appeal to 
brute emergence or causation. Strawson’s claim also entails that a complex 
subject can collapse into many subjects, which would involve the brute creation 
of new conscious subjects. Insofar as it accepts the unintelligible, brute 
appearance and disappearance of phenomena, the constitutive panpsychist 
position is untenable. By ruling out the annihilation and brute creation of 
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conscious subjects we concluded that the subject of each conscious experience 
must arise in dependence upon a single prior conscious subject. With each 
singular conscious subject giving rise to or “becoming” another with each new 
instance of conscious experience, there would be an unbroken continuum of 
individual conscious subjects. Barring brute annihilation, this unbroken 
continuum will persist regardless of bodily death. 
Chapter Seven argued that phenomenal consciousness is inseparable from the 
temporal structure in virtue of which there is awareness of dynamic 
phenomena. This argument was connected to the further argument that the 
fundamental phenomena that constitute reality are best understood as activities 
rather than as inert states. This entails that every instance of conscious 
awareness must be awareness of active, dynamic phenomena. This is why all 
instances in the stream of phenomenal consciousness must arise with 
instances of retaining-recollection in which the immediate past is retained along 
with the present. Each instance of conscious experience is likewise dynamic, 
being part of an unbroken stream of subjective experiences in which the subject 
of one experience becomes the subject of the next without gaps or breaks. This 
further strengthens Dharmakīrti’s overall argument for the unbroken continuity 
of conscious events. 
In the first part of Chapter Eight we explored how the retaining temporal 
structure of phenomenal consciousness must have, embedded within it, 
sedimentations of the past impressions that have arisen within the stream of 
conscious events. These sedimented impressions are not retained as memory 
but rather as embedded features of the ongoing structure of consciousness, 
which influence the precise quality of presently occurring conscious experience. 
It is nevertheless the precise character of the sedimented impressions from 
sense experiences, feelings, thoughts, and volitional impulses that conditions 
the character of any presently occurring psychological factors. 
The second part of Chapter Eight addressed the question of how a conscious 
event, with its embedded sedimentations of retained impressions, interacts with 
physical events. Ways were suggested as to how we might try to understand 
the relationship between the physical processes and the illuminating, retaining, 
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embedding, temporal structuring processes of consciousness. The question of 
how mental causation might work was approached with reference to 
Abhidharma principles and by making use of William James’ distinction 
between the centre and the fringe of conscious experience. It was suggested 
that mental-physical interaction might take place between inseparable and 
mutually conditioning physical and mental factors, where these mental factors 
exist within the deep fringe of conscious experience. Reasons for considering 
this possibility were presented as well as a more general argument for the view 
that physical reality is generally responsive to phenomenally conscious events, 
even after death. 
Overall, each chapter of this project has built towards the following argument: 
Any view that considers a stream of conscious experience to arise from non-
conscious factors is committed to the view that phenomenal consciousness, 
which is the phenomenal qualities and structures that constitute the experience 
of dynamic objects as well as the subject of these experiences, all appear out 
of factors devoid of the phenomenal qualities and structures that make these 
distinctive features what they are. But without these phenomenal qualities and 
the structures in which they are embedded, the factors in question would be 
inadequate to the task of constituting conscious experience. We would need to 
posit brute emergence or brute causation in order for conscious experience to 
arise. This is why any view that considers a stream of conscious experience to 
arise from non-conscious factors is committed to appealing to brute emergence 
or causation. A view that appeals to these brute occurrences renders the world 
unintelligible, which is why a view that seeks the origins of a stream of 
consciousness in non-conscious factors presents the world as an unintelligible 
one in which no view or theory can be relied upon because factors could appear 
from anywhere at any time. 
Therefore, we are much better off taking the view that an instance of conscious 
experience is preceded by a prior instance of conscious experience and that 
this stream of instances is unbroken. This is why physical birth cannot be the 
point at which conscious experience brutally emerges from non-conscious 
factors nor can bodily death be the point at which the stream of phenomenal 
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consciousness brutally transforms into completely different non-conscious 
factors. But this does not mean that phenomenal consciousness is separate 
from the physical factors that constitute the body. The simplest way to account 
for interactions between mental and physical factors is to assume that 
phenomenally conscious events and physical events are mutually conditioning 
and responsive to one another. 
Insofar as we accept that phenomenally conscious processes and physical 
processes are mutually conditioning, there are a variety of ways in which a 
stream of consciousness might operate after bodily death. By considering the 
intense desires that are sedimented within the deep structure of phenomenal 
consciousness, whilst also considering the mutually conditioning relationship 
between this deep structure and physical reality, one can get a sense of how 
our physical world might still be an available object of attention as well as 
influence for a post-mortem instance of phenomenal consciousness. 
With the overall argument concluded, there are a variety of questions that one 
could go on to investigate. For example, we might wonder precisely which 
regions of the physical universe a post-mortem consciousness would illuminate 
as well as if and how it might move through it. Within Buddhist philosophical 
systems it is generally assumed that craving and other mental factors 
embedded within the structure of consciousness will drive an ordinary mind-
stream towards an appropriate newly developing body.  
As to how the mind-stream gets to this new body, there are a range of options 
that can be plotted on a spectrum. At one end of the spectrum we might envision 
what we could call an “analogue” approach to rebirth in which a stream of 
disembodied conscious events arises in different physical locations at different 
times, seeking a suitable embodiment. Within the north Indian schools of 
Buddhism, something like this was taken to occur. However, in the “between 
state” a being was considered to have a “subtle” body, which enabled it to travel 
through physical space and even experience the world in a somewhat sensory 
manner. I describe this approach to rebirth as analogue insofar as there is a 
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steady progression from the place of death to the place of conception or birth.1 
This contrasts with the “digital” approach to rebirth in which there is no between 
state and the stream of conscious events ceases to arise in the physical 
location of the dead body and immediately arises in the location of the newly 
developing body. This is how rebirth operates according to the Theravāda 
Buddhist tradition.2 Needless to say, more could be said on this topic. 
Another possible avenue of investigation is the question of whether there are 
ways in which traditional Buddhist cosmology and the belief in rebirth might 
influence or augment the practice of mindfulness. It is certainly interesting to 
consider whether one’s metaphysical and cosmological perspective has a 
serious impact when practising something as simple as mindfulness of 
breathing. This thesis has argued that mindfulness can be understood as the 
intrinsic capacity for consciousness to retain and embed past impressions, 
thoughts and attitudes. Given this, we might wonder whether an individual’s 
practice of mindfulness might be shaped by their background assumptions and 
attitudes in ways that are not obvious to them.  
We can follow this thought a little way by considering an example. When 
practising mindfulness of the breath our attention is placed on the sensations 
of the breath. Every time we recognise that our attention has wavered and we 
have become distracted we recall that we are practising mindfulness of the 
breath. Embedded within our recollection of the practice are deeper, implicit 
understandings. This is well illustrated in a passage from Rupert Gethin’s essay 
‘On some definitions of mindfulness’:  
[I]n the specific context in which the practice of mindfulness is 
envisaged by ancient Buddhist texts, in remembering that one 
should remember the breath, one is remembering that one should 
be doing a meditation practice; in remembering that one should be 
doing a meditation practice, one is remembering that one is a 
Buddhist monk; in remembering that one is a Buddhist monk, one is 
                                                 
 
 
 
1 See Robert Kritzer, ‘Rūpa and Antarābhava’, in Journal of Indian Philosophy, pp.235-272, 
Vol. 28, 2000. 
2 Ibid. 
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remembering that one should be trying to root out greed, hatred and 
delusion. Conversely, in forgetting the breath, one is forgetting that 
one is doing a meditation practice; in forgetting that one is doing a 
meditation practice, one is forgetting that one is a Buddhist monk; in 
forgetting that one is a Buddhist monk one is forgetting that one is 
trying to root out greed, hatred and delusion. This seems to me to 
make sense of such traditional Buddhist meditations as recollection 
(anussati) of the qualities of the Buddha, the Dhamma and the 
Sangha, which the texts themselves seem keen to include within the 
broad framework of mindfulness practice.3 
 
This passage highlights the implicit understandings that are embedded within 
any explicit practice. It illustrates how an apparently simple practice such as 
mindfulness of the breath may in fact be a complex process involving layers of 
embedded thoughts, experiences, and intentions. Given the backward 
dependence of present impressions on those past impressions embedded 
within them, it follows that any conscious experience has a host of deeper 
features embedded within it. The depth and complexity of embedded 
impressions is such that each feature of conscious experience is inextricably 
linked with the others. 
It is illuminating to consider this idea when we approach attempts to separate 
Buddhist practices such as mindfulness from Buddhist philosophy and 
cosmology. There may be an assumption here that the practice has been made 
simpler by being secularised. But mindfulness practice is nothing if not a serious 
engagement with consciousness. And if this project has done anything, it has 
hopefully made clear that consciousness is anything but simple. In trying to 
simplify the framework in which mindfulness is practised, secular approaches 
might in fact be replacing a Buddhist framework with one that is inadequate to 
the task of taking the depth and history of the practitioner’s potentially 
beginningless mind-stream seriously.  
When engaging in mindfulness within a secular context, a practitioner would do 
well to question whether the traditional Buddhist framework has been replaced 
                                                 
 
 
 
3 Rupert Gethin, 'On some definitions of mindfulness', Contemporary Buddhism: An 
Interdisciplinary Journal, Vol. 12, No. 1, May 2011, p.270. 
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with something that has the depth, richness, and sophistication required to deal 
appropriately with the sheer depth and complexity of their consciousness. This 
consciousness may well have a beginningless history and an inconceivably 
long future. My hope is that this line of questioning is taken that much more 
seriously in the light of the arguments that have been presented. 
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